PAUL AND ALLEGORY: GALATIANS 4:21–31 REVISITED

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John Jarrett Ford

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APPROVAL SHEET

PAUL AND ALLEGORY: GALATIANS 4:21–31 REVISITED

John Jarrett Ford

Read and Approved by:

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Thomas R. Schreiner (Chair)

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Robert L. Plummer

_____
Brian J. Vickers

Date_____

To Julia, my beloved wife and best friend.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AB	Anchor Bible
Abr.	*De Abrahamo*
Adol. poet. aud.	*Quomodo adolescens poetas audire debeat*
Agr.	*De agricultura*
All.	*Allegoriae Homericae*
Ant.	*Antiquitates judaicae*
BDAG	Danker, Frederick W., Walter Bauer, and William F. Arndt, and F. Wilbur Gingrich. *Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament and Other Early Christian Literature*. 3rd ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000
BECNT	Baker Exegetical Commentary on the New Testament
BBR	*Bulletin for Biblical Research*
BNTC	Black's New Testament Commentary
Cher.	*De cherubim*
Conf.	*De confusion linguarum*
Congr.	*De congressu eruditionis gratia*
Contempl.	*De vita contemplative*
Cels.	*Contra Celsum*
Det.	*Quod deterius potiori insidari soleat*
Deus	*Quod Deus sit immutabilis*
Ebr.	*De ebrietate*
Eloc.	*De elocutione*
Fug.	*De fuga et inventione*
Geogr.	*Geographica*

Gig.	*De gigantibus*
Her.	*Quis rerum divinarum heres sit*
ICC	International Critical Commentary
Il.	*Iliad*
Inst.	*Institutio Oratoria*
Ios.	*De Iosepho*
Is. Os.	*De Iside et Osiride*
JSNT	*Journal for the Study of the New Testament*
JSOT	*Journal for the Study of the Old Testament*
Jub.	*Jubilees*
LCL	Loeb Classical Library
Leg.	*Legum allegoriae*
LSJ	Liddell, Henry G., Robert Scott, and Henry S. Jones. *A Greek-English Lexicon*. 9th ed. with revised supplement. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996
LXX	Septuagint
Migr.	*De migratione Abrahami*
Mut.	*De mutatione nominum*
MT	Masoretic Text
NAC	New American Commentary
NICNT	New International Commentary on the New Testament
NICOT	New International Commentary on the Old Testament
NIGTC	New International Greek Testament Commentary
NovT	*Novum Testamentum*
NPNF[1]	*Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers*, Series 1. 14 vols. Edited by Philip Schaff. Buffalo, NY: Christian Literature, 1886–1889
NTL	New Testament Library
Opif.	*De opificio mundi*
OTL	Old Testament Library

Plant.	*De plantation*
Post.	*De posteritate caini*
Praem.	*De praemiis et poenis*
Ps. Plutarch	Pseudo Plutarch
QE 1, 2	*Quaestiones et solutiones in Exodum* I, II
QG 1, 2, 3, 4	*Quaestiones et solutiones in Genesin* I, II, III, IV
Quaest. ev.	*Quaestionum evangelicarum libri II*
SBJT	*Southern Baptist Journal of Theology*
SBL	Society of Biblical Literature
Schol. Eur. Phoen.	*Scholion of Euripides's Play Phoenician Women*
SCM	Student Christian Movement
Sobr.	*De sobretate*
Somn.	*De somniis*
SPCK	Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge
Spec. 1, 2, 3, 4	*De specialibus legibus* I, II, III, IV
TDNT	*Theological Dictionary of the New Testament*. Edited by Gerhard Kittel and Gerhard Friedrich. Translated by Geoffrey W. Bromiley. 10 vols. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1964–1976
TLG	Thesaurus Linguae Graecae (http://stephanus.tlg.uci.edu/)
TOTC	Tyndale Old Testament Commentaries
VT	*Vetus Testamentum*
WBC	Word Biblical Commentary
ZECNT	Zondervan Exegetical Commentary on the New Testament

PREFACE

In a very real sense, this dissertation is a confluence of dozens of factors. Cole Feix, my roommate in college and best friend to this day, showed me for the first time that philosophy was simply about thinking carefully. It was he that first gave me a zeal to pursue the life of the mind. Shortly thereafter, my interest narrowed to epistemology. Questions of knowing consumed me throughout the latter half of my time in university.

Around the same time, I also began to learn how to study my Bible. A local parachurch ministry taught me inductive, and for the first time, I began to love my Bible. These two factors—a love of the Bible and a love of epistemology—became the slow growing seeds of this project. Hermeneutics is epistemology for those that work with texts, and this dissertation is my window into the epistemological world.

There are so many people to thank who have helped me along the way. Thank you to my friends and brothers within the PhD program here at Southern—Coye Still, Andrés Vera, Paul Lamicella, Ben Hussung, and many others. Without their encouragement, I probably would not have made it to this point. Special thanks to both Richard Blaylock and Cole Feix. Both of these men read my chapters carefully, and my work is undoubtedly much better because of their input. Thank you to my extended family—my dad Greg Ford, mom Marla Ford, and my brothers Brady and Will Ford. As good family members typically are, they have been my unconditional cheer leaders throughout this process. Thank you to my grandpa and namesake, Jarrett Ford, and my uncle, Gary Ford. Without their love and financial support, especially from my grandpa, circumstances would have forced me to quit long ago.

Thank you to the faculty of the Southern Baptist Theological Seminary. Without their training and help, I would have never been able to write this dissertation.

Thank you to Dr. Rob Plummer. His class on elementary Greek is what gave me the confidence that I could in fact complete a theological education, and of course, it fanned into flame my love of Greek. Thank you to Dr. Jarvis Williams. The difficulty of his classes has become somewhat legendary around Southern, but if he had not pushed me to excel, I would have never stumbled upon the topic of this dissertation that I have now written on for two years. Thank you to Dr. Peter Gentry. If Dr. Plummer started my love of Greek, Dr. Gentry finished it. He helped me to learn about languages more so than I ever thought I would. Many of the tools I used to complete this dissertation were sharpened by him.

Thank you to my advisor, Dr. Tom Schreiner. He was always a loving mentor, but now he has become a dear friend. I have always been what some might call a fiery individual, but I quickly realized that fire burns would be allies and friends. I would like to think my fire has cooled at least to some degree, and to the extent that it has, I cannot help but thank Tom. He is about as cool as they come, and although I will never be as even keel as he is, I am a better scholar and, more importantly, a better man because of my time with him.

Thank you most of all to my wife and family. I had only one child when I came here. Now, I have four. Annabelle, Owen, Charlotte, and James, I love you dearly. You make my life full. Thank you most of all to my wife, Julia. I love you dearly. Thank you for struggling through this journey with me. You have been a sharp editor, a comforting partner, and a faithful friend. I dedicate this dissertation to you.

Jarrett Ford

Louisville, Kentucky

December 2022

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Many Christian scholars, both Catholic and Protestant alike, are finding freedom from their historical-critical shackles in the interpretive methods of their premodern forefathers.[1] Ancient giants like Augustine and Origen are now being held up as exemplars of hermeneutical vitality. To read the Bible rightly, according to these scholars, is to read it as these men once did.[2] There is much to this conversation, involving theories of language, views of meaning, and general questions of epistemology; but at its heart stand the methods of the New Testament authors. How did these inspired men read their Bibles, and can modern authors follow in their footsteps?[3]

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[1] This consistent movement from historical-critical to pre-critical methods can hardly be missed by anyone who surveys the recent mass of material concerning hermeneutics. Even without the explicit appeal to premodern exegesis, Christopher Spink's survey of recent trends opens with a very similar description: "In recent years theological interpretation of Scripture has found new life in the post-Enlightenment freedom from pure objectivity and the reaction to the modernist tendency to segregate the theological disciplines." D. Christopher Spinks, *The Bible and the Crisis of Meaning: Debates on the Theological Interpretation of Scripture* (London: T&T Clark, 2007), 1.

[2] Although each of the following authors provides their own distinct nuance, they all make the same basic appeal. Henri de Lubac, "Spiritual Understanding," in *The Theological Interpretation of Scripture: Classic and Contemporary Readings*, ed. Stephen E. Fowl (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 1997), 3–25; David C. Steinmetz, "The Superiority of Pre-Critical Exegesis," in Fowl, *The Theological Interpretation of Scripture*, 26–38; Frances M. Young, *Biblical Exegesis and the Formation of Christian Culture* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Dale B. Martin, *Pedagogy of the Bible: An Analysis and Proposal* (Louisville: John Knox Press, 2008); Daniel J. Treier, *Introducing Theological Interpretation of Scripture: Recovering a Christian Practice* (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2008); Peter J. Leithart, *Deep Exegesis: The Mystery of Reading Scripture* (Waco, TX: Baylor University Press, 2009); Douglas S. Earl, *The Joshua Delusion? Rethinking Genocide in the Bible* (Cambridge: James Clarke, 2011); Hans Boersma, *Heavenly Participation: The Weaving of a Sacramental Tapestry* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2011); Boersma, *Scripture as Real Presence: Sacramental Exegesis in the Early Church* (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2017); Craig A. Carter, *Interpreting Scripture with the Great Tradition: Recovering the Genius of Premodern Exegesis* (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2018); Keith D. Stanglin, *The Letter and Spirit of Biblical Interpretation: From the Early Church to Modern Practice* (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2018).

[3] Consider Dale Martin's comments on the topic: "The first thing to note about premodern, 'Christian' interpretation of Scripture is that it begins with the authors of the New Testament itself, and even with Jesus." Martin, *Pedagogy of the Bible*, 47. Iain Provan, who stands on the other side of the debate, also bears witness to the importance of this question by devoting nearly seventy pages to an analysis of the NT authors' methods. Iain W. Provan, *The Reformation and the Right Reading of Scripture* (Waco, TX: Baylor University Press, 2017), 107–71. Cf. Stephen E. Fowl, *Engaging Scripture: A Model*

Obviously, the second question presupposes the first. Modern Christian readers cannot follow the apostles' footsteps if they do not even know *what* these apostles were doing. The problem is that it is not always clear what, in fact, they were doing. Sometimes, their exegesis seems fairly plain.[4] Other times, they present their readers with a seemingly unsolvable puzzle.[5] In this dissertation, therefore, I will attempt to answer this "what" question with respect to one of these puzzles—Paul's allegory in Galatians 4:21–31.[6] With its enigmatic take on the Sarah and Hagar narratives, this pericope has become a focal point of the modern hermeneutical conversation and perhaps rightly so.[7] One cannot deny that Paul's use of ἀλληγορέω and his connection between Sarah, Hagar, and their respective Jerusalems bear a certain resemblance to the church's allegorical technique that would develop soon after him.[8] If scholars are looking for biblical warrant

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for Theological Interpretation (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 1998), 150–54; Richard N. Longenecker, *Biblical Exegesis in the Apostolic Period*, 2nd ed. (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1999), xxxv–xxxviii. De Lubac is describing Origen's rationalization, but he seems to do so affirmingly. Henri de Lubac, *History and Spirit: The Understanding of Scripture According to Origen* (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2007), 79–82. See also Leithart, *Deep Exegesis*, vii–viii; Leonhard Goppelt, *Typos: The Typological Interpretation of the Old Testament in the New*, trans. Donald H. Madvig (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1982), 4.

[4] Take Paul's handling of Gen 15:6 in Rom 4, for example. Although one might take issue with the theological significance he attributes to this text, it is hard to see how his reading does not deserve the label "literal" even when understood in a narrow sense. Paul simply points out that verse 6 describes God as counting Abraham as righteous because of his belief. Circumcision, in Paul's view, merely served as a sign of this "counting" because Abraham was circumcised *after* he believed (see Rom 4:10). So, in Paul's reading, Abraham remains Abraham, as does circumcision, and Paul appeals to the sequence of events within the narrative, a perfectly "plain" thing to do.

[5] Other oft-cited enigmatic texts include Acts 2:25–31, 4:25–28, Matt 2:13–15, Rom 10:6–9, 1 Cor 9:9–10, 10:1–4, Gal 3:16, and Eph 4:7–10.

[6] As my thesis make clear, I do not think Paul's exegesis was in fact allegorical. However, for better or worse "Paul's allegory" has become the standard moniker for Gal 4:21–31. My use of this moniker reflects this custom, not my opinion of Paul's exegesis.

[7] Showing that Paul's allegory in Gal 4 has become a focal point of the modern hermeneutical debate will be the subject of the next chapter.

[8] Augustine's famous allegory of the parable of the good Samaritan helps to illustrate these surface similarities. Commenting on the famous passage, the doctor of grace connects nearly every detail within the parable to something else. The man traveling to Jericho is Adam. The thieves are the devil and his angels. The passing of the priest and the Levite stand for the passing of the ministry of the Old Testament, and so on. Augustine provides little argument for these connections, and when he does, his reasons seem to be extra-textual. For example, Jericho signifies the moon, and the moon signifies our mortality. Why? Because the moon waxes, wanes, and then dies. It is not clear why Jericho means the moon, and the reasons for the moon signifying mortality are seemingly shallow. On the surface, Paul's exegesis in Gal 4:21–31 might seem to be just as arbitrary, but as I hope to show, Paul reads Gen 16 and Isa

for premodern allegorical hermeneutics, Paul's allegory is the sensible place to go. Nevertheless, in this dissertation, I want to probe this issue by revisiting the question, "was Paul allegorizing the Sarah and Hagar narratives?"

Aims and Thesis

In this dissertation, I will argue that Paul was not in fact allegorizing the Sarah and Hagar narratives, and I will attempt ground this claim in the following reasons: First, although etymologically related to the English word allegory, Paul does not use ἀλληγορέω in the technical sense it later took on and now currently maintains.[9] Instead, it meant something like the English word "metaphor," and thus, Paul merely meant to communicate that the story of Sarah and Hagar pointed beyond itself; nothing more, nothing less.[10] He did not intend to associate his reading with the ancient practice of allegorical hermeneutics originally developed by the Greeks and later practiced by the Alexandrians.[11] Second, Paul provides a warranted reading built on certain details within

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54 in a much less arbitrary way than Augustine does the good Samaritan. For Augustine's allegory, see *Quaest. ev.* II.19 in C. H. Dodd, *Parables of the Kingdom*, rev. ed. (New York: Scribner, 1961), 13–14.

[9] Writing in the second half of the first century, Plutarch observes that his contemporaries make use of Homer's epics by employing an allegorical method of reading. He claims that the old word for this method of reading was ὑπόνοια but that it is now called ἀλληγορία, the cognate noun of ἀλληγορέω (*Adol. poet. aud.* 19f). The burden of this piece of the argument would be to ask when this change took place. In my view, "allegory" has now become a hermeneutically loaded term that is used to refer to a specific type of reading exemplified by Philo and those that resemble him.

[10] Frances Young makes a similar point: "Allegory in its rhetorical usage was a figure of speech among other figures of speech: it was to speak so as to imply something other than what is said and included irony. Often to interpret something allegorically was simply to recognize metaphor rather than taking something very woodenly according to the letter." Young, *Biblical Exegesis and the Formation of Christian Culture*, 120. Cf. Richard B. Hays, *Echoes of Scripture in the Letters of Paul* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1989).

[11] Many scholars have thought that the allegorical method passed from the Greeks through Philo to the Alexandrians. Henri de Lubac, however, has very famously criticized the connection drawn between Origen and his fellow Alexandrians and the Greeks, claiming that the supposed connection comprises meaningless generalities that are ultimately undermined by the following observations: First, Origen conceived of meaning as threefold, but Philo only two. Second, Origen binds his exegesis with Christ and the whole Christian mystery, whereas Philo does so primarily with Greek metaphysics. De Lubac, *History and Spirit*, 173–87. De Lubac's claim is certainly possible, but the distinction ultimately seems forced. Origen still clearly conceived of a sharp divide between the literal and spiritual even if the latter might be chopped up into smaller pieces, and the fact that he attempted to show Christ not Plato from every word does not exclude the possibility that he used the same procedure as Philo to get there. Furthermore, both interpreters share the same basic problem/solution method and enigmatic view of the inspired text—points de Lubac readily admits. Thus, although it is certainly true that Philo and Origen

the narratives of Genesis 16–21 (e.g., Hagar's slavery, the promises made to Abraham and Sarah, the juxtaposition between Ishmael and Isaac, etc.) and on Isaiah's vision of a Jew-Gentile eschatological Israel in Isaiah 54:1. Third, understood in this way, Paul's procedure differs significantly from interpreters that have become exemplars of the allegorical method, Philo in particular. Contrary to Paul, Philo's exegesis is marked by problem solving, etymologies, numerology, and arbitrariness.[12] Paul's is not. Instead, he begins with the details of the narrative, applying the significance of its plot to the issue of circumcision.[13] In short, Paul was not doing what Philo did. Therefore, Paul was not allegorizing.[14]

This thesis is meant to address part of a particular argument that runs as follows: (1) If the apostles allegorized, then the church should follow in their footsteps. (2) The apostles did allegorize as exemplified by Paul's allegory in Galatians 4:21–31. (3) Therefore, the church should follow in their footsteps and pursue the allegorical method as a legitimate means of reading.[15] Barring whether I agree with premise (1), my

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differ on these issues, these differences do not sufficiently overturn the connection between the two ancient exegetes pointed out by many.

[12] Cf. J. Pépin, "Remarques sur la théorie de l'exégèse allégorique chez Philon," *Colloques Nationaux Du Centre National de La Recherche Scientifique* (1966): 131–68; John M. Dillon, "The Formal Structure of Philo's Allegorical Exegesis," in *Two Treatises of Philo of Alexandria: A Commentary on De Gigantibus and Quod Deus Sit Immutabilis* (Chico, CA: Scholars Press, 1983), 77–87; John M. Dillon, "Philo and the Greek Tradition of Allegorical Exegesis," in *SBL 1994 Seminar Papers* (Evanston, IL: American Theological Library Association, 1994), 69; David Brewer, *Techniques and Assumptions in Jewish Exegesis before 70 CE* (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1992), 200; Adam Kamesar, "Biblical Interpretation in Philo," in *The Cambridge Companion to Philo*, ed. Adam Kamesar (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 78.

[13] As I will explain later in this dissertation, all I mean by veracity is that Paul's reading allows Sarah and Hagar to both remain who they are, whereas at times, Philo's reading denies that Sarah is Sarah at all. Where Philo's exegetical movement takes the form of "not this, but that," Paul's takes the form of "this; therefore, that."

[14] This thesis is indebted to Provan's chapter on the topic; see Provan, *The Reformation and the Right Reading of Scripture*, 137–50. I aim to both build and expand what he claims there.

[15] Origen makes this exact claim in *De principiis* 4.2.6, as does Gregory of Nyssa in the prologue to his *Commentary on the Song of Songs*. For a full explanation of the arguments from these two premodern interpreters, see Ronald E. Heine, "Gregory of Nyssa's Apology for Allegory," *Vigiliae Christianae* 38, no. 4 (1984): 360–70. David Starling's argument follows a similar form, but he is very careful to deny that Paul's allegory allows for "speculative" allegorization. Rather, he thinks it provides precedent for a certain type of figural reading that coheres with the biblical narrative. David Starling, "Justifying Allegory: Scripture, Rhetoric, and Reason in Galatians 4:21–5:1," *Journal of Theological*

thesis questions some of the evidence for premise (2) with an eye toward conclusion (3).[16] Galatians 4:21–31 does not provide precedent for allegorical reading because that is not what it is. Paul was doing something else. What this else is I will attempt to explain later. Clearly, my thesis does not answer the whole debate or even most of it. The other texts that might be labeled "allegorical" must be handled, and one must decide whether the church can apply the apostles' methods, a point some have denied.[17] It does, however, deal with a piece of the argument by answering this question—"did Paul allegorize the story of Sarah and Hagar?"

To that end, the following chapter attempts to do three things: First, it describes the need for the study. Second, it explains various methodological issues needed to defend my thesis. Third and finally, it provides a preview of the argument by explaining the contents of each individual chapter and how they advance the overarching claim.

Interpretation 9, no. 2 (2015): 227–45. When not included in the footnotes, editions of the primary sources used throughout this dissertation can be found in the bibliography.

[16] Recognizing the aim of this study is intended to acknowledge Jonathan Z. Smith's classic point: "Comparison requires . . . some stated cognitive end." Jonathan Z. Smith, *Drudgery Divine: On the Comparison of Early Christianities and the Religions of Late Antiquity* (London: University of London, 1990), 47. In other words, Smith thinks that all historical comparison serves a purpose, a "cognitive end" to use his words. Failure to recognize this purpose often results in a skewing of the evidence. Hence, I state my own purpose here so that I might resist the temptation to skew the evidence and allow it, as much as it is able, to move toward this cognitive end on its own.

[17] E.g., Longenecker, *Biblical Exegesis in the Apostolic Period*, xxxviii; Robert L. Thomas, "The New Testament Use of the Old Testament," *The Master's Seminary Journal* 13, no. 1 (2002): 79–98. Longenecker argues that the hermeneutics of the New Testament authors were culturally conditioned much like some of their ethical exhortations. For example, in 1 Cor 8, Paul addresses the issue of food offered to idols. Although still applicable it certain parts of the world, Paul's instruction here often has little direct bearing on the modern Western world. That is not to say that Paul's instruction was incorrect. It is simply to say that it had a specific time and place that it no longer has. Paul's hermeneutic, claims Longenecker, occupies a similar cultural place. Thomas's argument is slightly different. In an attempt to protect grammatical-historical hermeneutic, Thomas claims that Paul and the rest of the apostles had the right to fill out the meaning of the Old Testament texts to which they appeal because God so qualified them. They practiced a sort of "charismatic exegesis" whereby God provided them directly with inspired interpretations of the text, to which modern readers no longer have access. Again, since the point of my argument is not to ask whether the apostles should be followed, both of these claims bear weight on mine only insofar as they provide an accurate description of Paul's procedure in Gal 4. For a response to this sort of reading, see Andrew David Naselli and Douglas J. Moo, "The Problem of the New Testament's Use of the Old Testament," in *The Enduring Authority of the Christian Scriptures*, ed. D. A. Carson (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2016), 711–13.

Need for the Study

Thoughtful Christians have been pondering Paul's procedure in Galatians 4:21–31 for a long time. Origen, for example, briefly appeals to the pericope in his treatise *De principiis* to buttress his own hermeneutic, and John Chrysostom attempts to reign in the excesses of Alexandrian exegesis by describing Paul's methods in typological terms.[18] Christians of the past thought carefully about Paul's methods, and today, they are doing so again.[19] It might be rightly wondered, therefore, how one might make a contribution in this sea of black.

In my view, there are three primary ways: First, it seems as if an overcorrection against some of the excesses of historical-critical hermeneutics has shifted the conversation concerning how Christians should read their Bible slightly off-center. Although old, this thesis helps to nuance this overcorrection by bringing it back into balance with respect to Galatians 4:21–31. Paul may not have been reading in an historical-critical way in that text, but neither was he reading in an allegorical way. Second, repeated debates often change the rules of engagement each time they are

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[18] As noted above, for Origen's comments, see *Princ.* 4.2.6, and for Chrysostom's, see his comments on Gal 4:24 in his *Commentary on the Epistle to the Galatians*.

[19] The following are a sampling of the recent pieces of scholarship written about Paul's methods in Galatians 4: R. P. C. Hanson, *Allegory and Event: A Study of the Sources and Significance of Origen's Interpretation of Scripture* (London: SCM Press, 1959); Karen H. Jobes, "Jerusalem, Our Mother: Metalepsis and Intertextuality in Galatians 4:21–31," *Westminster Theological Journal* 55, no. 2 (1993): 299–320; P. G. Barker, "Allegory and Typology in Galatians 4:21–31," *St. Vladimir's Theological Quarterly* 38, no. 2 (1994): 193–209; Fowl, *Engaging Scripture*; Longenecker, *Biblical Exegesis in the Apostolic Period*; Torsten Löfstedt, "The Allegory of Hagar and Sarah: Gál 4.21-31," *Estudios Bíblicos* 58, no. 4 (2000): 475–94; Anne Davis, "Allegorically Speaking in Galatians 4:21–5:1," *BBR* 14, no. 2 (2004): 161–74; Joel Willitts, "Isa 54:1 in Gal 4:24b: reading Genesis in Light of Isaiah," *Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft* 96, nos. 3–4 (2005): 188–210; Steven Di Mattei, "Paul's Allegory of the Two Covenants (Gal 4:21–31) in Light of First-Century Hellenistic Rhetoric and Jewish Hermeneutics," *New Testament Studies* 52, no. 1 (2006): 102–22; Jeremy Punt, "Revealing Rereading Part 1: Pauline Allegory in Galatians 4:21–5:1," *Neotestamentica* 40, no. 1 (2006): 87–100; Punt, "Revealing Rereading Part 2: Paul and the Wives of the Father of Faith in Galatians 4:21–5:1," *Neotestamentica* 40, no. 1 (2006): 101–18; Martinus C. de Boer, "Paul's Quotation of Isaiah 54:1 in Galatians 4:27," *New Testament Studies* 50, no. 3 (2007): 370–89; Mark Gignilliat, "Paul, Allegory, and the Plain Sense of Scripture: Galatians 4:21–31," *Journal of Theological Interpretation* 2, no. 1 (2008): 135–46; A. B. Caneday, "Covenant Lineage Allegorically Prefigured: 'Which Things Are Written Allegorically' (Galatians 4:21–31)," *SBJT* 14, no. 3 (2010): 50–77; Matthew Y. Emerson, "Arbitrary Allegory, Typical Typology, or Intertextual Interpretation? Paul's Use of the Pentateuch in Galatians 4:21–31," *Biblical Theology Bulletin* 43, no. 1 (2013): 14–22; Starling, "Justifying Allegory," 227–45; Provan, *The Reformation and the Right Reading of Scripture*, 137–50.

recycled. Galatians 4 is no different. Therefore, although I will defend many of the same old conclusions, I will have to do so in a way that brings the supporting evidence of those conclusions up to date.[20] Third and finally, when something has been discussed as long as Galatians 4, conversation partners often talk past one another due to the sheer mass of data and argument they must process. The length of the following dissertation provides an opportunity to help bring clarity to this mass.

Method

Most of my case will be made by careful exegesis of the primary sources. To understand Philo, I intend not only to read his treatise *De congressu eruditionis gratia*, but also to read widely in his corpus so that I might obtain what Alasdair MacIntyre has dubbed a "second first language."[21] In other words, I want to learn Philo so well that I could read and reason as he did if I so chose.[22] Doing so recognizes that small details

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[20] There are at least four ways I think my dissertation will help update this thesis: (1) making a precise argument as to what constitutes allegory via Philo and what of his hermeneutical moves compose the heart of his hermeneutic; (2) providing an exhaustive study of the word ἀλληγορέω and its related hermeneutical words to show that Paul did not misuse the term but was using it in accordance with one of its senses; (3) not presenting the choice as allegory versus typology; and (4) conversing with the postmodern concepts of intertextuality and figural reading which were wholly absent in past versions on the conversation.

[21] Alasdair C. MacIntyre, *Whose Justice? Which Rationality?*, 3rd ed. (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988), 374. Although I do not share MacIntyre's wholesale rejection of an encyclopedic categorization of ancient thought, his advice on this point just seems prudent. Reading widely within the corpus of one's subject helps to mitigate against misreading him because wide reading develops an intuition that aids in observing the nuanced differences between the subject's and the scholar's respective thought worlds.

[22] Kavin Rowe takes MacIntyre's observations to what he sees as their logical end: "If reason is given its particular shape by the language that is concomitant with a tradition's life pattern, no amount of imaginative ingenuity could take the place of needing actually to live the tradition's pattern in order to learn how to reason the way the tradition reasons." C. Kavin Rowe, *One True Life: The Stoics and Early Christians as Rival Traditions* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2016), 204. In other words, one must actually become a first-century Alexandrian Jew to understand Philo, according to Rowe. Rowe buttresses this point by showing case after case how words are heavily dependent on the narratives in which they are embedded. "God," for example, means something entirely different for the Stoics and the Christians (p. 227). Oddly, Rowe presses on to seek a second first language from Stoics despite some rather perplexing language that would seem to render such a task futile. If Rowe is correct, then my project (and his for that matter) would be useless because I would be unwittingly misunderstanding Philo at every turn. There are, however, good reasons to think he oversteps. First, the claim that Rowe takes from MacIntyre—that words receive meaning from their respective narratives—is grounded in observations that can be countered by observations of similar strength. The reason Rowe's assertation concerning the meaning of words is compelling is because it simply *seems* true. It also seems true, however, that one can acquire MacIntyre's "second first language." Since both observations are built on intuitive judgments, one need not

within a text often depend on the author's larger worldview commitments. Thus, to understand these smaller details, one must understand the larger story in which they are embedded.[23] The findings from these wider readings will be brought in as background and as they illuminate Philo's work in *De congressu eruditionis gratia*. Unfortunately, wider reading in Paul does not prove as useful. To be sure, there are other enigmatic readings in Paul's corpus as I mentioned above, but none of them are quite like Galatians 4:21–31. Therefore, I will devote much more attention to how the pericope functions in the overarching argument of Galatians and to how Paul uses the Old Testament texts he references. On top of this exegesis, there are two other subfields that will operate in the background of my argument—modern linguistics and the comparative method. The following subsections will detail the ways in which I plan to use each.

Modern Linguistics

To provide a fresh study of the word ἀλληγορέω, I will use the tools of modern linguistics, specifically lexical semantics and lexicography.[24] Although much can be said

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reject the one for the other. It is one phenomenon against another. Second, Rowe cannot avoid the encyclopedic view he wishes to deny. His claim that the meaning of all words depends upon their narratives is itself an encyclopedic claim. It is as true for the Stoics as it is the Christians he surveys. Therefore, at least at this point, worldviews are not incommensurable as Rowe thinks, and if not at this point, then presumably at others as well. Third, it just does not seem right to say that all words depend on their narrative wholes. Rowe chooses certain words that do, such as "God" and "beginnings," but most words tend to be a part of bounded sets that are shared between various worldviews. Their connections to other words are not limitless; they are merely connected to the other words within a set. The meaning of "addition," for example, does not require one to know that God created the world *ex nihilo*. Rather, it merely requires one to be familiar with the concepts within the bounded set of mathematics. Therefore, in the end, I think Rowe's skepticism is unwarranted even if one grants that words largely depend on their narrative contexts. See Rowe, *One True Life*, 175ff.; cf. Rowe, "A Response to Friend-Critics," in *The New Testament in Comparison: Validity, Method, and Purpose in Comparing Traditions*, ed. John M. G. Barclay and Benjamin G. White (New York: T&T Clark, 2020), 132. For MacIntyre's own argument, see MacIntyre, *Whose Justice*, 374–75.

[23] In the New Testament world, N. T. Wright has probably done as much as anyone to develop this claim. For a fuller explanation and defense of the use of stories and how they relate to reading texts, see N. T. Wright, *The New Testament and the People God*, vol. 1 of *Christian Origins and the Question of God* (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1992), 32ff. Cf. Rowe, *One True Life*, 201.

[24] As Campbell points out, the difference between lexical semantics and lexicography is one of theory and practice. Lexical semantics attempts to understand what it is for a word to mean, whereas lexicography attempts to apply this understanding to specific languages at specific times in order to produce a lexicon. Constantine R. Campbell, *Advances in the Study of Greek: New Insights for Reading the New Testament* (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2015), 72.

about these fields, there are a few key findings within them that prove pertinent to the case I am trying to make. First, it has become common to think of words as comprising three components—sign, sense, and referent.[25] The first component (the sign) consists of the actual letters on the page, the word ἀλληγορέω in my case. The referent is the thing the word denotes, the actual object to which it refers. The sense is generally thought to be the cognitive concept brought about by the sign. All three combine to form the basic lexical content of the word, and therefore, all three must be understood to comprehend the lexical freight the word carries.

Consider the words "kid," "child," and "Johnny" in the following scenario. Johnny is a little boy who has just thrown a tantrum because his mom, Sue, would not give him doughnuts for breakfast. In response, Sue tells Johnny, "Johnny, you are being a child." In Sue's statement, the signs "Johnny" and "child" have the same referent (Sue's son), but they have drastically different senses. "Johnny" is simply a name used to refer to the little boy and, as such, contains almost no discernable sense. "Child" like "Johnny" refers to Sue's son, but it connotes a prepubescent human who is acting more immature than what is expected of his or her age.

Now, consider the word "kid." Without being placed in a sentence, one would rightly intuit that it basically maintains the same sense as "child." Both "kid" and "child" generally refer to prepubescent humans. If "kid" is placed in the sentence above, however, one can see the sense of "kid" is slightly different than "child." Instead of using the word "child" in her rebuke of her son, what if Sue were to say, "Johnny, you are being a *kid*." A bystander might be able to grasp her meaning from context but not without difficulty. The word "kid" sits uncomfortably where the word "child" once stood,

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[25] This now well-entrenched triangle of meaning dates back to Ogden and Richard's famous book on the topic; see C. K. Ogden and I. A. Richards, *The Meaning of Meaning: A Study of the Influence of Language upon Thought and of the Science of Symbolism*, 8th ed. (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1956), 9–12. For a fuller explanation of this linguistic triangle, see Moisés Silva, *Biblical Words and Their Meaning: An Introduction to Lexical Semantics* (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1983), 102–3; Campbell, *Advances in the Study of Greek*, 73–74.

the latter being better suited to call attention to Johnny's immaturity. What this observation suggests is that the sense of "kid" and "child" are similar but not identical. Again, "child" tends to carry connotations of immaturity, especially when applied to those that are not in fact children, like teenagers or adults. "Kid," on the other hand, often connotes the innocence of a prepubescent human who need not concern himself with the cares of the world. For example, if Bob, Sue's husband, were to walk in on the scene and say, "Sue, be gentle. He is just a kid," the word "kid" would refer to Johnny, but it would connote his innocence and an expectation of immaturity, the opposite expectation communicated by the word "child." This thought experiment helps to explain what it is for a word to mean, to communicate both sense and referent. All three words refer to the same thing, and yet none of them have the exact same sense.[26]

It also helps to elucidate the second feature I plan to consider in my argument—context. Context refers to a broad spectrum of things, from the small syntactical details to the general encyclopedic knowledge shared by the speaker and hearer.[27] The words "kid" and "child" seem nearly interchangeable when removed from their surroundings, but when placed in the sentence "you are being an [x]," it becomes quite clear that they mean slightly different things. This observation suggests that words take on their meaning only insofar as they are placed within a context, a sentence in this case. To use a currently common maxim, words are not the most basic units of meaning.

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[26] For a similar and more thorough discussion on the nature of "sense," see John Lyons, *Semantics*, vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 197–201.

[27] Silva offers four different contexts: syntagmatic, literary, historical, and reception historical. The syntagmatic context basically refers to the structure of the sentence in which the word normally occurs. It is important to note that clear lines do not divide the first two contexts. A literary context might be understood as the amalgam of multiple syntagmatic contexts within an individual story. To put it more concretely as Silva does, the Greek word πρεβύτερος in Luke 15:25 does not seem to have a technical meaning because it occurs within a context in which said technical meaning does not make any sense; that is, it does not fit the "syntagmatic relation" the word has with the rest of the story. The historical context simply refers to the extratextual time and place in which the word occurs, its *Sitz im Leben*. The reception historical context might be the most controversial, but it simply recognizes that a reader does not read in a vacuum, especially when it comes to a text like the Bible. Silva has inherited a long line of thinking on particular texts and particular words that must be recognized if those texts or words are to be interpreted correctly. To recognize the reception historical context is simply to recognize the hermeneutical spiral for what it is. Silva, *Biblical Words and Their Meaning*, 140–48.

Sentences are. A good word study, therefore, will not stop at obtaining the sense of the word. Rather, it will heavily favor the context because, to quote Moisés Silva, "context does not merely help us understand meaning—it virtually *makes* meaning."[28] In my argument, I intend to analyze the various senses of ἀλληγορέω, but I will ultimately place the most weight on how Paul seems to be using the term in Galatians 4:24.[29]

Semantic domain, the third linguistic concept, also appears in the thought experiment. Semantic domain consists of a range of words that mutually define one another.[30] Understanding the unique sense of "kid" helps a reader to discover the precise shape of "child," and vice versa.[31] Gaining a working knowledge of a given semantic domain becomes particularly important when it comes to words that may have a technical sense like ἀλληγορέω. Common words like "rain" often do not require a reader to first become familiar with the semantic domain in which the word occurs because the reader

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[28] Silva, *Biblical Words and Their Meaning*, 139. Silva cites Vendryes as the source of this claim. Vendryes provides example after example of how the same word, or sign, can refer to two completely different things. The French word *plume*, for example, can mean either "goose feather" or "an instrument for writing." No modern Frenchmen would be confused by the sentence *il vit de sa plume* ("he lives by the quill") because, to him, the context determines the meaning of the word. J. Vendryes, *Language: A Linguistic Introduction to History* (London: Kegan Paul International, 2003), 180.

[29] E. D. Hirsch disagrees with this notion, arguing that it is the author's choice that determines meaning not context. Hirsch's point is well taken. Paul's use of ἀλληγορέω does not mean what it does simply because it exists within a stream of other words. It means what it does because Paul himself used it in a particular way and thus determined what it meant. It gets complicated, however, when one considers why an author might choose to use a particular word in the first place. It stands to reason that an author used a particular word because he understood that word to be able to accurately convey what he wanted it to. He knows that the word can do this because he learned its meaning from observing how it functioned in other contexts. It is true that a word's meaning is determined by an author's use as Hirsch argues, but it also is true that an author uses a word because it has a certain meaning that he has picked up from its usage in another context. Therefore, when it comes to this debate, it would seem that there is a sort of chicken-or-egg scenario in which it is proper to affirm both ideas. Context *and* use determine meaning. In any case, Hirsch admits that an interpreter must look to the context to discern an author's use. So, in my particular situation, I am happy to affirm that ἀλληγορέω's meaning is tied to Paul use, but I can discern how Paul is using it only through contextual clues. E. D. Hirsch, *Validity in Interpretation* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1967), 47–48.

[30] This idea is typically attributed to Saussure; see Ferdinand de Saussure, *Course in General Linguistics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), 116.

[31] Recognizing this phenomenon need not require a denial of denotative meaning. Although it is certainly important to recognize that a word's meaning cannot be reduced to the thing it refers to, it is also important to recognize that many words do indeed refer to a thing, whether physical or conceptual. For further discussion, see Silva, *Biblical Words and Their Meaning*, 106–8; Lyons, *Semantics*, 1:109–14; Lyons, *Language and Linguistics: An Introduction* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 425; Kevin J. Vanhoozer, *Is There a Meaning in This Text? The Bible, the Reader, and the Morality of Literary Knowledge* (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2009), 301.

already shares these common domains with the author of the text. Everyone knows what weather is. However, as Ben Kuwitzky argues, what makes technical terms *technical* is that they "occur in domains that only certain people have experienced."[32] Even if ἀλληγορέω were not a technical term, the time standing between today and the first century would cause the same unfamiliarity as a technical domain.[33] Therefore, word studies of ἀλληγορέω should not only ask the questions, "to what does this word typically refer?" and "what is the sense of the word?" It should also ask questions like the following: How does the noun ἀλληγορία relate to the word τύπος?[34] Do they refer to the same thing or two different things? Does one describe a general category of which the other is a part? It is these sorts of comparative questions that will grant understanding of the semantic domain and begin to narrow the meaning of the word.[35]

The fourth and final linguistic feature to consider is word change. Because the meaning of words is determined by how they are used, words tend to change over time. As has often been pointed out, the word "nice," for example, comes from the Latin word *nescius*, which means "foolish." Although etymologically related, the modern word's

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[32] Benjamin Kuwitzky, "Semantics and Translation of Technical Terms," *Journal of Translation* 12, no. 1 (2016): 2. Both Barr and Silva concur when they give examples of words that become technical within a religious domain. James Barr, *The Semantics of Biblical Language* (London: Oxford University Press, 1961), 249; Silva, *Biblical Words and Their Meaning*, 77.

[33] Cf. Stephen Ullmann, *Semantics: An Introduction to the Science of Meaning* (New York: Blackwell, 1962), 212.

[34] Other words within this semantic domain include ἀλληγορία, ἀλληγορικός, σύμβολον, συμβολικός, τροπικός, ὑπόνοια, φύσις, and φυσικός.

[35] What I am talking about here is commonly called componential analysis, where a group of words is either marked or unmarked for particular components. Silva, for example, discusses the words "chair," "couch," and "stool" and three of their components "used for sitting," "includes a back," and "seats more than one person." A chair is used for sitting, includes a back, but does not seat more than one person. Therefore, the word "chair" would be marked for the first two components but unmarked for the third. A couch, on the other hand, can sit more than one person and is marked for all three. Silva, *Biblical Words and Their Meaning*, 132–35. Despite the criticism that such a procedure reduces meaning to referential components and undermines the sense components, this sort of analysis simply gives a formal structure to differences like those observed between "kid" and "child" in the thought experiment. It also, as David Alan Black points out, helps to discern which components are fundamental to a word and which are mere accessories, only applying in particular scenarios. David Alan Black, *Linguistics for Students of New Testament Greek: A Survey of Basic Concepts and Applications*, 2nd ed. (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1995), 140. For a fuller explanation of componential analysis, see Eugene A. Nida, *Componential Analysis of Meaning: An Introduction to Semantic Structures* (New York: Mouton, 1975).

meaning has drifted quite far from its older counterpart.[36] A word's ability to change requires the history of the word to be studied so that neither an old nor new meaning might be read into the word in question. Specifically, for my project, I intend to trace the development of ἀλληγορέω from approximately the sixth century BCE to the second century CE. This history of the word will allow me to place Paul's use of ἀλληγορέω in its proper linguistic moment.[37]

So, in summary, there are four linguistic principles that will bear weight on my study: (1) A word's meaning is complex, comprising both sense and reference. (2) Context determines meaning. (3) Words occur within a semantic domain of interrelated, mutually defining words. (4) Words change. I will take all four into consideration as I pursue a precise description of what the verb ἀλληγορέω means.

The Comparative Method

In addition to considering various linguistic issues, I also will engage the comparative method that has become the status quo in Pauline studies of late. As E. P. Sanders observes, "in the case of Paul, a Greek-speaking Jew of the first century, there has always been a major question of whether to read his letters primarily in the context of Greco-Roman culture or that of Judaism."[38] In other words, understanding Paul has

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[36] Ullmann suggests that word change be categorized along two lines: (1) changes due to linguistic conservatism, and (2) changes due to linguistic innovation. The former occurs when a word's meaning reduces; the latter when it is expanded. In the Christian sphere, the word εὐαγγέλιον serves as a perfect example of a conservative change. Originally, the term merely meant "good news." Eventually, however, it became a technical term to refer to the basic message of Christ and his followers. Its meaning reduced. The word ἄρτος illustrates a change due to innovation. Originally meaning bread, the term served as a part-for-whole metonym for "food," eventually losing the connotation of bread in certain contexts (see Mark 3:20). Ullmann, *Semantics*, 210–11. Cf. Silva, *Biblical Words and Their Meaning*, 79–86. In my view, ἀλληγορέω followed the first path because of the hermeneutical debates of the third and fourth centuries, a point I will attempt to show in chapter 3.

[37] In this way, diachronic study actually serves synchronic study, especially with respect to a word that has clearly undergone change. To use Black's words, "The aim is to follow the history of a word in its process of gradual transformation with a view to better understand its contextual meaning in a particular document at hand." Black, *Linguistics for Students of New Testament Greek*, 137. Cf. Silva, *Biblical Words and Their Meaning*, 81.

[38] E. P. Sanders, "Paul between Judaism and Hellenism," in *St. Paul among the Philosophers*, ed. John D. Caputo and Linda Alcoff (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009), 74.

always involved comparison, and my case is no different. Paul operated within a thought world with its own preconceived notions and language. Sometimes Paul, like all authors, assumed that his readers would catch what he was saying simply because he occupied the same thought world as they did. In my case, for example, Paul does not stop to explain what the phrase ἅτινα ἐστιν ἀλληγορούμενα means presumably because he thought his audience would instinctively understand him. This is where the comparative method comes in. Comparing an author to those around him shines light on an under-explained phenomenon in a particular text by observing a more robust handling of said phenomenon in another.[39] Paul may not have read or even been familiar with these other thinkers, but he was breathing the same intellectual air.[40] Therefore, along with others, I think that Paul's hermeneutic might be enlightened by reading him against a particular cultural backdrop.

To do so requires the following specific methodological considerations: First and most obviously, one must choose what or whom to compare, which requires a careful balancing of differences and similarities. The objects being compared must be similar enough to make the comparison possible but different enough to make it profitable.[41] Unlike many monograph-length studies in this field, I do not intend to aggregate all the

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[39] John M. G. Barclay, introduction to *The New Testament in Comparison*, 1.

[40] Jonathan Z. Smith is probably the foremost critical thinker on the comparative method. His thinking on the aim of comparison echoed by the authors of *The New Testament in Comparison*, however, runs against the thesis in this dissertation and seems overstated. According to Smith, "In the study of religion, as in any disciplined inquiry, comparison, in its strongest form, brings difference together within the space of the scholar's mind for the scholar's own intellectual reasons. It is the scholar who makes their cohabitation—their 'sameness'—possible, not 'natural affinities' or 'processes of history.'" Smith, *Drudgery Divine*, 51. Cf. John M. G. Barclay, "Method and Purpose in Comparing the New Testament," in Barclay and White, *The New Testament in Comparison*, 9. The problem with this statement is that it makes it seem as if two things are either genealogical related or the relation merely exists in the scholar's mind, a dichotomy that overlooks the possibility of other forms of relation. Two objects could be similar by coincidence or by such distant relation that a clear genealogical line cannot be drawn. Sanders, for example, discusses the entrenchment of Freudian psychology in Western society. Sanders, "Paul between Judaism and Hellenism," 76. Few have read the famed psychologist, but many are familiar with his ideas. The affinities between these ideas shared by the many within Western culture are certainly not genealogical (having never read Freud), but neither are they merely mental.

[41] Barclay, introduction to *The New Testament in Comparison*, 3.

data I can from Second Temple Judaism in order to provide an abstracted picture of what first-century hermeneutics look like. Instead, I intend to compare Paul to one person—Philo of Alexandria.[42]

There are a number of reasons for choosing this Alexandrian exegete. Because his writings predate Paul's, he would not have been familiar with or influenced by Paul's interpretation of the text.[43] This space allows Philo to serve as an independent attestation to what allegory looked like on its own terms before it entered into the Christian sphere. Also, both Paul and Philo appeal to the exact same text, which helpfully rules out the choice of text as a potential cause for their respective interpretive idiosyncrasies.[44] Lastly and most importantly, Philo's name has practically become inseparable from the allegorical method, meaning that when modern scholars ask, "was Paul allegorizing?" they mean "was Paul doing what Philo was doing?" a point I will defend in chapter 2.[45] If Philo truly embodies allegory, then it seems quite safe to conclude that the difference between Paul and Philo would also hold for a comparison between Paul and the general version of the craft.[46] At minimum, Paul was not doing what Philo was doing, but at

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[42] Comparing Paul to one person helps to avoid the issue of over generalization. As Jonathon A. Linebaugh points out, "Reducing a diverse tradition to a common denominator that is useful for comparison may conceal rather than capture the tradition or texts in question." Jonathon A. Linebaugh, "Relational Hermeneutics and Comparison as Conversation," in Barclay and White, *The New Testament in Comparison*, 151. I think such a thing has happened in the discussion concerning Paul's hermeneutic in Gal 4. What allegory was in the ancient world has become obscured because it has been drawn from too many sources, making determining what Paul was actually doing nearly impossible.

[43] If one dates the crucifixion to either 30 or 33 CE and assumes the reliability of Paul's autobiographical material in Gal 1:18 and 2:1, then the earliest Paul would have written Galatians would have been the late 40s. Most scholars seem to date Philo's writing to the first half of the first century. Folker Siegert, "Philo of Alexandria," in *Hebrew Bible, Old Testament: The History of Its Interpretation*, ed. Magne Sæbø (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1996), 166; Torrey Seland, "Philo of Alexandria: An Introduction," in *Reading Philo: A Handbook to Philo of Alexandria*, ed. Torrey Seland (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2014), 4.

[44] Philo's main text involving Genesis 16 is titled *De congressu eruditionis gratia*, where he explains his views on education.

[45] Kamesar, "Biblical Interpretation in Philo," 72.

[46] Although I will provide more evidence for this claim in the next chapter, it is important to note that John J. O'Keefe and Russell R. Reno define "allegory" generally in the same way that I would define Philo's allegory particularly. To use their language, allegorizing occurs "when the literal meaning of a text is seen to run in a wrong or unhelpful direction." This is exactly what I mean when I say Philo

maximum, he was not allegorizing because to allegorize was to interpret like Philo did. Here, the motive behind the comparison is not merely dictated by good historiography. It is also dictated by the state of the modern conversation. Paul and Philo then prove to be a perfect match. Their respective allegories provide the needed balance of similarity and difference to make for a fruitful comparison.

Second, the degree to which the objects of comparison differ must be measured. Usually, this measurement is done by way of a third object. To use Jonathan Z. Smith's language, "a statement of comparison is never dyadic, but always triadic; there is always an implicit 'more than,' and there is always a 'with respect to.'"[47] In other words, to say that object A looks like object B is to implicitly say that object A looks *more* like object B than some third object C with respect to some specific attribute. Because I am attempting to prove a difference, however, there is no "more than." There is merely a "with respect to." Paul is not like Philo with respect to their hermeneutical warrants, but to make this claim, I do not need to add a third object as a point of comparison.

This absence does not mean that the degree of difference is wholly absent from my thesis. On the contrary, in my view Paul and Philo were doing two entirely different things with Genesis 16, not two different versions of the same thing. The reason I am able to exclude Smith's third term is because a good case can be made for the essential attributes of Philo's hermeneutic. These attributes may not exhaust Philo's hermeneutic, but they do seem to serve as the boundary between what is "allegory" and what is not. As I will argue, Paul lacks these attributes and even argues in ways that stand at odds with

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hermeneutical warrant consists of a problem/solution framework. John J. O'Keefe and Russell R. Reno, *Sanctified Vision: An Introduction to Early Christian Interpretation of the Bible* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2005), 103. Cf. John L. Thompson, *Writing the Wrongs: Women of the Old Testament among Biblical Commentators from Philo through the Reformation* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 243.

[47] Smith, *Drudgery Divine*, 51.

them. Thus, I can sensibly claim that Paul and Philo are entirely different without introducing this third point of comparison.

The difference between a modern and ancient view of language helps to illustrate this point. Today, most linguists think that meaning is a result of use, whereas in ancient times, thinkers most often appealed to a word's etymology for meaning. These observations do not exhaust the linguistic commitments of either group, nor do they break the bonds of similarity such that the comparison becomes useless. They do, however, drive create an essential difference between the two theories of meaning without the need for an external point of comparison. My claim is similar. The claim of difference depends on the argument that the attributes listed above do accurately capture the essential pieces of Philo's hermeneutic and that Paul makes hermeneutical moves that are at odds with Philo's procedure. It does not depend on a third object.

Third and finally, one must consider the saliency of the attributes being compared. Simon Gathercole explains saliency as comparing non-trivial attributes to one another. Consider a comparison between the synoptic Gospels and the Gospel of Thomas. It may be true that both texts were written in Greek, but such a point of comparison is hardly worth mentioning. It certainly does not warrant saying that the Synoptics are like the Gospel of Thomas in any meaningful sense.[48] Problem solving, etymology, numerology, and arbitrariness serve as salient points of comparison because (A) Philo uses them frequently and (B) they constitute the warrant that moves him to his exegetical conclusions. If a hermeneutic consists of anything, it consists of an author's warrant for his particular reading. Therefore, when Paul is compared to Philo at this very point, the comparison means something. It shows a significant difference between the way Paul and Philo interpret their Bibles. So, although there is always more to consider when

[48] Simon J. Gathercole, "Resemblance and Relation," in Barclay and White, *The New Testament in Comparison*, 179.

comparing one author to another, three things stand out: (1) the balance of similarity and difference, (2) the degree of the similarity and difference, and (3) the saliency of the points of comparison. All three of these will be taken into consideration as I compare Paul to Philo.

Preview of Argument

So far, I have stated my thesis and its aims, suggested ways this thesis would contribute to the modern conversation on hermeneutics, and briefly described certain methodological issues. At this point, I will lay out my argument chapter by chapter. Again, my thesis runs as follows: There are some who advocate for a return to a premodern allegorical hermeneutic, arguing that such a hermeneutic reflects the practices of the New Testament authors. I am arguing that in Galatians 4:21–31, Paul was not allegorizing. To make this claim, I must answer three sub-questions: (1) What does the modern conversation mean by the term "allegory?" (2) What did Paul mean by the term ἀλληγορέω? (3) Given the fact that the modern conversation understands "allegory" to be something like what Philo was doing, at what points should Paul be compared to Philo? Chapters 2 (History of Research) will be devoted to question (1). Chapter 3 will be devoted to question (2). Chapters 4, 5, and 6 will be devoted to question (3).

In chapter 2, I will provide a survey and analysis of the answers given to the question "was Paul allegorizing the story of Sarah and Hagar?" This chapter will have three basic aims: First, it will simply provide a lay of the land, describing how the question has been handled in relatively modern scholarship. Second, it will show that the size of the debate has produced confusion as to how the question should be answered, thus further bolstering my claims concerning the need of this study. Third, it will show that today Philo has become an exemplar of allegorical hermeneutics and, consequently, serves as an appropriate stand-in for the modern word "allegory."

In chapter 3, I will provide a lexical study of the verb ἀλληγορέω. The chapter will begin by assessing the recent claims concerning the word's meaning, asking how modern commentators and lexicographers have understood it. After this introductory material, the bulk of the chapter will consist of exegesis of primary sources in which the word occurs from approximately the sixth century BCE to the second century CE. The purpose of this exegesis will be to address the questions, what does Paul mean by the term, and does his use match that of the modern term "allegory"?

Arguing that the apostle was typologizing and just accidentally labeled his procedure as an allegory is unpersuasive in my judgment. If the term was indeed a technical hermeneutical term that referred to a particular process of reading, then a heavy amount of weight should be placed on its use. It is not clear though that this is what the term meant. The word began to carry the hermeneutical freight that it now does in only the first or early second century after Paul wrote Galatians. Although etymologically related to the term "allegory," ἀλληγορέω at the time Paul was writing meant something like "metaphor." Hence, Paul was not telling the Galatians that he was allegorizing. He was simply claiming that the meaning of the narrative does not stop at the chronology of its events.

Chapter 4 will focus on Philo. Who was he? What was he doing? Where did his hermeneutic come from, and what made it what it was? It is to this last question that this chapter will primarily devote its attention. Although other scholars have followed a method similar to mine (i.e., comparing Paul to his hermeneutical contemporaries), it has proven difficult to decide which attributes of these contemporaries made them what they were. Was the spiritual nature of allegorizing that made it what it was? Was it its Greek roots? What characteristic should one point to say, "that is allegory"? As I have said multiple times, ancient allegory was marked by the following four attributes: (1) problem solving, (2) etymology, (3) numerology, and (4) arbitrariness. Because these attributes are what made his allegory what it was, it is here that Paul should be compared to Philo.

Chapter 5 will assess what role Galatians 4:21–31 plays in his argument in Galatians and how he constructs this argument from Genesis 16–21 and Isaiah 54:1. I will argue that the allegory is not a mere aside in Paul's polemic against the Judaizers but serves as a key piece within his overarching claim—circumcision and genetic relation to Abraham is not what makes one an heir. One must be a child of the promise to be a son like Isaac. The allegory in Galatians 4 bolsters this general claim by observing from the Old Testament that there are those who were Abraham's progeny who were not to inherit the promises originally made to him in Genesis 12:1–3. Abraham had two sons, but only Isaac was chosen. Assessing Paul's argument as it stands in Galatians first will prevent the Old Testament narrative from dominating its New Testament use.

Chapter 5 will conclude by analyzing Paul's warrant for this claim. What details of the text does Paul explicitly point to in order to support his view? Here, it is important to note that I intend to stay as narrow as possible, looking only at the narrative surrounding Sarah and Hagar primarily in Genesis 16–21 and various related texts surrounding Isaiah 54:1, which is cited by Paul in Galatians 4:27. Sometimes, arguments of this sort are accused of doing too much. Critics wonder whether Paul could have plausibly fit the entire biblical narrative into the span of ten verses. To a certain extent, I agree with this critique and am limiting myself to these two texts to avoid such a charge. In the end, I will argue that Paul's claims about those texts are warranted by the texts themselves.

Chapter 6 will conclude the dissertation by comparing Paul to Philo, showing point for point where Paul's lacks the attributes that made Philo's exegesis what it was and briefly explaining the implications of this comparison to the modern debate concerning applicability of allegory.

Criteria for Success or Failure

At the close of this chapter, it might be helpful to suggest what would make this project a success or failure. Echoing the standards mentioned by Kavin Rowe in his recent work comparing Paul to the Roman Stoics, I simply want to offer two negative corollaries. If my explanation of Philo or Paul make what they are doing less intelligible, then my argument fails. Likewise, if my claims of categorical difference seem more artificial than actual, it fails. If neither of these is true, however, then my thesis should be considered a success.[49] Obviously, it is ultimately for the reader to decide, but having these simple constraints in hand will hopefully aid the reader in thinking critically concerning the argument I intend to unfold in the following pages.[50]

[49] Rowe, *One True Life*, 206–7.

[50] All of these criteria might seem obvious and bland, but they are in keeping with the notion that there are no external criteria to which one might appeal to prove such a thesis. I, as the reader, cannot step outside myself to gain an objective viewpoint to gauge the rightness or wrongness of my thesis. It is simply me and the texts. This observation, however, need not lead to complete subjectivity as some suppose. A model and its data dance back and forth until the former is shaved down to fit the latter. In my argument, for example, suppose that over and over I observed that the word ἀλληγορέω denoted a technical manner of reading, not a simple literary trope as my thesis claims. In this scenario, there is clearly no infallible answer key to which one may appeal in order to judge my claim against the data, and yet the reader would be perfectly correct in rejecting my claim because the examples I discuss clearly do not fit my model. So, it would seem that the ability to step outside oneself does not deal a fatal blow to the ability to affirm or deny a hypothesis in a less than subjective manner. A reader can tell whether I am right or wrong. This give and take between model and data is commonly called the hermeneutical spiral and is usually paired with the epistemological system called critical realism. For further discussion, see Wright, *The New Testament and the People God*, 99–109; Kevin J. Vanhoozer, "Christ and Concept: Doing Theology and the 'Ministry of Philosophy,'" in *Doing Theology in Today's World: Essays in Honor of Kenneth S. Kantzer*, ed. Kenneth S. Kantzer and Thomas Edward McComiskey (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1991), 137–38; Vanhoozer, *Is There a Meaning in This Text?*, 301.

CHAPTER 2

DEFINING THE QUESTION "WAS PAUL ALLEGORIZING?"

In the last chapter, I set out to provide an overview of my answer to the question, "Was Paul allegorizing the story of Sarah and Hagar?" In this chapter, I intend to survey the relatively recent literature that has attempted to do the same.[1] Again, many careful thinkers have ably applied themselves to this question, so it is important for me to clearly show where my thesis fits in. Thus, this "survey" will not be a mere data dump. It will not explain every text ever written on the topic, nor will it detail every argument of the texts it does explain. Rather, it has two purposes—one positive, one negative—that I have already briefly mentioned in chapter 1. On the negative side, I will attempt to show that a significant amount of confusion has set in concerning both how the question should be answered and what the question is even asking. On the positive side, however, there does seem to be one point on which scholars agree, namely, that Philo embodied allegory during the time Paul was writing Galatians. This survey will attempt to detail and defend these two claims and offer some preliminary critiques.

Carefully Defining the Question

The confusion in the conversation runs along three general lines: First, the question itself has suffered from definitional ambiguity.[2] As Richard Longenecker points

[1] My work will not interact much with works published before Goppelt's *Typos* (1939). However, John Andrew Egger's doctoral thesis provides a fairly exhaustive study of the reception history of Gal 4. Although he is not asking the same research question as I am, Egger does provide a very helpful history of research that reaches back into the premodern era. See John Andrew Egger, "A Most Troublesome Text: Galatians 4:21–5:1 in the History of Interpretation" (PhD thesis, Toronto School of Theology, 2015), 103–215.

[2] Both Daniel Boyarin and Richard Longenecker acknowledge this problem. Longenecker, for example, argues that how one answers this question is completely contingent on how one defines

out, "determination of the extent of allegorical interpretation depends largely on how one defines 'allegorical exegesis,' and how one relates it to 'allegory.'"[3] Quite right. The problem is that there have been as many definitions as there have been answers. Just as the noun "history" means Bultmann for some and Calvin for others, so also has the term "allegory" come to mean different things for different scholars. Therefore, two different scholars could answer "yes" to the question "was Paul allegorizing the story of Sarah and Hagar?" while not really answering the same question. Likewise, two scholars might disagree on the surface while agreeing substantially in their detailed descriptions of Paul's procedure. Something has gone awry here.

The following are a sampling of the definitions of allegory that can be found in this survey:

1. Allegory is a hermeneutical system whereby an interpreter connects a historical event to an abstraction.
2. Allegory is a hermeneutical system whereby an interpreter *arbitrarily* connects a historical event to an abstraction.
3. Allegory is a hermeneutical system that includes all non-literal forms of reading—historical or not.
4. Allegory reads a text in light of an external system of ideas.
5. Allegory treats the text like a set of abstract symbols.
6. Allegory provides warranted readings that forge modern worldviews with a sacred text.
7. Allegory is an extended metaphor that contains a narrative shape and operates as a counter-hegemonic force.

"allegorical exegesis." In his opinion, the term denotes an extended metaphor that flows against the intent of the historical narrative. Richard N. Longenecker, *Biblical Exegesis in the Apostolic Period*, 2nd ed. (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1999), 34n110. Likewise, in note qualifying his definition of allegory, Boyarin acknowledges that there are multiple ways of allegorizing, and his thesis deals with only one. Daniel Boyarin, *A Radical Jew: Paul and the Politics of Identity* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), 263n4. For the purposes of his argument, Boyarin takes allegory to be "any notion of interpretation which depends on a prior and privileged pairing of signifiers and signifieds" (p. 16). Clearly, there is a definitional problem here. To loosen up the gridlock, scholars on both sides need to first understand what it is they are asking. Otherwise, two seemingly opposed answers might stand perfectly in unison or vice versa.

[3] Longenecker, *Biblical Exegesis in the Apostolic Period*, 33n110.

8. Allegory is a means of writing that intentionally obscures what the text is saying to invite a reader into thinking more deeply about the text in question.

Second and related to the first, there seems some confusion as to what can be inferred from Paul's use of the verb ἀλληγορέω in verse 24. Some, wanting to do justice to Paul's words, argue that the phrase ἅτινά ἐστιν ἀλληγορούμενα answers the question in the affirmative. Was Paul allegorizing? Yes, he says as much. Others, wanting to ascribe to Paul a different sort of reading other than allegory while still recognizing what he says in verse 24, claim that Paul simply misused the word. He might have called his exposition an allegory, but he meant something else. Both of these arguments suffer from the same basic issue. They assume that the ancient Greek word ἀλληγορέω and the modern English word "allegory" mean the same thing.[4] To be sure, these words are phonetically similar, but if James Barr's work has demonstrated anything, it has demonstrated that phonetic similarity does not mean semantic identity.[5] The two words need not mean the same thing despite being etymologically related.

Third and finally, no one agrees on how one should go about answering the question. Many have hung their answer on the observed arbitrariness of Paul's exegesis. Those that find sufficient warrant behind his exegetical connections conclude that he was not allegorizing. Those that find no warrant conclude he was. Most, however, have taken some sort of historical approach. They either look to the old rhetorical handbooks of the ancient world for definitions of allegory, read ancient examples of allegorical exegesis in an attempt to develop their own definitions, or some combination of the two. Paul's procedure is then compared against these definitions to ascertain whether he was allegorizing. It can be seen here that this third issue is closely related to the first. How

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[4] In his introduction to Heraclitus's treatise *Homeric Problems*, for example, David Konstan argues that one should not "forget that Paul several times resorts to allegorical interpretations (1 Cor 5:6–8, 9:8–10, 10: 1–11), in one instance (Gal 4:24) *using the term itself*." David Konstan, introduction to *Homeric Problems*, by Heraclitus, ed. and trans. David Konstan and Donald A. Russell (Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2005), xxvii (emphasis added).

[5] James Barr, *The Semantics of Biblical Language* (London: Oxford University Press, 1961), 107–9.

one thinks about these procedural problems is indissolubly tied to how one understands the question. The arbitrary group, for example, assumes that the question "was Paul allegorizing the story of Sarah and Hagar?" essentially means "was Paul's exegesis of the story of Sarah and Hagar arbitrary?" Thus, their quest for Paul's warrant (or lack thereof) makes complete sense given their take on the question.

Philo: The Common Denominator

Unsurprisingly, these definitional and procedural issues have caused scholars to talk past each other. Debating a particular research question requires some common ground. Disagreement cannot happen without at least some agreement as to what is being disagreed about. If scholars mean different things by the question "was Paul allegorizing the story of Sarah and Hagar?" then their yes or no answers mean very little. The good news is that there does seem to be common ground. Adam Kamesar has claimed that Philo's name has become nearly synonymous with the allegorical method.[6] His observation seems to hold for those that are attempting to dissect Paul's methods in Galatians 4:21–31. Whatever scholars have meant by the question, they at least seem to mean "was Paul doing what Philo was doing?" Philo is the lowest common denominator. So, in the following pages, I will attempt to show that although there is significant disagreement over what allegory is, scholars have generally agreed that Philo embodies the ancient craft in the first century.

Typos Leonhard Goppelt

To that end, I will first look at Leonhard Goppelt's famous work *Typos*. Originally published in 1939, *Typos* set the parameters for the conversation until it would begin to change in the 1980's and 90's. Although some had clearly made this claim

[6] Adam Kamesar, "Biblical Interpretation in Philo," in *The Cambridge Companion to Philo*, ed. Adam Kamesar (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 72.

before him, Goppelt made popular the dichotomy between allegory, on the one hand, and typology, on the other.[7] For Goppelt, both of these forms of interpretation transcend the literal. Literal reading, according to Goppelt, occurs "if the writer wishes to explain or describe what has happened or is literally there."[8] In other words, literal reading is a mere recounting of events. Paul would have been reading literally in this sense had he stopped in Galatians 4:23, merely recounting the fact that Abraham had two sons and abstaining from imbibing them with the theological significance that he does. Both typology and allegory transcend Goppelt's literal reading in that they point to things outside these mere historical details. They do not, however, do so in the exact same way.

Typology connects one historical fact to another. In Goppelt's words, "only historical facts—persons, actions, events, and institutions—are material for typological interpretation."[9] Generally speaking, typology includes some sort of escalation. An earlier event prefigures some future, greater event, although Goppelt does seem to leave room for instances of typology that lack this particular attribute.[10] Nevertheless, it is the first issue—typology's concern with "facts"—that distinguish it from allegory. "Neither

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[7] The dichotomy between typology and allegory reaches all the way back to the Antiochene fathers of the fourth century who challenged the dominant hermeneutic of Alexandria. Commenting on Gal 4:24, for example, John Chrysostom claimed that "contrary to [normal] usage, [Paul] calls a type an allegory; his meaning is as follows; this history not only declares that which appears on the face of it, but announces somewhat farther, whence it is called an allegory. And what hath it announced? no less than all the things now present." John Chrysostom, *Commentary on Galatians* 4:24 (*NPNF*[1], 13:34). Here, Chrysostom seems to affirm two different hermeneutical systems—one that dealt in types and the other in allegories. This why he must qualify Paul's use of the verb ἀλληγορέω and then provide an accurate account. Frances Young's caution about the historical/allegorical distinction between the fathers is well taken, but the readers need beware of the point her work actually succeeds in making. The evidence she provides does not demonstrate that there was no Alexandria/Antiochene divide. What it shows is that the concerns of the Antiochenes were not that of the modern historical critics. Statements like this one from Chrysostom, however, hardly make any sense if there was no real dispute. Frances M. Young, "Alexandrian and Antiochene Exegesis," in *A History of Biblical Interpretation*, ed. Alan J. Hauser and Duane Watson (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2003), 1:334–54. For a discussion of this dispute, see Johan Leemans, "After Philo and Paul: Hagar in the Writings of the Church Fathers," in *Abraham, the Nations, and the Hagarites: Jewish, Christian, and Islamic Perspectives on Kinship with Abraham*, ed. Martin Goodman, Geurt Hendrik van Kooten, and J. van Ruiten (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 441–44.

[8] Leonhard Goppelt, *Typos: The Typological Interpretation of the Old Testament in the New*, trans. Donald H. Madvig (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1982), 18.

[9] Goppelt, *Typos*, 17.

[10] Goppelt, *Typos*, 18.

the facts nor the literal sense of a passage taken as a whole is material for allegorical interpretation, but the ideas and phrases are."[11] By ideas and phrases, Goppelt seems to mean the abstractions of the text: Sarah's name, Hagar's status of being a slave, and so on. Allegory is not so much concerned with the historical events of the text, nor does it generally connect these events with other events.

Goppelt offers John 3:14ff and Philo's *Legum Allegoriae* 2.77–81 as examples of this difference. Both John and Philo are interpreting the same event found in Numbers 21. At the beginning of the pericope, Yahweh sends fiery serpents among the people of Israel because they have disobeyed him. Moses intercedes, and Yahweh relents, instructing him to make a pole-mounted serpent that would heal the people if they would but look at it (Num 21:6–9). John, according to Goppelt, interprets this text typologically, taking the raised serpent "as a type of Christ's 'being lifted up'" (see John 3:14–15). Philo interprets it allegorically, understanding it as a symbol of the virtue of temperance given only to the godly. John connects one historical event (the raising of a serpent) to another (the raising of Jesus). Philo connects the same event to an abstraction (the virtue of temperance). Thus, for Goppelt, the difference between the two modes of interpretation lies in the historical nature of the things they connect.[12] Typology connects historical events. Allegory does not.

Concerning Paul's own practice in Galatians 4, Goppelt clearly sees the so-called allegory as an act of typology, but at the beginning, he seems reticent to firmly place the apostle in either of the categories he sets up in the beginning of his work. Consider the opening line to his discussion: The dichotomy between the Law and the Abrahamic covenant "is expressed with polemical acuity in the typological interpretation

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[11] Goppelt, *Typos*, 18.

[12] Goppelt, *Typos*, 18n55.

of Ishmael and Isaac, which in some respects passes over into allegory."[13] Goppelt very confidently labels Paul's exegesis as an act of typology, but he suggests that it contains certain elements of allegory. Goppelt's confidence stems from the nature of the connection Paul makes between Sarah, Hagar, Ishmael, Isaac, and their modern counterparts. The ancient situation ultimately receives its significance as it points to the modern one. The historical nature of the things Paul connects is what makes Paul's so-called allegory an act of typology for Goppelt.[14]

Where then does he think Paul passes over into allegory? First, in verse 25, Paul writes τὸ δὲ Ἁγὰρ Ζινᾶ ὄρος ἐστὶν ἐν τῇ Ἀραβίᾳ, which the RSV translates as "Now Hagar is Mount Sinai in Arabia" (Gal 4:25a). Goppelt thinks with this statement that Paul connects Hagar to Sinai "by means of etymology in keeping with the allegorical method."[15] Second, Goppelt points to Paul's use of the participle ἀλληγορούμενα in verse 24. In his view, Paul is claiming that the story of Sarah and Hagar "was told as an allegory and, therefore, must be interpreted allegorically."[16] Goppelt here thinks Paul is labeling his own exegesis as allegorical, which prevents the exposition from being labeled as a pure instance of typology.

Ultimately, however, these two allegorical attributes are not enough to overturn Goppelt's initial categorization of Paul's exegesis. "Only certain features of his exposition come close to being allegorical interpretation as we conceive of it. His exposition is entirely confined to a typological comparison of the historical facts."[17] Goppelt's definitions finally win out. Paul is concerned with historical facts, not atemporal abstractions. Thus, despite showing some signs of allegory, he must be

[13] Goppelt, *Typos*, 139.

[14] Goppelt, *Typos*, 139–40.

[15] Goppelt, *Typos*, 139.

[16] Goppelt, *Typos*, 139.

[17] Goppelt, *Typos*, 139.

typologizing. This observation even leads Goppelt to qualify Paul's use of ἀλληγορέω. Paul does not use the verb in any sort of technical sense, according to Goppelt. He "simply means that this is an instance in which the interpretation goes beyond the literal meaning."[18] For Goppelt, Paul's so-called allegory is so only in name.

The last thing to consider in *Typos* is Goppelt's handling of Philo. When discussing the hermeneutical practices of Hellenistic Judaism, Philo serves as Goppelt's standout. "We begin our study of biblical interpretation in Hellenistic Judaism with a consideration of Philo, the most outstanding representative of this school of thought."[19] Goppelt's description of Philo is clear. The exegesis of the ancient Jewish interpreter embodied allegory in the first century. Of the fifteen or so pages he uses to discuss the hermeneutics of Hellenistic Judaism, Goppelt spends ten of them on Philo.[20] For Goppelt, Philo was *the* allegorizer of the first century.

Goppelt observes that Philo often introduces his allegorical expositions "by stating that what follows is said in accordance with the 'laws of allegory.'"[21] What these "laws" are Philo never says, but there does seem to be some consistency in the way he moves from the texts to their deeper meanings. Although there are times where Philo tries to preserve the literal sense of the text, Philo usually dismisses the literal sense as impossible.[22] Goppelt thinks that this view of the literal sense is in keeping allegorical method of the Greeks that came before him. Philo, the Greek philosophers, and the Hellenistic Jews "all agree on the principle that one must interpret allegorically when the

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[18] It is worth noting that Goppelt does very little to investigate the word's use elsewhere outside of Paul. He merely mentions that it is not used anywhere else in the NT and then leans heavily on Friedrich Büchsel's article in the *TDNT*. Goppelt, *Typos*, 140; see also Friedrich Büchsel, "Ἀλληγορεω," in *TDNT*, 1:260–63.

[19] Goppelt, *Typos*, 42.

[20] Goppelt, *Typos*, 42–53.

[21] Goppelt, *Typos*, 49.

[22] Goppelt, *Typos*, 47–48.

Holy Scripture makes incorrect or unworthy statements about God . . . or when the literal meaning is absurd or contradictory."[23] These impossibilities serve as Philo's starting point, according to Goppelt. They tell him when to read a text allegorically. They do not, however, tell him how. That role is reserved from etymologies and symbolic connections.[24] So, as an exegete, Philo fits Goppelt's definition of allegory quite well. He shows little concern for the historical facts of the text and almost never sees them as pointers toward future historical facts. Rather, Philo most often connects them with philosophical abstractions like virtue or psychological facets of the mind.

At this point, there are a number of things to notice about Goppelt's discussion. First, definitions are key for Goppelt. How he categorizes Paul's exegesis in Galatians 4 is largely, if not exclusively, dependent on the dividing line he places between allegory and typology. Paul's exegesis does show some signs of allegory, according to Goppelt, but the signs are relatively unimportant. Ultimately, it is Paul's handling of history that places him squarely in the typological realm. This typological-allegorical framework continues into the present discussion but not without its fair share of detractors, as I will show below.

Second, consider Goppelt's method. For Goppelt, "was Paul allegorizing in Galatians 4?" asks whether Paul partook in a common hermeneutical practice of his day. It is a historical question. Thus, Goppelt surveys Paul's social circles, from Rabbinic Jews to Hellenized ones, grouping like with like and asking with whom Paul is most similar. Goppelt does not make much use of ancient definitions of allegory. He forms his definitions based on observations of what they actually do. Third, Goppelt subtly assumes that the ancient word ἀλληγορέω means the same thing as the modern word "allegory." To be sure, Goppelt thinks that Paul's actual interpretive moves overrule his use of the

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[23] Goppelt, *Typos*, 50.

[24] Goppelt, *Typos*, 50.

word, and he eventually argues that the word simply means non-literal. However, it is clear that Goppelt thinks that the modern word "allegory" (or *allegorie* in Goppelt's case) maintains the same sense as ἀλληγορέω. Fourth and finally, Goppelt sees Philo as the standout allegorizer. He is a living, breathing definition of what allegory looked like in the first century. Many will follow him here.

Allegory and Event R. P. C. Hanson

R. P. C. Hanson's book *Allegory and Event* focuses on Origen and how he relates to modern hermeneutics. What were Origen's origins? Where did his hermeneutic come from?[25] To answer these questions, Hanson looks at both Greek and Jewish hermeneutical practices of the ancient world, attempting to trace a line of descent through Origen to the medieval church. Paul's exegesis in Galatians 4 serves as an important step in Hanson's journey into the allegorical hermeneutic of the Middle Ages.

At first, Hanson's definitions resemble Goppelt's. He seemingly sees allegory and typology as hermeneutical rivals. For Hanson, "typology is the interpreting of an event belonging to the present or the recent past as the fulfillment of a similar situation recorded or prophesied in Scripture."[26] In contrast, "allegory is the interpretation of an object or person or a number of objects or persons as in reality meaning some object or person of a later time, with no attempt made to trace a relationship of 'similar situation' between them."[27] Although Hanson does not use the same language as Goppelt, his labels "event" or "similar situation" make the same basic point: Typology connects historical events. Allegory does not.

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[25] R. P. C. Hanson, *Allegory and Event: A Study of the Sources and Significance of Origen's Interpretation of Scripture* (London: SCM Press, 1959), 7.

[26] Hanson, *Allegory and Event*, 7.

[27] Hanson, *Allegory and Event*, 7.

This dichotomy is reaffirmed in Hanson's discussion of early Jewish typology and how it relates to later Christian typology. In Hanson's view, Christian typology did not appear out of thin air. It was borrowed from their Jewish predecessors.[28] His whole point in making this claim is to investigate a particular line of descent from Jewish hermeneutics to the allegorical hermeneutics of the medieval church. Barring whether Hanson correctly draws this line, his concluding statement in the discussion echoes the hermeneutical rivalry between typology and allegory sounded off initially in his definitions quoted above.

> If we allow [a list of Jewish types prior to the birth of Christianity] it is almost impossible to refuse the conclusion that these types were used and adapted by Christians from the earliest times, and that we have in fact here one source of Christian typology. *But typology is presumably not exactly the same as allegory*, and we have yet to show that Jewish typology was likely to become either Jewish or Christian allegory by its own development apart from other influences.[29]

What Hanson is saying is that he has yet to account for the source of Christian allegory because typology and allegory are not the same. The typology of the Jews must have undergone a metamorphosis on its way to becoming Christian allegory because allegory and typology are observably distinct.

At points in his argument, however, Hanson's definitional precision begins to fade. Typology and allegory, initially taken as distinct categories, begin to blur together. This blurring becomes apparent as Hanson begins to discuss what he calls Palestinian allegory, an allegorical system represented by the Rabbis and the Dead Sea Scrolls that developed independently of Alexandria. In his discussion of the hermeneutics of the *Damascus Document*, for example, Hanson asserts that "it is evident that in this document we have an example . . . of typology—the interpreting of an event belonging to the present or recent past as the fulfillment of a similar situation recorded or prophesied

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[28] Hanson, *Allegory and Event*, 19.

[29] Hanson, *Allegory and Event*, 19 (emphasis added).

in Scripture—slipping gradually into allegory, with no attempt made to trace a relationship of 'similar situation' between them."[30] One cannot help wonder how this might be. If the typology differs from allegory in that it connects similar situations together not just the objects in those situations, the distinction between the two must be categorical. Typology could not slip into allegory because once it focused merely on the objects without the situations it would become allegory. Hanson could be arguing that one follows the other chronologically (i.e., what the Jews practiced in the first century BCE eventually changed into allegory in the first), but the fact that he is talking about one document seems to rule this explanation out. The point is to recognize that although Hanson's definitions sharply distinguish the two disciplines, his comments on the *Damascus Document* leave the reader wondering if he maintains this distinction consistently when he applies it to specific texts.

Even more confusing is his description of Christian allegory: "Christian allegory is essentially an allegory of realization, of types finding their consummation and oracles their fulfillment and events their ordained re-enactment. . . . This is one reason why early Christians apparently found it so easy to interpret their Scriptures in an allegorical or typological way."[31] Again, how could this be? How could Christians read in an allegorical/typological way if Hanson's definitions accurately describe what each discipline is? Read on its own, this statement would suggest that allegory and typology are basically interchangeable.

Other comments suggest that Hanson thinks of typology as an attribute of certain types of allegory. For example, in his concluding comments on the relationship between Palestinian allegory and Hellenistic allegory, Hanson argues that two should be

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[30] Hanson, *Allegory and Event*, 22.

[31] Hanson, *Allegory and Event*, 36.

considered distinct forms of allegory because of their different orientations toward history. His comments are worth quoting in full:

> The two types of allegorical tradition [i.e., the Palestinian type and the Alexandrian type] seem quite distinct. The Palestinian is full of *typology*, closely linked with *historical* events, unenterprising in its speculation and motivated by either Messianic eschatological expectation or an intense devotion to the Torah. Hellenistic allegory is quite *unhistorical*, it knows nothing of typology, it is unrestrained in its speculation, where it touches the Torah it is designed to emancipate from a literal observance of it, and it is motivated by a desire to read various types of Greek philosophy into the given text or to remove difficulties which offend philosophy in it.[32]

In this quote, Hanson claims that Palestinian allegory and Hellenistic allegory are divided by their use of typology and their relationship with history. Palestinian is full of typology and makes heavy use of history. Hellenistic allegory is utterly unhistorical and knows nothing of typology. Both disciplines, however, are still allegory. As Hanson's first statement indicates, both of these types of reading are "allegorical traditions." Unlike Hanson's definitions, this statement suggests that typology and allegory operate on two different logical planes, the former sometimes serving as an attribute of the latter, not its polar opposite. On the surface, this language sounds a lot like Goppelt, but again, it must be remembered that Hanson is distinguishing two types of allegory, not typology from allegory. Goppelt would have never said that a certain type of allegory made use of typology because allegory's lack of history is what made it what it was. For Hanson, only Hellenistic allegory lacks a sense of history. Palestinian allegory, on the other hand, makes robust use of history and is yet still allegory.

It could be the case that Hanson is simply using the label "allegory" in a colloquial sense like I have done to refer to Paul's allegory multiple times throughout this dissertation. In such a scenario, what Hanson calls Palestinian allegory would basically reduce down to Goppelt's typology since typology has nothing to do with allegory. It is clear, however, that Hanson is deliberate in his labeling. He thinks of Palestine as having

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[32] Hanson, *Allegory and Event*, 63–64.

its own truly allegorical tradition. “In the face of all this evidence it seems impossible any longer to doubt that there was a lively and full-blooded tradition of allegorizing in existence in the Palestinian Judaism of our Lord’s day. . . . The only alternative is so to restrict the meaning of ‘allegory’ as to reduce it almost to insignificance.”[33] Hanson knew what he was doing. He was not using allegory merely as a colloquial placeholder when he flattens typology into allegory. He truly thinks that, despite making heavy use of typology, the Palestinian reading tradition should still be considered allegory lest the term be reduced to nothing.

These seemingly competing accounts of allegory begin to demonstrate what I mean by definitional confusion. In Hanson’s work, sometimes allegory and typology are at odds. Sometimes they are the same. Sometimes one is an attribute of the other. Hanson is simply unclear. Therefore, when he asks the question “was Paul allegorizing in Galatians 4?” it is not obvious what he means.

Nevertheless, he begins his discussion of Galatians 4 with a very straightforward statement: “This well-known passage comparing Ishmael and Isaac to the old and new covenants is *explicitly and undisguisedly allegorical*.”[34] Whatever Hanson understands allegory to be, he obviously thinks Paul is doing it. His basis for this confidence is similar to what made Goppelt reticent to label Paul’s exegesis as a pure act of typology. Paul uses the verb ἀλληγορέω, and he looks like he connects Hagar to Sinai via some etymological method.[35] (In passing, it is important to note that Hanson’s logic assumes, like Goppelt’s, that ἀλληγορέω and “allegory” mean the same thing.)[36] These

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[33] Hanson, *Allegory and Event*, 35.

[34] Hanson, *Allegory and Event*, 80 (emphasis added).

[35] Hanson places much more weight on Paul’s use of ἀλληγορέω than he does his potential use of etymology. He is not even sure what the etymological connection between Hagar’s name and Sinai might be, claiming that it may derive from some Midrash that has been lost. Hanson, *Allegory and Event*, 80–81.

[36] This assumption is surprising given Hanson’s fairly robust treatment of the ἀλληγορεώ word group before he gets to his analysis of Paul; see Hanson, *Allegory and Event*, 37–41. He recognizes that

two attributes settle the issue for Hanson. "That [Galatians 4:21–31] is allegory is certain."[37]

Hanson then asks if Galatians 4 is an instance of *Alexandrian* allegory, the sort of allegory practiced by Philo. After pondering a number of attributes that may place Paul with the Alexandrians, Hanson boils the issue down to a single sub-question: "Into what does Paul allegorize this text?"[38] If Paul is examined from this angle, argues Hanson, it becomes clear that there is no evidence of Alexandrian influence.[39] "Paul is not here trying to emancipate the meaning of the passage from its historical content and transmute it into a moral sentiment or a philosophical truth, which is the almost invariable function of Alexandrian allegory."[40] Paul may be allegorizing, but he is not doing so in an Alexandrian fashion.

Interestingly, in his concluding statements on Paul, Hanson seems to suggest that he thinks of Alexandrian allegory as allegory proper. "In practice, the bent of [Paul's] thought lay so much towards typology *rather than what we should strictly call allegory* that he has in the course of his extant letters few occasions to indulge in allegory."[41] In other words, Hanson thinks that only Alexandrian allegory rightly deserves the label "allegory."[42] Thus, despite using the verb ἀλληγορέω and

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ἀλληγορία and its cognates had a wide range of meaning, mostly referring to a general sort of figurative interpretation and only later to a more specific, technical type. He observes that it may mean metaphor and that the usual technical term for allegory in the ancient world was ὑπόνοια. If the word group does indeed cover this larger range of meanings, then Hanson's conclusions do not clearly or necessarily follow from Paul's use of ἀλληγορέω.

[37] Hanson, *Allegory and Event*, 81.

[38] Hanson, *Allegory and Event*, 82.

[39] Hanson, *Allegory and Event*, 82.

[40] Hanson, *Allegory and Event*, 82.

[41] Hanson, *Allegory and Event*, 83.

[42] There are a couple of other places where Hanson suggests that there is such a thing as "allegory proper." For example, in his discussion of the *Habakkuk Commentary* of the Dead Sea Scrolls, Hanson writes, "It would be more accurate to say that in this work we can see how the conviction that prophecy has been fulfilled is beginning to melt into *allegory proper*." Hanson, *Allegory and Event*, 20

etymologizing Hagar's name, Paul was typologizing, not *truly* allegorizing. This conclusion concerning Paul mirrors Goppelt's. The only difference between their arguments is that Hanson includes a category of allegory that is essentially vacuous of any content. It is an empty shell that houses two species of allegory with more discernable attributes—Palestinian allegory and Alexandrian allegory. Otherwise, Goppelt and Hanson agree. The important thing to note here is the definitional confusion. There is confusion within Hanson's own argument, which leads him to both disagree and agree with Goppelt's conclusions. Hanson confidently asserts that Paul was allegorizing, contra Goppelt, despite maintaining the same basics definitions of allegory and typology and the same basic view of Galatians 4.

Finally, Hanson views Philo much like Goppelt did—as an exemplar of allegory. This point can be seen throughout Hanson's discussion. For example, while pondering whether Palestinian allegory came from Alexandrian tradition, Hanson uses Philo as his point of comparison and describes him as "the great exponent of Alexandrian allegory."[43] Likewise, he thinks Philo to be the apex of a long line of allegorizing Jews who wrote for Gentile ears. Authors like Aristobulus and Pseudo-Aristeas serve as his precursors for Philo's more extensive work.[44] For Hanson, therefore, Philo is the primary representative of allegory, at least of the Alexandrian sort, and perhaps, if my observations above are correct about Hanson's view of true allegory, then also of the more general sort as well.

(emphasis added). He does not elaborate what he means by "allegory proper," but his statements concerning Paul mentioned above suggest that it is likely Alexandrian allegory.

[43] Hanson, *Allegory and Event*, 35.

[44] Hanson, *Allegory and Event*, 43. Some of Hanson's comments suggest that this emphasis on Philo may be an accident of history. For example, Hanson states, "[Philo's] writings are the first extensive example of it that we possess, and the chief non-Jewish examples of allegorizing that have survived are either contemporary with Philo (Heraclitus) or later than his day (Plutarch and Porphyry)" (p. 55). In other words, Philo has become the chief subject of this debate simply because his writings are the only ones that have survived down through the ages.

Hanson has much to say about Philo's hermeneutic itself. In his view, there are many ways Philo is similar to the Palestinian tradition except for one primary thing: Philo shows no signs of typology.[45] Instead, Philo uses allegory to emancipate himself from both the literal meaning of the text and its relation to history, keeping only enough of the latter to preserve some of God's essential acts.[46] The occasions when he does preserve the historical account are outliers, according to Hanson. They are so rare that it would be proper to conclude that "Philo has virtually no sense of history."[47]

So, given what has been discussed, Hanson's work *Allegory and Event* bears out my two claims mentioned above. He shows multiple levels of definitional confusion. What he means when he asks the questions "was Paul allegorizing?" is very unclear. He also comes to the question "what is allegory?" from a slightly different angle. Although he does provide a historical survey of certain allegorizers, unlike Goppelt, Hanson begins this historical survey with a study of the ἀλληγορία word group, seemingly assuming that answering the lexical question also answers the historical question. Goppelt does not do this. Thus, not only is there definitional confusion, but also the two scholars also differ on how to arrive at said definition.

Studies in Paul's Technique and Theology **A. T. Hanson**

A. T. Hanson's monograph *Studies in Paul's Technique* is more directly focused on Paul himself. The first half of the book surveys a number of Pauline passages,

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[45] Hanson, *Allegory and Event*, 49. Hanson does recognize that Philo sees certain figures as types of good virtue, but this use of "type" is different than "the sense in which the word has hitherto been used in this work." Joseph, for example, might serve as Philo's OT paradigm for self-control, but he is not a figure that point forward to a coming messiah. Typology, in Hanson's view, refers only to the latter.

[46] Hanson, *Allegory and Event*, 53. *Ebr.* 144 demonstrates this balance. Philo reluctantly admits that Samuel was indeed a human person (Σαμουὴλ δὲ γέγονε μὲν ἴσως ἄνθρωπος "Samuel was perhaps a man"). He quickly, however, moves on to the spiritual significance of Samuel as a "mind rejoicing only in the service and worship of God." These statements bear out Hanson's point that Philo preserved only enough history to give ode to God's great redemptive acts in history.

[47] Hanson, *Allegory and Event*, 52.

usually found in Galatians or Romans. The second half attempts to draw out broad themes in Paul's technique from these assessments. Galatians 4:21–31 is one of the key texts Hanson analyzes. Although published over a decade after *Allegory and Event* and two decades after *Typos*, *Studies in Paul's Technique* operates within the same basic typology-allegory dichotomy represented by Goppelt.

Allegory, for Hanson, "is an explanation of the text that replaces the literal sense and has a purely arbitrary connection with it. In an allegory, each detail corresponds to some idea or person in the complex which it expresses."[48] Typology, on the other hand, consists of "a pattern or set of circumstances which reproduces beforehand that set of circumstances of which it is a type."[49] Although slightly more obscure, these definitions are very similar to Goppelt and R. P. C. Hanson. Typology and allegory are at odds, and they differ in how they relate to history. One can presumably decide which is which by asking "what corresponds to what?"[50] If one historical event (or "circumstance" in his language) is connected to another, then the text in question is an instance of typology. If isolated details are connected to abstract ideas or individual persons, then it is an allegory.

Hanson's definition also focuses on a piece of the conversation that, although present, is much more shrouded in Goppelt and R. P. C. Hanson's discussions. The difference between typology and allegory does not merely lie in the nature of the objects connected but in the nature of the connection itself. The essence of allegory lies in the fact that it connects its objects arbitrarily. This point can be clearly seen in the first sentence of Hanson's definition: "An allegory is an explanation of the text that replaces

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[48] Anthony Tyrrell Hanson, *Studies in Paul's Technique and Theology* (London: SPCK, 1974), 94.

[49] Hanson, *Studies in Paul's Technique and Theology*, 94.

[50] Hanson, *Studies in Paul's Technique and Theology*, 94.

the literal sense and has a *purely arbitrary connection* with it."[51] For Hanson, this feature of allegory seems to become the crux of the matter. Toward the end of the book, for example, Hanson questions whether Paul ever uses allegory throughout his corpus. To answer the question, he further specifies what he has in mind: "By 'allegory' in this context we mean either interpreting a text in a sense which completely ignores its original meaning, or in a sense whose connection with the original meaning is purely arbitrary."[52] This specification seems to leave behind his "what corresponds to what?" criterion and is noticeably different than the question R. P. C. Hanson raises in a similar point in his argument. When R. P. C. Hanson attempts to classify Paul, he asks "into what does Paul allegorize?"[53] His focus is on the nature of the objects, particularly the object with which Paul connects the text. A. T. Hanson, on the other hand, focuses on *how* these objects are connected. It is this attribute that decides what is allegory and what is not. Thus, although this feature is certainly present in Goppelt and R. P. C. Hanson, it occupies a slightly more important role in A. T. Hanson's argument.

Perhaps what most distinguishes A. T. Hanson is his handling of Paul's use of ἀλληγορέω. Unlike Goppelt and R. P. C. Hanson before him, A. T. recognizes that ἀλληγορέω need not mean the same thing as "allegory": "One can understand the temptation to offer such a translation; it looks very obvious. But, just as τύπος in Paul does not necessarily mean 'type,' so we are not justified in assuming that ἀλληγορούμενα means 'are an allegory.' . . . One could write down half a dozen possible alternative

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[51] Hanson, *Studies in Paul's Technique and Theology*, 94 (emphasis added). Goppelt seems to agree when he says, "The historicity of what is reported and the literal meaning of the text *are of no consequence* for the allegorical interpretation, but for typology they are foundational." Goppelt, *Typos*, 18 (emphasis added). Likewise, this point seems to be what R. P. C Hanson has in mind when he says that allegory attempts "to emancipate the meaning of the passage from its historical content." Hanson, *Allegory and Event*, 82. A. T. Hanson's statements are merely more explicit.

[52] Hanson, *Studies in Paul's Technique and Theology*, 159.

[53] Hanson, *Allegory and Event*, 82.

translations, any of which might prove to be right."[54] Hanson's logic runs counter to the two men that preceded him. Whereas Goppelt and R. P. C. Hanson saw Paul's use of ἀλληγορέω as a definitive mark of allegory, Hanson thinks such a conclusion to be too hasty. The word may very well mean something else.[55]

Hanson attempts to determine what else the term might mean by surveying how the word was used by both Philo and some of the early church fathers. From his analysis, he concludes that the word in the passive voice never means "may be understood allegorically," as intuition might suggest.[56] Rather, it means "bears an allegorical sense."[57] In other words, it refers to an attribute of the text, not a method of the author. This dichotomy—between text and author— has become an important starting point for defining the word even down to the present day. Despite using the adverb "allegorically" in his initial definitions, Hanson seems to leave open the exact nuance of this textual attribute, offering the following stipulative definition for Galatians 4:24:

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[54] Hanson's options include (1) "'these things are capable of being allegorized'—but need not be if one does not feel inclined"; (2) "'these things must be allegorized,' for taken literally they are not very edifying"; (3) "'these things are now being treated allegorically' by me, Paul, for reasons of my own"; (4) "'these things are written allegorically'—deliberately by Moses?"; and (5) "'these thing are enacted in an allegorical way'—if these mean anything." Hanson, *Studies in Paul's Technique and Theology*, 91.

[55] To be sure, Goppelt at least ends up translating the term as "metaphor" or something more generic, but his comments suggest that such a use would be unique to Paul. Paul's exegesis is so foreign to the allegory of the first century that he must mean something else by the term. Hanson is claiming something slightly different. In his view, the term has a wide range of meaning in its broader use. Paul may be using it in a technical manner or not, but he is not the only one to do so.

[56] Because it would render the phrase in the passive voice, the English translation "may be understood allegorically" would seem to fit better than "[the text] speaks allegorically," a phrase that uses the active voice.

[57] Hanson's one exception to this conclusion is Origen. In a passage unnamed by Hanson, Origen points to Paul's allegory in Galatians 4 and says that the details of marriage are ἀλληγορεῖται, that is, *understood* allegorically. However, Hanson thinks that Origen reasons this way because Paul had set the precedent. The details must be *understood* allegorically because they were *intended* allegorical. Hanson may be right, but in the passage, it is very difficult to tell. It is at least clear that the "things of marriage" (τὰ κατὰ τοὺς γάμους) are the subject of the verb, in which case Origen's use here may not even be an exception. The verb may very well be functioning just like Hanson observed in the other unambiguous passages. What throws Hanson off is that it is the letter of Galatians that is the location for this allegorization, not Genesis. In Galatians, the things of marriage are allegorized, which suggests that Paul is the agent of that allegorization, not the text of Genesis. Whatever the case may be, it would seem that the ambiguity of Origen's use of the word in this passage is not sufficient to overturn Hanson's conclusion. Hanson, *Studies in Paul's Technique and Theology*, 93.

"These things are intended to convey a deeper meaning."[58] In his view, the ambiguity of this "deeper meaning" raises another question: "Is it an allegory or a type?"[59]

In an attempt to answer this question, Hanson begins to assess what Paul actually does in Galatians 4. Hanson describes Paul's procedure almost identically to Goppelt. Paul is typologizing with a little hint of allegory.[60] What keeps Hanson from categorizing Paul's exegesis as pure typology is the apostle's use of Hagar. Paul's comments on Sarah make sense, but the connections he makes between Hagar and the present Jerusalem are awkward. "It is easy to see how Christians can be sons of Sarah κατὰ πνεῦμα," but how could Hagar be the mother of unbelieving Jews?[61] Hanson thinks that Paul's words simply got away from him in the heat of the moment. In contrast, Romans 9 provides a glimpse into a more measured version of the argument from a more mature version of Paul.[62] This overreach in Galatians is what presses Paul's exegesis to the border of typology and allegory, but Hanson thinks that Paul stops just short.[63] He was attempting to show the ultimate deeper significance of the historical events for the present time. "This is typology, not allegory."[64]

Despite Hanson's confidence in labeling Paul as a typologist, he seems unsure how to describe Galatians 4's relationship with the literal sense of the text. Is Paul's reading of Genesis connected to its original sense or not? At first, he claims that "we

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[58] Hanson, *Studies in Paul's Technique and Theology*, 94. Hanson's warrant for leaving the exact nuance of the ἀλληγορέω as an open question is comes from a text from Theodotus in which he comments on Paul's hermeneutic in Gal 4. In Theodotus's view, Paul's reading does not go against the history of the text; thus, Paul's use of ἀλληγορέω was very mild one. The apostle was not trying to associate himself with the hermeneutical practices of the Greeks that came before him.

[59] Hanson, *Studies in Paul's Technique and Theology*, 94.

[60] Hanson, *Studies in Paul's Technique and Theology*, 94, 101.

[61] Hanson, *Studies in Paul's Technique and Theology*, 95.

[62] Hanson, *Studies in Paul's Technique and Theology*, 95.

[63] Hanson, *Studies in Paul's Technique and Theology*, 101.

[64] Hanson, *Studies in Paul's Technique and Theology*, 102.

must . . . admit that Paul is in fact going against the plain sense of the text."[65] Hanson does not elaborate on what he means here, but it is obvious what he has in mind. Genesis describes the nation of Israel as coming from the loins of Isaac, not Ishmael. In reversing this origin story, Paul goes "against the plain sense of the text." After pointing this reversal out, however, Hanson begins to argue that the plain sense is not completely useless for Paul. The text's "original meaning is important for him since it expresses the original historical events which he needs in order to pin down his whole theological scheme."[66] In other words, the events found in Genesis are the raw clay out of which Paul builds his famous dichotomy between Hagar and Sarah. Hagar must be a slave, and she must be Ishmael's mother. Likewise, Sarah must be free, and she must be the mother of Isaac. Without these details, Paul's points could not get off the ground.

Hanson then begins to waffle a bit, returning to his initial concerns and asking whether Paul was "really any different from Philo, who made the scriptural characters signify anything he chose."[67] Hanson provides a mixed answer to this question. On the one hand, "it must be confessed that as far as ignoring the original intention with which the text of Scripture was written is concerned, there is little to choose between Philo and Paul."[68] On the other, "Paul never succeeds in getting away from the content of Scripture in the way in which Philo invariably does."[69] He remains within biblical categories (e.g., law, promise, works, faith, and so on), whereas Philo moves on to things the Bible knows nothing about (e.g., wisdom, sophistry, and intermediate training).[70] So, for Hanson, is Paul like Philo? Yes and no. He clearly thinks that Paul's connections are not warranted

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[65] Hanson, *Studies in Paul's Technique and Theology*, 102.

[66] Hanson, *Studies in Paul's Technique and Theology*, 102.

[67] Hanson, *Studies in Paul's Technique and Theology*, 103.

[68] Hanson, *Studies in Paul's Technique and Theology*, 103.

[69] Hanson, *Studies in Paul's Technique and Theology*, 103.

[70] Hanson, *Studies in Paul's Technique and Theology*, 103.

by the text; that is, they go against the plain sense. They ignore the original intention just like Philo's.[71] However, he recognizes that the connections are stronger than those of Philo. They are closer to the text. They are made out of the original details. Thus, Hanson struggles to provide a definitive answer to his question. He was typologizing, but the typological structures he builds do not sit well with the original sense of the text.

Hanson mentions Philo only in passing, but it is clear that he understands him in the same way as Goppelt and R. P. C. Hanson. Even in the conversation above concerning Paul, Hanson can be seen to use Philo as a foil against which Paul's exegesis is measured. The main place of note comes in the middle of the work when Hanson again raises the question of whether Paul ever used allegory in his entire corpus.[72] Here, he repeats the fact that Paul was typologizing in Galatians and only accidentally veered into certain techniques that resembles allegory. "The connection, for example, between the two women and the two mountains depends on the slender etymological link whereby Hagar could be taken to mean 'the mountain.'"[73] Hanson cites Paul's use of etymology as one of these accidental allegorical attributes. Hanson knows etymology was a key attribute of allegory because "it was, of course, a favorite technique with that master of allegories, Philo."[74] Hanson's logic places him alongside Goppelt and R. P. C. Hanson before him. Etymology is a telltale trait of allegory because etymology is a telltale straight of Philo's exegesis. Philo equals allegory.

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[71] Even on this point, Hanson seems to be conflicted. Hanson later says that Paul might be cleared of the charge of arbitrary exegesis if read against his own presuppositions: "[His interpretation] seems arbitrary to us, till we have examined Paul's assumptions and the assumptions of contemporary exegesis. When we do this, we find that there was nothing arbitrary about it." Hanson, *Studies in Paul's Technique and Theology*, 157. This comment further supports my claim that Hanson simply struggles to describe what it was that Paul was doing. How can one read against the grain of the text and avoid the charge of being arbitrary? Pointing out Paul's presuppositions does not help since those presuppositions might be the very reason for arbitrary exegesis. Philo no doubt was reading in accordance with his presuppositions, but Hanson would not hesitate to call his exegesis arbitrary.

[72] Hanson, *Studies in Paul's Technique and Theology*, 159ff.

[73] Hanson, *Studies in Paul's Technique and Theology*, 161.

[74] Hanson, *Studies in Paul's Technique and Theology*, 161.

At this point, some general comparisons can be made between A. T. Hanson's work the other two men. Within his own work, Hanson seems to maintain the sharp dichotomy between typology and allegory, unlike R. P. C. Hanson. In this regard, he is almost identical to Goppelt except for the fact that he seems to focus on the arbitrary nature of the connection slightly more than Goppelt does. Thus, there really is only a slight definitional disagreement between Goppelt and A. T. Hanson.

Hanson's definitional problems come as he attempts to apply them to Paul. If Paul reads against the original sense of the text, as Hanson seems to think, it is hard to see how he is not offering "an explanation of the text that replaces the literal sense and has a purely arbitrary connection with it."[75] If Hanson's account of Paul's reading is accurate, then Paul indeed crosses the line that Hanson himself draws in the sand. He connects one biblical thing with another, but those two things, according to Hanson, are connected arbitrarily. The original meaning of the text does not yield the meaning Paul on which Paul draws. Is this not allegory as Hanson understands it?

What becomes clear is that Hanson is caught between two poles. He thinks that Paul goes against the grain of the original sense of the text, presumably understood in the historical-critical sense, but not as severely as Philo. There is something irresistible about Hanson's observation here (Paul and Philo do seem to be different), but his definition does not allow him to make this separation. As he says, "it must be confessed that as far as ignoring the original intention with which the text of Scripture was written is concerned, there is little to choose between Philo and Paul."[76] Thus, consistency would seem to require that Hanson admit that Paul is indeed allegorizing, or he must revisit his definition of allegory itself.

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[75] Hanson, *Studies in Paul's Technique and Theology*, 94.

[76] Hanson, *Studies in Paul's Technique and Theology*, 103.

The Epistle to the Galatians F. F. Bruce

In his commentary on Galatians, F. F. Bruce also comments on Paul's exegetical technique and continues on with the categories of allegory and typology.[77] Bruce never explicitly defines allegory, but he does describe his view of typology: "Typology presupposes that salvation-history displays a recurring pattern of divine action."[78] This "recurring pattern" is to Bruce what "historical facts" are to Goppelt, "similar situations" are to R. P. C. Hanson, and "sets of circumstances" are to A. T. Hanson. Typology occurs when an author connects one historical event to another based on similar patterns. Bruce clearly offers this definition looking forward to Paul's hermeneutic in Galatians 4.

At the beginning of his commentary on the pericope, Bruce points out that "Paul himself calls his interpretation 'allegorical.'"[79] At a glance, it would seem like Bruce is arguing similarly to R. P. C. Hanson. Paul's pericope in Galatians 4 is an allegory because he says so. However, there are a number of things Bruce argues shortly thereafter that muddle what he means. First, he qualifies how he takes Paul's statement in Galatians 4:24. By ἅτινά ἐστιν ἀλληγορούμενα, Paul simply meant that "the entities in the story stand for something other than their *prima facie* sense."[80] Second, he makes it clear that an allegory is something like John Bunyan's *Pilgrim's Progress*.[81] Third, he argues

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[77] Bruce's work is one of the few commentaries that I will interact with in this survey because it is to him that many point back to as making explicit that Paul got the history wrong. Hagar was not the mother of Jerusalem.

[78] F. F. Bruce, *The Epistle to the Galatians: A Commentary on the Greek Text*, NIGTC (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1982), 217. Cf. F. F. Bruce, "'Abraham Had Two Sons': A Study in Pauline Hermeneutics," in *New Testament Studies: Essays in Honor of Ray Summers in His Sixty-Fifth Year*, ed. Huber L. Drumwright and Curtis Vaughan (Waco, TX: Markham Press, 1975), 83.

[79] Bruce, *The Epistle to the Galatians*, 214.

[80] Bruce, *The Epistle to the Galatians*, 214.

[81] Bruce, *The Epistle to the Galatians*, 215. To be clear, Bruce's main point in bringing up *Pilgrim's Progress* is to discuss whether those that allegorize understand their allegories to be authorially intended or not. *Pilgrim's Progress* serves as an example of an allegory in which the connections between the symbolic characters and their referents were clearly intended by the creator. Nevertheless, it is clear in the flow of Bruce's thought that he thinks *Pilgrim's Progress* and Paul's allegory are both allegories of the same sort, authorially intended or not.

that Paul is not doing allegory in a Philonic sense. Rather, "he has in mind that form of allegory which is commonly called typology."[82]

These three qualifications cause similar definitional problems to what was seen in R. P. C. Hanson's *Allegory and Event*. His logic in categorizing Paul (i.e., Paul is allegorizing because he says so) and his connection between Paul's exegesis and *Pilgrim's Progress* make it seem as if Bruce assumes that the modern term "allegory" and ἀλληγορέω mean the same thing. His qualification of verse 24, however, drastically reduces what Paul would be claiming in that verse. To say that ἀλληγορέω merely means that "the entities in the story stand for something other than their *prima facie* sense" is to say that it means "non-literal."[83] It is not to say that it means "allegory." The latter refers to works like *Pilgrim's Progress*; the former to any work with meaning that goes beyond the surface-level details. These are not the same. The meaning of works like *Pilgrim's Progress* certainly transcend what is written on the page, but they do so in a very specific way. Thus, it is misleading to say that Paul was allegorizing because he claims to be in verse 24 as Bruce does.

His third qualification—that Paul is actually doing typology—suggests that he operates with two levels of allegory, one general and one specific. The general category encompasses non-literal types of meaning like typology and Philonic allegory. The specific type is exemplified by Philo and stands at odds with typology. Paul is merely doing the general type, according to Bruce, not the specific. Even here, though, Bruce is not clear. In his comments on Galatians 4:21, he says that "Paul was not the first to allegorize the story of Abraham's two sons: Philo had done so already."[84] Probably what

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[82] Bruce, *The Epistle to the Galatians*, 217. Cf. Bruce, "'Abraham Had Two Sons,'" 83.

[83] Bruce, *The Epistle to the Galatians*, 214.

[84] Bruce does go on to say that there is "no relation between Philo's interpretation and Paul's," but he is not referring to their hermeneutic. He is simply referring to the conclusions of their exegesis. Bruce, *The Epistle to the Galatians*, 215. Philo connects Sarah to virtue and Hagar to elementary education. Paul connects them to the new and old Jerusalems. Most have followed Bruce here, although Jason Zurawski has argued that Paul was actually appropriating some of the ideas within Philo's conclusions.

he means is that they were both doing the same non-literal thing; that is, both Paul and Philo fit under the general allegorical umbrella of which typology and Philonic allegory are types. Nevertheless, claiming on the one hand that Philo allegorized Abraham's two sons before Paul did and then on the other asserting that Paul was not thinking of allegory in the Philonic sense is at best confusing and at worst conflicting. Hence, Bruce's definition of allegory is simply unclear, much like R. P. C. Hanson's was before him.

When it comes to what Paul is doing with Hagar's name in verse 25, Bruce deviates from the status quo. Goppelt and both of the Hanson's see Paul's handling of Hagar in verse 25 as an instance of etymological exegesis. Paul is linking Hagar's name in some way to Mount Sinai. All of them are somewhat agnostic as to how he does so since there is no readymade Hebrew word that connects "Hagar" to "mountain," but they all agree that Paul's conclusions hinge on Hagar's name. Bruce disagrees. In his view, Paul was not etymologizing the name "Hagar."[85] Hagar does not obviously mean "mountain" or "Sinai" or anything that would allow Paul to connect the two via etymology. Some have attempted to argue that Paul was drawing on the Aramaic word *hagra* or the Arabic word *hagar*, but Bruce finds neither of these solutions convincing.[86] In his view, he is merely connecting Hagar to Mount Sinai so that it might serve as a metonym for the entire Jewish system, its laws, and customs.[87] It is an assertion, not an argument. Thus, Bruce denies to Paul what the others thought to be a key attribute of allegorical exegesis. Paul was not etymologizing Hagar's name in verse 25 to draw the conclusions he does.

Jason Zurawski, "Mosaic Torah as Encyclical Paideia: Reading Paul's Allegory of Hagar and Sarah in Light of Philo of Alexandria's," in *Pedagogy in Ancient Judaism and Early Christianity*, ed. Karina Martin Hogan, Matthew Goff, and Emma Wasserman, Early Judaism and Its Literature 41 (Atlanta: SBL Press, 2017), 283–308.

[85] Bruce, *The Epistle to the Galatians*, 219–20.

[86] The source of Paul's potential etymological exegesis is an important part of the debate and will be delt with in a later chapter. Bruce, *The Epistle to the Galatians*, 219.

[87] Bruce, *The Epistle to the Galatians*, 220.

The last thing to discuss concerning Bruce's work is his view on the relationship between Galatians 4 and Genesis 16–21. Following C. K. Barrett's famous article on Paul's allegory,[88] Bruce argues that Paul's typological understanding runs roughshod over its Old Testament source material: "Whereas in other typological passages the OT account is left intact, the argument here is up against the historical fact that Isaac was the ancestor of the Jews, whereas Ishmael's descendants were Gentiles."[89] Bruce is perplexed by Paul's "forcible inversion," claiming that it is "unparalleled elsewhere in Paul."[90] Why would Paul claim something so obviously denied by the text? Hagar was not the mother of Israel. Sarah was. "This unique clash between type and antitype demands an explanation."[91] Bruce finds just such an explanation in Barrett's work.

Paul, wanting to respond directly to his interlocutors, goes right for the heart of their exegetical evidence. Presumably, Paul's opponents argued that the story of Isaac and Ishmael supported their case.[92] One must be circumcised to become a part of the

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[88] C. K. Barrett's famous article was a turning point for scholarship on Gal 4. At least since Luther, interpreters of the Bible struggled to place Paul's allegory. How did it fit into his argument? What was its purpose? Many prior to Barrett argued that the pericope functioned merely as an illustration of what had already been argued. By popularizing the idea that the passage filled a key role in Paul's overarching claim, Barrett turned things upside down. Paul's infamous pericope was not an illustration. It was a rebuttal in and of itself. Scholarship generally followed Barrett, culminating in Samuel J. Tedder's recent work that places the allegory at the peak of Paul's claims. Barrett does not say much as to what it is Paul is doing hermeneutically, so his claims with be discussed in a later chapter. C. K. Barrett, "The Allegory of Abraham, Sarah, and Hagar in the Argument of Galatians," in *Rechtfertigung: Festschrift Für Ernst Käsemann z 70 Geburtstag*, ed. Johannes Friedrich, Wolfgang Pöhlmann, and Peter Stuhlmacher (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1976), 1–16; Samuel J. Tedder, *Children of Laughter and the Re-Creation of Humanity: The Theological Vision and Logic of Paul's Letter to the Galatians* (Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 2020).

[89] Bruce, *The Epistle to the Galatians*, 218. Cf. Bruce, "'Abraham Had Two Sons,'" 84.

[90] Bruce, *The Epistle to the Galatians*, 218.

[91] Bruce, *The Epistle to the Galatians*, 218.

[92] Barrett cites *Jub*. 16:17–19a as an example of this view where the writer says concerning Ishmael, "And through Isaac a name and seed would be named for him. And all the seed of his sons would become nations. And they would be counted with the nations. But from the sons of Isaac one would become a holy seed and he would not be counted among the nations because he would become the portion of the Most High and all his seed would fall (by lot) into that which God will rule so that he might become a people (belonging) to the LORD, a (special) possession from all people, and so that he might become a kingdom of priests and holy people." James H. Charlesworth, ed., "Jubilees," in *The Old Testament Pseudepigrapha*, trans. O. S. Wintermute (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 1983), 2:88.

people of God. Paul's allegory attempts to flip this argument on its head by showing that, properly understood, the story of Isaac and Ishmael actually shows the opposite. Circumcision was never the true mark of the people of God. In Bruce's opinion, Paul neglects the surface-level of the text to deny his opponents their biblical stronghold.[93]

Later though, Bruce casts doubt on this opinion. "If it was Paul's opponents who compelled him to take up the story of Ishmael and Isaac, they unintentionally provided him with a wonderful text to undergird the argument of this whole letter."[94] This statement seems at odds with Bruce's earlier notion that the type runs contrary to the antitype to which Paul connects it. The reason Bruce seems to renege on his claim is that he is looking at a different portion of Genesis. In his view, Genesis 21:10 does defend the notion that "legal bondage and spiritual freedom cannot coexist," the point Bruce thinks Paul to be making in Galatians 4:21–31.[95] Thus, Bruce ultimately argues that certain parts of Genesis do support Paul's reading while others do not. The problem with this mixed view lies in Barrett's original motive. The whole reason Barrett attributed Paul's choice of text to his opponents was because the choice was so odd. If Bruce, is correct, however, could not Paul have chosen the text precisely because Genesis 21:10 bears out the point he is trying to make? If so, would not the impetus for Barrett's original thesis fall away? Therefore, Bruce ultimately sends mixed messages as to how Paul's exegesis related to the literal sense of the text. Sometimes he thinks the text is suitable. Sometimes not.

Bruce's discussion looks much like what had come before him. He operates with the basic dichotomy between allegory and typology. Despite there being a general category for the former, Paul falls into the latter since he connects one historical event to another. Bruce struggles over Galatians 4's relationship with the literal sense of the text.

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[93] Bruce, *The Epistle to the Galatians*, 218.

[94] Bruce, *The Epistle to the Galatians*, 225.

[95] Bruce, *The Epistle to the Galatians*, 225.

Hagar's progeny were Gentiles, not Jews, and yet, there is something suitable about what Paul ends up doing with Genesis. Philo again makes an appearance. He only does so in passing, but it is clear that Bruce understands him to be the representative of at least a peculiar species of allegorical exegesis against which Paul must be measured.

Bruce also struggles with his definitions. Much like A. T. Hanson, he claims both a general and a specific type of allegory. He places Paul only under the specific category, presumably because he uses the verb ἀλληγορέω. This logic shows two things. First, as stated above, he assumes that ἀλληγορέω and allegory mean the same thing. Second, it shows the impetus for the general category. Had Paul not used the term, it stands to reason that Bruce would have been comfortable denying altogether that Paul was allegorizing. This general species of allegory is simply a vacuous category intended to account for Paul's own language. If it could be shown that ἀλληγορέω did not mean the same things as its modern counterpart, this general category would likely be unnecessary.

Old and New in Interpretation James Barr

James Barr is one of the few of this era to challenge the typology-allegory distinction. Writing in the period between R. P. C. Hanson and A. T. Hanson, Barr questions whether typology and allegory can be divided along the lines of history. Most scholars, like those above, conceive of typology as uniquely historical over against allegory. As Barr puts it, "the distinction generally made is that typology is based on historical correspondences and thus related to the Bible's own historical emphasis; while, judged by that same emphasis, allegory is non-historical and anti-historical."[96] Barr questions this claim. "The idea that allegory is definitely and ineluctably anti-historical does not seem true to me."[97]

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[96] James Barr, *Old and New in Interpretation: A Study of the Two Testaments* (New York: Harper & Row, 1966), 104.

[97] Barr, *Old and New in Interpretation*, 105.

In his view, scholars have been able to maintain this distinction only by arbitrarily limiting the pool of evidence. They have excluded examples of allegory that do not fit cleanly into an anti-historical mode and have placed too much emphasis on those that do. Their distinction "depends on the choice of examples."[98] Philo, for example, supports the distinction. "His system was one which had extremely little interest in a revelation communicated through the medium of history."[99] Thus, many have reasoned that allegory is anti-historical because Philo's exegesis was anti-historical. The problem with this way of reasoning, according to Barr, is that "it seems impossible to say that the characteristics which apply to Philo apply to allegory universally, unless one produces a quite tautological definition of allegory."[100] Philo could serve as the exemplar of allegory only if one has already determined that allegory is anti-historical. If one has already determined that allegory is anti-historical, however, it would be pointless to point to Philo as evidence for its anti-historical nature. Doing so would be, as Barr puts it, tautological.

Barr chooses to widen the evidence pool to include examples like Augustine's famous allegory of the parable of the Good Samaritan. In his allegory, Augustine takes elements of the parable and connects them to various objects or persons. For example, Augustine takes the town of Jericho as a symbol of the moon. Unlike Philo, Augustine's exegesis of the Good Samaritan could not possibly fit into an anti-historical mode, for "the story was not historical in the first place."[101] If examples like Augustine's allegory of the Good Samaritan are to be allowed, "allegory cannot be described categorically as anti-historical in character, and we cannot make this into an ultimate distinction from typology."[102]

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[98] Barr, *Old and New in Interpretation*, 105.

[99] Barr, *Old and New in Interpretation*, 105.

[100] Barr, *Old and New in Interpretation*, 106.

[101] Barr, *Old and New in Interpretation*, 107.

[102] Barr, *Old and New in Interpretation*, 107.

Barr presses even further. In his view, certain distinctive attributes of allegory actually have a historical quality to them. "Etymologizing interpretation of biblical words are a good example."[103] Allegorizers that argue on the basis of etymology demonstrate sensitivity to the *history* of the word. They make arguments about what a certain word means based on how it developed over time. Whether such an etymological argument proves valid, its form demonstrates "a high valuation for the history of words."[104] Barr uses this example to make the same point he made with Augustine but from a different angle. Allegory is not anti-historical because one of its exegetical staples holds history in high regard. It is for these two reasons that Barr denies that allegory is uniquely anti-historical. How could it if allegory both deals with non-historical texts and has certain historical characteristics?

Barr replaces the typology-allegory framework with a view that distinguishes allegory on the basis of what he calls a "resultant system."[105] In Barr's thought, a resultant system is one of two levels that interpreters connect in these sorts of interpretations. "The first [level] is the text, the second is the system into which the interpretation runs out."[106] This "system into which the interpretation runs out" is Barr's resultant system. The differences between typology and allegory are not reducible to "*methods* stable separately from the resultant system, . . . but between different kinds of resultant systems."[107] Philo uses an atemporal resultant system, and thus, his exegesis looks atemporal. Paul, on the other hand, uses the Christ event (a historical event) as his resultant system, and thus, his exegesis looks historical. That one is historical and the other not is a non-essential attribute of each individual's hermeneutic. It is an accident

[103] Barr, *Old and New in Interpretation*, 107–8.

[104] Barr, *Old and New in Interpretation*, 108.

[105] Barr, *Old and New in Interpretation*, 108.

[106] Barr, *Old and New in Interpretation*, 108.

[107] Barr, *Old and New in Interpretation*, 108.

resulting from the systems they chose.[108] Therefore, for Barr, the essence of allegory lies in the use of these resultant systems, not in any sort of method or anti-historical character.

Barr divides these systems into two categories—homogeneous systems and heterogeneous systems. Homogeneous systems loosely fit with the text they are trying to interpret. Barr thinks that the early Christian allegories fit into this group.[109] They are homogeneous in the sense that they come from the thought world of the text. Adam, the person to whom Augustine connects the main character in the parable Good Samaritan, is a biblical person. He comes from the thought world of the Bible. Thus, Augustine's interpretation fits the text in question. The problem though, according to Barr, is that the interpretation, while fitting the text, does not come directly from it. "Some of these things, while taught indeed in the New Testament, are not taught in it *here*, i.e., at the point now being interpreted."[110] Adam may be a biblical person, but is he the destitute man in the parable of the Good Samaritan as Augustine takes him to be? Probably not. Therefore, a homogeneous allegory is *merely* homogeneous with the specific text being interpreted. It does not necessarily come from it. Heterogeneous, on the other hand, systems do not come from the thought-world of the text at all. "The standard case of this is Philo."[111] The Greek philosophy that made up Philo's resultant system was not a part of the thought world of the Bible.

Understood in this way, allegory suffers from a different problem. Allegory does not err by being anti-historical, as proponents of typology argue. It errs, according to Barr, because it has lost a feel for literary genre and has replaced it with artificial interpretive methods.[112] It is difficult to know exactly what Barr means by "artificial

[108] Barr, *Old and New in Interpretation*, 110.

[109] Barr, *Old and New in Interpretation*, 116.

[110] Barr, *Old and New in Interpretation*, 116.

[111] Barr, *Old and New in Interpretation*, 116.

[112] Barr, *Old and New in Interpretation*, 117.

interpretive methods," but the examples to which he appeals provide some idea. An allegorizer, for example, may indiscriminately draw exegetical conclusions from various etymologies regardless of the genre of the text at hand. For some texts, this technique may work. The name changes in Genesis clearly invite the interpreter to make these sorts of etymological claims. For others, it seems forced. The text does not offer this sort of invitation and may even resist the use of such a technique. In these latter scenarios, the use of etymology would be artificial.

Barr's critique at this point reveals that he has more to say concerning the definition of allegory than his discussion on resultants systems would suggests. It is not merely its use of a resultant system that makes allegory what it is. It is its use of these artificial interpretive methods that connect these systems to their texts. In short, to be allegorical in Barr's thought, an interpretation must both connect a resultant system to a text *and* do so via artificial interpretive methods. Barr never deals with Paul's allegory in detail, but it is clear that he thinks it is a homogeneous allegory. The characters and the entities that Paul plays with in the allegory are certainly biblical, but he, like many of those that inhabit the historical-critical world, probably thought that the methods Paul used to connect them together were artificial. Paul's allegory then fits Barr's definition quite well.

Even without specific comment on Paul, Barr's analysis of the typology-allegory framework poses a few challenges to my thesis. He denies Philo his allegorical throne, and he attempts to undermine the notion that allegory might be defined along methodological lines. If he is right about Philo, then I would be wrong to use Philo as the standard against which Paul's allegory might be assessed. Likewise, if he is right about one's ability to ascribe certain methods to allegory, then my claim that Paul's allegory lacks certain tried and true allegorical techniques would also be wrong. Before I deal with these two issues, it is important to note the primary place where Barr seems to be right.

Even if one does not widen the pool of evidence to include examples like Augustine as Barr does, it does seem true that some allegorizers were not necessarily antagonistic to history. Philo himself allegorized texts that were not historical such as the law codes of ancient Israel.[113] Thus, the same logic that applied to Augustine also applies to the one most think to be the exemplar of allegory. Philo's exegesis in these places cannot be considered anti-historical because he was not dealing with history in the first place. In my view, however, this observation misses the essence of the question concerning allegory, a point I will detail and defend in my chapter on Philo. Barr's argument from the historical character of etymology is less successful since he does not seem to do justice to the sense of history that advocates of typology are working with. As can be seen above, by "history" supporters of typology have in mind *events* brought about by a specific person or groups of people. The exodus is "historical" in this sense. The semantic development of κεφαλή is not. Nevertheless, Barr's argument from genre seems sound and is enough to call prevailing definitions of allegory and typology into question. If allegory might be applied to non-historical texts, then it cannot be anti-historical.

Barr's statements concerning Philo and method do not hold up as well. For example, despite his attempt to reduce allegory's boundaries to the connection of a text to a resultant system, it is clear that he still defines allegory as a method. Again, Barr argues that the methodological differences between allegory and typology are accidental. They are a result of their respective resultant systems, not of a self-consciously applied hermeneutical method.[114] In other words, Paul wants to connect Genesis to Christianity. Philo wants to connect Genesis to Platonism. Scholars who hold to the typology-allegory

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[113] By not historical, I do not mean that I read those law codes as not belonging to the ancient nation of Israel, born of Abraham and delivered from Egypt. What I mean is that these law codes are not an attempt to describe historical events. They prescribe how Israel was to conduct her day-to-day life. The prologue of Deuteronomy is historical in this sense. The stipulations are not.

[114] Barr, *Old and New in Interpretation*, 108.

framework have argued that these two authors forged these connections in different ways. Paul used typology. Philo used allegory. Barr disagrees. In his view, the differences between the two methods stem from the different systems they want to connect Genesis to—Christianity for Paul and Platonism for Philo. They do not stem from different *ways* each author used to make these connections. Both Paul and Philo were allegorizing merely because they tried to connect Genesis to Christianity and Platonism. How they did so is irrelevant. Paul's hermeneutical methods may look more historical than Philo's as advocates of typology observe, but that is simply because Christianity, Paul's resultant system, is more historical than Platonism, Philo's resultant system.

Later, Barr seems to backtrack on this claim when he offers his own critique of allegory in the place of the anti-historical critique. He sets up this critique by describing the traditional critique in his own terms. According to Barr, the problem with delineating allegory by its anti-historical character is that doing so focuses too much on Philo, who in Barr's view is an anomaly within the allegorical pool. He serves as an outlier of allegory, not the first-century exemplar many have taken him to be. Instead, critique must account for the homogeneous type, like Augustine's allegorization of the parable of the Good Samaritan, in which we can see features common to all allegory.[115]

"If a criticism is to be offered of allegory on this basis [i.e., against the more common type], it will in many cases be a criticism not for anti-historical bias, but rather for the making of a form-mistake: for neglecting the indications which are given by the context."[116] In other words, what makes allegory distinct—what is common to both Philo and Augustine—is its lack of sensitivity to genre, its artificiality. Barr may or not be right here, but the important thing to note is his critique demonstrates that he still considers allegory a method, not just the connecting of a text to a resultant system. Proper reading,

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[115] Barr, *Old and New in Interpretation*, 117.

[116] Barr, *Old and New in Interpretation*, 117.

in his view, is sensitive to genre. Allegory is not. Since sensitivity to genre is a methodological issue, what makes allegory allegory must concern hermeneutical method, not just the connection between a text and a resultant system. The *way* they are connected matters. To be sure, the weakness of allegory might be a different methodological issue than the anti-historical issue typically observed, but it is a methodological issue nonetheless. It speaks to the *means* by which an allegorizer connects his resultant system to the text. Barr even somewhat recognizes this when he later calls the forms of this lack of sensitivity "artificial interpretive *methods*."[117] It would seem then that the question of allegory as a method is still open even in Barr's own thought, and the difference between Paul and Philo may lie at the methodological level.

His comments on Philo pose a greater challenge. If it is true that an appeal Philo proves tautological, then my argument does not work. Philo would indeed arbitrarily serve as the stand-in for allegory, but there are a number of problems with Barr's point here. First, Barr inadvertently limits the pool of evidence just like he accuses the typology-allegory defenders of doing. He trades out Philo for Augustine and those like him rather than including both. He thinks such a move is justified because a larger proportion of the allegorizing within the Jewish-Christian tradition is of the Augustinian kind, but this claim is far from clear.[118] Famous Christian allegorizers, such as Clement, Origen, and Didymus the Blind, look very much like Philo, so it does not seem true that Philo is an outlier within the Christian tradition.[119] Furthermore, why limit the pool to the

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[117] Barr, *Old and New in Interpretation*, 117.

[118] Barr, *Old and New in Interpretation*, 116.

[119] Henri de Lubac, the famous Origen scholar, is one of the few who have attempted to drive a wedge between Philo and the Alexandrian Christians that resemble him. He argues that the similarities between the two are merely skin deep because they differ where it matters most—their view of Jesus. Philo, according to de Lubac, could not put the whole biblical puzzle together because he lacked the key that Origen would later find. The spiritual referent behind the text is properly Jesus, and it is he that makes sense of an otherwise enigmatic text. Therefore, although bearing some surface-level similarities, Philo and the early Christian allegorizers should not be united as they so often are. Henri de Lubac, *History and Spirit: The Understanding of Scripture According to Origen* (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2007), 187. De Lubac's argument warrants serious consideration. He is right to say that Philo and Origen differ in a key

Christian tradition? Allegory was a discipline practiced by many outside the Christian tradition, and many of them look like Philo as well. If the net is cast as wide as Barr recommends, it is very challenging to see how one could justifiably push Philo to the hermeneutical periphery.

More importantly, the fact that many scholars point to Philo when they think of allegory is itself an argument for defining the term by appealing to him. Barr is famous for defending a synchronic view of language which understands meaning to result from word use over against word development.[120] Thus, if most scholars in the modern era think "Philo" when they think "allegory," then allegory *means* "Philo." Even scholars that want to widen the definition of allegory struggle not to put Philo in this role. Remember that R. P. C. Hanson, who defended both a Palestinian and Alexandrian view of allegory, saw something distinct in Philo. He saw him as the representative of allegory proper. Barr himself struggles in this way. When choosing who should represent allegory, he admits that Philo is the natural choice, and he later calls Philo the arch-allegorist.[121] Limiting the pool of evidence to Philo arbitrarily runs one into a tautological wall, but the impulse to take Philo as the arch-allegorist is irresistible, which is why many scholars have done so even down to the present. Therefore, Barr's critiques of allegory as method and allegory defined by Philo do not hold up to scrutiny.

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area. He fails though to show that they differ hermeneutically in my opinion. He spends page after page conceding that Philo and Origen do indeed employ the same interpretive moves, and then only about a sentence asserting that Jesus causes them to be worlds apart (pp. 182–87). It seems as if de Lubac is simply trying to argue that Philo and Origen differ simply because they draw different interpret conclusions, but this argument does not work. The same means could very plausibly lead to completely different ends. Modern historical-critical scholars, who essentially employ the same method, arrive at different conclusions about the meaning of texts all the time. Are they then using drastically different canons of reading? No. It still seems right then, despite de Lubac's point, to consider Origen and his followers as the Christian inheritors of Philo's hermeneutic.

[120] Barr, *The Semantics of Biblical Language*, 107–9.

[121] Barr, *Old and New in Interpretation*, 105, 114.

***Paradise Now and Not Yet* A. T. Lincoln**

A. T. Lincoln continues somewhat unphased by Barr's critique, preserving the typology-allegory framework in his discussion, but he pushes Paul further toward the allegorical side than the other authors thus far surveyed. In his view, had Paul left out verses 24–26 where he connects Hagar to the present Jerusalem and Sarah to the Jerusalem above, Paul would have indeed been typologizing.[122] However, true typology requires "that there be 'a real correspondence between type and antitype' and 'this correspondence must be both historical (i.e., a correspondence of situation and event) and theological (i.e., an embodiment of the same principle of God's working).'"[123] Therefore, because the correspondences of verses 24–26 are not "real," this portion of Galatians 4 should be considered allegorical, not typological.[124]

Contrary to Lincoln, the other surveyed scholars except A. T. Hanson have considered Paul's handling of Sarah, Hagar, and their respective Jerusalems in these verses as typological as well. If Paul showed any sign of allegory, it was in his use of ἀλληγορέω or the etymology of Hagar's name, not in the fact that he connects Abraham's wives to two different Jerusalems. Interestingly, Lincoln does not ascribe significance to either of these details. He thinks the etymological explanations of Hagar's name in verse 25 are unlikely and argues that ἀλληγορέω probably did not mean allegory at the time Galatians was written.[125] The key to understanding Lincoln's thought lies in the requirement of "real correspondence." The type and the antitype must not merely be historical events. They must really correspond.[126] Hagar does not really correspond to the

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[122] Andrew T. Lincoln, *Paradise Now and Not Yet: Studies in the Role of the Heavenly Dimension in Paul's Thought with Special Reference to His Eschatology* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 13.

[123] Lincoln, *Paradise Now and Not Yet*, 13.

[124] Lincoln, *Paradise Now and Not Yet*, 13.

[125] Lincoln, *Paradise Now and Not Yet*, 13–15.

[126] Lincoln, *Paradise Now and Not Yet*, 15.

present Jerusalem because "Paul finds himself up against the historical fact that it was the Jews who were Isaac's seed and the Gentiles who were Ishmael's descendants."[127] In Lincoln's view, Paul's dismissal of the literal sense of the text renders his exegesis allegorical in verses 24–26.

Lincoln is not the first to recognize arbitrariness of the connections in these verses. Many have observed that at least connecting Hagar to Jerusalem seems to rub against the grain of Genesis 16–21. He is, however, one of the few to take this observation to its logical conclusion. Goppelt, for example, recognizes that both typological and allegorical exegesis rise above the literal sense. Thus, whether Paul's connection between Hagar and the present Jerusalem fit the literal sense, Paul might still be typologizing under Goppelt's definitions. A. T. Hanson is perhaps the closest to Lincoln. He places a heavy emphasis on the arbitrariness of allegory, which seems to point to the same phenomenon as Lincoln's real correspondence. In the same way that Lincoln's "real correspondence" states what typology must have to be typology, Hanson's "arbitrary correspondence" states what allegory must lack to be allegory. These definitions match. Their applications of these definitions, on the other hand, do not. Where Hanson argues that Paul only slips into allegory in his handling of Hagar, Lincoln thinks that consistency requires one to admit that he allegorizes Sarah as well. The important thing to note is that despite using the typology-allegory framework, Lincoln categorizes Paul's exegesis as an instance of allegory because he adds a slight nuance to the typical definition. The connections must not merely be forged between historical events. They must be commended by the text. For Paul's reading to be typological, Genesis must somehow suggest that Hagar is the mother of the present Jerusalem.[128]

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[127] Lincoln, *Paradise Now and Not Yet*, 13.

[128] Lincoln ends his discussion claiming that "Paul serves up a cake, the basic ingredients of which are typological but which has some allegorical icing." Lincoln, *Paradise Now and Not Yet*, 14. From this statement, one would get the impression that Lincoln's conclusion concerning Paul fall more in line with the other that have claimed that Paul's exegesis is mostly typological, but the only reason he makes

Also, like A. T. Hanson, Lincoln thinks not much should be made of Paul's use of ἀλληγορέω. He begins by pointing out the typical two categories into which ἀλληγορέω falls. The verb "can mean to speak allegorically or to interpret allegorically."[129] More explicitly than Hanson, however, Lincoln points out that the adverb "allegorically" still leaves the meaning open. His words are worth quoting at length:

> The word "allegorically" should not however be allowed to prejudice any decision on Paul's technique here and we should certainly not import into that word all the connotations of the Alexandrian school. Paul's use of the verb ἀλληγορέω was not meant to denote a hard and fast hermeneutical category. . . . Literally ἀλληγορέω need only mean 'to speak with another meaning' and theoretically the means by which this was done could involve what we would now term either analogy or typology or allegory.[130]

As can be seen, past deciding whether the word refers to a textual or interpretive phenomenon, Lincoln thinks one must still decide the nature of that phenomenon. In other words, what does it mean for the text to speak *allegorically* or for a reader to interpret *allegorically*? In Lincoln's view, ἀλληγορέω simply means "to speak with another meaning," that is, to speak non-literally. As such, the term covers many forms of non-literal figures of speech—allegory, analogy, and even typology. It should not be loaded with the technical attributes for which Alexandrian exegesis came to be known. Scholars have been too quick to see Paul's use of the term as a determinative factor in discerning the nature of his hermeneutic simply because it is the ancestor of the modern term.

Lincoln's claim closely matches my own. I also think that ἀλληγορέω is better understood as something like "non-literal" or "metaphorical." Unfortunately, Lincoln seems to ground his claim in its etymology. When he says "literally ἀλληγορέω need only

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this statement is because he extends the label outside the text in question. No one really questions whether vv. 22, 23, 28–30 are typological. The question is whether vv. 24–27 are allegorical. Thus, Lincoln's concluding remarks need to be understood with some nuance lest readers take him to be agreeing with those he does not.

[129] Lincoln, *Paradise Now and Not Yet*, 12.

[130] Lincoln, *Paradise Now and Not Yet*, 13.

mean 'to speak with another meaning,'" he is probably referring to the fact that ἀλληγορέω stems from the Greek words ἄλλος which means "other" and ἀγορεύω which means "to speak." Their combination would then mean "to speak with another meaning." However, as is well known by now, a word's meaning cannot necessarily be reduced to its constituent parts, "butterfly" being a good example. Thus, in chapter 3, I intend to ground Lincoln's claim in word use. Ἀλληγορέω does mean "to speak with another meaning," but not because of its etymology. It does so because that is how ancient authors used it.

Lastly, Lincoln like many compares Paul to Philo as the standard of allegory. He admits that Paul's exegesis looks nothing like Philo's. "Paul's allegorizing does not attempt to develop philosophical principles and is rooted in the OT history."[131] At the end of the discussion, however, Lincoln follows Barr and argues that these differences are not enough "to justify a blurring of all distinctions whereby his interpretation is simply viewed as typology."[132] In other words, the only reason Paul looks different than Philo is because he uses a different "resultant system" to read the text. Despite the fact that his use of Barr at this point seems to be inconsistent with his earlier discussion, it is important to simply note that he uses Philo in the same way he has been used time and time again—as the standard of allegory.

Abraham in Galatians G. Walter Hansen

G. Walter Hansen follows Lincoln quite closely but with some important differences. Hansen dismisses Barr's critiques, arguing that the typology-allegory framework still serves the question well. He then appropriates R. P. C. Hanson's definitions as the basis of his discussion, which divide allegory and typology along the

[131] Lincoln, *Paradise Now and Not Yet*, 14.

[132] Lincoln, *Paradise Now and Not Yet*, 14.

lines of history.[133] Following Lincoln, Hansen argues that "typology" as defined by R. P. C. Hanson only accounts for the verses surrounding 24–27. The core of his pericope, which includes his comments on Sarah and Hagar, is not typological. It is allegorical.[134]

There is something else in R. P. C. Hanson's definition that rises to the surface in G. Walter Hansen's argument. Allegory does not merely dissolve the history of the text. It does so by treating the text like a collection of abstract symbols to be deciphered.[135] It is here that Hansen slightly separates himself from Lincoln. Lincoln concluded that Paul was allegorizing because his interpretation went against the literal sense of the text. Hansen adds to this notion arguing that Paul treated the text as a collection of enigmatic symbols to be untangled. "Paul, of course, is not using the text as did Philo to expound neo-Platonic philosophical principles. Nevertheless, he is giving a meaning to the various terms of the text in an allegorical fashion."[136] In other words, Paul's objectives might differ from Philo's, but his methods are the same. Both men interpreted the text as "a book of symbols which have hidden meaning beyond the literal, historical sense."[137]

This method can be seen in Paul's interpretation of Hagar's name. "The definitions which [Paul] develops to reverse the customary interpretation of the story are derived from an allegorical method of exegesis which resorts to the etymology of Hagar's

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[133] Hansen rightly points out that Barr doubts whether typology and allegory can be properly divided along historical lines as I discussed above, but his response is puzzling. Presumably as a rebuff to Barr, Hanson argues that Paul may well have preserved a certain historical framework in parts of Gal 4, but his interpretation of Gen 21 "goes beyond the historical account." Barr's point though is that this sort of observation is irrelevant. The difference between allegory and typology has nothing to do with their relationship to history. Therefore, observing whether Paul did good history in Gal 4 does not help categorize his exegesis as allegory or typology. G. Walter Hansen, *Abraham in Galatians: Epistolary and Rhetorical Contexts* (Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1989), 210.

[134] Hansen, *Abraham in Galatians*, 210–11.

[135] This feature has been present since Goppelt, but Hansen is one of the first to focus on it. Hansen, *Abraham in Galatians*, 210. Cf. Goppelt, *Typos*, 18.

[136] Hansen, *Abraham in Galatians*, 212.

[137] Hansen, *Abraham in Galatians*, 211.

name and word-associations between names."[138] Paul, according to Hansen, treats Hagar's name like a symbol that reveals a deeper meaning which in turn reverses the interpretation of Genesis 16 he is trying to confront. Following Hans Dieter Betz, Hansen points to Paul's use of the neuter article τό as opposed to the feminine article ἡ in verse 25 as evidence for this claim.[139]

Hansen also features Philo prominently in his discussion. He does reference other Jews who practiced the ancient technique, but his opening statement singles out Philo: "The Jewish practice of allegorical interpretation was most prominently practiced by Philo of Alexandria."[140] Philo is the reason Hansen thinks allegory treats the text like a collection of symbols. He is the standard by which Hansen judges Paul's allegory. For Hansen, Philo is the allegorical exemplar.

There are a number of things that are of note in Hansen's discussion. First, it is interesting that Hansen, although basically agreeing with the typology-allegory framework, thinks that the core of the pericope consists of allegory. Scholars like Goppelt pointed to similar phenomena (like Paul's handling of Hagar's name), and yet they still concluded that Paul was employing typology. This is the sort of definitional confusion that has caused the conversation to stall. How can two scholars both agree on the definition of allegory and on Paul's procedure and yet come to opposite conclusions? Second, despite falling short of achieving this aim, Hansen demonstrates that it is important to say something positive concerning Paul's hermeneutic. Allegory is clearly not merely an anti-literal reading. It may rub against the literal meaning of the text, but it seems to do so in a particular way. Allegorizers like Philo were clearly doing more than

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[138] Hansen, *Abraham in Galatians*, 147.

[139] Hansen, *Abraham in Galatians*, 148. Cf. Hans Dieter Betz, *Galatians*, Hermeneia (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1979), 244n65.

[140] Hansen, *Abraham in Galatians*, 211.

reading the text non-literally. Their exegesis possesses a certain positive shape that must be explored if allegory is to be properly understood.

"The Law Has Given Sarah No Children"
Charles H. Cosgrove

Similar to Barr, Charles Cosgrove focuses on an attribute of allegory outside of the traditional typology-allegory framework. Whereas with the typology-allegory framework, the attributes of the exegesis served as the dividing lines between the two modes of interpretation, Cosgrove begins to focus on the motives with which the authors used those modes. His article focuses primarily on the argument Paul mounts via his allegory, but he makes some important points concerning the allegory itself along the way.

He opens his discussion by describing the problems Galatians 4 has posed for its interpreters. His second problem is the most important for my discussion: "the *form* of the passage has been difficult to pin down. Do we have, as Paul says, an allegory, something nearer to typology, or a combination of both?"[141] Cosgrove basically leaves the question unanswered. He labels Paul's exegesis an "allegorical-typological" interpretation,[142] and in a footnote leading into his section on Paul, he mentions that Paul shows signs of both categories. Galatians resembles allegory in form, but the frame of reference Paul uses to move from Sarah and Hagar to their Jerusalems resembles the sort of salvation-historical grid common to typology.[143] Ultimately, in Cosgrove's view, Paul was doing both.[144]

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[141] Charles H. Cosgrove, "The Law Has Given Sarah No Children (Gal 4:21–30)," *NovT* 29, no. 3 (1987): 219 (italics original).

[142] Cosgrove, "The Law Has Given Sarah No Children," 221.

[143] Charles H. Cosgrove, "Justification in Paul: A Linguistic and Theological Reflection," *Journal of Biblical Literature* 106, no. 4 (December 1987): 221n12.

[144] Cosgrove seems is persuaded by the arguments of Betz and Dunn, who make similar assertions. Betz claims that Paul's exegesis evinces a mixture of typology and allegory. Betz, *Galatians*, 239. Dunn claims that Paul "explicitly claims to be indulging in allegorical exegesis." James D. G. Dunn,

When talking about allegory in general, Cosgrove begins to get more detailed. In his discussion on the persuasiveness of allegory, he engages with the idea that allegory is arbitrary or unwarranted exegesis. Although those surveyed above focused primarily on the nature of the objects that were connected through allegoresis, some also recognized that the conclusions drawn from a text via allegory do not seem to follow from the textual details themselves; that is, the conclusions are arbitrary. Cosgrove objects to this view, particularly with respect to Galatians 4, asking "to what extent does the passage as a whole constitute an argument?"[145] What is its persuasive appeal? Cosgrove thinks it too hasty to assume that it had no appeal at all. "It will not suffice in this connection to observe simply the apparent arbitrariness of allegorical exegesis, as if the persuasive appeal of allegorical interpretation were somehow past finding out."[146]

In most cases, according to Cosgrove, the appeal came from the esteem held for both the tradition being allegorized and the modern worldview to which this tradition was made to conform.[147] To use the oft referred to example, Philo attempted to demonstrate that the Old Testament, the source of Philo's tradition, actually taught the accepted tenants of Platonic philosophy, his modern worldview. Those that accepted Philo's arguments as persuasive did so because they wanted to hold on to both things. His audience probably believed Platonic metaphysics to be true, but they also held their sacred texts in high esteem. Philo's allegories allowed them to believe both. Thus, he was sometimes able to make these exegetical claims with little argument.

According to Cosgrove, however, there were often times when these claims were met with resistance. In such cases, allegorizers like Philo were "ready with warrants

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Unity and Diversity in the New Testament: An Inquiry into the Character of Earliest Christianity (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1977), 90–91.

[145] Cosgrove, "The Law Has Given Sarah No Children," 220.

[146] Cosgrove, "The Law Has Given Sarah No Children," 220.

[147] Cosgrove, "The Law Has Given Sarah No Children," 220.

for [their] exegetical judgments."[148] For this reason, one cannot properly say that allegorical exegesis is arbitrary exegesis. Its practitioners provided warrant for their readings. They rarely merely asserted them as true. Thus, Cosgrove adds another layer to allegory. To allegorize is to attempt to bring a sacred tradition into conformity to the modern worldview through a persuasive argument, and this is exactly what Paul was doing in Galatians 4. He was attempting to bring his gospel into conformity with the Old Testament.[149] Here, Cosgrove objects to those that have come before him like Lincoln who argued that allegories forge unwarranted connections between text and conclusion. To be sure, one may find the warrants of the ancient allegorizers to be unpersuasive, but it cannot be said that they provided none. These ancient thinkers attempted to persuade their audiences of their conclusions, and in so doing, they were not arbitrarily connecting exegetical dots. Allegory, according to Cosgrove, was not an unwarranted reading.

Echoes of Scripture in the Letters of Paul Richard Hays

Richard Hays's work *Echoes of Scripture in the Letters of Paul* has served as a staple for New Testament scholarship on Paul's use of the Old Testament for decades. His comments on Galatians 4:21–31 have widened the conversation to include post-modern hermeneutical theories alongside the characteristic typology-allegory framework. Usually, scholars have attempted to grasp the essence of Paul's hermeneutic in part through reconstructing the historical situation he addressed. Hays generally agrees with this method, but he self-consciously adds to it by employing the tools of intertextuality, a literary theory originally developed by Julia Kristeva and Roland Barthes.[150] According

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[148] Cosgrove, "The Law Has Given Sarah No Children," 220.

[149] Cosgrove, "The Law Has Given Sarah No Children," 221.

[150] Richard B. Hays, *Echoes of Scripture in the Letters of Paul* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1989), 15. See Julia Kristeva, *Revolution in Poetic Language* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984); Roland Barthes, *S/Z* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1974).

to Hays, the difference between historical-critical methods and intertextuality lies in the way they describe the relationships between texts. "Where the historical critic traditionally seeks genetic or causal explanations for specific texts, critics such as Kristeva and Barthes are interested in describing the systems of codes or conventions that the texts manifest."[151]

C. K. Barrett serves as a perfect example of Hay's historical critic. Paul's odd use of the Sarah-Hagar narratives cries out for explanation. Barrett provides just such an explanation in Paul's opponents. As stated above, these Judaizers would have contended, according to Barrett, that Ishmael's progeny were Gentiles and Isaac's Jews. Wanting to flip this interpretation on its head, Paul essentially asserts the opposite by making the odd connections that he does in Galatians 4:21–31.[152] In this sense, Barrett's explanation seeks a genetic or causal explanation for Paul's text. The views of Paul's opponents serve as the impetus for his odd reading. The intertextual critic does not concern himself with such questions. He treats the Hebrew Bible almost like a giant sphere of atemporal ideas in which Paul lives and moves. He asks in what ways does Paul appropriate, confront, or correct the concepts within the Sarah-Hagar narratives. Just like it is difficult to understand Paul's choice of text without Barrett's historical theory, it would also be difficult to understand Paul without also knowing who Sarah, Hagar, and Abraham were. This is intertextuality—an attempt to comprehend Galatians 4 by analyzing the "intertextual field" of concepts that make his statement understandable.[153]

Hays's application of intertextuality yields some provocative results. In Hays's view, Paul's reading of the text is beyond radical. It is a no-holds-barred act of hermeneutical jujitsu intent on doing whatever it takes to overturn the Jewish view of

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[151] Hays, *Echoes of Scripture in the Letters of Paul*, 15.

[152] Barrett, "The Allegory of Abraham, Sarah, and Hagar," 9.

[153] For a fuller explanation, see Jonathan D. Culler, *The Pursuit of Signs: Semiotics, Literature, Deconstruction* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1981), 100–104.

Sarah and Hagar.[154] Clearly, Hays does not think Genesis commends Paul's reading in any way. Consider, for example, Hays's comments on Galatians 4:21: "The claim that Torah, rightly read, warrants the *rejection* of lawkeeping, is on its face, outrageous. No sane reader could appeal, without some flicker of irony, to the Law in order to nullify circumcision as the definitive sign of covenant relation with God."[155] His comments on Galatians 4:25 sound the same tune:

> The notoriously obscure explanation of Gal 4:25a . . . which has attracted numerous emendations in the textual tradition and countless quizzical comments by critics, is actually nothing other than a puff of rhetorical smoke that distracts the audience from noticing the naked assertion (Gal 4:24b) on which Paul's strong misreading actually depends, the assertion of phenomenological correspondence between Law and slavery.

Hays clearly thinks that Paul foists his reading atop Genesis, forging the link through the connotations of slavery shared by both Hagar and the Law. This account of verse 25 is where Hays's commitment to intertextuality can be clearly seen. Paul's connection is not explained historically or redemptively. It is explained merely connotatively. I will take up the question of whether Paul built his exegetical construct on such sandy ground in my chapter on Galatians. For now, it is simply important to note Hays's extreme description and the intertextual framework he uses to get there because although very few have followed Hays into his extreme assessment, many have taken up his use of intertextuality in assessing Galatians 4.[156]

The question that follows Hays's work is how does intertextuality meet allegory? Do they cohere? Do they overlap? Are they mutually exclusive? At least in

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[154] These labels are Hays's own. Hays, *Echoes of Scripture in the Letters of Paul*, 112–11.

[155] Hays, *Echoes of Scripture in the Letters of Paul*, 112.

[156] E.g., Karen H. Jobes, "Jerusalem, Our Mother: Metalepsis and Intertextuality in Galatians 4:21–31," *Westminster Theological Journal* 55, no. 2 (1993): 299–320; Matthew Y. Emerson, "Arbitrary Allegory, Typical Typology, or Intertextual Interpretation? Paul's Use of the Pentateuch in Galatians 4:21–31," *Biblical Theology Bulletin* 43, no. 1 (2013): 14–22; Francis Watson, *Paul and the Hermeneutics of Faith*, 2nd ed. (London: T&T Clark, 2016); Tedder, *Children of Laughter and the Re-Creation of Humanity*.

Hays, it is difficult to tell. Hays does address the question of allegory, but he only does so in passing. He acknowledges why many scholars have chosen to label Paul's exegesis as typology. Unlike Philo's, Paul's exegesis "deals with correspondences between figures past and present rather than with timeless spiritual truths."[157] "That is why some commentators insist that this passage, despite Paul's use of the word *allēgoroumena*, ought to be classified as typology rather than allegory."[158] Initially, Hays does not critique typological descriptions of Paul, but he goes on to argue that the distinction between allegory and typology is anachronistic. It is important to the modern scholar, but it was not important to Paul.[159] Thus, "when he says of the story of Abraham's sons that 'these things are to be interpreted as allegories,' he means simply that they are not to be taken at face value—we might say they are to be read neither merely as history nor self-enclosed fictional narrative—but that their meaning must be sought in a latent sense of some sort."[160]

This last statement is very important for understanding Hays. First, it reveals that Hays's definition of "allegory" is quite broad. It is essentially coextensive with "non-literal." Hays comments might seem as if they are just referring to ἀλληγορέω, but his flow of thought makes it clear that he is referring to allegory in general. Second, it shows that for Hays, intertextuality and allegory are essentially the same. Finding a text's meaning in some "latent sense," as Hays claims allegory does, is the essence of intertextuality. Paul reads Genesis in this odd fashion because he must bend those texts to fit his gospel and his experience with the Spirit. The pastoral and theological issues that Hays thinks motivated Paul to allegorize Sarah and Hagar is also the "intertextual field"

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[157] Hays, *Echoes of Scripture in the Letters of Paul*, 116.

[158] Hays, *Echoes of Scripture in the Letters of Paul*, 116.

[159] Hays, *Echoes of Scripture in the Letters of Paul*, 116.

[160] Hays, *Echoes of Scripture in the Letters of Paul*, 116.

in which he operates. Hays is very close to Barr here.[161] Clearly, this intertextual field cannot be reduced to the historical circumstances of Genesis because much of its content, such as Paul's new view of the Spirit, came to be long after Genesis was written. Paul was not reading his theology out of the text. He was reading it back into it.

Debating whether intertextuality serves as a helpful tool in assessing Paul's reading lies outside the scope of this dissertation; however, there is something to be said concerning Hays's use of the theory that uncovers a problem in Hays's definition of allegory. As originally conceived and as Hays acknowledges, intertextuality was intended as a totalizing hermeneutic. It does not describe specific instances of reading. It describes how reading is done in general. All reading is intertextual reading.[162] If true, labeling Paul's reading intertextual may shine some light on his methods as its shines light on reading in general, but it falls short of pointing out what makes it unique as it clearly is.

Hays's handling of allegory suffers from a similar issue. Multiple of those who have claimed that Paul was allegorizing point out that his connection between Hagar and the Old Jerusalem presses the boundaries of what the narratives of Genesis allow. According to such interpreters, a literal reading of the text would look something like Jubilees mentioned above, where Isaac represents the Jews and Ishmael the Gentiles. Hays's disagrees. "Even the conventional Jewish interpretation offered in Jubilees is allegorical, with its symbolic identification of Ishmael and Isaac as representatives of Gentiles and Jews."[163] Hays claim here demonstrates that his definition of allegory is

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[161] Barr's "resultant system" feels very much like Hays's "intertextual field."

[162] Describing the development of intertextuality, Hays writes, "Julia Kristeva and Roland Barthes have been influential voices defining intertextuality as the study of the semiotic matrix within which a text's acts of signification occur. All discourse, in this view, is necessarily intertextual in the sense that its conditions of intelligibility are given by and in relation to the previously given body of discourse." Hays, *Echoes of Scripture in the Letters of Paul*, 15.

[163] Hays, *Echoes of Scripture in the Letters of Paul*, 113. Hays self-consciously rejects Bruce's assertion mentioned above that Paul is up against the historical fact that from Isaac descended the Jews and Ishmael the Gentiles (113n77).

probably not built around salient points of comparison.[164] If he cannot separate Jubilees from Paul, then the question "was Paul allegorizing?" reduces down to nothing. It would be like lumping the Reformers in with modern historical critics merely because both took history seriously without considering the fact that both have fundamentally different orientations toward the text. The Reformers, thinking the text was inspired, implicitly trusted the text. Historical critics, taking the text to be a merely human document, think a reader should maintain methodological doubt when interpreting the text. These two convictions cannot be reconciled. A good definition of historical criticism, therefore, must include both its concern for history and this method of doubt to distinguish between two observably different methods of reading. If the definition is not able to make this distinction, its boundaries must be redrawn. Since it lumps the hermeneutic of Jubilees in with Paul, Hays's definition of allegory suffers from this very issue.

Moreover, his statement on Jubilees demonstrates that although he sounds like the definitions mentioned above (allegory is a non-literal, symbolic treatment of the text), Hays is clearly operating with a different definition. For example, Goppelt, with whose definitions Hays seems to agree, argued that a reading like that of Jubilees would be a literal reading, the opposite conclusion of Hays. This disagreement again demonstrates the definitional confusion that has settled into the conversation surrounding Paul's exegesis in Galatians 4.

"The Rhetorical Strategy of Galatians 4:21–5:1" Andrew C. Perriman

Andrew Perriman's article rehearses much of what has already been discussed concerning the typology-allegory framework, but he ends up concluding that Paul was doing something entirely unique, neither typology nor allegory. Drawing on R. P. C.

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[164] This critique harks back to Gathercole's advice described in chapter 1. Simon J. Gathercole, "Resemblance and Relation," in *The New Testament in Comparison: Validity, Method, and Purpose in Comparing Traditions*, ed. John M. G. Barclay and Benjamin G. White (New York: T&T Clark, 2020), 179.

Hanson, Perriman describes the two sorts of allegory that existed in the ancient world. Alexandrian allegory was "more elaborate and more extensive, drawing heavily on Greek learning; its purpose was primarily to accommodate the Scriptures to Hellenistic thought and culture."[165] Like the rest of those discussed, Perriman points to Philo as the exemplar of this method.[166] Palestinian allegory, on the other hand, "was less common, less systematic, and stays closer to the literal meaning of the text, operating strictly within the single tradition of Yahwistic revelation."[167] Galatians 4, according to Perriman, probably most resembles the latter category, but he thinks this sort of historical judgment does nothing for the conversation "because the allegorical details serve only to make explicit . . . what had already emerged in his paraphrase of the OT story." In other words, Paul was not allegorizing like Philo or the Rabbis because the object of his allegorization was his own summary of the Sarah and Hagar saga in Galatians 4:22–23, not the entire story. In arguing this point, Perriman throws another ingredient into the definitional mix. Whereas the other scholars primarily focused on the *method* ancient exegetes like Philo or Paul applied to the text, Perriman focuses on whether these methods were applied to the text at all. Against Perriman, one cannot help but wonder what else Paul could have done. Unless he were to quote the entire text from Genesis, Paul would have had to provide a summary, and when used in argument, summaries are generally tailored to fit the point an author intends to make. Thus, Perriman simply makes too much of this observation. That Paul allegorizes his summary instead of the entire text is irrelevant in determining the nature of his hermeneutic and how it fits with other ancient modes of interpretation.

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[165] Andrew C. Perriman, "The Rhetorical Strategy of Galatians 4:21–5:1," *Evangelical Quarterly* 65 (1993): 29.

[166] Perriman, "The Rhetorical Strategy of Galatians 4:21–5:1," 42.

[167] Perriman, "The Rhetorical Strategy of Galatians 4:21–5:1," 29.

Perriman also discusses two of the more granular issues of Paul's exegesis relevant to the allegory debate—the supposed etymology of verse 25 and the link between Hagar and present Jerusalem. Like others, Perriman doubts that Paul was appealing to the etymology of Hagar's name. Such a hypothesis "would either imply that Paul meant 'Mount Sinai' to be substitutable for 'Hagar,' which is clearly inappropriate, or it would entail the tenuous philological argument that 'Hagar' corresponds to the Arabic word for 'mountain,' an argument which does not in any case establish the link with Sinai."[168] Rather, following C. F. D. Moule, Perriman argues that the neuter article functions like inverted commas to hold the entire phrase (τὸ δὲ Ἀγὰρ Σινᾶ ὄρος) together. Thus, Σινᾶ ὄρος functions with Ἀγάρ as the subject of the sentence rather than the predicate.[169] If correct, Perriman's grammatical argument would further call into question the etymological view of verse 25. Not only does the text lack a ready-made etymological link between the name "Hagar" and Sinai, but also the odd use of the neuter article, which served as the main evidence for the etymological view for scholars like G. Walter Hansen, lends itself to Perriman's alternative explanation.

Finally, Perriman probes whether scholars have properly understood Paul's link between Hagar and the New Jerusalem. In his view, the typology-allegory framework was created to solve the problem this link poses. "How, in particular, can we justify what appears, in the interpretation of Hagar as an allegorical representation of the Sinaitic covenant and the present people of Israel, to be a blatant contradiction of biblical history?"[170] As can be seen above, many held that typology provided just such a justification, but Perriman thinks it falls short. A typological justification "amounts to no more than a side-stepping of the problem; in the end it is still necessary to explain why

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[168] Perriman, "The Rhetorical Strategy of Galatians 4:21–5:1," 37.

[169] Perriman, "The Rhetorical Strategy of Galatians 4:21–5:1," 42; C. F. D. Moule, *An Idiom Book of New Testament Greek*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1959), 110.

[170] Perriman, ""The Rhetorical Strategy of Galatians 4:21–5:1," 28.

the typological aspect of the historical relationship is presented in so controversial a manner."[171] Perriman's point is that even if Paul's connection between Hagar and the present Jerusalem might be rightly labeled "typological," it still sits uncomfortably with the biblical data.

To address the issue, Perriman reevaluates the problem. The link between Hagar and the New Jerusalem is only an issue if Paul were making some sort of historical claim, but Perriman thinks such a view misunderstands the apostle. Paul's "argument is worked out not in term of historical continuity, . . . but as a tactical redefinition, an enforced change of perspective."[172] Paul was never trying to claim that the nation of Israel descended historically from Hagar. Thus, Paul's supposed contradiction of the Genesis account of Israel's origins falls away. Perriman's negative claim here holds promise. It does seem hasty to conclude that Paul was making a historical claim in linking Hagar to the nation of Israel. Unfortunately, his alternative explanation does not hold up well. He initially argues that Paul forges the link through the motif of slavery. (Hagar was a slave. Israel was enslaved.)[173] Later, however, Perriman seems to rescind his view, claiming that Paul "perpetuated a historical solecism" (i.e., a historical fiction) for rhetorical purposes.[174] For Paul to perpetuate a historical solecism, he must be making a historical claim, a point that Perriman's solution initially denied. Therefore, although his initial analysis holds promise, Perriman ultimately leaves the problem unsolved. I will pick up his negative claim and attempt to develop a positive one of my own in a subsequent chapter.

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[171] Perriman, "The Rhetorical Strategy of Galatians 4:21–5:1," 28.

[172] Perriman, "The Rhetorical Strategy of Galatians 4:21–5:1," 39.

[173] Perriman, "The Rhetorical Strategy of Galatians 4:21–5:1," 38–39.

[174] Perriman, "The Rhetorical Strategy of Galatians 4:21–5:1," 42.

David Dawson and His Children

In his book *Allegorical Readers and Cultural Revision in Ancient Alexandria*, David Dawson attempts to provide a definition to compete with the typology-allegory framework and grounds this definition in close readings of three ancient authors—Philo, Valentinus, and Clement. Although he never tests his own theory on Galatians 4, Dawson has persuaded multiple Pauline scholars of his view, leading them to conclude that Paul was indeed allegorizing throughout Galatians 4 and beyond. Thus, I have grouped David Dawson, Stephen Fowl, Daniel Boyarin, and Jeremy Punt together to show how this new definition works with Galatians 4 and how it differs from the dominant typology-allegory scheme.

Dawson begins his work by acknowledging the problem. "The history of the study of allegory is characterized by extreme diversity and fundamental disagreement over allegory's nature and function."[175] This observation recognizes what this history of research is trying to prove. Answering whether Paul was allegorizing in Galatians 4 has proven difficult because no one really agrees on what allegory is. Dawson attempts to solve this issue but not by refining the definitions already in place. Instead, Dawson leaves behind the inward-looking typology-allegory framework for a completely new, more outward-looking view of allegory focused on how the ancient practice attempted to shape the culture around it.[176]

Much like Hays, Dawson drops the typology-allegory distinction because he thinks it was foreign to the ancient world. "The claim for the uniqueness of typological meaning and its essential distinction from, and incompatibility with, allegory arose much later, in large part of Reformation polemic against the use of allegory."[177] Thus, "in this

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[175] David Dawson, *Allegorical Readers and Cultural Revision in Ancient Alexandria* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), 11.

[176] Dawson, *Allegorical Readers and Cultural Revision*, 1.

[177] Dawson, *Allegorical Readers and Cultural Revision*, 15. Dawson proof for this claim is rather weak. In his view, typology did not arise until the thinkers of the Reformation explicitly defined the

book, typology is understood to be simply one species of allegory."[178] In Dawson's view, typology could not have been what Paul was doing because typology, strictly defined, did not differ from allegory in antiquity. If Paul happened to look different than his contemporaries, it was not because he was exercising a different hermeneutical discipline. The typological shape of Galatians 4 was a hermeneutical accident.

Dawson replaces this framework with a definition of allegory that can roughly break down into the following three propositions.[179]

1. Allegory meant to say something other than what the text seemed to say.[180]
2. Allegory is essentially narrative in character.[181]
3. Allegory functioned as a counter-hegemonic force.[182]

Together these three propositions serve as the sufficient conditions that made allegory what it was. Dawson derives proposition one from etymological pieces of ἀλληγορία— ἄλλος, meaning "other," and ἀγορεύω, meaning "to speak."[183] Propositions two and three distinguish allegory from other literary tropes that could also claim proposition one. A metaphor, for example, also communicates something past what the surface details seem to communicate. Unlike a metaphor, however, allegory forms a

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term. This thinking is faulty for two reasons. First, intellectuals usually work toward careful definitions of abstractions like typology after they have already entered the conversation for some time, and the same is most likely true of the Reformer's thinking on typology. Second, it is observably false to say that typology was not developed until the Reformation. The Antiochene school of hermeneutics had developed typology centuries before the Reformation took place.

[178] Dawson, *Allegorical Readers and Cultural Revision*, 16. This conclusion simply does not follow even if typology were an anachronistic system. If typology did not exist prior to the Reformation, then it cannot become a subset of allegory. It must disappear altogether.

[179] Dawson's definition is actually quite complicated, and he never clearly lays it out in the way I am describing. However, I think these three statements fairly reflect the attributes he ascribes to allegory throughout his work.

[180] Dawson, *Allegorical Readers and Cultural Revision*, 3.

[181] Dawson, *Allegorical Readers and Cultural Revision*, 7.

[182] Dawson, *Allegorical Readers and Cultural Revision*, 9.

[183] Dawson, *Allegorical Readers and Cultural Revision*, 3.

narrative, a story with a beginning, middle, and end.[184] This narrative can either exist in the literal sense of the text with which the allegory plays, or it can exist in the "other meaning" the allegory constructs. Either way, allegory must include a narrative at some level in order for its "other meaning" to count as allegory.[185]

Proposition three is what makes Dawson's work unique, and it is the attribute that both Fowl and Boyarin point to as the deciding factor in categorizing Paul's exegesis in Galatians 4. Allegory serves as a counter-hegemonic force in the sense that it challenges the literal sense of the text. "One can understand the character and function of allegory only in relation to its necessary 'other,' traditionally called the 'literal sense' or 'literal meaning.'"[186] At a glance, Dawson's statement here does not sound unique at all. Every scholar since Goppelt has recognized the challenge allegorical readings often posed to their literal opposition; however, because of Dawson's postmodern sensibilities, he defines "literal sense" in a drastically different way than those surveyed above. Commonly understood to be a phenomenon of the text itself, Dawson's literal sense exists within a community of readers. It "stems from a community's generally unself-conscious decision to adopt and promote a certain kind of meaning, rather than from its recognition of a text's inherent and self-evident sense."[187] In short, the literal sense is something a community possesses, not the text.

This view of literal meaning produces two important corollaries. First, allegory does not challenge the literal sense of the text so much as it challenges the dominant culture that currently affirms a particular view of that text.[188] This factor makes Dawson's view of allegory much more outward-facing than those held above. Whereas Goppelt and

[184] Dawson, *Allegorical Readers and Cultural Revision*, 3–4.

[185] Dawson, *Allegorical Readers and Cultural Revision*, 4.

[186] Dawson, *Allegorical Readers and Cultural Revision*, 7.

[187] Dawson, *Allegorical Readers and Cultural Revision*, 8.

[188] Dawson, *Allegorical Readers and Cultural Revision*, 8.

company saw ancient allegorists primarily as interpreters, Dawson sees them as social activists. Second, allegorical and literal meanings are theoretically interchangeable. Thus, if a particular allegory succeeded in supplanting the "literal sense" held by the wider culture, it would then become the new literal sense.[189] The text has no say in the matter.

By employing Dawson's definition, Fowl, Punt, and Boyarin argue that Paul was allegorizing in Galatians 4:21–31. For Fowl and Punt, Paul's exegesis consists of a metaphorical narrative read in light of the Galatians' experience of the Spirit that challenges the Judaizer's view of those stories.[190] This characterization hits all three premises of Dawson's definition. Boyarin's reading is much more radical. He constructs a Paul consumed with the Greek idea of univocity. The Jews thought the world was diverse; that is, there is both Jew and Greek, slave and free, male and female. Having succumbed to the Greeks' discomfort with such distinctions, Paul employs allegory to usher in a utopia where they no longer exist.[191] As with Fowl, one can easily see how Boyarin's radically Hellenized Paul fits into Dawson's scheme. He uses allegory to construct a narrative which he uses to challenge the dominant worldview of his day, again hitting all three components of Dawson's definition.[192] Although I think Fowl's and Punt's descriptions of Galatians 4 are much different than Boyarin's, Dawson's definition covers both perspectives. In fact, it would be hard to see how any reading of Galatians 4 could deny Paul the three propositions that make up Dawson's definition. At the very

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[189] Dawson, *Allegorical Readers and Cultural Revision*, 8.

[190] Stephen E. Fowl, "Who Can Read Abraham's Story? Allegory and Interpretive Power in Galatians," *JSNT* 17, no. 55 (1995): 78–79; Jeremy Punt, "Revealing Rereading Part 1: Pauline Allegory in Galatians 4:21–5:1," *Neotestamentica* 40, no. 1 (2006): 94.

[191] Boyarin, *A Radical Jew*, 21–22.

[192] I will interact with Boyarin's view of Gal 4 in a subsequent chapter, but it is outside the scope of this dissertation to deal with his claims in full. For a more thorough analysis and critique of Boyarin's unique ideas, see N. T. Wright, "Two Radical Jews," *Reviews in Religion and Theology*, no. 3 (1995): 15–23.

least, Paul's reading says something that was not obvious from the text of Genesis, it counters the dominant reading, and it has narrative shape.

When assessing Dawson's discussion, it is important to note how radically Dawson's view of allegory deviates from nearly all the definitions described above. Each of them maintained the basic assumption that allegory concerned how an interpreter's conclusion related to the text he was reading. To ask "was Paul allegorizing?" was at least to ask if he moved from the text to his conclusions through the same route as Philo. Having removed the text from the equation, Dawson virtually shares no common ground with these views, except for the fact that he treats Philo as an allegorical exemplar.[193] Dawson is certainly onto something when he observes that allegorical readings challenge the literal sense. In fact, my own view of allegory understands this attribute to be essential to the ancient practice. Because of his postmodern commitments, however, Dawson's definition of allegory struggles at a couple of key points.

For starters, if Dawson is correct about the literal sense being a product of cultural expectation, then allegory's revisionary function is not sufficient to identify its unique boundaries. All readings to some degree or another challenge other readings. Just like with Hays, Dawson's third premise is not a salient point of comparison because it is shared by all types of reading.[194] It is clearly the case that Paul is challenging a common Jewish reading of the Sarah-Hagar narrative, but this observation is not enough to determine whether he issues this challenge via allegory. It is simply a trivial attribute of Paul's exegesis because it is a trivial function of nearly all exegesis. To be sure, Dawson's second premise helps account for this problem. Allegory does not merely

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[193] Dawson's does bring up two other exemplars (Valentinus and Clement) and describes them as "three distinctly different modes of allegorical reading." It is clear, though, that these differences do not concern what is allegory and what is not: "Despite their many differences, . . . these three interpreters stand within a common literary and philosophical tradition." Dawson, *Allegorical Readers and Cultural Revision*, 18. Thus, Dawson also demonstrates that Philo serves as a common ground amongst those that attempt to describe what allegory is.

[194] Gathercole, "Resemblance and Relation," 179.

consist of countercultural readings. It consists of *narrative* counter-cultural readings. This premise, however, succumbs to Barr's critique described above. As Barr notes, allegory did not always deal with narrative texts (or historical texts to use his language), nor did it always construct a narrative out of a non-narrative text. Therefore, even when combined, propositions two and three observably do not divide what is allegory from what is not.

Furthermore, Dawson's definition hinges on a view of the literal sense that his own logic struggles to maintain. For example, while pondering the ways which allegory might function as a revisionary force, Dawson argues that "an allegorical reading might serve to domesticate the text—to show that its literal meaning really is in step with cultural expectation."[195] It does so by neutralizing "the culturally deviant meanings of the literal text, replacing them with culturally obvious meanings."[196] Given his definition of the literal sense, one cannot help but wonder how allegory might function in this way. If the literal sense of a text truly reduces to "an honorific title given to a kind of meaning that is *culturally expected*," what need would allegory have to domesticate the text?[197] By definition, the literal sense is already the domesticated sense. Thus, Dawson must be wrong about the revisionary identity of allegory, or he must be wrong about the nature of the literal sense it seeks to revise. As I will show, Dawson is correct about the revisionary nature of allegory. It does challenge the literal sense, but Dawson's entire discussion—and its application to Galatians 4 by Fowl, Punt, and Boyarin—stumbles over its postmodern sense of literal meaning.

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[195] Dawson, *Allegorical Readers and Cultural Revision*, 10.

[196] Dawson, *Allegorical Readers and Cultural Revision*, 10.

[197] Dawson, *Allegorical Readers and Cultural Revision*, 8 (emphasis added).

Biblical Exegesis in the Apostolic Period
Richard N. Longenecker

In his book *Biblical Exegesis in the Apostolic Period*, Richard Longenecker maintains much of what has already been seen in the survey above. He recognizes that categorizing Paul's exegesis depends largely on how one defines the term,[198] and he uses Philo as the baseline for this definition.[199] Within these boundaries, Longenecker's discussion contains a number of unique claims. First, he answers the charge of anachronism levied against dividing typology from allegory. Scholars like Hays and Dawson rejected the dichotomy because they thought it foreign to the first-century mind. Longenecker concedes this point, but he argues that modern categories used to classify ancient hermeneutics still maintain some utility. "Any attempt at classification must inevitably go beyond that system's explicit statements as to its own principles."[200] In other words, even if first-century thinkers never developed the distinct nuances of their hermeneutical systems, these systems might still differ along lines discoverable long after they are gone.

Second, despite using the same typology-allegory framework, Longenecker argues that Paul was allegorizing in Galatians 4 just like Philo.[201] From its inception, the typology-allegory framework was meant to account for the observed difference between Paul's exegesis and the allegorists around him. Paul was not a modern historical-critical scholar, but he was not Philo either. Typology seemed to account for this middle ground. Longenecker disagrees. His definition of a text's literal sense ultimately requires him to label Paul an allegorist despite the fact that he affirms typology as a legitimate category.

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[198] Longenecker, *Biblical Exegesis in the Apostolic Period*, 33–34n110, 110.

[199] Longenecker, *Biblical Exegesis in the Apostolic Period*, 30. Longenecker does ponder how representative Philo was of first-century Jewish culture (p. 13), but these statements should not be read as calling into question his status as an allegorical exemplar. Philo can still serve as the paradigm of first-century allegory even if his fellow Jews did not follow him in this endeavor.

[200] Longenecker, *Biblical Exegesis in the Apostolic Period*, 14.

[201] Longenecker, *Biblical Exegesis in the Apostolic Period*, 110.

Following Raymond Brown, Longenecker defines the literal sense as "that meaning which by the rules of historico-critical exegesis we can determine as the author's message for his time."[202] The last three words of this quote are important. They determine *how* one determines what is literally in the text in historical-critical terms. The literal sense stops along with the original audience's ability to understand. If the original audience could not have understood the text to mean what a later author takes it to mean, then he has gone beyond the literal sense. Longenecker's definition of allegory plays off this definition. Allegory should "be viewed simply as an extended metaphor . . . whose intent is different from that of historical narrative."[203] The intent of the historical narrative is the literal sense. Allegory is simply an extended metaphor that reaches beyond the original intent of the narrative.

Galatians 4:21–31, according to Longenecker, fits this definition: "We must reject the view that Hagar and Sarah are here treated merely typologically. Allegorical exegesis has certainly entered in. For while it is true that the apostle begins with the historical situation, he definitely goes beyond the literal and primary sense of the narrative to insist on hidden and symbolic meanings in the words."[204] Paul is allegorizing because he goes beyond Longenecker's literal sense to find hidden, symbolic meanings hidden within.

If Longenecker uses the same basic typology-allegory framework, how is it that he comes to the opposite conclusion from most of the scholars before him? Part of the answer to this question lies in his view of Galatians 4:21–31. According to Longenecker, Paul does not merely go beyond the boundaries of the narrative. He does so

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[202] Longenecker, *Biblical Exegesis in the Apostolic Period*, xxxii.

[203] Longenecker, *Biblical Exegesis in the Apostolic Period*, 34n110.

[204] Longenecker, *Biblical Exegesis in the Apostolic Period*, 110.

"to insist on hidden and symbolic meanings in the words."[205] Very few, save those that thought Paul etymologized Hagar's name to connect her to Mt. Sinai, would have agreed with this statement. Paul was not treating the words of the Genesis narrative as symbols. He was connecting two historical events that resembled one another. This connection might be foreign to the literal sense, but it was typological because it connected historical events, not ahistorical symbols. Longenecker differs from the other typology-allegory advocates first because he differs about Paul.

The second and main part of the answer lies in the balance of Longenecker's definition. Despite appearing as if he straightforwardly appropriates the typology-allegory framework, Longenecker places more weight on one piece of the typical definition. Goppelt, for example, recognized that both typology and allegory went beyond the literal sense to a degree. To point this out in Paul's exegesis, therefore, was not enough to place him on the allegorical side of this divide. He might still be typologizing even if the types he constructed were not obviously warranted by the literal sense of the text. As can be seen, Longenecker thinks that the types must be contained within the literal sense. Otherwise, the types are simply historical-looking allegories. At this point, Longenecker argues similarly to A. T. Lincoln and G. W. Hansen, who both thought that the historical correspondences must be real; that is, they must be warranted by the text. Since Paul's types "definitely go beyond the literal and primary sense of the narrative," he was allegorizing. Thus, despite looking like he shares common definitional ground with those that affirm the utility of typology, he appropriates a variant strain of their definition.

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[205] Longenecker, *Biblical Exegesis in the Apostolic Period*, 110.

"Allegorically Speaking in Galatians 4:21–5:1" Anne Davis

In her article "Allegorically Speaking in Galatians 4:21–5:1," Anne Davis offers a definition of allegory that is utterly unique. According to Davis, Paul was neither concerned with connecting types, nor was he using a method of Greek rhetoric. He was creating intentionally obscure metaphors to startle the reader into looking more deeply into the Hebrew Scriptures. Davis's definition of allegory resembles both Perriman and Dawson in that it is outward-looking. Allegory for her is not an interpretive technique per se. It is a rhetorical technique meant to do something to the reader, namely, invite him to think more carefully about the text in question.

Despite this unique definition, Davis still points to Philo to ground her view. Philo, according to Davis, would intentionally create obscure metaphors in order to shock the reader. In the first book of *Legum allegoriae*, for example, Philo pairs heaven with mind and the earth with sensation.[206] These connections would not be obvious to the reader, and Philo knows this. He uses these "startling metaphors that used unexpected associations" to "stimulate what he called the 'inward sense of the passage.'"[207] Davis thinks Philo calls direct attention to this rhetorical technique in book 2 of *Legum allegoriae*. There, Philo says that "speaking in an 'allegorical manner' was 'a kind of abuse of language.'"[208] Davis understands this abuse of language to be something the interpreter does. Others reviewed above saw this abuse of language as a textual phenomenon. Not so with Davis. According to her view, allegory is used by an author to intentionally create confusing and intriguing descriptions of the text.

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[206] Philo's words are as follows: "For, speaking symbolically, [Moses] calls the mind heaven since the natures, which are perceptible to the mind, are in heaven. And he calls sensation earth because sensation has obtained a material and earthly composition" (*Leg.* 1.1).

[207] Anne Davis, "Allegorically Speaking in Galatians 4:21–5:1," *BBR* 14, no. 2 (2004): 164.

[208] Davis specifically cites *Leg.* 2.10. Davis, "Allegorically Speaking in Galatians 4:21–5:1," 164.

Quintilian, a first-century Latin rhetorician, also provides evidence for Davis. In his book *Institutio Oratoria*, Quintilian claims that allegory says something "absolutely opposed to the meaning of the word."[209] Davis understands this statement to be analogous to Philo's claim that allegory consists of an abuse of language. She repeats again that ancient authors would use this technique to introduce a sense of irony and stimulate the reader to seek further meaning.[210] In appealing to Quintilian, Davis starts an important trend that others would follow. Multiple scholars after her have given prime of place to ancient rhetoricians like Quintilian, who gave direct attention to the rhetorical tropes of the ancient world such as allegory.

According to Davis, Paul employs this allegorical technique in Galatians 4. He, like Philo, was attempting to create obscure metaphors "to act as markers leading to deeper aspects of meaning."[211] The connection between Hagar and Mount Sinai was to Paul what the connection between the mind and heaven was to Philo. It was intended to shock the reader into reading the law more carefully. It was not an act of typology nor of allegory in the Greek sense of the term.

Davis rejects typology for four reasons. First, typology was prophetic, not surprising. Had Paul been using typology, argues Davis, his metaphors would have made more sense.[212] Second, Paul does not use the same language he uses in clear instances of

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[209] This quote is taken from Davis, "Allegorically Speaking in Galatians 4:21–5:1," 167, but it is difficult to tell what exactly she is referring to. Quintilian does refer to a type of allegory that stands contrary to the truth (*quo contraria ostenduntur*; *Inst.* 8.54), but he never seems to say that allegory is an abuse of language used to intentionally beckon the reader into a deeper meaning. In fact, his statements following the definition of the second type suggest that the speaker's delivery or the nature of the subject make his meaning immediately obvious to his readers. Sarcasm serves as a perfect example of this type of allegory. I can turn the statement "you look pretty" into "you look ugly" if I use a sarcastic tone. To be sure, a few paragraphs earlier, Quintilian talks about more enigmatic allegories, but he hardly commends this type of allegory as something authors did on purpose to stimulate their readers. In his view, such allegories are to be avoided because he holds lucidity in high regard. These allegories are merely the consequences of poor writing.

[210] Davis, "Allegorically Speaking in Galatians 4:21–5:1," 167.

[211] Davis, "Allegorically Speaking in Galatians 4:21–5:1," 164.

[212] Davis, "Allegorically Speaking in Galatians 4:21–5:1," 165.

typology. In 1 Corinthians 10:6, for example, Paul outright says that the events surrounding the wilderness generation "have become types for us." Paul uses no such language in Galatians 4.[213] Third, treating the passage typologically "merely retains the simple meaning of Paul's words, since the application of typology has interpreted Paul's reference to Hagar and Sarah as pointing forward to Israel, Christ, and the Christian church."[214] Fourth and finally, the typology view of Galatians 4 "has spawned a wide variety of conflicting theological interpretations—which raises the question of intended meaning."[215] It is difficult to tell what Davis means by reasons three and four, and it is not clear why these reasons render typology useless. The important thing to note, however, is how much her definition of typology differs from those that have come before her. None of the scholars that came before her argued that typology was necessarily prophetic or that identifying it required the word τύπος. Thus, her rejection of typology is a rejection of a category that no one ascribed to Paul in the first place.

Davis returns to Philo to explain the two reasons she rejects the Greek allegory view of Paul. First, "Philo explained extensively the allegorical meaning of his metaphors, whereas Paul did not."[216] In other words, Philo's allegories were much more robust than Paul's. Second, Paul differs from Philo in that he did not draw heavily from Greek philosophy. Therefore, Davis thinks that "Paul's allegorical speaking was not a Greek philosophical method of searching for deeper spiritual meaning but most likely reflected rabbinic practiced in first-century Judea."[217]

Davis's analysis at this point is all over the place. If what made Philo Philo was his abuse of language, then why is his use of Greek philosophy relevant? Philo may

[213] Davis, "Allegorically Speaking in Galatians 4:21–5:1," 165.

[214] Davis, "Allegorically Speaking in Galatians 4:21–5:1," 165–66.

[215] Davis, "Allegorically Speaking in Galatians 4:21–5:1," 166.

[216] Davis, "Allegorically Speaking in Galatians 4:21–5:1," 164.

[217] Davis, "Allegorically Speaking in Galatians 4:21–5:1," 164.

have very well used allegory as an abuse of language to do exactly what Davis thought the trope did in the first century—draw readers into thinking more deeply about the texts being explained. What that deeper meaning was does not matter given Davis's definition of allegory. It could be Greek philosophy. It could be Jewish theology. Both could function as the deeper meaning. At this point in her argument, Davis simply abandons her definition. Whether she has properly understood Paul and Philo I will deal with in a later chapter. For now, it is simply important to note the internal tensions in her argument and the radically different definition of allegory that she works with. She does think Paul allegorizes, but her definition significantly differs from both those that agree and disagree with her.

"Paul's Allegory of the Two Covenants"
Steven Di Mattei

Steven Di Mattei argues that Paul was allegorizing just like Philo by stripping down what it means to allegorize.[218] In Mattei's view, definitions of allegory have been too colored by the hermeneutical disputes of the fourth century between the Antiochenes and the Alexandrians. Frustrated by Origen's defense of his ahistorical hermeneutic via Paul's allegory, Antiochenes like John Chrysostom argued that Paul mislabeled his own exegesis. Allegory was an apologetic tool developed by the Greeks to defend a text against its critics according to the Antiochenes, and Paul was doing no such thing despite his use of the term ἀλληγορέω. Modern defenders of typology, according to Di Mattei, still follow the same line of reasoning.[219] Di Mattei admits that if allegory is the apologetic practiced by Philo and the Stoics, then Antiochenes and their modern counterparts are correct. "Paul's usage certainly does not square with Philo's

[218] Steven Di Mattei, "Paul's Allegory of the Two Covenants (Gal 4:21–31) in Light of First-Century Hellenistic Rhetoric and Jewish Hermeneutics," *New Testament Studies* 52, no. 1 (2006): 108.

[219] Di Mattei, "Paul's Allegory of the Two Covenants," 102–4.

apologetic."[220] The problem is that "this apologetic . . . is often mistaken for allegory itself."[221] In Di Mattei's view, the apologetic motives behind Philo's allegories do not define the allegories themselves.

Di Mattei swaps this view of allegory for explicit definitions found in two ancient sources. Both Trypon, an Alexandrian grammarian writing in the late first century CE, and Heraclitus, an Alexandrian also of the first century, define allegory as a trope where one thing signifies another (e.g., the heavens are the mind, Hagar is Sinai, etc.).[222] Di Mattei adopts these definitions wholesale, claiming that an apologetic aim is not essential to allegory itself. It is just one way it can be used. Although he never explicitly says so, Di Mattei's comments surrounding these ancient authors suggest that his trust in them stems from their experience with Hellenistic rhetorical education.[223] Why would one look any further for a definition of a trope than those that thought about them at the time they were being used? Given Mattei's stripped-down definition, it is not hard to see how he lands where he does. If allegory truly is merely a this-for-that trope, then Paul is certainly allegorizing just like Philo was because to allegorize was to do very little. In fact, any sort of reading that did not merely recount the details already contained in a text would fit this definition.

When he turns to Galatians 4, Di Mattei spends some time interacting with details others have assessed to determine the nature of Paul's exegesis. For example, he is confident that Paul etymologizes Hagar's name in verse 25, and he provides a fairly extensive study of the verb ἀλληγορέω.[224] Neither of these discussions move the needle in

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[220] Di Mattei, "Paul's Allegory of the Two Covenants," 105.

[221] Di Mattei, "Paul's Allegory of the Two Covenants," 105.

[222] Di Mattei, "Paul's Allegory of the Two Covenants," 105–6.

[223] Di Mattei, "Paul's Allegory of the Two Covenants," 106.

[224] Di Mattei, "Paul's Allegory of the Two Covenants," 106–7, 111.

either direction, however, because his definition of allegory is so thin. These details, like the apologetic nature of allegory, do not fit into allegory itself.

There are multiple good things about Di Mattei's discussion. He follows scholarly consensus when he points to Philo as an exemplar of allegory even after he changes the definition. He also rightly describes what Philo does. Philo does allegorize to defend the text against perceived problems. The difference between his thesis and mine lies in how he relates this defensive technique to allegory. I think this defensive move to be essential to allegory, and therefore, I do not think Paul was allegorizing. Di Mattei disagrees, and consequently, he lumps Paul and Philo together. The crux of his argument consists in his use of first-century definitions. It is by these that he is able to shave away the defensive part of allegory, and to a degree, his appeal to them is prudent. Again, to determine the nature of a first-century practice, one should probably look at the first-century definitions of that practice, but this procedure also contains its fair share of weaknesses.

For starters, ancient authors were notorious for defining words etymologically, inferring the meaning of the word from its parts. Trypon and Heraclitus most likely did the same. Di Mattei even concedes this point when he says that Heraclitus gives a more formal *etymological* definition.[225] Therefore, Di Mattei's trust in these definitions might be misplaced since they seem to be built on the pieces of the words rather than careful observation how the word functions in various contexts. Furthermore, Heraclitus brings up the trope of allegory in order to defend Homer against his critics. He may have narrowed the definition to a this-for-that trope, but he thinks this trope is the key to preserving the integrity of Homer's epics.[226] It is an odd move, therefore, to reduce the

[225] Di Mattei states, "Likewise Heraclitus, giving us the more formal etymological definition writes: 'The trope that says one thing but signifies something other than what is said is called by the name *allegoria*.'" Di Mattei, "Paul's Allegory of the Two Covenants," 106.

[226] Consider Heraclitus's opening lines: "It is a weighty and damaging charge that heaven brings against Homer for his disrespect for the divine. If he meant nothing *allegorically* (ἀλληγόρησεν), he

definition when the author upon which the definition is built shows the sort of apologetic nature of allegory on every page of his most famous work on the topic. Certainly, these definitions should play a role in shaping how one understands allegory of the ancient world, but they should not be prioritized over other data simply because they provide explicit definitions.

Perhaps most problematic is the definition itself. Defining allegory as a this-for-that trope seems self-evidently wrong, whether it be the modern version or the ancient version. Such a definition struggles to distinguish the trope in any way from its fellow tropes. Works like *Animal Farm* or ancient works of allegory are clearly more than a this-for-that trope. To be sure, ἀλληγορέω and its noun form may refer to a this-for-that trope, but that is different than saying that allegory does so. Di Mattei admits that "when we think of allegory, we quite naturally envision the brand of allegory practiced by Philo and the Stoics."[227] If so, then the modern term "allegory" means much more than a this-for-that trope. In the end, Di Mattei's discussion demonstrates very clearly how important definitions are. We both agree that if the apologetic function that so often accompanies allegory is a part of allegory itself, then Paul was not allegorizing Genesis 16. We simply disagree on how this question should be decided and, consequently, the corresponding answer.

"Paul, Allegory, and the Plain Sense of Scripture: Galatians 4:21–31"
Mark Gignilliat

In his article on Galatians 4:21–31, Mark Gignilliat seeks to answer two questions: "(1) What is the relationship between typology and allegory, and (2) what is

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was impious through and through, and sacrilegious fables, loaded with blasphemous folly, run riot through both epics." Heraclitus, *Homeric Problems*, 3 (emphasis added).

[227] Di Mattei, "Paul's Allegory of the Two Covenants," 105.

the relationship between the literal sense and the figural sense of Scripture?"[228] In his view, typology and allegory do not stand at odds. Rather, typology "is a form of allegorical reading or a subset of allegorical reading and is still a useful term but is not to be opposed to allegory. Typology *is* allegorical or figural reading."[229] Gignilliat defends this claim on two grounds.

First, like multiple scholars surveyed above, Gignilliat thinks that the category of typology was foreign to the ancient world. Typology, in his view, is a framework created by modern Christian historical-critical scholars to defend some of the odd examples of exegesis of the Bible by claiming that these examples did justice to the history of the text.[230] The pre-modern era, however, had no such concerns. "The historicity of the text was assumed in the pre-modern world and was not the defining feature of figural, typological, or allegorical readings of the text, nor could such a thing be used to differentiate them one from another."[231] In other words, since the historicity of a text was assumed in all hermeneutical systems in the ancient world, it could not have been used to divide one hermeneutical system from another.

Second, Gignilliat claims that allegory was a very broad category. Following Hans Frei, Gignilliat defines allegory as "a literal reading of a story in light of the nexus of revelation as a whole."[232] Typology, despite looking more historical than many of its Alexandrian cousins, does exactly this. Paul was reading the Genesis narratives in light of all of redemptive history. He includes the Gentiles within the people of God because he

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[228] Mark Gignilliat, "Paul, Allegory, and the Plain Sense of Scripture: Galatians 4:21–31," *Journal of Theological Interpretation* 2, no. 1 (2008): 137.

[229] Gignilliat, "Paul, Allegory, and the Plain Sense of Scripture," 140 (italics original).

[230] Gignilliat, "Paul, Allegory, and the Plain Sense of Scripture," 138.

[231] Gignilliat, "Paul, Allegory, and the Plain Sense of Scripture," 139.

[232] Gignilliat, "Paul, Allegory, and the Plain Sense of Scripture," 140. See Hans W. Frei, *The Eclipse of Biblical Narrative: A Study in Eighteenth and Nineteenth Century Hermeneutics* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1974), 1–37. This definition is very similar to Barr's definition of allegory.

thinks the acts of Abraham should be coupled with the coming of Jesus and the work of Spirit. Thus, Paul was allegorizing because he read these earlier texts through these later events, or what Frei calls the "nexus of revelation as a whole."[233]

Gignilliat restates his second major question to focus the discussion on Galatians 4: "Is a Christian interpretation of the OT from a Christocentric or trinitarian perspective a germane reading of the text itself or an alien imposition."[234] Initially, Gignilliat does not so much answer this question as he denies its validity. Asking how close an allegorical reading gets to the literal sense of a text, according to Gignilliat, is a vestige of modernistic sensibility long thought to be obsolete. There is no literal sense of the text discoverable through methods that cross ideological boundaries. Therefore, relating the allegorical to the literal in any sort of objective way is impossible.[235] All that is left is to decide how the literal sense relates within a Christian worldview.[236] Paul's worldview "assumed an eschatological context in which God's redemptive and saving activities have been concretely defined by God's action in Jesus Christ."[237] With these pieces in place, Paul's exegesis does not violate the literal sense. "It is the only proper reading that takes into account the ultimate subject matter of Scripture where the *signum* and the *res*, or the sign and the subject matter, are conjoined."[238] In other words, Paul's reading of the text makes sense if one grants him common Christian commitments, namely, that the Old Testament points to Jesus and the redemptive events that surrounded him.

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[233] Gignilliat, "Paul, Allegory, and the Plain Sense of Scripture," 145.

[234] Gignilliat, "Paul, Allegory, and the Plain Sense of Scripture," 141.

[235] Gignilliat, "Paul, Allegory, and the Plain Sense of Scripture," 141.

[236] Gignilliat, "Paul, Allegory, and the Plain Sense of Scripture," 141.

[237] Gignilliat, "Paul, Allegory, and the Plain Sense of Scripture," 141.

[238] Gignilliat, "Paul, Allegory, and the Plain Sense of Scripture," 141–42.

As can be seen, Gignilliat's discussion is unique. Although his reasons for rejecting typology resemble those of Hays and Dawson, the details of his argument fill in the gaps left by their discussions. Hays and Dawson join Gignilliat in rejecting typology because of anachronism, but they stop short of showing how this is so. Gignilliat does not. He argues that the reason typology is an anachronistic category is because the ancient mind simply was not concerned with the facticity of the text. Such a concern is unique to the modern world.[239] Although the purpose of my argument is not to defend typology per se, there are good reasons to doubt Gignilliat's construal of the ancient world and his claims of anachronism along with it.

First, it is simply misleading to say that the ancient world was not concerned with the facticity of the text. Gignilliat admits that pre-critical thinkers simply assumed that the text was factual; that is, they assumed it accurately referred to something outside itself. In Gignilliat's words, "if one were to ask Calvin or Augustine whether the Sarah/Hagar story really happened, they would presumably look at the questioner quizzically and say, 'This is a biblical story. Are there any legitimate options to its veracity?'"[240] Quite right, but assuming that the text is factual and having no concern at all for facticity are two different things. Thus, claiming that "Paul's appeal to the correspondence between realities is not to be identified with historical connections between figures. . . . Rather, the connection is taking place on a theological line of correspondence within the divine economy" creates a false dichotomy also foreign to the pre-critical mind.[241] If one were to ask Calvin or Augustine whether the Sarah-Hagar story corresponded within history or within the divine economy, they would presumably

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[239] Gignilliat, "Paul, Allegory, and the Plain Sense of Scripture," 139.

[240] Gignilliat, "Paul, Allegory, and the Plain Sense of Scripture," 139. Even this claim is questionable. Works like Josephus's *Contra Apionem* demonstrate that the historicity of a text was not always a given. Criticism of the biblical narrative often led Christians and Jews to defend the veracity of the events contained in its pages in a way that very much resembles the sort of history done today.

[241] Gignilliat, "Paul, Allegory, and the Plain Sense of Scripture," 139.

look at the questioner quizzically and ask, "are not those the same thing?" Yes, pre-critical thinkers may have allowed certain theological claims into history that modern critical thinkers would not, but this is not a difference over the general notion of facticity. It is a difference over what counts as a valid fact. These are not the same. So, in the end, the pre-critical disposition toward facticity will not do what Gignilliat wants it to.

Second, it would seem that at least some in the pre-critical era were explicitly concerned with preserving the facticity of the text. The famous dispute between the allegorizing Alexandrians and the typologizing Antiochene's was at the very least over the text's facticity. Over and over again, thinkers of the Antiochene school complained about the Alexandrians' mishandling of the text. In their view, allegory made Scripture say something it did not say. It perverted the meaning of the text. Consider Theodore of Mopsuestia's comments on the Alexandrian's use of Galatians 4:

> There are some people who make it their business to pervert the meaning of the divine Scripture . . . . They invent foolish takes of their own and give to their nonsense the name of "allegory." By using the apostle's word, they imagine they have found a way to undermine the meaning of everything in Scripture—they keep on using the apostle's expression "allegorical." They do not realize what a difference there is between their use of the term and the apostle's use of it here.[242]

Notice two things in Theodore's complaint. First, Theodore does seem concerned with the facticity of the text. The ancient allegorizers had a tendency to call the facticity of the literal sense into question because of the apparent enigmas it contained (an observation I will defend in my chapter on Philo). Theodore is addressing this issue when he claims that they "pervert the meaning of the divine Scripture." Now, although Theodore's concern with facticity might not perfectly map onto modern concerns of facticity, his statements at the very least suggest that Gignilliat's descriptions of the premodern world are misleading. The Antiochene's were concerned with allowing the text to refer to what it seemed to refer to; that is, they were concerned with its facticity. Second, Theodore

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[242] Theodore of Mopsuestia, *Commentary on the Minor Pauline Epistles* quoted in Leemans, "After Philo and Paul," 444.

clearly saw allegory as a distinct hermeneutical system that Galatians 4 could not be used to defend. Therefore, to say that facticity was only discussed explicitly in the modern era is just not true. Theodore's statement shows that whether the text reliably pointed outside itself was indeed a concern of the pre-critical world. In the end, therefore, typology may indeed be anachronistic, but it is not so for the reasons Gignilliat describes.

Gignilliat's definition of allegory does not fare much better. Despite defining the term in a unique way, he provides little argument for understanding allegory merely as a reading of the literal sense in light of the nexus of revelation. He briefly recognizes the tendency to look to Philo or, more recently, to adopt the definitions found in first-century Hellenistic rhetorical treatises, but he does not interact with either.[243] He simply adopts Hans Frei's definition with little argument. If Gignilliat agrees that Philo or the rhetorical treatises of the first century demonstrate what allegory was, then Frei's definition seems woefully inadequate. To repeat, Frei claims that "a figural or allegorical reading of the text is a literal reading of the story in light of the nexus of revelation as a whole."[244] This definition is simply too narrow to account for what allegory is. Only certain Christian writers could have constructed a literal reading that took into account the whole of revelation, but Christians are not the only authors who practiced allegory in the ancient world. As noted above, Heraclitus used allegory to read Homer's epics. If he was allegorizing, then allegory cannot be what Frei takes it to be because he did not have a nexus of revelation by which he could read the literal sense. Likewise, the first-century treatises define allegory as a textual trope, not a means of reading. Thus, Frei's definition does not fit their definition either. Again, Gignilliat may be right about the relationship between allegory and typology, but his definitions simply do not bear the burden of his claim.

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[243] Gignilliat, "Paul, Allegory, and the Plain Sense of Scripture," 136.

[244] Gignilliat, "Paul, Allegory, and the Plain Sense of Scripture," 140; see Frei, *The Eclipse of Biblical Narrative*, 1–37.

Lastly, Gignilliat seems to be caught between two worlds in his discussion of the literal sense. On the one hand, he seems determined to reject what he sees to be modernity's unhelpful obsession with a literal sense.[245] On the other, he wants to defend Paul's reading of Genesis 16 against those, like Hays, who would claim that Paul was imposing his reading on the Sarah-Hagar narratives. To thread these two desires together, Gignilliat again appeals to pre-critical thinking. "In pre-critical exegesis, typological or figural readings were not conceived of as an imposition onto the text but were viewed as a 'natural extension' of the text."[246] Perhaps Gignilliat is correct on this point, but what does it prove? Pre-critical exegetes could have been wrong. The fact that they thought of the allegorical sense as an extension of the literal sense does not make it so.

Unfortunately, despite Gignilliat's efforts, these two desires cannot be reconciled. One cannot determine whether Paul's reading is an imposition without assessing how his reading relates to the literal sense, and one cannot do this if the literal sense is outside the reach of the modern mind. Thus, Gignilliat's claims that Paul's "figural or allegorical reading of the narrative is warranted" is only true if the confessional framework through which he read the narrative matches the framework of the narrative itself.[247] To be sure, Gignilliat at times seems to think that it does. Paul's reading, in his view, "is the only proper reading that takes into account the ultimate subject matter of Scripture."[248] To say, however, that there is an ultimate subject matter of Scripture is to say that Scripture contains a discoverable literal sense. Given Gignilliat's postmodern commitments, he would have been better off leaving the question unanswered. Paul read the text as a Christian. Nothing more could be said. Ultimately,

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[245] Gignilliat, "Paul, Allegory, and the Plain Sense of Scripture," 141.

[246] Gignilliat, "Paul, Allegory, and the Plain Sense of Scripture," 142.

[247] Gignilliat, "Paul, Allegory, and the Plain Sense of Scripture," 145.

[248] Gignilliat, "Paul, Allegory, and the Plain Sense of Scripture," 142.

Gignilliat's use of postmodern literary theory obscures Paul's hermeneutic and does not satisfactorily answer the question of whether he was allegorizing.

"Covenant Lineage Allegorically Prefigured" A. B. Caneday

Ardel Caneday doubts whether Paul's hermeneutics should be characterized as an allegorical or typological interpretation but for different reasons. He is not concerned with anachronism. Rather, he thinks characterizing Paul's exegesis in Galatians 4 as either allegory or typology produces two unfortunate consequences:

> First, it implies that what Paul now discovers concerning Christ in the Old Testament Scriptures is grounded in little more than his fresh revelatory bias effected by his conversion. Second, it implies that foreshadows of Christ in the Old Testament are rendered so by retrospect after Messiah's coming, thus inadequately accounting for the fact that foreshadows of Christ really are there to be seen within the Old Testament.[249]

In other words, Caneday thinks that taking Paul's exegesis as either typological or allegorical interpretation insinuate that he placed his reading in the Genesis text by pure apostolic fiat. Caneday thinks this view to be obviously false and, therefore, opts for what he sees to be a third option. "Paul reads Scripture's story of Abraham as historical narrative invested with symbolic representations embedded within the characters and the two contrasting births of two sons—one by natural order, the other by divine promise. Hence, the Genesis text itself, not Paul's interpretation of the text, is allegorical while simultaneously upholding the historical authenticity of those characters."[250] Unlike typological and allegorical interpretation, Caneday thinks the Genesis text makes Paul's point. He was not generating allegories or types. The key to understanding Paul's reading lies in the warrants the text of Genesis provides.[251]

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[249] A. B. Caneday, "Covenant Lineage Allegorically Prefigured: 'Which Things Are Written Allegorically' (Galatians 4:21–31)," *SBJT* 14, no. 3 (2010): 66.

[250] Caneday, "Covenant Lineage Allegorically Prefigured," 51.

[251] Caneday, "Covenant Lineage Allegorically Prefigured," 53.

Before he looks for these warrants, however, Caneday observes that Paul himself claims warrant for his reading. For example, he starts the pericope with "speak to me, you who wish to be under the law, do you not hear the law?" (Gal 4:21).[252] This scathing rhetorical question suggests that Paul was not merely appealing to his apostolic authority. He expected his readers would "be able to recognize in the Genesis narrative the allegory that he claims is actually there."[253] Even his use of the elusive phrase ἅτινά ἐστιν ἀλληγούμενα, according to Caneday, indicates that Paul understood Genesis itself to be allegorical. Characteristically, "translators and exegetes tend to take Paul's statement . . . as 'these things are *interpreted* allegorically,'" making the phrase refer to Paul's hermeneutical method not a textual trope present within the text of Genesis.[254] Following Di Mattei's study of the term, Caneday argues that it should be rendered "'to *speak* allegorically,' in which case it is usually the original author or the personified text itself which speaks allegorically."[255] In Caneday's view, these pieces of evidence demonstrate that Paul expected his audience to follow his reading, and if so, then he presumably provided them with a warranted reading, a reading commended by Genesis itself.[256]

Looking to the Old Testament, Caneday admits that Paul's reading of Sarah and Hagar is not explicit. The storyline of scripture slowly unfolds like plot points in a narrative. "Veiled former revelation becomes lucid as the climactic finale to the storyline clarifies the dramatic development and escalation of the story's whole plotline."[257] The

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[252] Caneday, "Covenant Lineage Allegorically Prefigured," 55.

[253] Caneday, "Covenant Lineage Allegorically Prefigured," 54.

[254] Caneday, "Covenant Lineage Allegorically Prefigured," 53 (italics original).

[255] Caneday, "Covenant Lineage Allegorically Prefigured," 54; see Di Mattei, "Paul's Allegory of the Two Covenants," 106–7.

[256] Caneday, "Covenant Lineage Allegorically Prefigured," 56.

[257] Caneday, "Covenant Lineage Allegorically Prefigured," 52.

story of Sarah and Hagar points forward to climactic points that Paul is pointing to in his recounting of the narrative without stating them explicitly, and those climactic points elucidate the birth narratives of Ishmael and Isaac. This characterization allows Caneday to concede that Paul's Damascus Road experience did serve as the impetus for the change in his theology and to ultimately ground this same theology in the Old Testament.[258] The story of Sarah and Hagar foreshadows with the births of Isaac and Ishmael the Gentile inclusion and the reception of the Spirit in two ways. Sarah's barrenness begins a theme that reaches "all the way to the birth narrative in Luke's gospel."[259] It highlights God's sovereign power to fulfill his promise, which in turn elicits the faith that Paul sees as the sole source of salvation. The story also lays out the dividing line between those who compose God's people and those who do not. "Not all who descend from Abraham are his true children."[260] If so, then there must be some other means of identifying the true seed of Abraham. For Paul, this means is the promise of God. According to Caneday, these two Genesis plot points serve as Paul's warrant. They are what make his reading plausible and what put him outside the allegorical *and* typological interpretation fold.

Caneday's discussion is very helpful. He does seem right that Paul's own language suggests that he expected readers to follow his argument. He also keys in on an important aspect of the discussion concerning the verb ἀλληγορέω. If the verb refers to a textual trope not a hermeneutical method, then it seems odd to use it as the lynchpin for deciding whether Paul was allegorizing. If Caneday is correct, Paul would not be describing what he was doing. He would be describing something the text was doing. Finally and most importantly, his likening of the function of the canon to the function of

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[258] Caneday, "Covenant Lineage Allegorically Prefigured," 52.

[259] Caneday, "Covenant Lineage Allegorically Prefigured," 62.

[260] Caneday, "Covenant Lineage Allegorically Prefigured," 64.

a narrative shines light on how a text might objectively point forward to a climax that in turn elucidates said text without doing so in a way that runs against its original sense.

My work is very much in line with Caneday's and will build on his in the following ways: First, it will provide a detailed look into what ἀλληγορέω meant in the ancient world, further bolstering the insight of Caneday's work. Second, it will provide a detailed reading of Philo to show that "allegory" in the first century was in fact marked by arbitrariness. Thus, to show that Paul's reading was warranted is to show that it is not allegorical. Third and finally, it will provide a more detailed reading of both Galatians 4:21–31 and the Old Testament texts to which Paul appeals to further establish the thesis that Paul's reading was actually a warranted reading.

"Arbitrary Allegory, Typical Typology, or Intertextual Interpretation"
Matt Y. Emerson

The logic of Matt Emerson's article closely resembles Caneday's. Wanting to guard Paul against the charge of violating the original sense of the text, Emerson attempts "to show that Paul is actually employing a hermeneutic that properly interprets the textual meaning of the Pentateuch and the particular passages involved."[261] According to Emerson, very few scholars have agreed with him on this point. "Virtually no commentator from the time of Calvin has concluded that Paul accurately conveys the message of the Pentateuch's narratives to which he alludes in his 'allegory.'"[262] Before moving into his own argument, Emerson groups these commentators into three broad categories.

The first group argues "that Paul's use of the Pentateuch in Galatians 4:21–31 does not accurately reflect the author of the Pentateuch's intention for the particular

[261] Emerson, "Arbitrary Allegory, Typical Typology, or Intertextual Interpretation?," 15.

[262] Emerson, "Arbitrary Allegory, Typical Typology, or Intertextual Interpretation?," 14.

passages."[263] Luther, for example, described the allegory as an aesthetic addition. It was not meant to prove anything. Paul simply used it to add beauty to what he had already said.[264] Modern versions of Luther are slightly more direct. Jonathan Lunde claims that Paul "appears not to be concerned with historical reality."[265] He keeps the characters but changes the story. Emerson's second group is less critical of Paul. They think that "while Paul has not violated or ignored the historical sense of the text, he also has not reflected it wholesale and has imported Christological presuppositions onto it."[266] Paul's reading extends or fills out the original meaning. It does not contradict it. Gignilliat would be representative of this second group. Emerson's third and final group argues that Paul was typologizing despite his use of the term ἀλληγορέω, a view encountered multiple times above.[267] Although this third group gives Paul more credit than groups one and two, they still merely look for "parallels in the history of Israel with the contemporaneous events of the early church."[268] They do not think these parallels native to the Pentateuch itself.

Despite their obvious differences, according to Emerson, all three of these views have one thing in common: None of them believe that Paul offers a *textual* reading of the Pentateuch, that is, a reading "that pays attention to the 'historical' or 'original' sense of the passage as seen through an exegetical study of the grammar, syntax, and

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[263] Emerson, "Arbitrary Allegory, Typical Typology, or Intertextual Interpretation?," 15.

[264] Martin Luther, *A Commentary on St. Paul's Epistle to the Galatians*, trans. Robert Carter (New York, 1848), 426; Emerson, "Arbitrary Allegory, Typical Typology, or Intertextual Interpretation?," 15. Although the impetus for Luther's view of Gal 4 may have been his inability to explain Paul's hermeneutic, it does not seem fair to characterize Luther as arguing that Paul got the intent of the Pentateuch wrong. In arguing that Paul was merely adding an aesthetic addition, Luther avoids making any such claim. According to Luther's view, Paul could not have read the Pentateuch incorrectly because he really was not reading at all. He was merely illustrating it.

[265] Jonathan Lunde, "An Introduction to Central Questions in the New Testament Use of the Old Testament," in *Three Views on the New Testament Use of the Old Testament*, ed. Kenneth Berding and Jonathan Lunde (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2008), 29; Emerson, "Arbitrary Allegory, Typical Typology, or Intertextual Interpretation?," 15.

[266] Emerson, "Arbitrary Allegory, Typical Typology, or Intertextual Interpretation?," 16.

[267] Emerson, "Arbitrary Allegory, Typical Typology, or Intertextual Interpretation?," 17.

[268] Emerson, "Arbitrary Allegory, Typical Typology, or Intertextual Interpretation?," 17.

structure of the text."[269] Emerson takes aim at this particular point. Paul did have warrant for his reading, and Emerson attempts to show what that is by using the tools of intertextuality.[270] Here, his similarity to Caneday shines through, but unlike Caneday, Emerson's exegesis is much more granular. Caneday wove together broad themes and motifs, treating the Pentateuch much like a modern reader would a novel. Emerson, on the other hand, points to particular words that he thinks reflect Genesis's intention to associate Hagar with the Sinaitic covenant and other negative events within the Pentateuch.[271] For example, Hagar "curses" Sarah, "which is the same Hebrew word used for God promising to 'curse' those who curse Abraham in Genesis 12:3," linking Genesis 16 with Genesis 21.[272] Details like these coalesce to show that "the Hagar covenant was evidently not eternally salvific but only for physical protection."[273] Thus, "one must consider the possibility that the links presented are intended to show that the Sinai covenant too is only for physical protection and not eternally salvific."[274] In other words, Paul may have had a point. Although it may do so subtly, the Pentateuch does indeed forge the links that Paul observes in Galatians 4.

Like Caneday, much of Emerson's discussion is helpful. Both men accurately characterize modern sentiment toward Paul's exegesis, and they are both slightly more patient in their analysis of the Pentateuch than those they survey. However, Emerson's more granular reading often strains credulity. The idea that Abraham should be linked with Adam or Cain because of the repeated word גרש, for example, seems too detailed. There is a difference between arguing that the motif of casting out links these men

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[269] Emerson, "Arbitrary Allegory, Typical Typology, or Intertextual Interpretation?," 17.

[270] Emerson, "Arbitrary Allegory, Typical Typology, or Intertextual Interpretation?," 14.

[271] Emerson, "Arbitrary Allegory, Typical Typology, or Intertextual Interpretation?," 18.

[272] Emerson, "Arbitrary Allegory, Typical Typology, or Intertextual Interpretation?," 18.

[273] Emerson, "Arbitrary Allegory, Typical Typology, or Intertextual Interpretation?," 20.

[274] Emerson, "Arbitrary Allegory, Typical Typology, or Intertextual Interpretation?," 20.

together and arguing that the repeated use of the Hebrew word for casting out links them together. The latter implies that there were many words at the author's disposal but that he chose the גרשׁ specifically to alert the reader of this link, which is highly unlikely. It would have been better for Emerson to focus on the motifs that he repeatedly brings up than to attempt to ground Paul's reading in these sorts of details.[275] Doing so induces skepticism of Paul's reading. It does not alleviate it. If reading textually means doing what Emerson claims, then it seems as if Paul was obviously not reading in a textual manner.

Furthermore, Emerson's appeal to intertextuality seems out of place. Hays's work popularized such an appeal for scholars who interact with Paul's use of the Old Testament, but the framework simply does not fit with what Emerson is trying to do. Although it has morphed somewhat in biblical scholarship, intertextuality came about precisely because certain literary scholars had become disillusioned with "the intentionality of a given passage."[276] At the very least, proponents of intertextuality are generally agnostic concerning authorial intent. For example, although he does argue that texts constrain interpretation, Francis Watson (a leading proponent of intertextuality) doubts whether one could adjudicate between two competing readings based on the intent of the passage. Both Paul's and Jubilee's readings of the Sarah-Hagar narratives are merely two results stemming from the semantic protentional of the text, neither more

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[275] For example, Emerson connects Ishmael to Cain because they were both cast out and Hagar to Israel because they both wonder in the wilderness. He then argues that these links suggest that "like the promise made to Cain and to Israel in the wilderness, the promise made to Hagar does not result in her or Ishmael's inclusion in the eternal covenant but only in physical provision." Emerson, "Arbitrary Allegory, Typical Typology, or Intertextual Interpretation?," 20. Rather than parsing these somewhat bland details, Emerson would have been better off appealing to Genesis 21, where Sarah's interaction with Abraham clearly excludes Ishmael from the eternal covenant made with Abraham.

[276] Emerson, "Arbitrary Allegory, Typical Typology, or Intertextual Interpretation?," 17. See Beale and Bates for description of the development of intertextuality: G. K. Beale, *Handbook on the New Testament Use of the Old Testament: Exegesis and Interpretation* (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2012), 39–40; Matthew W. Bates, *The Hermeneutics of the Apostolic Proclamation: The Center of Paul's Method of Scriptural Interpretation* (Waco, TX: Baylor University Press, 2012), 47–53.

correct than the other.[277] If intertextuality is stripped of these deconstructionist underpinnings, it reduces to the biblical authors' appeals to the Old Testament, in which case it is certainly not worth mentioning. Therefore, despite Emerson's attempt to defend intertextuality as an apt description of Paul's method, ultimately it ends up obscuring what the apostle was actually doing.

Finally, it must be recognized that Emerson's study only tangentially connects with my own because it never attempts to define what allegory is. To be sure, Emerson never intended to do so. His "article is intended to address, not the particular nuances of the definition of 'allegory,' but instead the legitimacy of Paul's use of the Pentateuch for his 'allegorical' argument in Galatians 4:21–31."[278] He wants to defend Paul's reading as a warranted reading, but such a defense provides only one half of the puzzle. One must assess whether allegory is unwarranted reading before his descriptions of Paul can bear weight on my particular question.

"Allegory, Typology, or Something Else?" Matthew S. Harmon

Matt Harmon's article goes directly at the question. As his title suggests, Harmon attempts to identify if Paul was typologizing, allegorizing, or something else by analyzing the meaning of the verb ἀλληγορέω. In Harmon's view, Paul's use of the term in Galatians 4:24 is fairly unique. It does not mean "to speak allegorically" nor "to interpret allegorically" as others have taken it to mean.[279] It means "reading a text through the lens of another textual, philosophical, or theological framework to reveal a fuller meaning."[280] Here, Harmon sounds a lot like Barr. Allegory is not so much a

[277] Watson, *Paul and the Hermeneutics of Faith*, 3–4.

[278] Emerson, "Arbitrary Allegory, Typical Typology, or Intertextual Interpretation?," 14.

[279] Matthew S. Harmon, "Allegory, Typology, or Something Else? Revisiting Galatians 4:21–5:1," in *Studies in the Pauline Epistles: Essays in Honor of Douglas J. Moo*, ed. Matthew S. Harmon and Jay E. Smith (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2014), 150.

[280] Harmon, "Allegory, Typology, or Something Else?," 150.

method as it is filtering a text through an external lens. Philo serves as Harmon's proof. In *De posteritate caini* 1.7, Philo writes the following:

> It now remains for us, considering that none of these things are spoken of in terms of strict propriety [τῶν προταθέντων οὐδὲν κυριολογεῖται], to turn to the allegorical system [τὴν δι'ἀλληγορίας ὁδόν], which is dear to men versed in natural philosophy [φυσικοῖς φίλην ἀνδράσι] taking the first principles of our argument from this source [τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐνθένδε τοῦ λόγου ποιησαμένους]. (*Post* 1.7)[281]

In this excerpt, Philo seems to explicitly flag his hermeneutic. Arguing that the text in question should not be interpreted literally, Philo recommends turning to an allegorical system that will help alleviate the problems in the text. The source of this system, argues Harmon, "is 'natural philosophy,' a phrase that renders the adjective φυσικός."[282] Thus, "Philo is reading Genesis through the lens of his natural Philosophy, and he signals this by noting that he is using 'the allegorical system [τὴν δι'ἀλληγορίας ὁδόν].'"[283] To allegorize, therefore, is to do what Philo does in this passage—read one text through the lens of some external system.

Traditionally, according to Harmon, typology differs from allegory in that its correspondences exist *within* the text not behind it, and they are intended by the author.[284] Here, Harmon makes the point that originally conceived typologies were thought to be warranted, authorially intended readings, a point that Emerson denies. Harmon's definition also differs in another way. Most advocates of typology were not so much concerned with the locations of the correspondences as they were with the historical nature. Typology connected historical events with other historical events, within the text or not. At this point, it is not important to decide who is right, but it is important to recognize that despite thinking that he has accurately captured the traditional view,

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[281] Quoted in Harmon, "Allegory, Typology, or Something Else?," 151.

[282] Harmon, "Allegory, Typology, or Something Else?," 151.

[283] Harmon, "Allegory, Typology, or Something Else?," 150.

[284] Harmon, "Allegory, Typology, or Something Else?," 154.

Harmon does not divide typology and allegory in the same place as other users of the typology-allegory framework, even those contemporary with him.[285] With this typological core in place, Harmon adds five other characteristics of typology: (1) analogical correspondence, (2) historicity, (3) pointing-forwardness, (4) escalation, and (5) retrospection.[286]

After defining typology and allegory, Harmon moves onto Galatians 4:21–31. Ultimately, Harmon settles in the middle, characterizing Paul's exegesis as a mixture of both typology and allegory. One cannot deny that Galatians shows most if not all of Harmon's five characteristics of typology, but he was clearly doing more. Isaiah 54:1 serves as an external framework that Paul uses to draw out a fuller meaning. In Harmon's view, however, Paul was not reading Isaiah into Genesis.[287] Rather, "Paul *perceives additional meaning* in Genesis 16–21 that is *legitimately in the text* but only recognizable when read through the lens of Isaiah 54:1."[288] Genesis already meant what Paul took it to mean. He just needed Isaiah to make that meaning clear. Therefore, Paul was not merely typologizing. He was allegorizing as well.

Harmon's detailed analysis of certain passages from Philo is helpful and further shows that Philo serves as an exemplar of allegory. However, there are a number of issues with Harmon's handling of Galatians 4. For starters, Harmon does not sufficiently grapple with the issues raised by Barr concerning the divide between typology and allegory. It may well be that Paul's exegesis shows the historical signs of typology, but the signs might be mere accidents, resulting from the nature of the external lens through which he views Genesis. In other words, Paul's exegesis looks historical

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[285] Harmon, Caneday, and Emerson all wrote their articles within five years of one another.

[286] Harmon, "Allegory, Typology, or Something Else?," 155.

[287] Harmon, "Allegory, Typology, or Something Else?," 157–58.

[288] Harmon, "Allegory, Typology, or Something Else?," 158.

because the lens he uses is historical. Without dealing with this issue, the claim that Paul was typologizing means very little. It might accurately describe certain attributes of Paul's exegesis, but it does not describe the core commitments of his hermeneutic.

Also, it seems clear that Harmon thinks one can answer the question "was Paul allegorizing?" by answering the question "what does the term ἀλληγορέω mean?" which is simply not true. The verb may very well have changed, and one must look to the popular allegories of Paul's day more extensively to answer the question. To put it another way, one must look at Philo's exegetical moves not just his use of the verb ἀλληγορέω to determine what it is to allegorize. In using the term, Philo may be only referring to a part of his hermeneutic in any given passage, not necessarily the whole thing. A modern scholar, for example, might say something like "we must appeal to modern semiotics to properly understand the verb τελειόω in Hebrews 2:10." He may then go on to appeal to various contextual clues to further his view of the verb. It is clear to the modern reader that the scholar's appeal to "semiotics" and to "contextual clues" are not one and the same. Therefore, although it may be the case that Philo indeed reads his given text through the lens of an external system, one cannot conclude that Philo intends to flag that fact by his use of the verb ἀλληγορέω unless there are more specific contextual clues that would suggest such a conclusion.

Also, Harmon's flattens the study of the verb ἀλληγορέω into the noun ἀλληγορία, which also yields questionable results. For example, in the text quoted from *De posteritate caini* above, Philo uses the noun ἀλληγορία not the verb ἀλληγορέω. Just like one cannot assume that ἀλληγορέω does not necessarily mean the same thing as the modern English word "allegory," one cannot assume that a verb means the same thing as its cognate noun. Consider the verb "believe" and the noun "belief." There are certain uses in which the noun clearly refers to the same thing as the verb as in the sentence "true belief is hard to come by." In this sentence, the noun "belief" refers to the act of believing, but this synonymy does not always hold. In the sentence "your beliefs are

true," the noun belief does not refer to the act of believing. It refers to the direct object of that act. What this shows is that a cognate verb and noun must be studied independently to determine if they refer to the same thing. Philo's use of ἀλληγορία, therefore, only goes so far to elucidate Paul's use of ἀλληγορέω.

Even if the noun and the verb were synonymous, it is not clear that Harmon has accurately captured the meaning of the noun in *De posteritate caini*, which serves as the best example of his definition. The phrase ὁ φυσικός probably does refer to natural philosophy, but Philo's use of the term does not suggest that he is reading the Genesis through the lens of natural philosophy. He is merely saying that the allegorical method is loved by men who love this philosophy, and it is from this method that Philo intends to draw his first principles. What this method is Philo does not indicate. It may include "reading Genesis through the lens of his natural philosophy," but such a reading is not obvious. Ultimately, therefore, the means by which Harmon arrives at his conclusions needs some refining.

"Justifying Allegory: Scripture, Rhetoric, and Reason in Galatians 4:21–5:1"
David I. Starling

David Starling stands in line with Caneday and Emerson, looking to flesh out the warrant for Paul's reading. Unlike Caneday and Emerson, however, Starling attempts to reconcile two seemingly disparate camps. Camp one consists of scholars like Caneday and Emerson who argue that Paul's warrant comes from inside the text.[289] Camp two opposes this view. According to them, Paul's reading comes from external factors, like his experience of the Spirit or his new view of justification, not the text itself.[290] Starling "proposes a reading that resists polarization between these two alternatives, tracing the

[289] David Starling, "Justifying Allegory: Scripture, Rhetoric, and Reason in Galatians 4:21–5:1," *Journal of Theological Interpretation* 9, no. 2 (2015): 230–31.

[290] Starling, "Justifying Allegory," 229–30.

various interwoven threads of inner-biblical intertextuality, salvation-historical narrative, apocalyptic revelation, apostolic ethos, and Galatian experience within the argument that supports Paul's allegorical appropriation of the Genesis story."[291]

Starling defends this ecumenical attempt by first clearing the table of a piece of evidence many have thought key to understanding Paul. The verb ἀλληγορέω "had not yet come to be used as a technical term for a particular form of interpretation that finds deeper, timeless meanings hidden behind the details of an ancient narrative."[292] At the time Paul used it, ἀλληγορέω simply meant something like the modern word "metaphor." Thus, as Gignilliat argues, it may very well include readings strategies like typology that it is usually thought to oppose, and Paul's procedure cannot be nailed down simply by a study of the verb.[293] Such studies, according to Starling, have become sterile wars of words.[294]

Starling then begins a critique of camp one by appealing to the argumentative and, at times, emotional nature of Paul's rhetoric. It is clear that Paul was not merely reading a text and trying to understand what it meant, nor was he offering a stoic argument, devoid of any emotional appeal. Galatians 4:12–20, for example, is a highly emotional text.[295] According to Starling, recognizing Paul's pathos calls into question the impression that can be given by camp one's view of Paul's allegory as "an objective, context-free exegesis of the original meaning of the Genesis story."[296] Paul was not a commentator, methodically explaining the meaning of Genesis 16. He was a pastor fending off the Judaizing wolves from his Gentile sheep.

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[291] Starling, "Justifying Allegory," 227.

[292] Starling, "Justifying Allegory," 228.

[293] Starling, "Justifying Allegory," 228.

[294] Starling, "Justifying Allegory," 228.

[295] Starling, "Justifying Allegory," 232–33.

[296] Starling, "Justifying Allegory," 234.

On the other hand, it is also clear that Paul's reading does not merely come from outside the text, as one would think from reading Hays and Fowl. As Starling points out, Paul explicitly appeals to features of both Genesis and Isaiah to make his case. At the beginning of the pericope, for example, he plainly states "that Abraham had 'two sons,' not one."[297] Thus, "Paul is pressing his audience between the two ways of being a 'son of Abraham'—one of which leads to freedom (5:1) and inheritance (4:30) and the other of which leads to slavery (4:25–25) and expulsion (4:30)."[298] Details like these show that Paul constructs his allegory from themes that are "native to the text itself" and, in so doing, differentiates himself "from the Alexandrian allegorical interpretations of Philo and his Christian successors."[299] Therefore, Paul's reading is a *warranted* allegorical reading—a reading "grounded in the phenomena and themes of the original source text, attentive to its intertextual relationship with the rest of canonical Scripture."[300]

It is worth noting that Starling questions whether the word "allegorical" can be rehabilitated, meaning that his use of the term to describe Paul's exegesis is merely in keeping with common parlance. He is not trying to make a strong claim concerning whether Paul was allegorizing. This question is also worth noting because it suggests that he thinks the word has been indissolubly tied to Philo in modern usage. Starling thinks of Philo as an exemplar of an Alexandrian school of hermeneutics that Paul was not a part

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[297] Starling, "Justifying Allegory," 234.

[298] Starling, "Justifying Allegory," 235.

[299] Starling, "Justifying Allegory," 236.

[300] Starling leans on Francis Watson for this point. Starling, "Justifying Allegory," 242. Watson claims that "[Paul's] 'allegorical' interpretation of this narrative is in fact grounded in a plausible construal of its fundamental intention. . . . He does not regard the text as a pretext for a free interpretative fantasia." Watson, *Paul and the Hermeneutics of Faith*, 189–90. Watson's work is very important to this conversation, but since he does not directly engage the question of allegory, I have left direct interaction with his work out of this history of research.

of.[301] Thus, Starling is hesitant to call his reading "allegorical" because it could press the apostle's exegesis to an extreme Starling wants to avoid.[302]

For these reasons, Starling's discussion is very helpful, but there are two areas that could improve. First, it is not clear that the evidence Starling garners allows him to stay put between what he sees to be two extremes. For example, it may be the case that Paul's "pathos-laden appeal in 4:12–20 is not simply forgotten when he turns back to argumentation from Scripture in 4:21–5:1," but what does this point prove?[303] No one in camp one, not Caneday nor Emerson, claims that Paul issued his exegetical claims without any emotion. That is simply not the question. The question of camp one is do Genesis and Isaiah make the point Paul thinks they do, regardless of whether he explains this point in a pathos-laden manner. Starling struggles similarly with camp two. Yes, Paul may point to Abraham's two sons, but when he claims that their mothers allegorically represent two covenants, he seems to have gone far beyond what these narrative details allow him to, which is why Hays and Fowl think the Christ event and the reception of the Spirit serve as the primary causes for Paul's reading. Perhaps there is a middle ground to be found, but Starling's middle ground needs refining.

Second, Starling too quickly dismisses the discussion of ἀλληγορέω. Steven Di Mattei and Ian Scott, to whom Starling appeals to make this point, clearly do not agree that "recent interpreters of Galatians have rightly pointed out the sterility of this particular war of words."[304] Both men provide fairly extensive studies of ἀλληγορέω demonstrating that they think this particular war of words is not sterile at all. Steven Di Mattei even comes to the opposite conclusion of Starling primarily because of his study

[301] Starling, "Justifying Allegory," 236.

[302] Starling, "Justifying Allegory," 236.

[303] Starling, "Justifying Allegory," 233.

[304] Starling, "Justifying Allegory," 228. See Di Mattei, "Paul's Allegory of the Two Covenants," 108–9; Ian W. Scott, *Paul's Way of Knowing: Story, Experience, and the Spirit* (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2009), 240.

of the term. It seems as if Starling mistook the conclusion of these two men to mean the word does not matter when, in reality, they were simply trying to prove that the word had not yet become a technical term. These two conclusions are not the same. What Starling probably means is that when the evidence is considered, ἀλληγορέω was not intended to flag Paul's reading as allegory. It would have meant little more than "the text speaks metaphorically." Thus, it should not be considered a major tipping point for those who align Paul with Philo. On this point, Starling and I completely agree. My next chapter will attempt to defend a similar claim.

The Reformation and the Right Reading of Scripture Iain Provan

Iain Provan's answer to the question "was Paul allegorizing in Galatians 4?" is an emphatic no. Taking Philo as the foil against whom he measures Paul, Provan argues the apostle in no way resembles the allegory of the ancient world despite using the term ἀλληγορέω.[305] To build his case, Provan looks at the roots of Philo's hermeneutic. Originally developed by the ancient Greeks, allegory was a hermeneutical technique intended to salvage Homer from his critics. "Increasingly, educated Greeks found [Homer's] portrayals of the gods in both the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* troubling."[306] Plato sought to ban the poems, but others, according to Provan, attempted to preserve the epics through a particular means of reading. Thus, allegory was born. Through allegory, petty squabbles between the gods were transformed into cosmic strife between the elements. The impious or improper elements of Homer were erased, and his overall epics were preserved.[307]

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[305] Iain W. Provan, *The Reformation and the Right Reading of Scripture* (Waco, TX: Baylor University Press, 2017), 147.

[306] Provan, *The Reformation and the Right Reading of Scripture*, 139.

[307] Provan, *The Reformation and the Right Reading of Scripture*, 139–40.

It is this technique that Provan thinks Philo employed. Having been deeply steeped in the Hellenistic culture of Alexandria, Philo sought to "subject his revered and authoritative (but now unfortunately difficult and embarrassing) traditional texts to allegorical reading, in order to reveal to the contemporary detractors of Judaism all the many ways in which Jewish scriptural teaching was, against all appearances, consistent with prevailing Greco-Roman philosophical and ethical norms."[308] Philo did to the Old Testament what the Greeks did to Homer. Read on its own, for example, the story of the serpent in Genesis 3 embarrassed the ancient mind. Read allegorically, however, the story became a "warning to those who pursue the pleasures of the body rather than 'heavenly good' offered by wisdom to 'contemplative men.'" Philo fixed the problems of the Old Testament via allegory.[309] Provan argues that Philo's brand of allegory exhibits two key attributes: (1) "It departs in a serious manner from anything that could reasonably be described as the literal sense of the text," and (2) it is extremely extensive, incorporating every text Philo sought to explain.[310]

Because Paul does not exhibit either of these attributes, he was not allegorizing. Steven Di Mattei serves as one of Provan's primary conversation partners. As discussed above, Di Mattei leans heavily on the first-century definitions of allegory developed by men like Trypho and Heraclitus who claimed that allegory was a "this for that" trope. The problem with this view, according to Provan, is that the "'this' is entirely unconstrained by 'that,' which is merely a convenient starting point for philosophical speculation. This is very far from describing Paul's approach."[311] Paul "is reading the OT Scriptures that lie before him literally, allowing the larger context always to inform his

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[308] Provan, *The Reformation and the Right Reading of Scripture*, 142.

[309] Provan, *The Reformation and the Right Reading of Scripture*, 143.

[310] Provan, *The Reformation and the Right Reading of Scripture*, 143–44.

[311] Provan, *The Reformation and the Right Reading of Scripture*, 145.

reading of the particular text."[312] The key to understanding Provan's claim at this point is understanding what he means by "literally." Provan defines the term in a much more robust manner than those that came before him:

> To read Scripture "literally" . . . means to read it in accordance with its various, apparent communicative intentions as a collection of texts from the past now integrated into one Great Story, doing justice to such realities as literary convention, idiom, metaphor, and typology or figuration.[313]

If Provan's definition of literal holds, Paul was indeed reading literally. He was not imposing the Christ event on Genesis. The Christ event is the climax of a story of which Genesis is a part, and like any story, its parts must be read in light of the whole. Scholars have gone askew in their thinking concerning Paul because they have conflated the "literal" and the "historical." To read literally, according to historical-critical scholars, is to merely recount the events. Who did what? To read the biblical texts in this manner, however, is to read them literalistically. It is to miss the communicative intents of their authors. Although they were certainly concerned with the past, they did not write about it for its own sake. "They tell their story about it in order to persuade of certain truths and to advocate certain ways of living," which is exactly how Paul reads Genesis.[314] According to Provan, Paul is only denied his rightful literal label because the term has been too narrowly defined.

Provan ends his discussion by talking about the term ἀλληγορέω. If it is true, according to Provan, that Paul is doing something decidedly different than Philo, why is it that scholars continue to insist that the term means "allegory?" The modern mind cannot help but think of Philo when he thinks of allegory. Thus, "in this real world, confusion *inevitably* arises when 'allegory' is used for what Paul is doing in Galatians 4."

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[312] Provan, *The Reformation and the Right Reading of Scripture*, 147.

[313] Provan, *The Reformation and the Right Reading of Scripture*, 85–86.

[314] Provan, *The Reformation and the Right Reading of Scripture*, 92.

If Paul was not doing what Philo was doing, then he was not allegorizing.[315] With this point, Provan objects to Barr's original critique of the typology-allegory framework. Barr argued that the definition of allegory had been unnecessarily narrowed. Provan argues that it has now been unwisely broadened, linking ancient exegetical practices that look nothing alike. Why call two different hermeneutics by the same name?[316]

My thesis owes a heavy debt to Provan's work. I think he is not only right about the nature of Philo's exegesis but also about Philo's connection to allegory in general. One of the primary burdens of the history of research is to prove his point. Almost without fail, scholars have taken the ancient Alexandrian as the standard of first-century allegory, even those that would disagree with Provan and myself. I also think Provan is right about ἀλληγορέω. Again and again, it seems like the word has been assumed to mean "allegory" simply because it is the genetic precursor to its modern counterpart. However, the opposite assumption must not be made either. Just because Paul was doing something decidedly different than Philo does not mean that he was not using the term in the same manner. The semantic range of the term cannot be erased simply because it is placed in an odd context. Understanding Paul's use of ἀλληγορέω requires a complex balance between the semantic range of the word and the context into which it is placed. If the term is indeed a technical term with a very narrow semantic range, then there is not much the context can do to overturn what it means, and Paul probably was using it exactly as those around him. One must consider both how to term is used widely and how it is used in the particular text in question.

Furthermore, Provan's description of what Paul is doing needs to be more specific if he is to truly prove that Paul read Genesis in line with its communicative

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[315] Provan, *The Reformation and the Right Reading of Scripture*, 150.

[316] Provan helpfully points to Longenecker and Hanson to stress this point. Both men claim that there were two different species of allegory—Palestinian and Alexandrian. Both men also stress the stark differences between these two traditions. As Provan argues, "How does it promote clarity, then, to use the same term for both?" Provan, *The Reformation and the Right Reading of Scripture*, 149.

intent. It may be true that Paul's reading "is not so much interested in correlating 'this' and 'that' as it is correlating 'then' and 'now,'" but Paul's "then and now" can still misconstrue the Genesis text, as many have claimed that it does. Paul claims that Hagar is the mother of the present Jerusalem, and yet Genesis seems to claim that Sarah is. Paul's claim may be more historical than Philo's. It is also may deal with characters present elsewhere in the biblical text, but it is not obvious how it fits into the Genesis story. The bulk of my argument will attempt to continue where Provan left off by filling in these particular gaps.

Children of Laughter and the Re-Creation of Humanity Samuel J. Tedder

Samuel J. Tedder stands at the end of this long line of scholarship, combining what he sees to be the best work on allegory and applying them to Paul. Ultimately, Tedder thinks intertextuality serves as the best framework to characterize Paul's exegesis, but he first argues that Galatians 4:21–31 should indeed be understood as allegory. Having been heavily influenced by David Dawson, Tedder rejects the notion that there is one type of allegory and opts for an eclectic approach to reach his own definition.[317] Traditionally, according to Tedder, allegory has been defined by how an interpretation relates to a text. Peter Berek, for example, claims that allegory is the reading "of a text whose author's intention did not clearly call for such interpretation."[318] Allegory violates or at least displaces the literal sense of the text. Tedder rejects this type of definition, claiming that modern scholarship has shown the futility of meaning grounded in authorial intent. "A text is subject to a range of readings that are opened by the rich semantic

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[317] Tedder seems to misread Dawson at this point. Yes, it may be true that allegory might be broad enough to incorporate typology, but that does not mean that it is not one thing. It might be a broad one thing, but it could still be one thing with distinct boundaries. Tedder, *Children of Laughter and the Re-Creation of Humanity*, 134.

[318] Peter Berek, "Interpretation, Allegory, and Allegoresis," *College English* 40, no. 2 (1978): 136.

potential of any text, and depend on the reader's own context and interests."[319] Instead, Tedder argues allegory should be understood on a spectrum. Some allegories correspond to the apparent literal meaning. Some diverge.[320]

Frances Young, according to Tedder, has nuanced this spectrum even further. In her work on the topic, Young replaces the categories of typology and allegory with ikonic and symbolic allegory. Ikonic allegory "would find a higher degree of correspondence between the various features of the text, the passage or narrative as a whole reflecting or mirroring in the narrative structure the 'undersense' adduced."[321] Symbolic allegory, on the other hand, "would tend to focus on particular verbal 'tokens' which consistently signify specific heavenly realities in the scriptures taken as a whole, but at the level of particular passages may produce a more piecemeal and apparently arbitrary meaning."[322] This ikonic-symbolic framework allows Tedder to "succinctly capture the nature of the relationship between text and its allegoresis in terms of varying degrees of correspondence and divergence" better than the traditional typology-allegory framework.[323]

Tedder also adds in Dawson's unique theory concerning allegory's socio-cultural function. As described above, Dawson thought that allegory could be described not only as a method of reading, but also as a culturally revisionary force, a tool to change the world surrounding the reader. Allegory achieves this goal by challenging the culturally accepted (i.e., literal) reading and, consequently, the reigning assumptions that

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[319] Tedder, *Children of Laughter and the Re-Creation of Humanity*, 136.

[320] Tedder, *Children of Laughter and the Re-Creation of Humanity*, 136. Tedder draws heavily on John Whitman for this point. John Whitman, *Interpretation and Allegory: Antiquity to the Modern Period* (Boston: Brill, 2000), 2.

[321] Frances M. Young, "Allegory and the Ethics of Reading," in *The Open Text: New Directions for Biblical Studies?*, ed. Francis Watson (London: SCM Press, 1993), 114.

[322] Young, "Allegory and the Ethics of Reading," 114.

[323] Tedder, *Children of Laughter and the Re-Creation of Humanity*, 137.

prop it up.[324] Allegory can also conserve the text by "bringing the text to line up with cultural expectations."[325] It saves the text by erasing its more embarrassing parts.

Even with this eclectic definition, Tedder still turns to Philo to add flesh to his somewhat abstract claims concerning allegory. Philo's allegories were both a conservative and counterhegemonic in the sense that Dawson describes. He was attempting to make the Jewish faith more palatable to the Hellenized world around him by challenging the Greek assumptions about what the Hebrew Bible did or did not teach.[326] On the topics of divergence or convergence, Philo's "philosophical system diverges significantly on the level of the content and themes that the narrative itself is concerned with."[327] In other words, his readings do not match the apparent meaning of the text.

Although he was doing something much different than Philo, Paul was indeed allegorizing. Paul himself says as much in Galatians 4:24, where he claims to be reading the text allegorically.[328] Tedder recognizes that scholars like Di Mattei have argued that the phrase does not mean "to interpret allegorically" but "to speak allegorically." However, since the former can follow from the latter, he takes the term to include both senses. When Paul says ἅτινά ἐστιν ἀλληγορούμενα, he means both "these things speak allegorically" *and* "these things are interpreted allegorically."[329] Tedder has no doubt, therefore, that Paul was allegorizing. The question that follows is what type of allegory was he doing?

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[324] Tedder, *Children of Laughter and the Re-Creation of Humanity*, 139.

[325] Tedder, *Children of Laughter and the Re-Creation of Humanity*, 139.

[326] Tedder, *Children of Laughter and the Re-Creation of Humanity*, 144.

[327] Tedder, *Children of Laughter and the Re-Creation of Humanity*, 145.

[328] Tedder, *Children of Laughter and the Re-Creation of Humanity*, 148.

[329] Tedder, *Children of Laughter and the Re-Creation of Humanity*, 155.

Both Paul's and Philo's readings have a similar socio-cultural function. They both attempt to conserve the text to some degree and challenge certain prevailing assumptions of the culture around them.[330] Unlike Philo, however, Paul's allegory was much more tethered to the text. To use Tedder's language, there is a high level of convergence between Paul's reading and the apparent literal sense. "Paul is actually interested in the themes and content of the scriptural text."[331] Philo does not seem interested in them at all. Paul's reading converges. Philo's diverges. Tedder never returns to the definitions he appropriates from Young, but Paul and Philo would presumably find themselves at odds on her terms as well. Paul's exegesis resembles what Young calls ikonic allegory since his reading pays much more attention to the narrative flow of Genesis. Philo's exegesis deals with the text as if it were a bag of symbols, placing it into Young's symbolic allegory. Therefore, other than their socio-cultural features, Paul and Philo stand at odds.

Tedder's point is not the same as mine. He is not trying to precisely categorize Paul. He clearly wants to deal with the question of allegory and quickly move on to his views of intertextuality. With that said, there are a number of problems with the claims that Tedder makes about allegory generally and about Paul specifically. For starters, Tedder's definition of allegory suffers the same fate as Dawson's in its attempt to do away with the literal sense. One cannot do away with definitions of allegory that include a commitment to literal meaning only to develop a definition that depends on that same literal sense. One can only say whether a reading diverges or converges with the text if that text has a discernable literal sense.

Also, in his attempt to be eclectic, Tedder neglects synthesizing the definitions of allegory where they are similar. For example, Tedder replaces typology and allegory

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[330] For Tedder's description of Paul, see Tedder, *Children of Laughter and the Re-Creation of Humanity*, 140.

[331] Tedder, *Children of Laughter and the Re-Creation of Humanity*, 148.

with ikonic and symbolic, but the two groups are nearly the same. Ikonic allegory is basically another name for typology, and symbolic allegory is basically another name for allegory. The only difference is that the ikonic and symbolic framework allows Tedder to hold together two distinct modes of reading as two species of allegory rather than seeing them as two irreconcilable ways of reading. Therefore, Tedder's definitions obscure the entire discussion, making it seem as if he uses an entirely different definition of allegory when he does no such thing.

This issue exposes perhaps Tedder's biggest problem, the problem Provan points out at the end of his discussion. How likely is it that two men, who are operating on opposite sides of the hermeneutical spectrum in almost every way, are actually using the same exegetical method? If Paul and Philo differ as much as Tedder thinks they do, saying that they both allegorize seems at best unhelpful. An allegory that includes both Paul and Philo on Tedder's terms really says nothing about the nature of their reading at all. All reading would be allegorical reading, in which case calling Paul's reading an allegory would be to merely say that he was reading, again, a point hardly worth making. It would seem that Tedder's main reason for taking Paul's reading to be allegorical is Galatians 4:24, and his handling of this text is not great. To say that Paul's use of ἀλληγορεώ includes both "to read allegorically" and "to speak allegorically" because one entails the other is fallacious reasoning. The question is not whether speaking allegorically entails interpreting allergically in practice. The question is which of these actions is included in the verb itself? Even if Tedder were correct about this point, Paul's words would not be sufficient to mark his reading as allegorical because, as I have said many times, the word could have changed. So, in the end, although Tedder attempts to reconcile seemingly disparate pieces of scholarship into one whole, his efforts yield a confusing and unlikely result.

Conclusion

In the end, this limited survey of research seems to bear out the two sub-theses I brought up in my introduction. First, there seems to be definitional confusion at multiple levels. Scholars often think they are disagreeing when they in fact agree because they call the same thing by two different labels, or they think they agree when they disagree because they call two different things by the same label. Many think that to answer the question "what does ἀλληγορέω mean?" is also to answer the question "was Paul allegorizing?" Others disagree. Some attempt to answer the question by surveying a broad range of ancient exegetes. Others narrow their gaze to the explicit contemplations of first-century rhetorical handbooks. There is very little common ground here, save one thing—Philo represents what allegory was in the first century, my second sub-thesis. Except for James Barr, nearly every scholar agrees that Philo serves as an exemplar of the ancient craft. Thus, I will use him to provide a full-orbed picture of what allegory looked like so that I can determine whether Paul was allegorizing in Galatians 4:21–31.

CHAPTER 3

THE MEANING OF ἈΛΛΗΓΟΡΕΩ

From my history of research, it becomes clear that understanding the exact nuance of the verb ἀλληγορέω is key to understanding Paul's hermeneutic in Galatians 4:21–31. If by using the term Paul means "I am interpreting these things allegorically," then the question of Paul's interpretive procedure would be all but answered—he would likely be allegorizing.[1] However, if he does not mean this, then the question remains open. In this chapter, I will argue that the phrase ἅτινά ἐστιν ἀλληγορούμενα means "these things are metaphorical," which would indeed leave said question open.[2] This rendering

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[1] See the following for examples of this translation: CSB; ESV; Hans Dieter Betz, *Galatians*, Hermeneia (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1989), 239, 243; Richard B. Hays, *Echoes of Scripture in the Letters of Paul* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1989), 113; Richard N. Longenecker, *Galatians*, WBC, vol. 41 (Dallas: Word Books, 1990), 209–10; James D. G. Dunn, *The Epistle to the Galatians*, BNTC (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 1993), 247; Richard N. Longenecker, "Graphic Illustrations of a Believer's New Life in Christ : Galatians 4:21–31," *Review and Expositor* 91, no. 2 (1994): 194; Heraclitus, *Homeric Problems*, ed. and trans. David Konstan and Donald A. Russell (Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2005), xxvii; Martinus C. de Boer, *Galatians*, NTL (Louisville: John Knox Press, 2011), 295; Douglas J. Moo, *Galatians*, BECNT (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2013), 299; A. Andrew Das, *Galatians*, Concordia Commentary (St. Louis, MO: Concordia, 2014), 479.

[2] The following scholars make similar points in their work on this issue. Scott and Lincoln come the closest to arguing as I do. Provan criticizes translations that use "allegory," doubting that ἀλληγορέω had come to be associated with the hermeneutic represented by Philo, but he does not investigate whether evidence bears out this doubt. My work complements his by confirming his doubts. Di Mattei also argues similarly to me but then oddly uses the definition of the term to connect Paul's hermeneutic to Philo's. One wonders how this could be if the term is not referring to a hermeneutical method. David Starling, "Justifying Allegory: Scripture, Rhetoric, and Reason in Galatians 4:21–5:1," *Journal of Theological Interpretation* 9, no. 2 (2015): 228; Ian W. Scott, *Paul's Way of Knowing: Story, Experience, and the Spirit* (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2009), 239n20, 249n24; Andrew T. Lincoln, *Paradise Now and Not Yet: Studies in the Role of the Heavenly Dimension in Paul's Thought with Special Reference to His Eschatology* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 13; Iain W. Provan, *The Reformation and the Right Reading of Scripture* (Waco, TX: Baylor University Press, 2017), 148–50; Steven Di Mattei, "Paul's Allegory of the Two Covenants (Gal 4:21–31) in Light of First-Century Hellenistic Rhetoric and Jewish Hermeneutics," *New Testament Studies* 52, no. 1 (2006): 104–9. See also Albrecht Oepke, *Der Brief des Paulus an die Galater*, ed. Joachim Rohde, 4th ed. (Berlin: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt, 1973), 148; Franz Mußner, *Der Galaterbrief*, 5th ed. (Freiburg: Herder, 1988), 139; Curtis D. McClane, "The Hellenistic Background to the Pauline Allegorical Method in Galatians 4:21–31," *Restoration Quarterly* 40, no. 2 (1998): 131; Gerhard Sellin, "Hagar und Sara: Religionsgeschichtliche Hintergründe der Schriftallegorese Gal 4, 21–31," in *Das Urchristentum in seiner literarischen Geschichte: Festschrift für Jürgen Becker zum 65*, ed. Ulrich Mell and Ulrich B. Müller (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1999), 66–67; David A. deSilva, *The Letter to the Galatians*, NICNT (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2018), 394.

is best for three reasons: First, the majority of the uses of ἀλληγορέω available in the two hundred or so years surrounding the writing of Galatians mean "to speak metaphorically." Second, the contextual clues surrounding Paul's use of the term in Galatians itself, such as his call to hear the Law in verse 21, strongly suggest such a reading. Third and finally, the view that takes ἀλληγορούμενα to refer to a mode of reading struggles to account for both the voice and mood of the periphrastic construction Paul uses. This chapter will attempt to demonstrate these points.

To Speak or to Read?

The word ἀλληγορέω itself arrives fairly late within in the Greek corpus, boasting only a handful of occurrences before the first century CE, most of which are from fragmented texts.[3] Most scholars take the word to mean either of two things: (1) to speak allegorically or (2) to read allegorically.[4] The difference between the two definitions lies in the agent of the action. Definition one (to speak allegorically) takes the text or the author to be doing the allegorizing, whereas definition two takes the reader. If definition one holds, the word would merely denote some sort of textual trope. If definition two holds, the author would be indicating his own method of reading.

Careful study of the evidence bears out this basic dichotomy, but it also reveals a certain level of complexity lying underneath these deceptively simple definitions. For example, if the term does mean "to interpret allegorically," the question then becomes

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[3] For an overview of the many of the sources surveyed below and a description of the overall state of ancient Greek scholarship, see Eleanor Dickey, *Ancient Greek Scholarship: A Guide to Finding, Reading, and Understanding Scholia, Commentaries, Lexica, and Grammatical Treatises, from Their Beginnings to the Byzantine Period* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 4.

[4] Most scholars point to Friedrich Büchsel's article in the *TDNT* as the source of this view. The following pieces on Gal 4 show that his basic dichotomy has persisted up through the present. Friedrich Büchsel, "Ἀλληγορεω," in *TDNT*, 1:260–63; Anthony Tyrrell Hanson, *Studies in Paul's Technique and Theology* (London: SPCK, 1974), 91; Longenecker, *Galatians*, 208–10; Di Mattei, "Paul's Allegory of the Two Covenants," 106; Matthew S. Harmon, "Allegory, Typology, or Something Else? Revisiting Galatians 4:21–5:1," in *Studies in the Pauline Epistles: Essays in Honor of Douglas J. Moo*, ed. Matthew S. Harmon and Jay E. Smith (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2014), 150; Samuel J. Tedder, *Children of Laughter and the Re-Creation of Humanity: The Theological Vision and Logic of Paul's Letter to the Galatians* (Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 2020), 155.

what exactly does "interpreting allegorically" entail? Matthew Harmon thinks it means to read a text in light of some sort of external framework.[5] Steven Di Mattei thinks it merely means to read something as a this-for-that trope.[6] David Dawson argues that it means to construct an extended narratival metaphor from the text that includes a beginning, middle, and end.[7] As can be seen, although these scholars agree that ἀλληγορέω denotes some form of reading, they do not agree what sort of reading it denotes. The same problem occurs for definition one. If the word does refer to a textual phenomenon, what sort of phenomenon is it? Does it refer to modern-day allegories like George Orwell's *Animal Farm* or John Bunyan's *Pilgrim's Progress*?[8] Does it refer to a mere turn of phrase? A metaphor? A simile? What exactly does ἀλληγορέω communicate that the text is doing?

Once it is understood what sort of reading or speaking ἀλληγορέω communicates, one must then decide what modern word best captures this type of speaking and reading. For example, suppose that Steven Di Mattei is correct. The term ἀλληγορέω merely refers to a this-for-that trope.[9] Does the phrase "to speak allegorically" best capture that meaning? Probably not. The adverb "allegorically" communicates far too much to fit Di Mattei's minimal definition. It brings to mind extended narratives in which every detail carries some sort of significance lying beneath the surface.[10] In

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[5] Harmon, "Allegory, Typology, or Something Else?," 150.

[6] Di Mattei, "Paul's Allegory of the Two Covenants," 106.

[7] David Dawson, *Allegorical Readers and Cultural Revision in Ancient Alexandria* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), 7.

[8] Commenting on Gal 4, F. F. Bruce brings up these works as examples of what he thinks to be allegories. F. F. Bruce, *The Epistle to the Galatians: A Commentary on the Greek Text*, NIGTC (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1982), 215.

[9] Di Mattei, "Paul's Allegory of the Two Covenants," 106–9.

[10] The *Oxford English Dictionary* defines the term as "a story, picture, etc., which uses symbols to convey a hidden or ulterior meaning, typically a moral or political one; a symbolic representation; an *extended* metaphor." *Oxford English Dictionary Online* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021), s.v. "allegory, n.," https://www-oed-com.ezproxy.sbts.edu/view/Entry/5230?rskey=Xu0kaK&result=1#eid.

Pilgrim's Progress, for example, every character symbolizes a particular virtue or vice, every encounter a trial, and the overall story represents the Christian life as a whole. Allegories like *Pilgrim's Progress* contain too many essential pieces to be reduced to the this-for-that trope Di Mattei thinks ἀλληγορέω represents. Doing so would be like saying that an isosceles triangle is merely a three-sided polygon. True, but not quite. The point of all this is that although these two basic definitions have survived down through the history of scholarship, they ultimately leave a number of questions unanswered.[11]

How then does my thesis concerning Paul's use of the term answer these questions? For starters, Paul's use seems to fall under definition (1). He was using the verb to refer to something the text does. The rendering "these things are metaphorical" captures this sense. It attributes the "allegorical" quality Paul sees in the text *to the text itself* and avoids suggesting that Paul was flagging his own interpretive procedure. This rendering also captures how ἀλληγορέω functioned in the ancient world by using the adjective "metaphorical" over against "allegorical." As it is used in modern colloquial speech, the word "metaphor" covers a broad range of figures of speech. Euphemisms, metonyms, synecdoches, parables, and even allegories are all commonly called "metaphors." For example, technically, in the sentence "the suits fired me today," the word "suits" functions as a synecdoche, but most would call the statement a "metaphor." The word ἀλληγορέω seems to have functioned similarly, referring to a whole range of textual tropes. Thus, the adjective "metaphor" maps onto ἀλληγορέω better than "allegorical," which tends to carry a more specific meaning. To use the example above, to call the statement "the suits fired me today" an "allegory" would not work well. It would be more accurate to say that it was a synecdoche, the more specific and accurate term, or to call it a metaphor, the more general term.[12]

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[11] Cf. Hanson, *Studies in Paul's Technique and Theology*, 91.

[12] This definition of metaphor attempts to the thread the needle between two different senses. On the one hand, the word metaphor could refer to a specific form of figural speech that is often juxtaposed

My translation uses a "to be" verb rather than an adverb and an active verb like the rendering "to speak allegorically" for two reasons: First, the clause has a number of characteristics that make it feel more stative than dynamic, a feel that "to be metaphorical" captures better "to speak metaphorically." Its impersonal subject ἅτινα, middle/passive voice, and periphrastic structure suggest that Paul meant to focus on the *state* of being metaphorical, not the *activity* of speaking metaphorically.[13] Second, the verb form of metaphor is not commonly used in modern speech if it is used at all. A modern English speaker will say that something is *metaphorical* before he will say that something *metaphorizes*. If it were used, the latter would be a better option, but its scarcity obfuscates Paul's meaning, hence why the phrase should be rendered "these things are metaphorical" as opposed to "these things are metaphoricalized."

The evidence portion of this chapter will operate off the commonly accepted assumption that most words have a range of meaning that is shaved down in certain contexts. I also assume that these different meanings do not overlap. If a word has two meanings, it is likely that only one is present in a given context unless there are strong reasons to think otherwise.[14] The first part of this chapter, therefore, will attempt to demonstrate the range of meaning contained in ἀλληγορέω, and the second part will argue which portion of this range operates within Galatians 4:24.

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with a simile. The sentence "He is a clown" is a metaphor in this sense, whereas "He is *like* a clown" is a simile. On the other hand, philosophers of language have used the idea of metaphor as an all-encompassing frame to explain how language functions. See, e.g., George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, *Metaphors We Live By* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980); Paul Ricœur, *The Rule of Metaphor: The Creation of Meaning in Language* (London: Routledge, 2003). Even in these treatments, a clean definition seems to never crystalize. I am appealing to a common-use meaning of the word that is only known when seen. For a further discussion of this view of metaphor and others, see L. David Ritchie, *Metaphor* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 3–18.

[13] Why these characteristics create a stative feel will be explained in my discussion of Gal 4:24 below.

[14] Moisés Silva, *Biblical Words and Their Meaning: An Introduction to Lexical Semantics* (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1983), 25–27.

Sense One: "To Speak Metaphorically"

Up until the end of the second century CE, ἀλληγορέω predominantly took on the first sense of the word—"to speak metaphorically."[15] The ancient sources contain three pieces of evidence that make this sense clear. First, when the verb means "to speak allegorically," the subject of the verb is usually the author or the text itself, not the reader. Second, the examples of ἀλληγορέω that these ancient authors discussed would be called metaphors by modern English speakers. Third and finally, when ancient authors attempted to define ἀλληγορέω, they described a trope that fits the modern notion of metaphor, understood in the broad, colloquial sense.

One of the first occurrences of ἀλληγορέω in the ancient Greek corpus comes from a scholion on Euripides's play *Phoenician Women*.[16] Although notoriously difficult to date, this scholion at least reaches back to the beginning of the first century BCE if not back to the third.[17] In his discussion, the ancient Greek commentator compares Empedocles, a pre-Socratic Philosopher writing in the middle of the fifth century BCE, to Euripides, the famous poet who wrote a few decades later. The scholion reads as follows:

> "Do not sow the furrow of children." Empedocles, the natural philosopher, speaks metaphorically (ἀλληγορῶν φησι) when he uses the phrase, "the divided meadows of Aphrodite," by which he means "the genesis of children." Euripides, on the other hand, speaking of the same thing [as Empedocles] flees shameful thoughts, and he uses household words and skillful metaphors, by using the terms "sowing" and "furrow." (*Schol. Eur. Phoen.* 18.66.3–5)[18]

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[15] I stopped at the end of the second century because it is at that point that the word became entangled in the hermeneutical debated between Christians and their opponents, causing the term to crystalize into a more technical term than it seems to have. Plutarch even attests to analogous change in Greek literature when he says that "some forcibly distort [Homer] through what used to be called 'the undersense' [ὑπονοίαις] but is now called 'allegory' [ἀλληγορίαις]" (Plutarch, *Adol. poet. aud.* 19f). Plutarch statement here suggests that the development of the hermeneutical sense of ἀλληγορέω was fairly late, decades after the time Paul wrote Galatians.

[16] Scholia are basically ancient commentary found in the margins of a text like the *Iliad* or *Odyssey*. For further discussion, see Dickey, *Ancient Greek Scholarship*, 11n25.

[17] Dickey, *Ancient Greek Scholarship*, 31–34.

[18] I have smoothed out the Greek slightly so that it would make more sense. The full text can be accessed on the TLG and reads as follows: 'μὴ σπεῖρε τέκνων ἄλοκα' Ἐ. ὁ φυσικὸς ἀλληγορῶν φησιν 'σχιτοὺς λειμῶνας Ἀφροδίτης,' ἐν οἷς ἡ τῶν παίδων γένεσίς. Εὐριπίδης δὲ ταὐτὸν τούτωι φάσκων την τε ἔννοιαν τὴν αἰσχρὰν ἀπέφυγε και τοῖς ὀνόμασιν οἰκείοις ἐχρήσατο και τεχνικαῖς ταῖς μεταφοραῖς, σπόρον και

Here, the author is commenting on how both men attempted to modestly refer to the female anatomy.[19] Empedocles does so with the phrase "the divided meadows of Aphrodite." Euripides does so with "the furrow of children." The commentator prefers the latter, claiming that "the furrow of children" uses more accessible (or household) images while successfully avoiding sexual connotations. Apparently, Empedocles fails on both of these fronts.

In this paragraph, there are a number of contextual clues that commend taking ἀλληγορέω to mean "to speak metaphorically." For starters, it is clear that Empedocles is the agent of the action to which ἀλληγορῶν refers, meaning that the verb refers to a textual or authorial phenomenon, not a hermeneutical method. It is Empedocles, the author, that is doing the "allegorizing," not the commentator, the reader of the text. Also, this example helps to show what it is that the text is doing. The phenomenon the commentator discusses and to which ἀλληγορέω refers is a metaphor. Again, in the author's opinion, Empedocles uses "the divided fields of Aphrodite" as a modest stand-in for the female anatomy; that is, he uses it as a *metaphor* for the female anatomy. It is worth noting that it would be too much to call this textual phenomenon an allegory. Doing so would obscure what the commentator is actually describing because it would tend to connote textual phenomena like *Animal Farm* or *Pilgrim's Progress* which are far too robust to fit the simple symbol found in Empedocles. If anything, the figure of speech could be more precisely labeled as a euphemism. Lastly, the parallel drawn between the two men strongly suggest that ἀλληγορέω refers to the same thing as μεταφορά, the ancient Greek word for metaphor.[20] The author is not saying that the two men are doing

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ἄλοκα λέγων. H. Diels and W. Kranz, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, vol. 1, 6th ed. (Berlin: Weidmann, 1951), TLG.

[19] Although the commentator never explicitly explains that these two metaphors refer to female anatomy, his use of the phrase ἡ τῶν παίδων γένεσίς (“the genesis of children”) is clear enough.

[20] According to Trypho, μεταφορά seems to mean the same thing it does now, referring to when something is described in light of something else based on a shared likeness (see Trypho, Περὶ τρόπων 191.23–192.1).

completely different things. He is saying that Euripides is doing the *same thing* better than Empedocles. In so doing, the author binds the meaning of ἀλληγορῶν φησι ("he speaks allegorically") to ἐχρήσατο . . . τεχνικαῖς ταῖς μεταφοραῖς ("he uses skillful metaphors"). Thus, ἀλληγορέω early on seemed to mean "to speak metaphorically."[21]

Pausanias also bears witness to the early meaning of the word. Although he was writing in the early portion of the second century CE, Pausanias was one of the founders of Attic lexicography. Thus, his discussion of ἀλληγορέω reaches back behind the conquests of Alexander the Great. In his work, Ἀττικῶν ὀνομάτων συναγωγή (*A Collection of Attic Word's*), Pausanias defines the terms διομήδειος ἀνάγκη as follows: "This [literary device] refers to a proverb like that from Tydeus or from the Thracian, who compelled the foreigners to sleep with his deformed daughters, whom the sentence takes as metaphors [ἀλληγορεῖ] for horses" (Pausinias, Ἀττικῶν ὀνομάτων συναγωγή 14.2).[22] The paragraph goes on to talk about the exploits of Diomedes and Odysseus who stole the Palladion from Troy, but it is difficult to tell how these two episodes connect or what story Pausanias has in mind.[23] There are, however, pieces of evidence around his use of ἀλληγορέω that fit the definition "to speak metaphorically."

First, just like above, it is clear that Pausanias uses the term to refer to an action of the text. The words ὁ λόγος stands behind "the sentence" in my rendering above. In ancient Greek scholarship, the word λόγος commonly referred not to a singular

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[21] In her article on ancient metaphor, Stefania Giombini freely uses the word "metaphor" to describe the figure of speech the author uses ἀλληγορέω to refer to, further corroborating this match. Stefania Giombini, "Μεταφορά. The Figure of Speech before Aristotle," *Isonomia - Epistemologica* 9 (2017): 29.

[22] Unfortunately, no complete copy of Pausanias work has survived. Only fragments have been recovered from later scholars like Eustathius. For more information on the work of Pausanias and access to his fragments, see Dickey, *Ancient Greek Scholarship*, 99; H. Erbse, *Untersuchungen zu den attizistischen Lexika [Abhandlungen der deutschen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin, Philosoph.-hist. KL.]* (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1950).

[23] Given the characters and events Pausanias discusses, it is likely he is referring the famous story wherein Adrastus marries off his daughters to Tydeus and Polynices after finding them fighting with one another. An account of the story can be found in book 3 of Appolodorus's work *Bibliotheca* III.vi.1.

word but to a full sentence, and Pausanias seems to be using it to refer to the episode he has just described between Tydeus and the daughters to whom he was wed.[24] Thus, since ὁ λόγος is clearly the subject of the verb ἀλληγορεῖ, the verb likely refers to a textual phenomenon. Second, although it is slightly more veiled than the instance from Empedocles, the idea of "metaphor" still seems to fit Pausanias's use. In his view, the deformed daughters (θυγατέρες αἰσχραί) in the story serve as symbols for horses (ἵππους), a connection that modern English speakers would likely call a metaphor.

Strabo's use of the term is similar. Writing in the middle of the first century BCE, Strabo uses ἀλληγορέω in his famous work *Geographica*, an extensive description of the geography of the ancient world. In the second chapter of book 1, Strabo comes to Homer's defense against the criticism of Eratosthenes (*Geogr.* 1.2.7). Apparently, Eratosthenes accused Homer of "sanctioning myths" (*Geogr.* 1.2.8). Strabo disagrees. In his view, "when Homer indulges in myths, he is at least more accurate than the later writers, since he does not deal wholly in marvels, but for our instruction he also uses allegory [ἀλληγορῶν], or revises myths, or curries popular favor" (*Geogr.* 1.2.7 [Jones, LCL]). Strabo's point seems to be that although Homer does write myths (μυθολογεῖται), he does not do so as extravagantly as later poets, and when he does, his rhetorical intentions are obvious. He is not waxing eloquently. He is creating transparent metaphors for the education of his audience.

As with Pausanias, it is difficult to tell what exactly stands behind the participle ἀλληγορῶν. Strabo does not provide an example that shines light on what he thinks Homer is doing. However, the idea of "metaphor" would make sense given the logic of Strabo's defense. If Eratosthenes took issue with Homer because he placed the gods in precarious positions, then it would be fitting for Strabo to claim that these provocative stories were actually metaphors intended to teach life lessons, but this

[24] Dickey, *Ancient Greek Scholarship*, 124.

reasoning remains speculative without concrete examples like that found in the scholion on *Phoenician Women*. What is clear is that it does not refer to a method of reading. Homer is clearly the agent behind ἀλληγορῶν. Thus, in this instance, ἀλληγορέω refers to a textual phenomenon.

Demetrius's two uses of the term in his book *De elocutione* are clearer.[25] In section 151, he discusses how some allegories (ἀλληγορίαι τινές) have a colloquial flavor (τι στωμύλον). He offers three examples, the third of which being the most helpful. In this example, Demetrius claims that the poet Sophron "speaks metaphorically (ἀλληγορεῖ) about women in the following line about fish: 'tube fish (σωλήν), sweet-fleshed oysters, dainty meat for widows'" (*Eloc.* 151).[26] This line from Sophron quoted by Demetrius is a crass joke, playing off the meaning of the word σωλήν or "tube fish" which serves as a double entendre for male anatomy.[27] Just as real tube-fish are a delectable treat for women, so also are the other things to which the word could refer. It is no wonder why Demetrius finishes the discussion by claiming that "such jokes are shameful and only suitable for mimes" (*Eloc.* 151). Nevertheless, this tasteless quip helps to demonstrate that Demetrius thought ἀλληγορέω referred to a textual phenomenon resembling a modern metaphor. Sophron, the author of the line being discussed, is the subject of the verb ἀλληγορεῖ, and the line itself, using "tube fish" as a not so veiled reference to male genitalia, operates as a metaphor.

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[25] Traditionally, this work was attributed to Demetrius, the famous student of Aristotle. Unfortunately, both this attribution and the date of the work are highly uncertain. It is likely that it was written sometime in the first century BCE, making its evidence still useful in this study. See the introduction of Aristotle, Longinus, and Demetrius, *Poetics. Longinus: On the Sublime. Demetrius: On Style*, trans. Stephen Halliwell et al., rev. ed., LCL 199 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995), 310–11.

[26] Note that Demetrius uses the noun ἀλληγορία and the verb ἀλληγορέω almost interchangeably. He uses the noun to introduce his discussion and the verb to introduce his example.

[27] Cf. LSJ, 1748; Aristotle, Longinus, and Demetrius, *Poetics. On the Sublime. On Style*, 441n184.

The second occurrence of ἀλληγορέω in *De electutione* bears similar results. In section 285, Demetrius quotes the following line: "a city which is no longer the city of our ancestors fighting sea battles, but an old hag, wearing slippers and gulping down her broth" (*Eloc*. 285 [Innes, LCL]). Demetrius goes on to describe what he thinks is going on in this text. "Here 'hag' functions as a metaphor [ἀλληγοῦν] for a weak city in terminal decline, whose impotence it also suggests implicitly and with hyperbole; and 'gulping down her broth' also [functions as a metaphor], describing a city then preoccupied with feasts and banquets and squandering the funds for war" (*Eloc.* 285).[28] Even without Demetrius's comments, modern readers would undoubtedly recognize his example as a some form of personification.[29] A once great city is described as an old hag, gulping down some soup. Demetrius, however, uses the term ἀλληγορέω to describe the figure of speech in question.

The term also appears in Josephus's work *Antiquitates judaicae*. Throughout the book, Josephus is clearly concerned with appealing to the Greeks. In his introduction, Josephus states that he is writing *Antiquitates judaicae* in order to make the story of the Jewish people accessible to the Greek-speaking world (*Ant.*1.5). Josephus promises these Greeks mere history, but he recognizes that the Greeks will immediately notice a problem (*Ant*. 1.17). If *Antiquitates judaicae* is truly pure history, then why does it include so much natural philosophy (φυσιολογίας), a term that referred to discourse on God and the origin of man, topics the Greeks thought to be outside the bounds of history (*Ant*. 1.18)? Josephus proactively answers this question by claiming that Moses wisely recognized that piety must precede civility. The lawgiver, as Josephus often calls Moses, thought that one must know God before one could submit to him (*Ant.* 1.19–22). Josephus uses this

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[28] My translation is a slightly modified form of Innes's in the LCL volume to make clear what I take ἀλληγορέω to mean.

[29] Di Mattei oddly calls this example an "allegory." Di Mattei, "Paul's Allegory of the Two Covenants," 113. In my view, his discussion shows exactly why ἀλληγορέω does not neatly map onto the modern term "allegory."

opportunity to show the superiority of the Jewish faith over its Greek counterparts. Unlike other lawgivers who impute the errors of men to their gods destroying their status as exemplars of righteous living, Moses presents God as the essence of virtue to be followed (*Ant*. 1.23). Thus, all that is contained in *Antiquitates judaicae* is in keeping with how proper history should be written (*Ant.* 1.24).

The verb ἀλληγορέω occurs in a concession to this last point:

> It will be evident for those who look into these things carefully that nothing will appear to them as unreasonable or out of step with the majesty and benevolence of God, for all things are in keeping with the nature of the universe. To be sure, some things the lawgiver [τοῦ νομοθέτου] presents through shrewd enigmas [τὰ μὲν αἰνιττομένου τοῦ νομοθέτου δεξιῶς], others he presents as metaphors with dignity [ἀλληγοροῦντος μετά σεμνότητος], but whatever commends straightforward speech [εὐθείας λέγεσθαι συνέφερε], these things he explains literally [ῥητῶς ἐμφανίζοντος]. (Josephus, *Ant.* 1.24)

In other words, Moses may say some confusing things, but he describes the important stuff plainly. At least in this paragraph, Josephus does not describe what such statements might be, nor does he give examples. There are, however, two main clues in his discussion that shine light on ἀλληγορέω.

First, Moses, the author of the history in question, is the one who allegorizes. As can be seen above, the participle ἀλληγοροῦντος occurs within a genitive absolute with τοῦ νομοθέτου ("the lawgiver") as its subject. Thus, yet again, ἀλληγορέω refers to an action of the author. Second, in the sentence above, ἀλληγοροῦντος is surrounded by other actions that help elucidate what Josephus thinks Moses is doing. Standing parallel to the verb αἰνίσσομαι ("to speak enigmatically") and in opposition to both λέγω ἐξ εὐθείας ("to speak straightforwardly") and ἐμφανίζω ῥητῶς ("to explain literally"), ἀλληγορέω must refer to some form of non-literal but understandable speech, a meaning that the colloquial use of metaphor would match quite well. Therefore, although Josephus's use of the term may not allow an exact understanding of what he meant by the term, what he does say fits with the evidence presented thus far.

Trypho was a well-esteemed, albeit elusive scholar most likely writing in Rome in the second half of the first century BCE.[30] Although he uses the cognate noun ἀλληγορία, his discussion of the trope in his treatise Περὶ τρόπων is incredibly important because it provides both an ancient definition of ἀλληγορέω and a fairly clear example of what the trope refers to.[31] In his treatise Περὶ τρόπων, Trypho says the following about ἀλληγορία: "An allegory [ἀλληγορία] is a statement that describing one thing regularly, actually brings to mind the thought of something else according to a likeness with the former thing. For example, [in the line] 'whose bronze pours out most straw on the ground.'"[32] The definition Trypho provides fits quite well with the idea of a metaphor. A metaphor is a textual trope that seems to describe something fairly straightforwardly but actually brings to mind something else. It creates this effect by tying these two things together through something they share. To use Demetrius's example above, a "tube fish" resembles the shape of male anatomy, and Sophron, the crass creator of the joke, uses this physical likeness to make the quip work.

Trypho's example further corroborates this reading. The line he quotes occurs in book 19 of the *Iliad* in a conversation between Odysseus and Achilles. Incensed by the death of Patroclus, Achilles announces his intent to seek revenge against Hector, Patroclus's killer (*Il.* 19.199–214). Odysseus intervenes and tries to convince Achilles of the cost of war by arguing that "men quickly have their fill of war, *whose bronze spills*

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[30] Unfortunately, Trypho's work remains only in fragments and a few extant treatises, most of which are of doubtful authenticity. According to Dickey, the best text of his work is by Spengel and can be accessed through the TLG. Dickey, *Ancient Greek Scholarship*, 84; L. Spengel, *Rhetores Graeci*, vol. 3 (Leipzig: Teubner, 1856).

[31] Given how Demetrius above and Heraclitus below both use ἀλληγορία and ἀλληγορέω to refer to the same phenomenon, Trypho discussion of the trope is still very useful, despite only using ἀλληγορία.

[32] The text from Spengel reads as follows: Ἀλληγορία ἐστὶ λόγος ἕτερον μέν τι κυρίως δηλῶν, ἑτέρου δὲ ἔννοιαν παιστάνων καθ᾽ ὁμοίωσιν ἐπὶ τὸ πλεῖστον, οἷον ἧς τε πλείστην μὲν καλάμην χθονὶ χαλκὸς ἔχευεν. Spengel, *Rhetores Graeci*, 3:193 (TLG). His differs slightly from Di Mattei's, but the definition in Di Mattei communicates the same basic point. Di Mattei, "Paul's Allegory of the Two Covenants," 106n11.

most straw upon the ground" (*Il.* 221–222). In other words, men quickly and rightly grow tired of war because it spills precious blood. Odysseus is clearly using a metaphor here. Straw serves as a symbol for men of war and bronze the weapons by which they fall. Trypho claims that this line represents what ἀλληγορία is, thus providing strong evidence that the trope is very similar to what modern speakers would call a metaphor.[33]

In Philo's work, ἀλληγορέω means to "speak metaphorically" multiple times.[34] The difficulty with these instances is that the text Philo is interpreting rarely gives clues that it is indeed speaking metaphorically, leaving the reader to take Philo's word for it. Nevertheless, the purpose of this study is not to determine the legitimacy of Philo's conclusions. It is to determine what it is that he is concluding, rightly or wrongly. If he uses ἀλληγορέω to flag what he thinks to be a metaphor in a text, then so be it. This flagging still serves as a witness to what the term meant in the early first century CE even if Philo cannot appropriately justify the metaphor that he sees.

Take for example his discussion in *De ebrietate* on Exodus 32:17. As Moses comes down off Mount Sinai with the two newly minted tablets of the Law, Joshua hears a noise in the Israelite camp and assumes that it is the noise of war (Exod 32:15–17). In the story, Moses corrects Joshua, stating that he hears singing not the sounds of war. Philo, however, feels compelled to come to Joshua's defense. "That war was in the camp is very natural, for where else might there be contentions, fights, hostilities and all the works that go with interminable war if not in the life of the body, which speaking metaphorically he calls 'the camp' [ὃν ἀλληγορῶν καλεῖ στρατόπεδον]" (Philo, *Ebr.* 99). Before this statement, Philo discusses the nature of the interaction between the body and

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[33] It is also worth noting that Trypho's discussion shows that ἀλληγορέω fits the colloquial use of the term metaphor. The example he provides is an entire sentence. Thus, the trope cannot refer to a "metaphor" over a simile, but neither does it refer to something as robust as a modern allegory.

[34] Although I agree with Di Mattei when he claims that Philo's use of the term can be hard to place, I would describe the following uses of ἀλληγορέω as meaning "to speaking metaphorically": *Leg.* 2.5, 2.10; *Cher.* 25; *Ebr.* 99, *Migr.* 131, 205; *Somn.* 2.31, 2.205; *Ios.* 28; *Spec.* 2.29; *Praem.* 125, 159; *Contempl.* 29. Di Mattei, "Paul's Allegory of the Two Covenants," 107n20.

the mind. Philo thinks Joshua was right because, since passions are constantly churning in the body, one could properly say that this churning operates as a war of sorts. For Philo, Joshua is obviously speaking about this phenomenon by using "the camp" as a symbol for the human body. Now admittedly, one might not get where Philo gets if he were to read Exodus himself, but that does not matter. What is clear is that Philo thinks Joshua's statement is talking about the internal life of a human and that he uses "the camp" as a metaphor for the body, the storehouse of these passions. The verb ἀλληγορέω in this instance does not refer to Philo's odd reading but to Joshua's metaphorical speech.

Other examples in Philo follow this same pattern. In *De migratione Abrahami* 131, Philo ponders the meaning of Deuteronomy 13:4 that commands the Israelites to "walk *before*" God. Philo thinks that this cannot be literal speech because God is not a corporeal being, and therefore, men cannot truly walk *before* him in any spatial sense. He concludes (not unlike modern interpreters) that "walking before God" must refer to living in accordance with God's statutes. In his words, "[Moses] seems to be speaking metaphorically [ἔοικεν ἀλληγορεῖν], describing a soul's following of God's doctrines" (Philo, *Migr.* 131). Here again, ἀλληγορέω refers to the action of the author, and that action seems to be what modern English speakers would call a metaphor.

The last thing to note in Philo's corpus is the function of the medio-passive forms of ἀλληγορεω. Usually, ἀλληγορέω is a transitive verb that takes two accusatives. The first accusative serves as the symbol, and the second the thing symbolized. In his book *De Iside et Osiride*, for example, Plutarch mentions how the Greeks "allegorize" Chronos into time. His sentence reads as follows: Ἕλληνες Κρόνον ἀλληγοροῦσι τὸν χρόνον which when translated means "The Greeks allegorize Chronos [as] time" (Plutarch, *Is. Os.* 363.D.6). In this sentence, ἀλληγορέω is in the active voice and takes two accusatives—Κρόνον, the titan, as the symbol and χρόνον, "time," as the thing symbolized. The question though is what were authors like Plutarch communicating

when they place the verb in the medio-passive voice, removing one or more of these accusatives?

Philo's use of the term in *De cherubim* 25 helps shine some light on this issue. There, Philo wonders why the cherubim have flaming swords, concluding that the swords either represent the movement of planetary bodies or the two hemispheres of the universe (*Cher*. 25). He introduces the first interpretation with a medio-passive form of ἀλληγορεω like so: τὰ μὲν δὴ Χερουβὶμ καθ'ἕνα τρόπον οὕτως ἀλληγεῖται. C. D. Yonge renders this clause as "this, then, is one of the systems, according to which what is said of the cherubim may be understood allegorically." Similarly, Colson and Whitaker render it as "this then is one interpretation of the allegory of the cherubim." Both renderings suggest that ἀλληγεῖται refers to a means of reading or an interpretation rather than a textual trope.

In my view, however, the medio-passive form is not intended to change the nature of the action but to focus on the resultant state of said action. In other words, the form does not change the meaning of the word from speaking to reading. Rather, the form focuses on the "allegoricallness" of the cherubim, and there are a number of reasons to take this view: First, although taking the medio-passive form to refer to "reading" as opposed to speaking helps account for the voice change, it does not fit well with the mood. Yonge in particular ends up having to render the clause with sort of hortatory force, which would be odd for an indicative verb like ἀλληγορεῖται. Taking this medio-passive form to mean "are allegorical" instead "are to be interpreted allegorical" preserves the usual force of the indicative mood.

Second, usually, a change in voice does not change the action or the agent of that action. To return to the example above. Had Plutarch written his clause in the medio-passive voice, it would have looked something like Κρόνος ἀλληγορεῖται ὁ χρόνος ὑφ' Ἑλλησῶν ("Chronos is allegorized [as] time by the Greeks"). The accusatives change into nominatives, and the nominative subject Ἕλληνες changes to an agency clause; but the

meaning of ἀλληγορέω and the doer of the action do not change. The verb in the sentence "The Greeks allegorize Chronos [as] time" means essentially the same thing as "Chronos is allegorized [as] time by the Greeks." Yonge's rendering, however, changes both the meaning and the actor. The speaking becomes reading, and the actor is no longer Moses.

Third and finally, a parallel structure later in *De cherubim* 25 suggests that the ἀλληγορεῖται is something that the cherubim are doing despite being in the medio-passive voice. The clause in which ἀλληγορεῖται occurs introduces one of two interpretations that Philo describes. This can be seen in the prepositional phrase καθ' ἕνα τρόπον, which means "according to one manner [of reading]." Philo introduces the second interpretation with a clause that closely parallels the first. It reads μήποτε δὲ καθ'ἑτέραν ἐκδοχὴν τὰ μὲν Χερουβὶμ δηλοῖ τῶν ἡμισφαιρίων ἑκάτερον ("Or perhaps, according to another interpretation, the Cherubim represent both of the hemispheres"). Note that the clause τὰ μὲν Χερουβὶμ δηλοῖ in this sentence follows the structure of the first clause (τὰ μὲν δὴ Χερουβὶμ . . . ἀλληγεῖται), and both are the means by which Philo introduces the two interpretations he discusses. The verb in the second, however, is in the active voice (δηλοῖ). This parallel suggests that ἀλληγορεῖται, despite being in the medio-passive voice, still maintains an active sense because it is functionally doing the same thing as a verb that is unambiguously in the active voice.

Therefore, given these three factors, the medio-passive voice here most likely does not mean "ought to be interpreted allegorically," a rendering that would make ἀλληγροεῖται refer to a means of reading. Instead, the best reading would be "are allegorical."[35] Such a rendering preserves the mood, fits the parallel clause that begins the second interpretation, and accounts for the medio-passive form. Philo uses this form in order to focus on a resultant state by detransitivizing an otherwise dynamic, transitive

[35] Since I am trying to focus on the function of voice and not the meaning of the lexeme, I have chosen to render Philo's phrase with "allegory" for convenience.

verb. In other words, the difference between the sentence "Moses allegorizes the cherubim" and "The cherubim are allegorized" is that the latter focuses on the quality of being allegorized instead of the action of allegorizing.[36] Other instances of the medio-passive form that will be discussed later seem to bear this view out.

The last author I will discuss that seems to use ἀλληγορέω in the sense of "to speak allegorically" is an author named Heraclitus, not to be confused with Heraclitus of Ephesus, the pre-Socratic philosopher.[37] Writing probably sometime in the first century CE, Heraclitus attempted to defend Homer against critics like Plato who saw him as propagating irreverent myths about the gods in a treatise titled *Allegoriae Homericae*.[38] To defend Homer, Heraclitus repeatedly argues that the ancient poet's critics read him too literally, missing the significance of his metaphors. In his words, "it is a weighty and damaging charge that heaven brings against Homer for his disrespect of the divine. If he meant nothing metaphorically [εἰ μηδὲν ἠλληγόρησεν], he was impious through and through" (*All.* 1.1).[39] Throughout his defense, Heraclitus uses ἀλληγορέω approximately

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[36] Stanley Porter argues that "the frequent result of use of the passive voice is that attention regarding the action is placed upon the grammatical subject (recipient) rather than the agent." Stanley E. Porter, *Idioms of the Greek New Testament* (Sheffield: JSOT, 1992), 64. What he means is that if an author were to change the sentence "Johnny throws the ball" to "*the ball* was thrown by Johnny," the pragmatic effect would be to highlight the ball over the action of throwing. In Philo's case, Porter's view would mean that Philo was putting ἀλληγορέω into the medio-passive voice to focus on the cherubim as opposed to the state of being allegorical. Porter is certainly right as about many cases of the passive voice, but his view does not fit Philo here. Whether the recipient or the stative result of the action function as the focal point of a passive sentence depends on which of these is in question in the surrounding context. To continue with the Johnny example, it would make sense for the author of "Johnny throws the ball" to place emphasis on "the ball" if readers were not sure what it was that Johnny had thrown because the context had left such a detail ambiguous. Perhaps the boy had a stick or a boomerang lying around, all of which would quite adequately serve as a projectile. However, if the action were in question in the context, then the passive sentence would place emphasis on said action. Perhaps no one knew whether the ball was *thrown* or *caught* by Johnny. In this scenario, "the ball *was thrown* by Johnny" would focus on the action of throwing not the ball. Such is the case above. Philo has been discussing the cherubim at length, so he need not clarify whom he is discussing. He is, however, compelled to discuss the theological significance of the cherubim within the story, meaning it would make sense for his use of voice to focus on what it is they are doing.

[37] Dickey, *Ancient Greek Scholarship*, 26.

[38] Heraclitus often explicitly voices criticism of Plato (e.g., *All.* 4.1), but for a more detailed discussion of Plato's problem with Homer, see the introduction of Konstan and Russell's translation of *Allegoriae Homericae* in Heraclitus's *Homeric Problems*, xix–xxi.

[39] I have slightly modified Konstan and Russell's translation, which can be found in Heraclitus, *Homeric Problems*, 3.

26 times, all of which to mean "to speak allegorically." He also exhibits all three main pieces evidence that have come up thus far in this survey. He attributes the action to Homer both by making him the subject of the verb again and again and by painstakingly showing that the metaphors he sees are objectively in the text. He defines the term in a way that fits with the idea of metaphor, and he illustrates the trope with examples modern English speakers would readily label as metaphors.

Consider the opening line above. Homer, the author of the epics Heraclitus seeks to defend, is said to be the one allegorizing. It is he that would be accused of sacrilege "if he meant nothing metaphorical [εἰ μηδὲν ἠλληγόρησεν]" (*All*. 1.1). Other than the rare occasion when Heraclitus uses ἀλληγορέω as an attributive participle, his uses follow these opening lines consistently.[40] Also, in multiple places throughout his reading of the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*, Heraclitus is at pains to show that the metaphors he sees are plausibly in the text. For example, after surveying how the trope has been used in other pieces of poetry and how Homer places a metaphor in the mouth of Odysseus himself, Heraclitus asks his interlocutors why such a trope might not exist in Homer. "So, since the trope of allegory [ὁ τῆς ἀλληγορίας τρόπος] is familiar to all other writers and known even to Homer, what should prevent us from mending his alleged wrong notions about the gods by this kind of justification?" (*All*. 6.1 [Konstan and Russell]).[41] Clearly, Heraclitus attributes the action to Homer.

What is it, though, that Heraclitus thinks Homer is doing? In the opening chapters, Heraclitus attempts to answer this question by providing both a cogent definition and multiple examples. His definitions closely resemble Trypho's. "For the moment, it is probably essential to give a little technical account of allegory [ἀλληγορίας],

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[40] See *All.* 5.5, 5.10, 13.5, 15.2, 24.1, 24.5, 24.8, 29.4, 41.12, 59.1, 60.1, 61.3, 68.2, 69.12, 70.11. Although Heraclitus does not mention Homer by name in all of these examples, the context makes clear that he or the poets that resemble him are the grammatical subjects of these instances.

[41] That Heraclitus begins his discussion with the verb ἀλληγορέω and here uses the noun ἀλληγορία suggests that he thinks the terms refer to the same thing much like Demetrius above.

quite briefly. The word itself, which is formed in a way expressive of truth, reveals its own significance. For the trope which says one thing but signifies something other than what it says received the name 'allegory' [ἀλληγορία καλεῖται] precisely from this" (*All.* 5.1–5.2 [Konstan and Russell]). Heraclitus provides multiple examples to illustrate his definition. An author named Archilochus apparently uses the trope called ἀλληγορία when he compares war to a surge of the sea as does Mytilene who compares the woes of tyranny to the sea (*All.* 5.3–9). Most tellingly, Heraclitus appeals to the same metaphor from Odysseus found in Trypho's discussion above, which uses straw and copper as symbols for men and weapons (*All.* 5.15). Therefore, Heraclitus's discussion provides strong reasons to think that ἀλληγορέω referred to metaphors.

Heraclitus also provides insight into the nuance of the medio-passive voice. In multiple places, one can see that the medio-passive voice was intended to make the dynamic verb ἀλληγορέω function more like an adjective, focusing on the resulting state of the action. For example, toward the middle of the treatise, Heraclitus discusses the tears wept for Sarpedon in book 15 in the *Iliad*. "The tears wept for Sarpedon do not misrepresent a god as suffering grief, which is an affliction even for humans; rather, the reader who wishes to be exact in his inquiries perceives in this a form of allegorized truth [ἀλληγορουμένης ἀληθείας]" (*All.* 42.2 [Konstan and Russell]). Being an attributive participle, here ἀλληγορέω is almost indistinguishable from an adjective. The medio-passive form further bolters this stative nuance by detransitivizing an otherwise transitive verb. Similarly, when discussing the rescue of Zeus, Heraclitus says that "there is only one remedy for this impiety: to show that the myth is an allegory [ἐπιδείξωμεν ἠλληγορημένον τὸν μῦθον]" (*All.* 22.1 [Konstan and Russell]). In this instance, ἀλληγορέω is a predicative of a "to be" clause and is in the perfect tense, both qualities that soften the action of the verb into a state. Thus again, the medio-passive voice is most likely not indicating how Heraclitus wants the text to be read but rather the metaphorical quality of the text itself.

The sources above fairly clearly show that ἀλληγορέω quite often meant "to speak metaphorically." Each of the authors above attributes the action to the author of the text they were reading or to the text itself. Those that provide definitions describe the term in a manner that matches the modern idea of metaphor, and they provide illustrations that are clearly metaphors. This sense seems to have dominated the few centuries surrounding Paul's writing of Galatians 4:21–31, but there are a few examples where the term does take on a different sense.

Sense Two: "To Interpret Allegorically"

In a small minority of occurrences, the verb refers to a mode of reading, although it is difficult to tell what this mode entails. This sense shows itself via the subject of the action. If the reader—as opposed to the text or author—is doing the action, then it seems clear that the word does not refer to a textual trope but to some sort of interpretive method. Philo uses the term in this sense multiple times. For example, in book 3 of *Legum allegoriae*, Philo pairs ἀλληγορέω with the indefinite subject τις, which functions much like the dummy subject "one" in modern English. Perplexed by Genesis 3:8 where Adam is said to have hidden from God, Philo says the following: "Let us see next how a man is said actually to hide himself from God. Were one not to take the language as figurative [εἰ δὲ μὴ ἀλληγορήσειέ τις], it would be impossible to accept the statement" (*Leg.* 3.4 [Colson and Whitaker, LCL]). As can be seen in Colson and Whitaker's translation, the pronoun τις or "one" as they appropriately render it serves as a stand-in for a reader, meaning that ἀλληγορέω must refer to some form of reading.

Philo does not describe what this sort of reading is, but it is clear that he is not content with taking the text literally. Adam and Eve could not be so foolish as to hide from an omniscient God (*Leg.* 3.4–6). Thus, hiding must be interpreted figuratively. Philo goes on to say that it represents the man who wrongly thinks God is contained by creation, located in space and time. This person, according to Philo, is in a sense hidden

from God because he thinks wrongly about him (*Leg.* 3.7). Philo's use of ἀλληγορέω points to this sort of reading.

Philo does something similar in *De migratione Abrahami* where he claims that the daughters of Salpaad, understood allegorically, symbolize the five senses.[42] "Do you not see that the five daughters, whom by allegorizing we say are the outward senses [ἃς ἀλληγοροῦντες αἰσθήσεις εἶναί φαμεν], have come from the tribe of Manasseh" (*Migr.* 205). That "we" serves as the subject of the allegorizing indicates that Philo does not use ἀλληγορέω to refer to a textual trope. It refers to a form of reading just like it did in Genesis. Unfortunately, again, he does not describe this form of reading. All he says is that the daughters of Salpaad symbolize the five senses. He does not tell us how or why. Thus, one can only infer from its occurrences in Philo that, when ἀλληγορέω refers to a mode of reading, that mode is some nebulous form of non-literal interpretation.[43]

The only other author in the centuries surrounding Paul that uses ἀλληγορέω to refer to a mode of reading is Celsus. His treatise Ἀληθὴς λόγος was probably written in the second half of the first century CE and is one of the earliest known criticisms of Christianity. Unfortunately, a full copy of the treatise has been lost to history, leaving only fragmented quotes in Origen's work *Contra Celsum*.[44] The instances of ἀλληγορέω attributed to Celsum can sometimes be difficult to distinguish from Origen's own voice. For example, in *Contra Celsum* 1.17, Origen complains that Celsus wrongly faults those who allegorize Moses's works. "In what follows, assailing the history of Moses, [Celsus] finds fault with those who read figuratively and allegorize it [τοὺς τροπολογοῦντας καὶ

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[42] The daughters of Salpaad are discussed in Num 27.

[43] Di Mattei argues that even instances like this one should be understood as "speaking allegorically," claiming that perhaps Philo thought of himself as imitating Moses. Di Mattei, "Paul's Allegory of the Two Covenants," 107n20. Although I sympathize with Di Mattei, his view is ultimately unprovable, and it seems prudent to simply accept that ἀλληγορέω can and does refer to a mode of reading in certain contexts based on the grammatical subject.

[44] James Carleton Paget and Simon Gathercole, eds., *Celsus in His World: Philosophy, Polemic and Religion in the Second Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021), 1.

ἀλληγοροῦντας αὐτην]" (*Cels.* 1.17). It is clear that ἀλληγορέω refers to a mode of reading in this instance since the history of Moses is the object of the verb, but it is not clear whether these words reflect the voice of Celsus.[45] They read more like a descriptive paraphrase of Celsus rather than a direct quote, meaning the use of ἀλληγορέω here would reflect Origen's later use not Celsus's in the second century CE.

Book 4, however, provides the closest thing to the words of Celsus himself that include a use of ἀλληγορέω. There, Origen says the following: "As if solely to hate and despise, [Celsus] has devoted himself to the statements of the Jews and the Christians, saying that 'the most reasonable of the Jews and the Christians, being ashamed of such things, attempt somehow to allegorize them [πειρῶνταί πως ἀλληγορεῖν αὐτά], but these things cannot be considered allegorical but are straightforwardly mythological'" (*Cels.* 4.48).[46] If truly from Celsus, this quote would provide evidence that ἀλληγορέω referred to a mode of reading in the middle of the second century CE. Although it is not obvious from the quote itself, the pronoun αὐτά, the object of the verb ἀλληγορεῖν, probably refers to Christian and Jewish writings. Celsus would then be claiming that Christians and Jews alike used a certain form of reading, referred to by ἀλληγορέω, to avoid the uncomfortable portions found in their Bibles. Again, other than the fact this sort of reading was not literal, Celsus does not describe the nature of this sort of reading, but it is clear that it is something that a reader did, not the text.

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[45] The antecedent of "it" (αὐτήν) is "the history of Moses" (τῆς Μωϋσέως ἱστορίας), which undoubtedly refers to the text of the OT.

[46] The Greek seems to vary somewhat toward the end of the quote depending on what version of *Contra Celsum* one chooses. For the Greek source I used, see R. Bader, *Der Ἀληθὴς λὸγος Des Kelsos* (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1940). The portion that differs does not change the fact that the wise Christians and Jews (οἱ ἐπιεικέστεροι Ἰουδαίων τε καὶ Χριστιανῶν) functions as the subject of ἀλληγορεῖν in the quote above.

The Meaning of ἅτινά ἐστιν ἀλληγορούμενα

These examples from Philo and Celsus demonstrate that ἀλληγορέω did not exclusively mean "to speak metaphorically." Both of these authors use ἀλληγορέω to refer to the action of the reader. Thus, it would seem that the basic dichotomy between speaking and reading that has come down through the scholarly discussion of Galatians 4 fits the data. The question, though, is which of these two did Paul mean in Galatians 4? Should the phrase ἅτινά ἐστιν ἀλληγορούμενα be rendered as "now this may be interpreted allegorically" or as "these things are metaphorical"? The former certainly falls within the possible range of meaning of the word, and it accounts for the medio-passive form.[47] However, there are more compelling reasons to prefer the latter. For starters, the sheer probability alone should compel one to prefer a rendering that attributes the action to the text over the reader. The sense "to interpret allegorically" is relatively rare and late.[48] Philo uses the term in this sense only about half a dozen times, and Celsus's work is somewhat tainted by the hermeneutical debates that were beginning to boil before the third and fourth centuries CE.

Furthermore, Paul provides his readers with clues that suggest he understands ἀλληγορέω to be referring to a textual phenomenon. For example, he begins the pericope with "tell me, you who want to be under law, do you not hear the Law?" (Gal 4:21). If Paul beckons his interlocutors to hear the text, it stands to reason that he thinks the text to be speaking. The connotations of speaking in verse 21, therefore, push the phrase in the direction of the sense that contains the same feel, that is, "to *speak* metaphorically."[49] Even more to the point, the text is the subject of the clause. The indefinite pronoun ἅτινα

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[47] Hanson, for example, argues that the medio-passive form indicates a shift from speaking to reading. See Hanson, *Studies in Paul's Technique and Theology*, 91.

[48] McClane, "Hellenistic Background to Pauline Allegorical Method," 131; Di Mattei, "Paul's Allegory of the Two Covenants," 106.

[49] Cf. A. B. Caneday, "Covenant Lineage Allegorically Prefigured: 'Which Things Are Written Allegorically' (Galatians 4:21–31)," *SBJT* 14, no. 3 (2010): 53.

refers to the story of Abraham, Hagar, and Sarah that Paul has just paraphrased in verses 22 and 23. In the examples above, the subject often, if not always, dictated which sense the author had in view. Only when the reader was the subject did the verb mean "to interpret allegorically." When the text or the author was the subject, it meant "to speak metaphorically." Hence, since the text or its paraphrase serves as the subject of the clause, one would expect Paul to mean what the other authors meant when they made the text the subject of ἀλληγορέω.

Lastly, the greatest strength of the view that takes Paul to mean "to interpret allegorically" is its accounting of the medio-passive form, but as I have argued above, there is a better way to account for the phrase's voice. In Philo and Heraclitus, the change in voice was not intended to change the action. (In fact, in the instances above where Philo used the term to refer to a mode of reading, he usually used the active voice.) Instead, the medio-passive voice seems to have been intended to bring out the state of being metaphorical as opposed to changing the action from speaking to reading.[50] Unless there is good reason to think otherwise, it would be prudent to assume that Paul was doing the same thing. He was not using the medio-passive form to change the clause from "these things *speak* metaphorically" to "these things are *being read* allegorically." He was doing so to change "these things *speak* metaphorically" into "these things *are* metaphorical."[51] Such a rendering accounts for the medio-passive form without causing the problems stemming from the reading view listed above.

That Paul uses a periphrastic further corroborates this view. As Seven H. Levinsohn argues, "Cross-linguistically, if a language has two imperfectives and one of them involves the copula, the norm is for the copular form to be more *stative* than the

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[50] Contra Longenecker, *Galatians*, 210.

[51] Paul's pattern follows Philo's above. He is not using the medio-passive voice to draw attention to the recipients of the action, that is, the story of Abraham and his brides in this case. The context suggests that he is drawing attention to the manner in which this story speaks because, in his view, his interlocutors read the story too rigidly.

other."[52] Paul certainly had the non-copula form ἀλληγορεῖται available to him, meaning that he was probably following the same cross-linguistic pattern Levinsohn describes. His choice of the periphrastic structure ἐστιν ἀλληγορούμενα suggests a focus on state over action just like his choice of voice.[53] Therefore, for these reasons—the dominance of the speaking view, the contextual clues, and the ability of the speaking view to account for the medio-passive voice and the periphrastic construction—Paul's phrase ἅτινά ἐστιν ἀλληγορούμενα most likely means "these things are metaphorical," leaving the question of his hermeneutic open to other factors within the pericope. Paul was not saying that he was interpreting Sarah and Hagar allegorically.

[52] Stephen H. Levinsohn, "Functions of Copula-Participle Combinations ('Periphrastics')," in *The Greek Verb Revisited: A Fresh Approach for Biblical Exegesis*, ed. Steven E. Runge and Christopher J. Fresch (Bellingham, WA: Lexham Press, 2016), 311–12.

[53] For a more extensive discussion of this argument concerning periphrasis, see Klaas Bentein, *Verbal Periphrasis in Ancient Greek: Have- and Be- Constructions* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 77–79.

CHAPTER 4

PHILO'S HERMENEUTIC

This chapter serves two purposes, one direct and one indirect. Directly, this chapter will provide a detailed description of Philo's hermeneutic. What is it that made Philo's hermeneutic what it was? Indirectly, it will also provide a detailed description of allegory simpliciter around the time Paul wrote Galatians. If Philo truly is the allegorizer par excellence of the first century, then it stands to reason that an investigation into his hermeneutic provides a window into the craft in general. To achieve these purposes, this chapter will do three things: First, it will describe what seem to be the necessary attributes of Philo's hermeneutic, that is, the interpretive moves and qualities that move him from text to conclusion. Second, it will exposit his treatise *De congressu eruditionis gratia*, a text that explores the Sarah and Hagar narratives of Genesis 16–21, in order to show how these allegorical attributes functioned in the same narrative Paul interprets in Galatians 4. Third and finally, it will discuss Philo's relationship with the so-called literal sense of the text. In my view, Philo's hermeneutic and thus allegory in general consisted of four attributes: (1) the solving of problems, (2) the use of the etymology of names, (3) the use of numbers, and (4) seemingly arbitrary conclusions.[1] Although there is certainly

[1] Although none of the following authors makes the exact same claim as I do, my description of Philo's hermeneutic stands in line with the scholarship done over the last few decades on the ancient Alexandrian. See, for example, R. P. C. Hanson, *Allegory and Event: A Study of the Sources and Significance of Origen's Interpretation of Scripture* (London: SCM Press, 1959), 49; Leonhard Goppelt, *Typos: The Typological Interpretation of the Old Testament in the New*, trans. Donald H. Madvig (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1982), 47; John M. Dillon, "Philo and the Greek Tradition of Allegorical Exegesis," in *SBL 1994 Seminar Papers* (Evanston, IL: American Theological Library Association, 1994), 69; John M. G. Barclay, *Jews in the Mediterranean Diaspora: From Alexander to Trajan (323 BCE–117 CE)* (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1996), 165–70; Folker Siegert, "Philo of Alexandria," in *Hebrew Bible, Old Testament: The History of Its Interpretation*, ed. Magne Sæbø (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1996), 163–66; Adam Kamesar, "Biblical Interpretation in Philo," in *The Cambridge Companion to Philo*, ed. Adam Kamesar (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 73–81; Iain W. Provan, *The Reformation and the Right Reading of Scripture* (Waco, TX: Baylor University Press, 2017), 145; Samuel

more to say about allegory as a discipline, these four attributes show up consistently enough in Philo's thinking to form the boundary for what is allegory and what is not.

Philo's Hermeneutic

It is well recognized that Philo was no exegetical innovator.[2] Although he never lays out any systematic explanation of his hermeneutic like that found in Origen's *De principiis*, he does seem to follow a consistent enough pattern to suggest he was thinking systematically about how to interpret the text.[3]

Problems

Typically, problems in the text serve as triggers to tell Philo not so much as *how* the text should be interpreted allegorically, but when.[4] Left on its own, the text presents Philo with some sort of *aporia* when weighed against a whole host of presuppositions that Philo brings to the text, and Philo turns to allegory to untangle the enigma.[5] Consider his comments on Genesis 1. Pondering the six-day creation account,

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J. Tedder, *Children of Laughter and the Re-Creation of Humanity: The Theological Vision and Logic of Paul's Letter to the Galatians* (Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 2020), 146–47.

[2] The earliest documented cases of allegory hail from Greece. Rita Copeland and Peter T. Struck, eds., *Cambridge Companion to Allegory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 3. Most scholars place Philo within a Jewish stream that took up this Greek practice. See Hanson, *Allegory and Event*, 44; David Brewer, *Techniques and Assumptions in Jewish Exegesis before 70 CE* (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1992), 201, 211; Folker Siegert, "Early Jewish Interpretation in a Hellenistic Style," in Sæbø, *Hebrew Bible, Old Testament*, 142; Siegert, "Philo of Alexandria," 165; Peder Borgen, *Philo of Alexandria: An Exegete for His Time* (Leiden: Brill, 1997), 10; Richard N. Longenecker, *Biblical Exegesis in the Apostolic Period*, 2nd ed. (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1999), 32; Christos Térézis and Eugenia Tzouramani, "A General Discussion of Philo's Use of Allegory with a Reference to His Techniques," *Phronema* 18 (2003): 130; Kamesar, "Biblical Interpretation in Philo," 73; Provan, *The Reformation and the Right Reading of Scripture*, 141.

[3] Siegert suggests that Philo's silence might indicate that the "canons" of allegory had become trivial by his day. One need not lay out what everyone would have assumed to be true. Siegert, "Early Jewish Interpretation in a Hellenistic Style," 184. Cf. David M. Hay, "Defining Allegory in Philo's Exegetical World," in *SBL 1994 Seminar Papers*, 59.

[4] Cf. Brewer, *Techniques and Assumptions in Jewish Exegesis before 70 CE*, 200; Kamesar, "Biblical Interpretation in Philo," 78. Both Brewer and Kamesar cite Pépin as the source of this observation. J. Pépin, "Remarques sur la théorie de l'exégèse allégorique chez Philon," *Colloques Nationaux Du Centre National de La Recherche Scientifique* (1966): 131–68.

[5] Philo may not have thought he was trying to fix the literal sense. As R. M. Grant has pointed out, Philo's sensitivity to these sorts of problems probably stems from his view of inspiration. R. M. Grant, *The Letter and the Spirit* (London: SPCK, 1957), 33–36. Speaking of the nature of the OT, Philo writes,

Philo writes the following: "He says that in six days, the world was created, not since its Maker required (προσεδεῖτο) a length of time for His work, for it is fitting (εἰκός) for God to accomplish all things simultaneously, not through his command alone but also merely through thinking" (*Opif.* 13).[6] The six-day creation account cannot be taken literally because God, being all-powerful, does not need any length of time to create. Without going into the deep Platonic metaphysics behind the text, it is clear that for Philo, reading this text in a literal manner poses a problem.[7] It clashes with his view of God; hence, it must be understood allegorically.[8]

Philo makes this problem-solving logic even more explicit in the beginning of his treatise *De plantatione*. There, Philo takes issue with a literal reading of Genesis 2:8, which reads, "And the LORD God planted a garden in Eden to the east, and he put there the man which he had formed." Read literally, this text raises a whole host of questions for Philo: Why would God need a garden? Does he need it for food? No, God being God needs nothing, and only an impious man, according to Philo, would suggest that God planted the garden to supply himself with its fruits. Does he need it to serve as his own

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"No pronouncement of a prophet is ever his own. He is an interpreter prompted by another in all his utterances, when knowing not what he does he is filled with inspiration, as the reason withdraws and surrenders the citadel of the soul to a new visitor and tenant, the divine spirit, which plays upon the vocal organism and dictates words which clearly express its prophetic message" (*Spec.* 4.49; quoted in Grant). In other words, the biblical author merely served as a mouthpiece. He entered a trance-like state and uttered the exact words of God. Since God's words must be perfect, apparent errors must be God's way of calling the reader to reach behind the surface of the text. They are not problems. They are clues. Nevertheless, as will be shown below, that the OT contained these enigmas was a presupposition that Philo brought to the text.

[6] My translation. All subsequent translations will be mine unless otherwise noted, including both Philo and biblical text. The actual meaning of the participle εἰκός is difficult. LSJ lists "fitting" or "probable" as possible glosses (p. 485). The latter meaning would make Philo's assertion much more tentative than the former. Either way, Philo's interpretive move is clear.

[7] There is debate concerning whether Philo was a Platonist. Some think he was, given statements like the one above; see, e.g., John M. Dillon, *The Middle Platonists: A Study of Platonism, 80 B.C. to A.D. 220* (London: Duckworth, 1977), 139–83. Some think he was not because his main purpose was to exposit the OT; see, e.g., David T. Runia, *Philo of Alexandria and the Timaeus of Plato* (Leiden: Brill, 1986), 499, 505–19. It seems like this decision hinges on whether the reader thinks certain things to be essential to Platonism itself. Philo clearly held to some form of Platonist metaphysics, but holding to a few select elements of Platonism does not necessarily make one a Platonist. In my view, Philo certainly held to many Platonic distinctives such as the supremacy of the immaterial soul over the material body.

[8] Cf. Térézis and Tzouramani, "A General Discussion of Philo's Use of Allegory," 132n23.

abode? Also no. God is omnipresent, unable to be contained by the entire universe much less a seemingly insignificant garden. (*Plant.* 33–34). Philo also does not think that the garden was made for man, for the text says that God made man elsewhere only to bring him into paradise later (*Plant.* 34). These questions and others like them compel Philo to read the text allegorically as he himself says:

> [These words] are utterly monstrous inventions of men who would overthrow great virtues like piety and reverence by representing [God] as having the form and passions of mankind. So we must turn to allegory [ἀλληγορίαν], the method dear to men with their eyes opened. Indeed the sacred oracles most evidently afford us the clues for the use of this method. (*Plant.* 35–36 [Colson and Whitaker, LCL])

Philo's logic here is more explicit than that of the creation account. Allegory provides Philo with an escape from the problems posed by the literal sense of the text.

These problems vary widely throughout Philo's corpus. Sometimes, they concern theological matters, as is the case above. Other times they concern empirical matters where the description given does not fit Philo's observations.[9] Quite often, they even concern grammatical matters, like repetitions or superfluous details.[10] Whatever the problem may be, Philo appeals to this sort of logic dozens of times in his work.[11] Problems in the text indicate places ripe with allegorical meaning.[12]

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[9] In *QG* 2.28, Philo questions whether physical wind could be the referent of πνεῦμα in Gen 8:1. He answers "no" because he has observed only wind causing waves, not completely diminishing the waters as Gen 8:1 indicates.

[10] Particular examples of this type come up in his comments on Sarah and Hagar and will be discussed later.

[11] Although not exhaustive, the following is a list of instances where Philo solves problems in the text via allegory: *QG* 1.8, 45, 92, 95; 2.74; 4.9, 60, 141, 166, 172, 175, 196, 206; *QE* 42; *Fug*. 59, 106–9, 179–80, 203–4; *Gig.* 58; *Mut*. 8–9, 15, 26–30, 60, 143; *Conf*. 14, 62, 134, 142–43, 158; *Plant*. 34–36, 74, 113; *Deus* 57–60, 141–143; *Leg*. 3.4, 40, 49, 55, 60, 67, 188, 236; *Post*. 1, 7, 17, 34, 51, 168; *Somn.* 1.65, 94–102, 230; 2.301–2; *Her*. 278–80, 289; *Agr.* 87, 97, 131–32, 157; *Det.* 14–15, 48, 57–58, 95, 155; *Cher*. 40, 55; *Abr*. 54–55.

[12] For a more extensive list of problems, see Kamesar, "Biblical Interpretation in Philo," 78.

Names

Perhaps just as frequently, Philo appeals to the etymology of names to bridge the gap between the literal sense and his allegorical reading.[13] Every name, whether the text calls for it or not, carries allegorical significance. For example, in *De Abrahamo* 82–83, Philo discusses Abraham's name change from Abram to Abraham. In his view, this change signifies Abraham's shift from a Chaldean pagan to a truly wise man, able to comprehend God as he is: "'Abram' if it interpreted means 'uplifted father,' whereas 'Abraham' means 'elect father of sound.' The former signifies an astrologer or meteorologist, but the latter a wise man" (*Plant*. 82).[14] Philo goes on to detail how he moves from these names to their meaning, but the point to note is simply the logic of his argument.[15] In *De Abrahamo*, Abraham serves as the archetype of wise man, and it is Abraham's name that tells Philo that this is so.

Obviously, the text often calls for this sort of reading. Genesis 17:5 itself draws attention to Abraham's name change, saying that Abraham signifies the fact that Abram would become the father of many nations. The text and Philo come to different conclusions, but they both assign significance to the name change. Thus, Philo's logic follows the text's own logic fairly closely. However, there are many times throughout his corpus where Philo interprets a name that the text does not. For example, in *De ebrietate* 127–28, Philo discusses Leviticus 10:8, where God forbids Aaron and his son from drinking wine. Philo thinks Aaron's name helps to explain the reason for this prohibition. The name "Aaron," meaning "mountain," suggests that the first high priest was to fixate his mind on lofty things (like mountains) and not on things below (like getting drunk).

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[13] Cf. Peder Borgen, "Philo of Alexandria as Exegete," in *A History of Biblical Interpretation*, ed. Alan J. Hauser and Duane F. Watson (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2003), 1:122–23.

[14] Interestingly, the impetus for this discussion seems to be an embarrassment concerning the insignificance of this name change. In Philo's words, "To the ear there was but a duplication of one letter, alpha, but in fact in the truth conveyed this duplication shewed a change of great importance" (*Abr.* 81 [Colson, LCL]). Thus, this example further corroborates Philo's problem-solving tendency.

[15] Philo also discusses this name change in *Cher.* 4, 7; *Gig.* 62, 64; *Mut.* 66.

Philo may well be correct about the reason for this prohibition, but the text never appeals to Aaron's name to establish such a reason. What this example and those like it suggest is that Philo came to the text looking for significance in the names it contained. Etymology was one of his favorite allegorical tools whether the text called him to use it.[16]

Numbers

Philo uses numbers similarly. Numbers like names often provide Philo with the means to bridge the gap between the text and its allegorical meaning.[17] For example, after voicing his problem with a literal reading of the creation account above, Philo says the following: "Six days are mentioned because for the things coming into existence there was need of order. Order involves number, and among numbers by the law of nature the most suitable to productivity is 6" (*Opif.* 13 [Colson and Whitaker, LCL]). As can be seen, Philo finds a solution to his problem in the number six. God did not create the cosmos in six days. The number six signifies order. The cosmos requires order. Thus, "six" must have been included in the narrative to communicate that God supplied order to the cosmos, not to describe the length of time it took to create it. Philo's use of numbers is much more sparse than his use of names, but wherever numbers can be found, Philo can be found using them to infer what he considers to be the deeper meaning of the text.[18]

Arbitrariness

The final attribute of Philo's hermeneutic does not so much describe the warrants of his readings as much as how closely tied his conclusions are to the text itself.

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[16] Like the list of identified problems above, the following list is not exhaustive, but it includes a number of places where Philo interprets someone or something's name: *Sobr*. 28–29; *Gig*. 64; *Mut.* 76; *Ebr.* 128, 143–44; *Post.* 32, 34, 35, 112, 125; *Cher.* 4–7; *QG* 2.77; 3.53; *QE* 28; *Her*. 128; *Migr.* 148; *Plant.* 134; *Det.* 28; *Leg.* 1.67; 3.218, 228; *Ios.* 28; *Conf.* 65; *Somn.* 2.33–35; *Abr.* 82, 201.

[17] Brewer claims that Philo's use of numbers follow the common Pythagorean methods of his day. Brewer, *Techniques and Assumptions in Jewish Exegesis before 70 CE*, 202.

[18] E.g., *QG* 83; *QE* 2.28; *Deus* 11; *Plant.* 121–24; *Opif*. 63.

Philo's exegesis consistently feels arbitrary.[19] Sometimes, this arbitrary feel stems from a lack of warrant. Philo claims, for example, that the man God creates in Genesis 1 symbolizes the mind, but he never says why (*QG* 1.4). Other times, this feel comes from weak warrant. In these instances, Philo does provide reasons for taking the text as he does, but the reasons are not sufficient to produce the conclusions he ends up making.[20] For example, in *De somniis* 1.6, Philo claims that Isaac's well from Genesis 26:32–33 symbolizes knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) because, like a well, knowledge is both deep and hidden. Although true of a well and true of knowledge, these attributes do not sufficiently connect the well to knowledge in the flow of the narrative.

Other times, Philo's conclusions even seem to run contrary to the flow of the narrative. Abraham's name discussed above serves as a perfect example. The text clearly indicates that the patriarch's name change symbolizes God's promise that he would be the father of many nations (Gen 17:5). Philo, on the other hand, takes the change to indicate that Abraham serves as an exemplar of a wise man. One cannot help but wonder why Philo does not take the name change in the same direction as Genesis seems to. Exegetical moves like these saturate Philo's exposition of the Pentateuch, making the arbitrariness they produce a defining trait of his hermeneutic.[21] So, it is these four

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[19] Cf. Ian W. Scott, *Paul's Way of Knowing: Story, Experience, and the Spirit* (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2009), 241–42; David Starling, "Justifying Allegory: Scripture, Rhetoric, and Reason in Galatians 4:21–5:1," *Journal of Theological Interpretation* 9, no. 2 (2015): 236; Provan, *The Reformation and the Right Reading of Scripture*, 145; Tedder, *Children of Laughter and the Re-Creation of Humanity*, 147.

[20] For this reason, Cosgrove's observation that ancient allegorizers *argued* for their conclusions does not absolve them of this arbitrary feel. The warrant still leaves the reader wondering how the connection is valid. Charles H. Cosgrove, "The Law Has Given Sarah No Children (Gal 4:21–30)," *NovT* 29, no. 3 (1987): 220.

[21] It is hard to say why Philo makes these moves, but there are clues in his corpus. Philo may do so simply because of convictions he does not spell out explicitly in his discourse. For example, Philo clearly ascribes to a Platonic anthropology. Over and over, he claims that the body serves as a temporary and poor housing for the soul from which man will eventually be freed (e.g., *QG* 4.152; *Conf.* 177; *Gig.* 12–15; *Deus* 2; *Ebr.* 101). This view of man could be the reason behind him taking Gen 1:26 as describing a disembodied mind. As the archetype of humanity, the man of Gen 1:26 would of course embody the sort of incorporeal existence Philo esteems, but Philo does not explicitly spell this out for his readers. He could also be asserting long held interpretations that most within his circles would take for granted. In *Abr.* 99, for example, Philo talks about hearing philosophers (φυσικῶν ἀνδρῶν) taking Abraham as a prudent mind and Sarah as virtue. Philo clearly ascribes to this view of the Gen narratives, and this may be why. Philo was not concocting the interpretation himself. He was merely affirming a view already held by his

attributes—problem-solving, the use of etymology and numbers, and arbitrariness—that made Philo's hermeneutic what it is was and thus allegory what it was.[22] The remainder of this chapter will exposit Philo's treatise on Genesis 16, *De congressu eruditionis gratia*, showing where these attributes show up in his discussion of Sarah, Hagar, Abraham, and their sons.

Philo on Sarah and Hagar

Philo's comments on the Sarah and Hagar narratives litter his entire corpus. A quick word search shows Sarah's name being mentioned over eighty times and Hagar's nearly thirty times across multiple works. In many of these instances, Philo's comments are quite brief, providing very little if any insight into the significance of these two women.[23] Fortunately, each receives sustained treatment in Philo's treatise *De congressu*

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contemporaries. Perhaps the same is true of his other interpretations that have little warrant. As the famous Philo scholar Erwin Goodenough thought, it could also be that Philo did not think he needed to provide careful warrant for his reading because he was writing for those already initiated into his theology. Erwin Ramsdell Goodenough, *An Introduction to Philo Judaeus*, 2nd ed. (Oxford: B. Blackwell, 1962), 47. Much of Philo's work would consist of devotional exposition that would not be overly concerned with proving every point he was making. Finally, and perhaps most likely, the arbitrariness stems from his view of the text itself. In Philo's view, the text had a certain fulness to it. Every detail, every character, had to contain some sort of spiritual significance lurking beneath the surface. Consider his comments on the story of Joseph. Having recounted the details of Joseph's story, Philo turns to allegory: "for nearly all or most of the narratives in the law speak allegorically" (*Ios.* 28; cf. *Det.* 167; *Mut.* 26–30). Such a conviction leads Philo to dig even when the text does not seem to invite him to do so, and this digging yields these arbitrary conclusions.

[22] One might notice that there is a subtle circularity to my argument. These attributes define Philo's allegorical hermeneutic, but they are also observed from the place where his exegetical moves seem allegorical. There is a certain extent to which this circle is unavoidable, but there are other clues that help the reader to know when Philo moves from his literal reading to his allegorical reading. When allegorizing, Philo will not always but often tell is readers that he is doing so, saying something like "having explained the literal sense, we will now move on to the allegorical sense." Philo often uses the adjective ῥητός to flag his literal reading. For example, in *Ios.* 28, he says, "It is worthwhile, *after the explanation of the literal sense* [μετὰ τὴν ῥητὴν διήγησιν], to attend to the allegorical sense [τὰ ἐν ὑπονοίαις]" (emphasis added). On occasion, Philo will use the word κυριολεγέω ("to speak straightforwardly") when he wants to say that the literal sense cannot be taken straightforwardly. On the allegorical side, Philo's word of choice is ὑπόνοια ("deeper sense"), which often stands opposite of the adjective ῥητός as it does above in the quote from *Ios.* 28. In addition, Philo uses words like συμβολικός, τροπικός, ἀλληγορία, ἀλληγορέω, and others to tell the reader his exposition is allegorical. Thus, these lexical clues provide an escape from the subtle circle. For a fuller exposition of these terms, see Hay, "Defining Allegory in Philo's Exegetical World."

[23] For example, in *Leg.* 2.82, Philo merely mentions Sarah's name as an appositional gloss to wisdom without any real explanation. It seems probable that Philo assumed his readers would be familiar with his other works, which would allow him to make these sorts of claims without providing any explanation.

eruditionis gratia, which comprises a verse-by-verse exposition of Genesis 16:1–6a and explains Philo's views on education.

Summary

In *De congressu eruditionis gratia*, Philo argues that Sarah represents true wisdom or virtue and Hagar encyclical education, which included subjects like grammar, mathematics, and music. Abraham represents the generic learner, who was to pass through encyclical education in order to obtain true wisdom.[24] By explaining the narrative this way, Philo attempted to forge a path between what he thought to be two extremes—the lack of care within the Jewish community for a decidedly Greek form of education and an unhelpful fixation on this form that never leads to virtue. Ultimately, the learner must obtain virtue and avoid getting bogged down in what was supposed to be a means to an end. Learning grammar and mathematics were useless to Philo lest they led to a virtuous life.[25]

Philo on Sarah's Name

How Philo arrives at these conclusions can be seen in his opening comments on Genesis 16:1. After quoting the text, Philo begins discussing Sarah's name:

> Now Sarah's name is, by interpretation, "sovereignty of me [ἀρχή μου]," and the wisdom in me, the self-control in me, the individual righteousness and each of the other virtues [τῶν ἄλλων ἀρετῶν] whose place is confined to the "me," are a sovereignty over me only. That sovereignty rules and dominates me, who have

[24] Multiple scholars suggest that Philo was probably borrowing from a common allegorical interpretation of Homer's narratives about Penelope like that found in Ps. Plutarch's *De liberis educandis* 7D. See, e.g., Borgen, "Philo of Alexandria as Exegete," 1:16–17; Justin M. Rogers, "The Philonic and the Pauline: Hagar and Sarah in the Exegesis of Didymus the Blind," *Studia Philonica Annual* 26 (2014): 64. Perhaps they are correct, but Philo does not merely assert this reading. He provides reasons for it.

[25] See similar summaries by Jason Zurawski and Abraham Bos. The location of the claims will come in the following exposition. Jason Zurawski, "Mosaic Torah as Encyclical Paideia: Reading Paul's Allegory of Hagar and Sarah in Light of Philo of Alexandria's," in *Pedagogy in Ancient Judaism and Early Christianity*, ed. Karina Martin Hogan, Matthew Goff, and Emma Wasserman, Early Judaism and Its Literature 41 (Atlanta: SBL Press, 2017), 285; Abraham P. Bos, "Hagar and the Enkyklios Paideia in Philo of Alexandria," in *Abraham, the Nations, and the Hagarites: Jewish, Christian, and Islamic Perspectives on Kinship with Abraham*, ed. Martin Goodman, Geurt Hendrik van Kooten, and J. van Ruiten (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 166.

> willed to render obedience to it, in virtue of its natural queenship. (*Congr.* 2 [Colson and Whitaker, LCL])

In Hebrew, Sarai (שָׂרַי) is the combination of the noun שׂר, which means "prince or princess," and a first-person suffix ("my"). Philo draws on this etymological breakdown to reach his conclusion concerning Sarah. His logic that follows is not as clear, but he seems to connect Sarah and virtue through the concept of rule. Sarah's name means "ruler over me." Virtue, as the queen of intellectual pursuits, rules over an individual in some sense. Therefore, Sarah corresponds to virtue.[26]

These exegetical moves show two of the attributes described above. Obviously, Philo is dealing with a name, one of his favorite tools, but his handling of the name has an arbitrary feel to it that is similar to the feel of his discussion of the name of Abraham. Sarah's name change is certainly significant, but Genesis 17:15–16 strongly suggests that Sarah's name change corresponds to Abraham's.[27] The first-person suffix is removed to signify that Sarah would become the mother of many nations (see Gen 17:6). She is no longer "my princess." She is "*the* princess" of all the kingdoms that would come from her progeny. Philo does well to notice the change, but he does not draw the same conclusions the text seems to, making his etymology feel disconnected from the text.

Philo on the Problem of Sarah's Fertility

Philo's allegorical problem-solving arrives in the very next section. Commenting on Genesis 16:2, Philo takes issue with Moses's supposed paradoxical presentation of Sarah (*Congr.* 3). "Now, Moses presents her paradoxically [τὸ

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[26] In *Mut.* 77–78, Philo further elaborates that the "Sarai" means "specific virtue," and "Sarah" means general virtue.

[27] The passage reads, "But God said to Abraham, 'your wife Sarai shall no longer be called by her current name. Instead, she will be called 'Sarah.' And I will bless her, and I will also give from her to you a son. And I will bless her, and she will become many nations. Kings of many peoples will come from her'" (Gen 17:15–16). The only thing missing from this text is the conjunction "for" between God's description of Sarah's name change and his promise to Sarah. Otherwise, the promise closely mimics the same statement made to Abraham.

παραδοξότατον] as being both barren and fertile since he says that the most populous of nations was to come from her." For Philo, this poses a problem requiring an allegorical solution. One cannot be both barren and fertile.[28] To solve it, Philo appeals to the connection he has already established between Sarah and virtue in his comments on Genesis 16:1. The text rightly represents Sarah as barren and fertile, according to Philo, because virtue is barren to certain things but fertile to others. In his words, "indeed virtue is barren to all that is evil, but she shows herself to be the fruitful mother of good" (*Congr.* 3). Taking Sarah as virtue solves the paradox. As virtue, Sarah can be both barren and fertile because virtue is barren to evil but fertile to good.

Philo finds further warrant for his reading in a minute detail of the narrative. The text, Philo points out, does not just say that Sarah could not bear children. It says that she could not bear children for some particular person (*Congr.* 9). Presumably, Philo is discussing Genesis 16:1, where the LXX reads, "Sarah, Abraham's wife, had not born any children *to him* [αὐτῷ]."[29] Philo places heavy weight on the dative pronoun αὐτῷ. Had Moses wanted to say merely that Sarah was barren, he would have left this pronoun out, but he does not.

> This is why [Moses] does not say that Sarah did not bear, but only that she did not bear for some particular person [αὐτῷ τινι]. For we are not yet prepared to receive yet the offspring of virtue unless we have first mated with her handmaiden, and the handmaiden of wisdom is the culture gained by the primary learning of the school course [i.e., encyclical education]. (*Congr.* 9)

Thus, in Philo's opinion, the text is attempting to flag the fact that Sarah, or virtue, yields its fruits only to those who are ready. She is not barren to all. She is only barren to those who have not yet passed through encyclical education. This argument further corroborates Philo's solution described above. Sarah is not barren and fertile. She is

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[28] Cf. Bos, "Hagar and the Enkyklios Paideia in Philo of Alexandria," 166.

[29] Emphasis added.

virtue, and as virtue, she is barren to some and fertile to others, those Moses represents with the pronoun αὐτῷ. Enigma erased.

Philo's line of thinking here provides a window into his *a priori* hermeneutical assumptions. The text does not present Sarah as barren and fertile. In fact, it plays up her barrenness so that when God finally does bless her with a child, one cannot deny that the child was the product of a miracle, a point even Philo seems to recognize elsewhere (*QG* 3.18). Philo, therefore, attempts to find a paradox where there is none, and in so doing, he shows that this sort of hermeneutical procedure was something that he was looking to do to the text whether the text called for it or not. Because they are not obviously warranted by the text, exegetical moves like this provide windows directly into an interpreter's hermeneutic, that is, how they assumed texts should be interpreted in general. This handling of Sarah provides clear evidence that problem-solving was a core part of Philo's *a priori* allegorical assumptions.

Philo on Hagar

Philo gives Hagar the same exegetical treatment as her master. He starts by claiming that it is fitting for virtue to receive the greatest of all preludes—encyclical education. Grammar, geometry, astronomy, rhetoric, and music all serve as the handmaidens of virtue and are symbolized by Hagar (*Congr.* 11). He then justifies his allegorizing by Sarah's command to Abraham found in Genesis 16:2:

> These [i.e., the topics of encyclical education] are symbolized by Hagar, the handmaiden of Sarah, as I shall proceed to show. For [γάρ] Sarah, we are told, said to Abraham: "Behold, the Lord has shut me out from bearing. Go unto my handmaiden so that you may beget children from her." In the present discussion, we must eliminate all bodily unions or intercourse which has pleasure [ἡδονήν] as its object [τελός]. (*Congr.* 12)

Philo again grounds his allegory of Hagar in a perceived enigma. On its own, the text poses a problem, seeming to espouse a sexual union that Philo deems unrighteous. Sex cannot be for pleasure.[30]

Elsewhere, Philo fixes this issue by arguing that Sarah only intended to allow her husband to bear children (e.g., *Abr.* 253).[31] Here though, Philo claims that the union was to represent Abraham's need for preliminary education prior to receiving virtue, a point he has already made earlier (see *Congr.* 11). He repeats, "what is meant is a mating of the mind with virtue. Mind desires to have children by virtue, and, if it cannot do so at once, is instructed to espouse virtue's handmaid, the lower instruction" (*Congr.* 12 [Colson and Whitaker, LCL]). Philo's point is clear. Sarah's giving of Hagar to Abraham signifies an untrained mind's need for prior education.

Philo's handling of Sarah's command mixes two of his allegorical attributes. The problem-solving attribute combines with Philo's prior conclusion concerning Sarah based on her name. He has already determined that she is to be understood as a symbol for virtue. Thus, she serves as the hinge around which his understanding of the rest of the characters revolves and the solution to the problems he raises. Likewise, Hagar does not represent encyclical knowledge merely because her union with Abraham poses problems for Philo's sexual ethic. She is what she is because of her relationship with Sarah, a

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[30] It could be argued that Philo was merely appealing to a narrative detail when he argues that the union was merely intended for procreation. Even in Philo's quote, Sarah states the express purpose for which she hands over Hagar. The problem though is that this view cannot account for why Philo denies what he does. What need would he have to state that sexual relationship between Hagar and Abraham was not for pleasure if he did not think the command to be a potential difficulty? Rogers has helpfully shown how this ethic crops up elsewhere in Philo's writings (*Spec.* 3.34) and was closely followed by Didymus the Blind. Thus, it seems probable that Philo does indeed have his own sexual ethic in mind not just the narrative when he issues his denial. Rogers, "The Philonic and the Pauline," 60–61.

[31] Philo is careful to say that Abraham only slept with Hagar right up until the point of pregnancy (ἄχρι τοῦ μόνον ἐγκύμονα γενέσθαι). Interestingly, even when Philo understands the text more straightforwardly, he still tries to fix its apparent problems. His paraphrase of Gen 16:2 in *Abr.* 245–53 paints Sarah not as virtue herself but as a picture-perfect exemplar of virtue who cares for only the needs of her husband. Sarah's image in the MT, on the other hand, does not fare too well. Unlike the LXX (which may have influenced Philo's reading) Sarah asks Abraham to take Hagar so that she might bear children for herself, not for him. Philo depicts Sarah as wanting Hagar to bear children solely for her husband's sake. Thus, the problem-solution exegesis seems to be fundamental even to Philo's more literal readings of the text.

character Philo has already allegorized. Often in Philo's expositions, once a story or text has lifted off into the allegorical plane, it tends not to land, drawing the other details up to itself.

This tendency for the allegory to displace the literal sense can be seen in a number of other places, perhaps most pointedly in *De congressu eruditionis gratia* 13. There, Philo praises virtue for only yielding her fruits to those who are ready and for not making those feel bad who are not sufficiently prepared. She supposedly omits "for you" ("ὑμῖν") in Genesis 16:2 so that these unqualified minds might not be put to shame.[32] If virtue has said that she was barren "for you," she would have shamed those who were not ready for her. In an act of compassion, he merely states that she is barren. What is interesting about this line of reasoning is that Philo seems to draw two opposing conclusions from the same sort of textual detail. Not but a few sections above (*Congr.* 9), the presence of the pronoun αὐτῷ indicated that virtue was not barren in toto, but here, when this sort of pronoun is absent, virtue is merely being polite. The very evidence Philo previously argued would indicate total barrenness now loses its exegetical edge. This inconsistency suggests that there comes a point in Philo's discourse when the text takes a backseat to the allegory. The details of the narrative become direct comments on virtue, encyclical education, and the mind rather than symbols that indirectly speak to these more abstract realities. It is this tendency of Philo's allegories to take center stage that contributes to their arbitrary feel. The reader cannot help but think that Philo is bending textual details around allegorical conclusions he has already made.

By the time Philo focuses his attention on Hagar, the allegory has completely taken over. Rather than using her textual characteristics as pathways into her allegorical

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[32] At this point, Philo has generalized Abraham; hence the discussion of "for you" rather than "for Abraham." His words are as follows: "Now we may well feel profound admiration for the discretion shown by wisdom. She refrains from reproaching us with our backwardness or complete impotence in generation, though, as the text truly stated, it was through our unfitness that she was not bearing, and not because she grudged us offspring. Thus, she says, 'The Lord has shut me out from bearing,' and does not go on to add, 'for you.' She does not wish to seem to upbraid and reproach others for their misfortune."

significance as he did with Sarah, he presupposes this significance and uses her name and nationality to nuance the nature of encyclical education itself. Philo begins with her nationality first. Genesis 16:1 mentions that Hagar was an Egyptian (Αἰγυπτία LXX). Philo thinks that this nationality speaks to the necessity of sense perception for learning: "The votary of the school studies, the friend of wide learning, must necessarily be associated with the earthy and Egyptian body; since he needs eyes to see and read, ears to listen and hear, and the other senses to unveil the several objects of sense" (*Congr.* 20 [Colson and Whitaker, LCL]). Philo explains that a person needs to be able to sense the outside world in order to unlock its secrets; hence why Hagar is explicitly labeled as an Egyptian, a race apparently associated with the physical body, the place of the senses (*Congr.* 21).[33] Philo combines Hagar's nationality with her name, which he takes to mean "sojourning." To him, it makes sense for encyclical education to be characterized as a sojourner because a learned man will only be with her temporarily just like a sojourner in his non-native land (*Congr.* 20).

The point to note in this exegesis is not so much its conclusion but its logic. Above, Sarah's name served as the warrant for taking her to symbolize virtue. Here, Hagar's name is used to nuance what Philo has already taken her to symbolize. Sarah is virtue because that is what her name means. Hagar is encyclical education because that is just what she is. Her name merely nuances what she symbolizes. It is these sorts of moves that contribute to the arbitrary feel of Philo's exegesis. Yes, Philo makes arguments for nuancing encyclical education, but it is the connection between Hagar and this form of education that needs the warrant that Philo's exegesis noticeably lacks.

[33] For an extensive treatment of Philo's view of Egypt and its inhabitants, see Sarah Pearce, *The Land of the Body: Studies in Philo's Representation of Egypt* (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2007).

Philo on the Problem of Moses's Rhetoric

Later in the treatise, Philo returns to problem solving. In *De congressu eruditionis gratia* 73, Philo discusses what he perceives to be a rhetorical problem in the text. He ponders why Moses repeats himself by again calling Sarah "the wife of Abraham." Left on its own, this detail seems superfluous, for Moses did not practice "the worse form of superfluous speech [μαρκρολογίας τὸ φαυλότατον εἶδος], namely tautology [ταυτολογίαν]."[34] Philo's problem is that Moses already told his readers that Sarah was Abraham's wife. He cannot understand why he would do so again. Philo solves this issue by claiming that the label was intended to remind Abraham of Hagar's true place. Lest Abraham forget that he was to ultimately obtain virtue after he had gone through encyclical education, Moses reminds Abraham that it is Sarah (or virtue) that is his wife, not Hagar (*Congr.* 73). This logic parallels what has been seen above. Philo finds a problem where there is none, and then he solves it by using the allegory he has established earlier in his treatise. The repeated label may just be an extraneous detail since narratives are almost never as economical as they can be. At most, it may be that the narrative is trying to remind its readers that Sarah is the one through whom the promised seed was to come (Gen 17:19). Either way, the extra label is not the rhetorical blemish that Philo takes it to be. Thus, the fact that he takes issue with it suggests that this problem-solving tendency operates as a core conviction of his allegorical hermeneutic.

Philo on the Conflict of Sarah and Hagar

Toward the end of *De congressu eruditionis gratia*, Philo discusses the conflict between Sarah and Hagar found in Genesis 16:6.[35] He begins by framing said conflict within Abraham's response to Sarah's indictment found in Genesis 16:5, which reads

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[34] It is difficult to tell exact what Philo means by ταυτολογία because of its rarity. Given the context, however, Philo seems merely to be referring to superfluous repetition. LSJ indicates that the term may refer to something like what Quintilian has in mind in *Inst.* 8.3.50. LSJ, 1761.

[35] Gen 16:6 reads, "And Abram said to Sarai, 'Behold, your maidservant is in your hand. Do to her whatever is good in your eyes.' And Sarai dealt harshly with her, and [Hagar] fled from before her."

"And Sarai said to Abram, 'May the wrong done to me be on you! I gave my servant to your embrace, and when she saw that she had conceived, she looked on me with contempt. May the LORD judge between you and me!'" (Gen 16:5 ESV). Again, for Philo, the literal sense poses a problem. Sarah's indignance toward Abraham and harsh treatment of Hagar are not behaviors that befit virtue. Philo explains away these issues, arguing that Sarah is actually making a calm appeal to God in verse 5 in an attempt to avoid making a hasty judgment about Abraham's attachment to encyclical knowledge. In other words, Sarah is not rebuking Abraham. She is pleading on his behalf.[36] Perhaps Abraham will return to her if she is patient, and to his credit, Abraham in verse 6 responds properly, turning over Hagar to Sarah to do with her what she wills. Abraham readily acknowledges, according to Philo, that encyclical education ultimately belongs to virtue (*Congr.* 152–153).

Other learners, however, are not as wise as the patriarch, and it is to them that verse 6 points. The casting out of Hagar represents the disciplinary action of virtue toward those who cling to encyclical knowledge too closely. Philo turns what seems to be an act of retribution on Sarah's part into a virtuous act of chastisement toward those who need it. "And such to those who need convincing of their errors [unlike Abraham] is the admonishing which the holy text indicates under its other name of affliction [κάκωσιν]. Therefore he adds 'and she afflicted [ἐκάκωσεν] her,' which means she admonished [ἐνουθέτησε] and chastised [ἐσωγρόνισε] her" (*Congr.* 157–158 [Colson and Whitaker]). Although it is subtle, Philo's statement suggests that he recognizes the negative connotations usually associated with the verb κακόω, a word that often refers not to mere

[36] The text reads as follows: "It is difficult to tell whether you stand firm or contrariwise as I supposed. It is impossible for anyone to know, but it is easy for God. Therefore, [Sarah] speaks properly, saying, 'May God judge between you and me.' [In saying this], she does not condemn [Abraham] as unrighteous beforehand, but instead, she expresses doubt that he might perhaps act rightly" (*Congr.* 152–53). In context, to stand firm means to return to virtue, and to act contrariwise is to remain with encyclical education.

disciplinary action but to harsh treatment.[37] He fixes this problem by watering the term down. Virtue does not deal harshly. She disciplines.

Philo applies more explicit attention to this problem a few sections later:

> When it [i.e., an act of κακόω] is the work of justice and the power of the law which chastens by reproof I am filled with admiration. When it is the work of folly and vice and therefore harmful, I turn away from it and call it by the evil names that are its due. When, then, you hear of Hagar as afflicted or evil-entreated by Sarah, do not suppose that you have here one of the usual accompaniments of women's jealousy. It is not women that are spoken of here; it is minds—on the one hand the mind which exercises itself in the preliminary learning, on the other, the mind which strives to win the palm of virtue and ceases not till it is won. (*Congr.* 179–80 [Colson and Whitaker])

Philo's return to this exegetical problem shows that his question does not merely concern the proper semantic range of κακόω, which can at times mean "chastisement."[38] Understood literally, the text makes it seem as if Sarah wrongs Hagar, but as has already been pointed out, this cannot be so. In response, Philo denies the literal meaning in favor an allegorical meaning. The text does not concern women. It concerns minds. Philo identifies a problem. Then he works toward a solution as he has done so time and again.

It is also worth pointing out that Philo mixes up his allegory. Above, the object of Sarah's chastisement is a generic stubborn man who refuses to move away from encyclical education. Here, Hagar returns. No longer does Sarah rebuke some generic man. She rebukes Hagar. Further, Sarah and Hagar no longer play the roles they did above. Previously taken to be virtue and encyclical education, here Sarah and Hagar become minds in pursuit of these two disciplines. As it did above, this inconsistency is

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[37] The LXX often uses κάκοω to describe the Egyptians' harsh treatment of the Jews during their enslavement (Gen 15:13, Exod 1:11, 5:23, Num 20:15, Deut 26:6, Josh 24:5). Moses uses it to characterize his harsh treatment at the hands of Yahweh in his complaints for being the appointed leader of the Exodus (Exod 5:22, Num 11:11). The book of Joshua uses it to construe God's act of retribution against Israel's idolatry (Josh 24:10).

[38] Philo actually spends a significant amount of time showing that κακόω can mean "chastise" (*Congr*. 159–179). Commenting on Deut 8:2, Philo asks, "Who then is so impious as to suppose that God is an afflicter, or evil-entreater, and that he sends famine, death in its most miserable form, on those who cannot live without food." Barring whether Philo's reasoning is correct, the word actually does seem to mean "chastise" in this particular text. It stands parallel to ἐκπειράζω, which typically means "test" or "chastise," and it is followed with a purpose statement that fits well with that meaning. The point to note though is not Philo's lexical work. It is his motive for starting the work in the first place.

what makes Philo's allegorical exegesis feel arbitrary. These connections are made without warrant, and they differ from the ones Philo has already made. Overall, in *De congressu eruditionis gratia*, therefore, Philo exhibits the main attributes of his allegorical hermeneutic found more widely in his corpus. He problem solves. He appeals to the etymology of names; and he weaves a thread of arbitrariness throughout his exposition. The only attribute missing is an appeal to numbers, and this absence is most likely due to the absence of numbers in the text. To apply "allegorical" exegesis to Genesis 16, then, is to do these three things to these stories.

Philo and the Literal Sense

Before I end this chapter, it is important for me to deal with a common objection to my characterization of Philo. Usually, in response to the attributes I have placed at the center of Philo's hermeneutic, scholars will often point out the fact that, at times, Philo seems to hold the literal sense in high regard. Because it focuses on the problem-solving tendency and the arbitrary feel of Philo's hermeneutic, characterizations like mine can insinuate that Philo's allegories have little to no concern for the literal sense of the text. This cannot be, so it is argued, because Philo does clearly care for the literal sense. Tedder's comments are indicative: "Sandmel perceives that the universalizing of the biblical accounts so that they concern the contemporary experience of all humans amounts to the dissolving of history in Scripture. This seems like an overstatement, since Philo recognizes that the literal level in Scripture describes real historical accounts of Israel's past."[39] In this quote, Tedder is addressing a description of Philo's hermeneutic by Samuel Sandmel that mirrors my own. Sandmel claims that Philo's hermeneutic essentially dissolves the history of the text, what I call the literal sense of the text. Tedder's response is measured, but he ultimately disagrees. Philo

[39] Tedder, *Children of Laughter and the Re-Creation of Humanity*, 142. For Sandmel's discussion, see Samuel Sandmel, *Philo of Alexandria: An Introduction* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), 24–25.

cannot be accused of dissolving the literal sense because there are moments where he clearly affirms the literal historical events of Israel's past.[40] Although a true observation, the problem with this response as it pertains to this discussion is that it misses the point. It may be true that Philo as a historical person cared about the literal sense, but the question concerns his *allegorical* hermeneutic. The proper questions is, "*when Philo allegorizes*, does he care about the literal sense?" The answer to this question is decidedly "no."

Philo's Esteem of the Literal Sense

As these scholars point out, Philo does, at times, attend to the literal sense quite carefully, and there are multiple times where he explicitly says one should esteem both the allegorical sense and the literal sense. For example, when discussing Genesis 2 where Adam is tasked with naming all the animals, Philo says that both the literal sense and the figurative sense deserve our admiration: "Both the figurative [ἡ τροπική] sense and the literal [ἡ ῥητή] sense are explanations worthy of admiration. The literal sense [is admirable] in so far as the lawgiver ascribes the placing of names to the first man. For those who study philosophy among the Greeks said that the first men to name things were wise men" (*Leg.* 2.14–15). Philo states his admiration plainly in this discussion. He preserves the literal sense because it paints Adam as the first one to name things. Apparently, the Greeks argued that men who gave names to various things were some of

[40] See the following for other examples of this argument: David Dawson, *Allegorical Readers and Cultural Revision in Ancient Alexandria* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), 100–103; Siegert, "Philo of Alexandria," 177; Borgen, *Philo of Alexandria*, 11; Jeremy Punt, "Revealing Rereading Part 1: Pauline Allegory in Galatians 4:21–5:1," *Neotestamentica* 40, no. 1 (2006): 88–89; Stefan Nordgaard Svendsen, *Allegory Transformed: The Appropriation of Philonic Hermeneutics in the Letter to the Hebrews* (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2009), 38–39; Rogers, "The Philonic and the Pauline," 59.

the original wise men, a label Philo is all too happy to ascribe to Adam.[41] Thus, Philo allows the literal sense to stand as it is.[42]

The most concentrated collection of these sorts of literal expositions occurs when Philo is talking about stipulations of Mosaic law—the ten commandments, circumcision, etc. Philo still wants to mine the deeper meaning of these laws, but he also wants to preserve the literal requirements found in them. Circumcision, for example, symbolizes the "excision of pleasure and every passion," but in Philo's view, this symbolic meaning does not nullify the flesh and blood requirement (*Migr.* 92). Generally, Philo thinks the laws should be thought of as resembling the body and their inner meanings (τοῖς δι' ὑπονοιῶν δηλουμένοις) the soul.[43] It follows, according to Philo, that one should attend to the literal sense as the abode of the inner sense as he attends to the body as the abode of the soul (*Migr.* 93).[44] These examples and others like them prove the point that Philo did indeed esteem the literal sense as many scholars have pointed out.

Reframing the Question

The problem, however, is that this objection misunderstands the question. When discussing allegory, the question is not "what does Philo do hermeneutically?" full stop. It is "what does Philo do *when he allegorizes*?" It is perfectly permissible and

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[41] It is worth noting that this example further corroborates the observation that Philo's relationship with the literal sense is contingent on whether the literal sense contains problems. Philo is only content with this account of Adam because it makes the first man look good. He becomes an example of a man that the Greeks would hold in high regard. Philo likes this characterization, so he keeps it. Thus, it subtly demonstrates Philo's problem-solving tendency from a different angle.

[42] Even here, though, Philo still goes on to allegorize the passage. Adam again becomes the mind, and his naming of the animals symbolizes the mind's encounter with abstractions like passions and vices, an interpretation that has very little to do with the literal sense he has just affirmed (*Leg.* 2.16–17).

[43] The phrase τοῖς δι'ὑπονοιων δηλουμένοις does not actually occur in the sentence in which Philo makes the comparison, but it is clearly the antecedent of the demonstrative pronoun ἐκεῖνα, which does occur in the sentence. The Greek reads as follows: ἀλλὰ χρὴ ταῦτα μὲν σώματι ἐοικέναι νομίζειν, ψυχῇ δὲ ἐκεῖνα (*Migr.* 93).

[44] Daniel Boyarin, *A Radical Jew: Paul and the Politics of Identity* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), 21.

perhaps even likely for there to be some cognitive dissonance in Philo's thinking.[45] Martin Luther very famously criticized allegory and yet did it himself.[46] Finite authors commit this error all the time. Despite his occasional preservation of the literal sense, Philo's *allegories* are routinely marked by arbitrariness and problem-solving. They either do not relate to the literal sense at all, or they find problems in it.

Allegorical vs. Literal

This nuanced take on Philo can be demonstrated in his handling of Sarah. As I showed above, Philo finds problems with the literal sense at multiple points in the narrative. He claims Moses paradoxically presents Sarah as both barren and fertile. However, in *Quaestiones et solutiones in Genesin*, Philo offers a straightforward reading of Sarah's barrenness:

> Why did not Sarah the wife of Abraham bear him children? As a barren woman is the mother of the race spoken of; first of all, in order that the seed of offspring may appear more wonderful and miraculous. Second, in the conceiving and bearing might not so much through union with a man as through the providence of God. For when a barren woman gives birth, it is not by way of generation but the work of the divine power. This is the literal meaning. (*QG* 3.18 [Marcus, LCL])[47]

This reading of Genesis 16:1 runs much more in step with the narrative. The intent of the text to highlight the miraculous nature of Isaac's birth and, with it, the power of God does seem to be the point of Sarah's barrenness. Philo affirms this point. His allegory, on the other hand, does not. It denies that the text is speaking about any sort of physical barrenness in an attempt to avoid a perceived paradox. Therefore, does Philo, the first-

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[45] Kamesar makes a similar point. In his view, Philo stands at the end of a long tradition that unwittingly practiced interpretive methods developed by the Greeks that were at odds with its convictions about the Pentateuch. Kamesar, "Biblical Interpretation in Philo," 77. Cf. Goppelt, *Typos*, 43.

[46] See Robert L. Plummer, "Contra Origen: Martin Luther on Allegorizing the Biblical Text," in *Always Reforming: Reflections on Martin Luther and Biblical Studies*, ed. Channing L. Crisler and Robert L. Plummer (Bellingham, WA: Lexham Press, 2021), 25–32.

[47] Unfortunately, the text does not provide much insight into the Greek words Philo uses to flag his literal exposition. The Greek version of *Questiones et solutiones in Genesin* is largely lost to the modern world. Ralph Marcus's translation in the LCL volume that I use here is largely based on the Armenian version. See Philo, *Questions on Genesis*, trans. Ralph Marcus, LCL 380 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1953), vii.

century interpreter, esteem the literal sense? Sometimes, yes. Do his allegories? No, almost never, and it is this last question that is important for determining what is and what is not "allegory."[48]

Conclusion

Despite Philo's occasional care for the literal sense, his *allegorical* hermeneutic often leads him to exegetical conclusions that are not warranted by the literal sense of the text. As I argued above, his allegories consist of the following four attributes: (1) the solving of problems, (2) the use of etymologies, (3) the use of numbers, and (4) seemingly arbitrary conclusions. Each of these attributes happens very frequently in Philo's exegesis, and they serve as his warrant. Thus, they were what made Philo's exegesis what it was. Attribute (1) concerns Philo's tendency to see the text as a collection of enigmas that must be solved. These problems vary widely, but they usually have something to do with text's antagonistic relationship with one of Philo's Platonic commitments. Philo's favorite solutions to these problems involve names and numbers, i.e., attributes (3) and (4). If there is a name in the text, Philo will inevitably appeal to its etymology—sometimes because the text calls for it (Abraham), sometimes for no apparent reason (Aaron). He uses numbers similarly. Attribute (4) describes the relationship between Philo's exegetical conclusions and the text more so than it does the means he uses to connect the two. Philo's conclusions, despite often being buttressed by multiple arguments, feel arbitrary. It is these attributes that made allegory what it was in the first century because it is these attributes that made Philo's what it was. Therefore, the question "was Paul allegorizing in Galatians 4:21–31?" means "does Paul's exegesis exhibit these four attributes?

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[48] It is worth noting that even in his two treatises *Quaestiones et solutiones in Genesin* and *Quaestiones et solutiones in Exodum* where Philo this same dynamic happens multiple times, Philo seems to affirm the literal sense only to find problems with the text if taken literally. See *QG* 1.8, 25, 45, 92, 95; 2.74; 4.9, 60, 122, 141, 166, 172, 175, 196, 206; *QE* 2.42.

CHAPTER 5

PAUL'S HERMENEUTIC IN GALATIANS 4:21–31

Having described what made Philo's hermeneutic what it was, this chapter will describe what made Paul's what it was in Galatians 4:21–31. Before this can be done, however, another question must be answered—how does Paul's take on Sarah and Hagar fit into Galatians itself? At least as far back as Luther, scholars have been unsure as to how, or even if, Paul's exposition of Sarah and Hagar fits into his argument.[1] If Paul is primarily concerned with the means by which the curse of the law is lifted, what do the Sarah-Hagar narratives and Isaiah 54 have to say about this issue?[2] Obviously, without answering this question, Paul's hermeneutic cannot be understood. One must understand *what* Paul thinks Genesis and Isaiah say before he can understand *why* it is he thinks they

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[1] E.g., Martin Luther, *A Commentary on St. Paul's Epistle to the Galatians* (London: James Clarke, 1953), 417; Ernest DeWitt Burton, *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Epistle to the Galatians*, ICC (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1921), 251; Heinrich Schlier, *Der Brief an die Galater* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1962), 216; Hans Dieter Betz, *Galatians*, Hermeneia (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1989), 239–40; Don B. Garlington, *An Exposition of Galatians: A Reading from the New Perspective*, 3rd ed. (Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 2007), 193; Mika Hietanen, *Paul's Argumentation in Galatians: A Pragma-Dialectical Analysis*, Library of New Testament Studies (London: T&T Clark, 2007), 20.

[2] Even those sympathetic to Paul do not think his exegesis ties very closely to the texts he interprets. See Burton, *Commentary on Galatians*, 253; C. K. Barrett, "The Allegory of Abraham, Sarah, and Hagar in the Argument of Galatians," in *Rechtfertigung: Festschrift Für Ernst Käsemann z 70 Geburtstag*, ed. Johannes Friedrich, Wolfgang Pöhlmann, and Peter Stuhlmacher (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1976), 10; Andrew T. Lincoln, *Paradise Now and Not Yet: Studies in the Role of the Heavenly Dimension in Paul's Thought with Special Reference to His Eschatology* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 13; F. F. Bruce, *The Epistle to the Galatians: A Commentary on the Greek Text*, NIGTC (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1982), 219; Betz, *Galatians*, 244; Richard B. Hays, *Echoes of Scripture in the Letters of Paul* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1989), 112; J. L. Martyn, *Galatians: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary*, AB 33A (New York: Doubleday, 1997), 436; F. S. Malan, "The Strategy of Two Opposing Covenants: Galatians 4:21–5:1," *Neotestamentica* 26, no. 2 (1992): 439; Stephen E. Fowl, "Who Can Read Abraham's Story? Allegory and Interpretive Power in Galatians," *JSNT* 17, no. 55 (1995): 78, 90; Jeremy Punt, "Revealing Rereading Part 1: Pauline Allegory in Galatians 4:21–5:1," *Neotestamentica* 40, no. 1 (2006): 95; Jonathan Lunde, "An Introduction to Central Questions in the New Testament Use of the Old Testament," in *Three Views on the New Testament Use of the Old Testament*, ed. Kenneth Berding and Jonathan Lunde (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2008), 29; Martinus C. de Boer, *Galatians*, NTL (Louisville: John Knox Press, 2011), 287–88.

say what they do. Thus, this chapter can be broadly broken into two pieces—Paul's reading and Paul's warrant. The arguments advanced in these two pieces attempt to address the following questions: First, what question is Paul answering in Galatians 4? Second, what is his answer to this question? Third and finally, how does he think that Genesis and Isaiah provide this answer; that is, what is his warrant for this answer?

Overview of Paul's Argument

So, how does Paul answer these questions? Although it is clear that Paul is concerned about *how* one is redeemed from the curse of the law throughout Galatians, he is also concerned about *who* the people of God are. Who are the true sons of Abraham and true heirs of the promises made from Genesis 12 onward? Is it the circumcised sons of Abraham as his opponents claim? Paul clearly does not think so. Whereas Paul's opponents think circumcision necessary to become Abraham's heir, Paul thinks that the patriarch's true sons are those who have received the Spirit by faith as a result of being chosen by God.[3] Circumcision, therefore, although required by the old covenant, was never what made one a son of Abraham like Isaac, a son of promise.[4] Paul thinks Genesis and Isaiah support this view in their own ways. Genesis 16–21 juxtaposes Abraham's two sons—Isaac and Ishmael—in such a way as to make clear that it was God's prerogative who his true heirs were. In Genesis, Ishmael is everything that Isaac is save one thing—he is not the chosen son.[5] He is circumcised. He is a son of Abraham. He is even promised to be the father of twelve princes, but he is still not the heir of the promise. Again, therefore, circumcision does not make one a member of Israel, that is, the nation

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[3] Betz, *Galatians*, 28–29; Daniel Boyarin, "Was Paul an 'Anti-Semite'? A Reading of Galatians 3–4," *Union Seminary Quarterly Review* 47, nos. 1–2 (1993): 54; Hietanen, *Paul's Argumentation in Galatians*, 154; David A. deSilva, *The Letter to the Galatians*, NICNT (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2018), 391.

[4] Douglas J. Moo, *Galatians*, BECNT (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2013), 293.

[5] Samuel J. Tedder, *Children of Laughter and the Re-Creation of Humanity: The Theological Vision and Logic of Paul's Letter to the Galatians* (Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 2020), 84.

of Abraham's heirs. If it did, then Ishmael should be considered a part of Israel. Isaiah complements the Genesis narratives. Harking back to Sarah's barrenness and the promises made to her in Genesis 17:16, Isaiah envisions a day where the Jews would inherit the nations, which Paul takes to refer to the Gentile inclusion in the people of God.[6]

To summarize, consider these brief answers to the questions posed above: What question does Galatians 4 answer? Who the people of God are. What is his answer? Those whom God chooses. How do Genesis and Isaiah buttress this answer? By juxtaposing Isaac and Ishmael and predicting the Gentile inclusion. Ultimately, therefore, Paul offers a warranted reading that is sensitive to the narrative flow of Genesis 16–21 and attempts to do justice to the blurring of the line between Jew and Gentile in Isaiah 54:1.[7]

I will take each of these questions in turn in the following pages. First, I will attempt to show that throughout Galatians, Paul is concerned with more than a law-free gospel. He is also concerned with who Abraham's true sons are and what connects these sons to him. Second, I will explain how Galatians 4:21–31 answers these questions, first by providing a broad answer and then by explaining the enigmatic pieces of that pericope. Third and finally, I will look to both Genesis 16–21 and Isaiah 54:1 to explain where I think Paul is finding the warrant for his readings of these texts.

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[6] Tedder, *Children of Laughter and the Re-Creation of Humanity*, 30.

[7] Each of the following sources thinks the text fits Paul's reading in one way or another: Charles H. Cosgrove, *The Cross and the Spirit: A Study in the Argument and Theology of Galatians* (Mercer, GA: Mercer University Press, 1988), 223; Jeffrey S. Siker, *Disinheriting the Jews: Abraham in Early Christian Controversy* (Louisville: John Knox Press, 1991), 45; A. B. Caneday, "Covenant Lineage Allegorically Prefigured: 'Which Things Are Written Allegorically' (Galatians 4:21–31)," *SBJT* 14, no. 3 (2010): 51; Thomas R. Schreiner, *Galatians*, ZECNT (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2010), 299; Matthew Y. Emerson, "Arbitrary Allegory, Typical Typology, or Intertextual Interpretation? Paul's Use of the Pentateuch in Galatians 4:21–31," *Biblical Theology Bulletin* 43, no. 1 (2013): 15; Moo, *Galatians*, 292–93; Francis Watson, *Paul and the Hermeneutics of Faith*, 2nd ed. (London: T&T Clark, 2016), 189–90; Tedder, *Children of Laughter and the Re-Creation of Humanity*, 31.

The Question Galatians 4:21–31 Asks

What question Paul is answering in Galatians 4:21–31 has split scholars into two extremes. Luther thought that the pericope merely illustrated a point Paul had already made and was superfluous to Paul's overarching purpose.[8] Many today echo his original view.[9] Recently, however, scholars have strongly objected to this trend. Since C. K. Barrett's landmark article "The Allegory of Abraham, Sarah, and Hagar in the Argument of Galatians," scholars have elevated the allegory to the apex of Paul's argument.[10] Samuel J. Tedder has gone so far as to argue that Paul's allegory provides a vantage point by which one can make sense of the rest of Galatians.[11] Quite the opposite of Luther.[12]

Galatians 4: Climax or Illustration?

Although they have their merits, both positions are simply too extreme. Paul's allegory is neither superfluous to his argument nor the climax of it. The pericope only

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[8] Luther, *Commentary on Galatians*, 417.

[9] These relatively modern commentators all have their own nuances, but they still see Paul's allegory as a mere illustration of some sort: Burton, *Commentary on Galatians*, 251; Schlier, *Der Brief an die Galater*, 216; Albrecht Oepke, *Der Brief des Paulus an die Galater*, ed. Joachim Rohde, 4th ed. (Berlin: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt, 1973), 147; Betz, *Galatians*, 239–40; James D. G. Dunn, *The Epistle to the Galatians*, BNTC (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 1993), 243; Richard N. Longenecker, "Graphic Illustrations of a Believer's New Life in Christ: Galatians 4:21–31," *Review and Expositor* 91, no. 2 (1994): 183; Garlington, *An Exposition of Galatians*, 193; N. T. Wright, *Paul and the Faithfulness of God* (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2013), 1133.

[10] Barrett, "The Allegory of Abraham, Sarah, and Hagar," 4. See also Boyarin, "Was Paul an 'Anti-Semite'?," 62; Karen H. Jobes, "Jerusalem, Our Mother: Metalepsis and Intertextuality in Galatians 4:21–31," *Westminster Theological Journal* 55, no. 2 (1993): 299; Matthew S. Harmon, *She Must and Shall Go Free: Paul's Isaianic Gospel in Galatians* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2010), 198.

[11] Tedder, *Children of Laughter and the Re-Creation of Humanity*, 27.

[12] For a survey of the change in modern scholarship, see Peder Borgen, "Some Hebrew and Pagan Features in Philo's and Paul's Interpretation of Hagar and Ishmael," in *The New Testament and Hellenistic Judaism*, ed. Giverson Soren and Peder Borgen (Aarhus, Denmark: Aarhus University Press, 1995), 151; Albert L. A. Hogeterp, "Hagar and Paul's Covenant Thought," in *Abraham, the Nations, and the Hagarites: Jewish, Christian, and Islamic Perspectives on Kinship with Abraham*, ed. Martin Goodman, Geurt Hendrik van Kooten, and J. van Ruiten (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 345; Emerson, "Arbitrary Allegory, Typical Typology, or Intertextual Interpretation?," 15; Jason Zurawski, "Mosaic Torah as Encyclical Paideia: Reading Paul's Allegory of Hagar and Sarah in Light of Philo of Alexandria's," in *Pedagogy in Ancient Judaism and Early Christianity*, ed. Karina Martin Hogan, Matthew Goff, and Emma Wasserman, Early Judaism and Its Literature 41 (Atlanta: SBL Press, 2017), 292; Douglas Robert Wallaker, "Promise and Freedom, Flesh and Slavery: Paul's Hermeneutical Key in Galatians 4:21–5:1 in Light of the Themes and Structure of Galatians" (PhD diss., The Southern Baptist Theological Seminary, 2017), 5–22.

becomes superfluous if Galatians is merely defending a law-free gospel, but as I will show below, Galatians is also concerned with defending a law-free people. Thus, Paul's allegory does visibly advance his case against accepting circumcision. Neither, however, is the pericope the climatic argument of the letter. The allegory lacks important themes that are present in the rest of the letter—faith, justification, and Jesus himself to name a few. If Galatians 4:21–31 were the climax, one would expect these themes to receive at least some attention from Paul, but they do not. Seeing Galatians 4 as the climax of Paul's argument seems to stem from a misunderstanding of how the arguments in the letter work. Paul's case is not completely linear, running from premises A, B, C, and D to conclusion E.[13] Rather, Paul makes a number of logically separate arguments that all aim at the same point—stopping the Galatians from accepting circumcision.[14]

Paul's logic in Galatians. Consider his autobiographical material in the opening portions of the letter. Paul is keen on showing that he did not receive his gospel from any man. He received it on the Damascus Road, straight from the Lord himself (Gal 1:11–12). Obviously, the rhetorical force of these verses is to keep the Galatians from turning away from his law-free gospel. Paul did not preach what he preached because he wanted to please men. He did so because God himself told him to. Why then would the Galatians reject his message? Paul seeks to establish himself in order to establish his gospel in order to prevent the Galatians from circumcising themselves.[15] The opening verses of chapter 3 share this same aim, but their argument is completely different. There, he lists a litany of gifts related to the Spirit that they received by faith. If the Galatians

[13] E.g., Fowl, "Who Can Read Abraham's Story?," 79; Harmon, *She Must and Shall Go Free*, 198.

[14] Betz, *Galatians*, 30–32; Dunn, *The Epistle to the Galatians*, 151; Hietanen, *Paul's Argumentation in Galatians*, 159; Moo, *Galatians*, 293; A. Andrew Das, *Galatians*, Concordia Commentary (St. Louis, MO: Concordia, 2014), 122; deSilva, *The Letter to the Galatians*, 391.

[15] Betz, *Galatians*, 56; Richard N. Longenecker, *Galatians*, WBC, vol. 41 (Dallas: Word Books, 1990), 197; Dunn, *The Epistle to the Galatians*, 52–54; de Boer, *Galatians*, 76; deSilva, *The Letter to the Galatians*, 138.

received the Spirit and his signs and wonders by faith, why then were they returning to the law (Gal 3:5)? Here, Paul appeals to the gift of the Spirit in order to establish faith as the exclusive mechanism by which these gifts were received in order to prevent the Galatians from circumcising themselves.[16] Same aim. Different, logically disconnected arguments, and so it is throughout Galatians.

Galatians 4:21–31 as argument but not climax. The pericope immediately preceding Paul's allegory exemplifies this same phenomenon. Galatians 4:11–20 operates as a pathos laden appeal.[17] The Galatians knew Paul, and they knew he was not a pleaser of men. Why then would they now take him to be caving to cultural pressures (Gal 4:11–20)? From its opening lines, Galatians 4:21–31 is noticeably different.[18] Paul's demeaner changes, and his argument is grounded in Scripture, not in his previous bond with the Galatian people. Like the two pericopes from the early portions of the letter, these two have the same goal, but they do not share a logical connection. For this reason, claims like Tedder's need to be nuanced. Paul's allegory does indeed advance his case, but it does not serve as the climax of the entire letter.[19]

Grace vs. Law? Or Jew vs. Gentile?

Part of the reason these extremes formed was because the question Paul was thought to have answered was unnecessarily narrowed. The "Old Perspective" thought of

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[16] Betz, *Galatians*, 30; Longenecker, *Galatians*, 106–7; Dunn, *The Epistle to the Galatians*, 151; de Boer, *Galatians*, 168–69; Das, *Galatians*, 289.

[17] Malan, "The Strategy of Two Opposing Covenants," 427; Dunn, *The Epistle to the Galatians*, 231; Harmon, *She Must and Shall Go Free*, 196; de Boer, *Galatians*, 278; Das, *Galatians*, 450–51.

[18] Tedder claims that Paul's labor pains in Gal 4:19 foreshadow the barren woman in Gal 4:27. Tedder, *Children of Laughter and the Re-Creation of Humanity*, 208. In my view, this connection is a coincidence. The metaphors function differently, and as I argue above, the tones of the two pericopes are completely different. Das and Harmon say something similar to Tedder; see Das, *Galatians*, 492; Harmon, *She Must and Shall Go Free*, 197. The following acknowledge the break: deSilva, *The Letter to the Galatians*, 391; Otto Merk, "Der Beginn der Paränese im Galaterbrief," *Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft und die Kunde der älteren Kirche* 60, nos. 1–2 (1969): 92.

[19] Moo, *Galatians*, 292–93.

Galatians as a treatise on grace versus law. Paul thought one was justified by faith and grace alone. His opponents thought one was justified by law. The whole of Galatians, so it was argued, was working toward defending a grace-based gospel over against a law-based gospel.[20] Although it must be noted that this characterization of the Old Perspective is more of a caricature than an accurate description, there is some truth in it, and it is not hard to see why this view would struggle to fit Galatians 4:21–31 into its scheme.[21] Justification is noticeably absent from Paul's discussion of Sarah, Hagar, and their sons.

The "New Perspective" traded in this scheme for an entirely new one. Rejecting the more vertical construal of the Old Perspective, these scholars saw Galatians as having a more horizontal aim.[22] Paul was not trying to solve how one escaped the condemnation of the law. He was trying to work out how the Jews were to relate to the Gentiles.[23] "Works of the law" were reduced down to boundary markers (like circumcision), and the verb δικαιόω was taken to refer to being included into the people of God, not being declared righteous by God.[24] It is not hard to see how scholars within

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[20] Luther, *Commentary on Galatians*, 417. For more modern versions of the Old Perspective and updated criticisms of the New, see C. E. B. Cranfield, *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans: Commentary on Romans 9–16 and Essays*, 6th ed., vol. 2 (London: T&T Clark, 2004), 853; Thomas R. Schreiner, *The Law and Its Fulfillment: A Pauline Theology of Law* (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1993), 11; A. Andrew Das, *Paul, the Law, and the Covenant* (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 2001), 7–8; Mark A. Seifrid, "Blind Alleys in the Controversy over the Paul of History," *Tyndale Bulletin* 45, no. 1 (1994): 73–74.

[21] Stephen Chester convincingly argues that this characterization of the Old Perspective by the New was not accurate and that the Old Perspective actually did make room for Jew/Gentile relations. Stephen J. Chester, *Reading Paul with the Reformers: Reconciling Old and New Perspectives* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2017).

[22] For more robust summaries of this change in Pauline scholarship, see Stephen Westerholm, *Perspectives Old and New on Paul: The "Lutheran" Paul and His Critics* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2004), 101–94; Magnus Zetterholm, *Approaches to Paul: A Student's Guide to Recent Scholarship* (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2009), 118; John M. G. Barclay, *Paul and the Gift* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2015), 97–165; N. T. Wright, *Paul and His Recent Interpreters: Some Contemporary Debates* (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2015), 64–87; Tedder, *Children of Laughter and the Re-Creation of Humanity*, 5–12.

[23] Krister Stendahl, "Paul among Jews and Gentiles," in *Paul among Jews and Gentiles, and Other Essays* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1976), 2–3; E. P. Sanders, *Paul, the Law, and the Jewish People* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1983), 159.

[24] E.g., Dunn, *The Epistle to the Galatians*, 134–35; Dunn, *The New Perspective on Paul*, rev. ed. (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2008), 107–9.

this school of thought would take Galatians 4:21–31 as the climax of the letter.[25] The pericope fixates on the relationship between Jews and Gentiles.

A Little Old and a Little New

The answer to where Galatians 4:21–31 fits into the letter lies somewhere in the middle of these opposing positions. At this point, proponents of both of these views have admitted the stronger points of the opposing side and left behind their own more extreme views.[26] Nevertheless, the vertical-horizontal framework left behind by the dispute serves as a helpful grid to see how Paul's allegory fits into his overarching argument.

The "how" question. In favor of a more vertical reading of Galatians, Paul clearly does care about how the curse of the law is lifted and how one is reconciled to God. In the heart of the letter, for example, Paul begins to argue that Abraham serves as the archetype and thus father of those who would be justified by faith:

> Therefore, it is those who are of faith that are blessed with the faithful Abraham. *For* as many as are of works of the law are under a curse, for it is written, "cursed is

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[25] There are, of course, other perspectives that do not fit into this simple scheme. N. T. Wright, for example, bridges the vertical/horizontal gap. His construal of Paul is vertical in the sense that it depicts a divine rescue mission. Paul's gospel is about God saving his people. On the other hand, it is horizontal in the sense that it is focuses on making a people, a family, comprising Jews and Gentiles. The Radical New Perspective on Paul (Nanos, Zetterholm, Eisenbaum, Thiessen) and the Apocalyptic Paul (Martyn, Barclay) also do not fit neatly into this scheme. What is clear, though, is that each of the Pauline views heavily involves horizontal or vertical lines. Thus, the simple divide between the Old and New Perspectives helps elucidates the core issues concerning Galatians. See the following for an example of Wright's thinking: N. T. Wright, *The Climax of the Covenant: Christ and the Law in Pauline Theology* (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1991), 142. See the following for examples of the Radical New Perspective: Zetterholm, *Approaches to Paul*, 127–63; Matthew Thiessen, *Paul and the Gentile Problem* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), 11; Pamela Eisenbaum, *Paul Was Not a Christian: The Original Message of a Misunderstood Apostle* (New York: HarperOne, 2010), 132–49; Mark D. Nanos and Magnus Zetterholm, *Paul within Judaism: Restoring the First-Century Context to the Apostle* (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2015), 1–11. See the following for examples of Apocalyptic readings: J. L. Martyn, "Apocalyptic Antinomies in Paul's Letter to the Galatians," *New Testament Studies* 31, no. 3 (1985): 411–14; Barclay, *Paul and the Gift*, 412–13.

[26] Barry Matlock makes a compelling case that Dunn's reading of Paul actually maintains a suspiciously Lutheran shape. See R. Barry Matlock, "Sins of the Flesh and Suspicious Minds: Dunn's New Theology of Paul," *JSNT* 21, no. 72 (1998): 92–86. Cf. Westerholm, *Perspectives Old and New on Paul*, 184–89. Even Dunn admitted many of the Old Perspective distinctives. See James D. G. Dunn, "What's Right about the Old Perspective on Paul," in *Studies in the Pauline Epistles: Essays in Honor of Douglas J. Moo*, ed. Matthew S. Harmon and Jay E. Smith (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2014).

> everyone who does not abide by all that is written in the book of the law to do them." Because it is evident that *no one is justified by law before God* since the righteous will live by faith. (Gal 3:9–11; emphasis added)

Space does not permit me argue this case, but this text does commend the insights that have been long held since the Reformation.[27] The typical meaning of δικαιόω, the concept of a curse being lifted, and that one is justified "before God" (παρὰ τῷ θεῷ) combine to commend the Old Perspective's vertical concerns (cf. Gal 2:16–17).[28] It is also clear, however, that Paul is not exclusively concerned with these issues. Intermingled within them are concerns about who the people of God are.

The "who" question. Consider the opening portion of the letter. In chapter 2, Paul recounts that Peter was acting like a hypocrite by eating with the Gentiles when James and his followers came to visit (Gal 2:12). Paul rebukes Peter for this hypocrisy, asking him "if you, even though you are a Jew, live in a Gentile manner and not in a Jewish one, how will you compel the Gentiles to live like Jews?" (Gal 2:14). Paul further argues that he is a Jew by nature and not a Gentile sinner, and yet he also is not justified by works of the law but through faith in Christ Jesus because no flesh—Jew or Gentile—will be justified by works of the law (Gal 2:15–16).[29] Embedded in the logic of these

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[27] E.g., John Calvin, *Commentaries on the Epistle of Paul to the Galatians and Ephesians*, trans. William Pringle, 500th anni. ed. (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2009), 88–90.

[28] Merk, "Der Beginn der Paränese im Galaterbrief," 85; Longenecker, *Galatians*, 85–86; Schreiner, *Galatians*, 207; Moo, *Galatians*, 205–6; Das, *Galatians*, 310–17.

[29] Although not the focal point of my argument, the debate over the objective or subjective genitive construal of the phrase πίστις Χριστοῦ requires comment. Those in favor of the subjective view typically point to the redundancy of Paul's statement in texts like Gal 3:22, which include both the genitive noun πίστεως and some form of the verb πιστεύω. Reading πίστεως as a subjective genitive removes this redundancy, allowing both statements to contribute to Paul's claims. Against this argument, John Barclay has pointed out that authors often make redundant claims, Paul included. No author is perfectly economical in their writing, which means redundancy probably means very little. This weakness becomes even more acute when one realizes that the statements are not, in fact, redundant even when the noun is read as an objective genitive. The genitive phrase πίστις Χριστοῦ focuses on the *means*, and the verb in all its forms tends to focus on *who* has achieved that means. This nuance is not as drastic as would be the case in the subjective view, but it is there, erasing complete redundancy. Overall, then, the objective genitive is probably to be preferred. For a fuller description of the positions and arguments, see Richard B. Hays, *The Faith of Jesus Christ: The Narrative Substructure of Galatians 3:1–4:11*, 2nd ed. (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2002), 249–97; de Boer, *Galatians*, 192. For a more extensive defense of the objective genitive view, see Barclay, *Paul and the Gift*, 380–82.

statements is the equaling of Jew and Gentile in light of Christ's coming.[30] There is no distinction between these two groups because no man is justified by works of the law. Peter's hypocrisy and Paul's rebuke suggest that Paul was concerned with how the Gentiles were to integrate with the Jews as the New Perspective emphasizes.

This social issue comes into sharper focus when Paul begins to discuss Abraham. After citing Genesis 15:6 in Galatians 3:6 ("Abraham believed God, and he counted it to him as righteousness"), Paul says something very interesting. Rather than launching into all flesh being justified by faith alone just like Abraham (cf. Rom 4:2–5), he says, "therefore, know that it is those of faith that are *sons of Abraham*" (Gal 3:7). Paul does go onto more vertical issues, but here, he seems concerned with something different. He is asking the question "who are the people of God?"[31] What makes them what they are? Paul's answer is faith. Just like faith is the means by which the curse of the law is lifted, so also is faith the mechanism by which one is included in the people of God.[32]

Paul makes similar statements as he moves toward his allegory. "All of you *are sons of God* through faith in Jesus Christ" (Gal 3:26; emphasis added). "There is neither Jew nor Greek, slave nor free, male nor female, for all of you are one in Christ Jesus. And if you are in Christ, then you are *the seed of Abraham*, *heirs* according to promise" (Gal 3:28–29; emphasis added). "Therefore, you are no longer a slave but a son, and if a son, then also an heir through God" (Gal 4:7; emphasis added). As can be seen, this horizontal motif runs throughout the whole letter. Apparently, Paul thought of the believing Gentiles as Jews, sons of Abraham and heirs of the promises made to him. As

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[30] Betz, *Galatians*, 112; Dunn, *The Epistle to the Galatians*, 140; Schreiner, *Galatians*, 155; Das, *Galatians*, 240; Bradley Trick, *Abrahamic Descent, Testamentary Adoption, and the Law in Galatians: Differentiating Abraham's Sons, Seed, and Children of Promise* (Leiden: Brill, 2016), 25.

[31] Hietanen, *Paul's Argumentation in Galatians*, 157.

[32] Longenecker, *Galatians*, 124; Schreiner, *Galatians*, 193; de Boer, *Galatians*, 185; Moo, *Galatians*, 293; Das, *Galatians*, 306–7; deSilva, *The Letter to the Galatians*, 280.

much as he was concerned with the question of how one was made right with God, he was also concerned with who God's people were. Presumably, his opponents argued that at least in part to be a son of Abraham one must be circumcised (cf. Gal 5:2–3). Circumcision for them was the boundary marker between those who were in and those who were out. This horizontal issue is not Paul's only concern. It is, however, one of them, and it is this concern that Galatians 4:21–31 addresses.[33] Who are the people of God, and what makes them what they are?[34]

The Answer Galatians 4:21–31 Gives

Despite appearances, Paul's answer in Galatians 4:21–31 is quite simple. If circumcision was what made one a son of Abraham, then Ishmael should be considered a part of Israel. Isaac is Isaac because God decided that it be so, not because he was a son of Abraham and certainly not because he was circumcised (Gal 4:22–23). Those who insist on placing circumcision in a privileged place correspond to Ishmael, who was a circumcised son of Abraham but was not ultimately his true heir (Gal 4:24–25).[35] The Gentile Galatians are the true heirs of Abraham, who have Sarah as their mother as Isaiah envisioned (Gal 4:26–28, 31).[36] Although he is answering a different question, Paul's

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[33] Francois Tolmie argues that Paul's focus is different from that of Gal 3:6–14. Gal 3 attempts to prove from Scripture that those who believe are children of Abraham, whereas chapter 4 attempts to prove from Scripture that Abraham has two children. The problem with this view is that it misses the point of bringing up Abraham's two sons. That Abraham had two sons, in Paul's view, proves that it is those who believe, or rather are born of Spirit, that are the true children of Abraham, the same point he makes in Gal 3. D. Francois Tolmie, *Persuading the Galatians: A Text-Centered Rhetorical Analysis of a Pauline Letter* (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2005), 166.

[34] Betz, *Galatians*, 142n29; Longenecker, *Galatians*, xcvii; Dunn, *The Epistle to the Galatians*, 9; Longenecker, "Graphic Illustrations of a Believer's New Life in Christ," 196–97; Fowl, "Who Can Read Abraham's Story?," 82–83; Harmon, *She Must and Shall Go Free*, 199; deSilva, *The Letter to the Galatians*, 391.

[35] Jeremy Punt, "Revealing Rereading Part 2: Paul and the Wives of the Father of Faith in Galatians 4:21–5:1," *Neotestamentica* 40, no. 1 (2006): 103–4; Tedder, *Children of Laughter and the Re-Creation of Humanity*, 87.

[36] Trick offers an interesting alternative reading where the covenants of the pericope correspond to Hellenistic adoption "testaments" like Paul discusses in Gal 3:15. According to Trick, this view somehow alleviates the problems posed by the traditional views which take the two women to correspond to the Mosaic and Abrahamic (or sometimes new) covenants because it focuses on descent. Trick's discussion is long and detailed, and he clearly shares a similar concern to my own. However, there

logic in Galatians 4 mirrors Romans 9.[37] There, Paul addresses the issue of whether God's promises to Israel had failed given her unbelief (Rom 9:6). He appeals to the story of Abraham and his sons to show that those promises were always and only made to Abraham's true seed. Not all Israel are Israel (Rom 9:6). Here, Paul appeals to the same story to make a slightly different point. God's promises, not circumcision, are what make Israel what she is because not all of Abraham's circumcised sons were a part of Israel. Again, not all Israel are Israel.

The View of Paul's Opponents

Paul's opponents presumably held to a view like that found in Jubilees 16:17: "All the seed of [Abraham's other] sons should be Gentiles, and be reckoned with the Gentiles; but from the sons of Isaac one should become a holy seed, and should not be reckoned among the Gentiles."[38] Although Jubilees does not mention him by name, Ishmael most likely stands behind the comments concerning Abraham's other sons. The author's point seems to be that only from Isaac does Abraham's true seed descend. The Judaizers would have urged that the Galatians needed to circumcise themselves in order to become legitimate sons like Isaac.[39] It may even be that they appealed to Genesis 16–21 as the ground of their view, and it is not uncommon for scholars to say that these

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are two main issues that call his overarching thesis into doubt. First, taking the covenants of v. 24 as Hellenistic adoptions "testaments" seems unlikely given their associations with Sinai. Paul's example in Gal 3:15 operates as an illustrative aside and should not color how the term διαθήκη should be understood in Gal 3:24. Second, even if one grants this reading of διαθήκη, it is not clear how such a reading would be able to differentiate between the covenant represented by Hagar and the covenant represented by Sarah. Both would be "adoptive," and thus, both would allow for Gentile inclusion. Trick, *Abrahamic Descent, Testamentary Adoption, and the Law in Galatians*, 253–330.

[37] Michael Wolter, "Das Israel problem nach Gal 4,21–31 und Röm 9–11," *Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche* 107, no. 1 (2010): 11; Moo, *Galatians*, 293; Watson, *Paul and the Hermeneutics of Faith*, 189.

[38] This translation is taken from Hays, who helpfully brings out the Jew-Gentile dichotomy by rendering "nations" as "Gentiles." Hays, *Echoes of Scripture in the Letters of Paul*, 111.

[39] Barrett, "The Allegory of Abraham, Sarah, and Hagar," 9; Hays, *Echoes of Scripture in the Letters of Paul*, 111; Dunn, *The Epistle to the Galatians*, 16; Longenecker, "Graphic Illustrations of a Believer's New Life in Christ," 191; Das, *Galatians*, 483.

narratives actually support their reading, not Paul's.[40] Paul chose these narratives as his battle ground because it was where the war was already being waged, not because it naturally served his purposes. Paul takes his opponents textual evidence and turns it against them by exegetical fiat, or so the argument goes.[41] In my view, however, there is good reason to nuance this view. It may well be that Paul chose the texts he did because his opponents appealed to them to support their own view, but if Paul's argument is understood correctly, it does seem like the story of Sarah, Hagar, and their sons support Paul's point.[42] The following exposition will attempt to bear this claim out.

Galatians 4:21: Listen to the Law

As has been observed by many, Paul begins his so-called allegory with a play on words.[43] "Tell me, you who wish to be *under law* [νόμον], do you not hear *the law* [τὸν νόμον]" (Gal 4:21; emphasis added). The anarthrous νόμον most likely refers to the Mosaic law, and the articular νόμον to the entire Old Testament. Paul has explained and critiqued the idea of being *under* law extensively in the middle of chapter 3, and his statement about this law coming 430 years after the promise made to Abraham in Galatians 3:17 makes it clear that being under the law means being under the Mosaic covenant (Gal 3:17–24). "Under law" probably means the same thing here.[44] Given the

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[40] E.g., Barrett, "The Allegory of Abraham, Sarah, and Hagar," 10; Betz, *Galatians*, 244; de Boer, *Galatians*, 287–88.

[41] Barrett, "The Allegory of Abraham, Sarah, and Hagar," 9–10; Hays, *Echoes of Scripture in the Letters of Paul*, 112; Hietanen, *Paul's Argumentation in Galatians*, 160; Dunn, *The New Perspective on Paul*, 243.

[42] Cosgrove, *The Cross and the Spirit*, 223; Siker, *Disinheriting the Jews*, 45; Caneday, "Covenant Lineage Allegorically Prefigured," 51; Schreiner, *Galatians*, 299; Emerson, "Arbitrary Allegory, Typical Typology, or Intertextual Interpretation?," 15; Moo, *Galatians*, 292–93; Watson, *Paul and the Hermeneutics of Faith*, 189–90; Tedder, *Children of Laughter and the Re-Creation of Humanity*, 31.

[43] Betz, *Galatians*, 241; Caneday, "Covenant Lineage Allegorically Prefigured," 55; de Boer, *Galatians*, 291; Moo, *Galatians*, 297.

[44] Betz, *Galatians*, 241; Malan, "The Strategy of Two Opposing Covenants," 429; Longenecker, *Galatians*, 207; Longenecker, "Graphic Illustrations of a Believer's New Life in Christ," 193.

fact that Paul appeals to both Genesis and Isaiah in the paragraph that follows, it seems likely that he is calling his opponents to hear the entire Old Testament when he calls them to hear the law in the second clause of this verse.[45] The point though is that despite having different referents, the double use of the noun νόμος blends the two meanings together to create a particular rhetorical effect—catching Paul's opponents in a contradiction. They, who wish to be under the law, do not actually understand what it says.[46] This rhetorical question also elucidates how Paul thinks his exposition relates to the text itself. If Paul did indeed mangle the Genesis account, he certainly did not think he was doing so. In his view, his opponents were reading the text incorrectly, and Paul is calling them to change their minds.[47]

Galatians 4:21–23: A Story of Two Sons

Paul follows this opening line up with what seems to be a fairly straightforward rehearsal of the narratives about Sarah, Hagar, Abraham, and their sons. "For it is written that Abraham had two sons—one from a slave woman and one from a free woman. The son of the slave was born according to the flesh, but the son of the free woman was born through promise" (Gal 4:22–23). Some scholars believe that Paul is merely setting up the polarities that he will defend later in the pericope.[48] Sarah, Isaac, freedom, and promise on the one side; Hagar, Ishmael, slavery, and flesh on the other.

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[45] Betz, *Galatians*, 241; Longenecker, *Galatians*, 207; Malan, "The Strategy of Two Opposing Covenants," 429; Longenecker, "Graphic Illustrations of a Believer's New Life in Christ," 193.

[46] Longenecker, *Galatians*, 207; Malan, "The Strategy of Two Opposing Covenants," 429; Martyn, *Galatians*, 433; Hogeterp, "Hagar and Paul's Covenant Thought," 347; Schreiner, *Galatians*, 298; Moo, *Galatians*, 297; Das, *Galatians*, 491; deSilva, *The Letter to the Galatians*, 392.

[47] Some sympathetic to Paul's hermeneutic point to this opening line as a knock down argument against those who do not. Paul clearly thought his reading stemmed from the text itself. Although true, one must be careful with this argument. Philo also thought his reading came from the text much like Paul. The question, though, is whether it did come from the text. Caneday, "Covenant Lineage Allegorically Prefigured," 54; Debbie Hunn, "The Hagar-Sarah Allegory: Two Covenants, Two Destinies," *Biblica* 100, no. 1 (2019): 121. Cosgrove voices a similar caution: Charles H. Cosgrove, "The Law Has Given Sarah No Children (Gal 4:21–30)," *NovT* 29, no. 3 (1987): 220.

[48] E.g., Betz, *Galatians*, 241; de Boer, *Galatians*, 292; Hunn, "The Hagar-Sarah Allegory," 122.

There are good reasons, however, to think that Paul begins his argument in these early verses.

Abraham's story as argument, not summary. First, Paul begins his summary with the conjunction γάρ, which suggests that he thinks the story of Sarah and Hagar somehow exposes his opponent's inconsistency.[49] They, who want to be under the law, do not hear the law, *for* Abraham had two sons and so on. Second, Paul clearly construes the story in such a way as to bring the salient details to bear on the issue at hand. Most noticeably, he does not even mention Sarah and Hagar by name. He refers to them by describing them as slave and free, a designation Genesis never even explicitly gives to Sarah. Paul, therefore, is indicating how the story defends his point. He is not merely retelling it.[50] Third and most importantly, the details he brings up seem to refute the Judaizers position if they are rightly understood. Paul's statement "Abraham had two sons" functions in itself as a critique of his opponents' position. As stated above, if Paul's opponents thought that circumcision is what made one a part of Israel, then why exclude Ishmael who was also circumcised? Abraham had two circumcised sons, not just one.[51] Paul then focuses on what he thinks divides these two sons (Gal 4:23). One was born according to the flesh (κατὰ σάρκα), and the other was born through promise (δι'ἐπαγγελίας).[52]

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[49] DeSilva, *The Letter to the Galatians*, 392.

[50] Susan Eastman argues that Paul most likely omitted Sarah's name to emphasize God's promise, but it seems more likely that he wishes to emphasize her status as a free woman, a point I will explain further below. Susan Grove Eastman, *Recovering Paul's Mother Tongue: Language and Theology in Galatians* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2007), 144–46. Cf. Longenecker, *Galatians*, 207; Moo, *Galatians*, 298.

[51] David Starling, "Justifying Allegory: Scripture, Rhetoric, and Reason in Galatians 4:21–5:1," *Journal of Theological Interpretation* 9, no. 2 (2015): 234.

[52] De Boer overstates when he says, "The commandment of circumcision is thus valid for the line of Abrahamic descent established through Ishmael, not for the line of Abrahamic descent established through Isaac!" De Boer, *Galatians*, 298. Paul's point is not so much that circumcision is the right of Ishmael. It is that both Isaac and Ishmael are circumcised. Therefore, circumcision is not the marker of God's covenant people.

Flesh and promise. "Flesh" and "promise" are very thick concepts in Galatians, but Paul's use of them here most likely refers to the agencies by which Abraham's sons were born.[53] The phrase, "according to the flesh" refers to the normal mode of conception used to bring forth Ishmael.[54] Abraham slept with Hagar who was of childbearing age, and she conceived a son. "Through promise," on the other hand, refers Isaac's miraculous birth. Sarah was not of childbearing age, and yet, God opened her womb so that she might conceive and bear Abraham a son.[55] Understanding these prepositions in this way makes sense of the Genesis narratives, elucidates Paul's objection to his opponents' view, and fits with what Paul says elsewhere in Galatians.[56] How Genesis commends this reading I will deal with below. For now, consider the following contextual clues in other portions of Galatians.

Only a few verses prior to Galatians 4:21–31, Paul describes the Galatians' turn from their idolatry:

> Therefore, you are no longer a slave but a son, and if a son, then also an heir *through God*. Formerly, when you did not know God, you were enslaved to those which by nature were not gods, but now, you know God—*or rather you are known by God*—how are you turning back again to the weak and poor powers of the world to which you want to be enslaved once more? (Gal 4:7–9; emphasis added)

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[53] Martyn's claim that Paul used γεννάω instead of τίκτω to communicate that he was talking about churches not individuals is an overreach. Paul, of course, does connect these modes of birth to the Galatian believers, but only after his expositions of Genesis and Isaiah. The perfect tense of the verb could be explained by the focus on the modes of birth. Paul's point is not that the two sons were born, but that they were born by a particular means. The stative aspect of the perfect tense suits this purpose well. Martyn, *Galatians*, 434–35.

[54] Schreiner's suggestion that Adam may be in view here is possible but unlikely. Taking the preposition as a reference to normal birth seems sufficient to account for the dichotomy between flesh and promise/Spirit. Schreiner, *Galatians*, 299. Cf. Longenecker, *Galatians*, 208; Malan, "The Strategy of Two Opposing Covenants," 431; Dunn, *The Epistle to the Galatians*, 246–47; de Boer, *Galatians*, 292–93; Moo, *Galatians*, 299; Das, *Galatians*, 493; deSilva, *The Letter to the Galatians*, 394.

[55] Longenecker, *Galatians*, 208; Malan, "The Strategy of Two Opposing Covenants," 431; Boyarin, "Was Paul an 'Anti-Semite'?," 62; Hietanen, *Paul's Argumentation in Galatians*, 155; Wolter, "Das Israel problem nach Gal 4,21–31 und Röm 9–11," 10–11; Caneday, "Covenant Lineage Allegorically Prefigured," 63; Moo, *Galatians*, 299; Das, *Galatians*, 293; deSilva, *The Letter to the Galatians*, 394.

[56] Betz, *Galatians*, 242–43; Watson, *Paul and the Hermeneutics of Faith*, 189.

In these verses, Paul describes the Galatians' conversion, and he goes out of his way to spotlight God's agency. He does so first by saying that they had become heirs "through God" [διὰ θεοῦ], thereby highlighting God as the instrument of their conversion. He does so second by an interjection in the middle of verse 9. At first saying "now you know God," Paul immediately nuances himself, saying "rather you are known by God" (Gal 4:9).[57] Both of these details show that Paul was at pains to emphasize God's agency in making the Galatians sons of Abraham.[58] He will not let even a phrase go by without making sure they know that it was God that turned them from their former way of life. These careful caveats poise Paul's readers to understand the prepositional phrase "through promise" as a reference to God's agency in conversion. Isaac was born by a miracle of God, that is, by divine agency. Thus, divine agency—not circumcision—is what made Isaac what he was.[59]

To summarize, verses 22–23 do not merely operate as an opener for Paul's argument. On their own, they advance two points: Verse 22 critiques Paul's opposition, and verse 23 establishes his own view. Abraham having two sons calls into question circumcision as a boundary marker for the people of God because it was something both Isaac and Ishmael shared.[60] That Isaac was born miraculously establishes that it was God's agency that operates as the boundary marker because it is something that Ishmael and Isaac did not share. Thus, Israel does not comprise circumcised sons of Abraham. She was made by God's agency, and the Galatians are added to her ranks by the same means. As Paul explicitly says in Galatians 4:28, "But you brothers are sons of promise like Isaac." If promise does indeed carry the idea of divine agency as I have argued

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[57] Schreiner, *Galatians*, 278.

[58] Martyn, *Galatians*, 412–13; Moo, *Galatians*, 276.

[59] Moo, *Galatians*, 299.

[60] Dunn, *The Epistle to the Galatians*, 245–47.

above, then this statement is Paul's way of saying the Galatians are a part of Israel by divine agency just like Isaac.[61]

Galatians 4:24–25: Paul's "Allegory"

The following section (vv. 24–25) is where Paul's exposition is most often labeled "allegorical."[62] In these verses, Paul moves from summarizing the narratives to explaining their significance. In his view, the Jews who wish to remain under the Mosaic law correspond to Ishmael because, like Ishmael, they are sons but not heirs of the promise made to Abraham. To explain how and why he makes these claims, I will frame my discussion around the following questions: (1) What is Paul claiming when he says ἅτινά ἐστιν ἀλληγορούμενα? (2) What exactly does he mean when he connects Hagar to things like the Mosaic covenant, Mount Sinai, or the present Jerusalem? (3) How does Hagar's slavery, a point he mentions repeatedly, factor into his claims? (4) Is Paul appealing to the etymology of Hagar's name in verse 25? Answering each of these questions will provide insight into Paul's hermeneutic.

The function of ἀλληγορέω. Although I have already dealt with the verb ἀλληγορέω at length, one question remains—if the term does not communicate a mode of reading, why use it at all? To put it another way, if Paul is offering a fairly straightforward reading of both Genesis 16–21 and Isaiah 54:1, as I think he is, why would he go out of his way to say that "these things speak metaphorically?" In my view, the clause has two rhetorical purposes. First, it does something similar to what Paul's wordplay does in verse 21. If Paul's opponents were in fact reading Genesis like Jubilees, then Paul's use of ἀλληγορέω intends to call them out for reading too woodenly. Yes,

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[61] For similar descriptions of Paul's argument, see Dunn, *The Epistle to the Galatians*, 256; Timothy George, *Galatians*, NAC, vol. 30 (Nashville: B&H Academic, 1994), 345–46; Schreiner, *Galatians*, 305; de Boer, *Galatians*, 305–6; Moo, *Galatians*, 308; Das, *Galatians*, 507.

[62] E.g., Betz, *Galatians*, 243; Dunn, *The Epistle to the Galatians*, 244; Schreiner, *Galatians*, 300; de Boer, *Galatians*, 294; deSilva, *The Letter to the Galatians*, 394.

Israel came from Isaac; Isaac was circumcised, and the Jews of the first century were his genetic progeny. However, claiming that these details commend circumcision misses the significance of the story. "These things speak metaphorically." Heraclitus, the first-century CE author of *Allegoriae Homericae*, used the word similarly. Defending Homer against what he thinks to be an improper reading, he says the following: "There is one antidote for this impiety: We must show that the story speaks metaphorically [ἠλληγορημένον τὸν μῦθον], for the origin of all things and the oldest substance is actually prophesied in these utterances" (*All.* 22.1). Here, Heraclitus calls his interlocuter to a proper reading, and Paul seems to be doing the same.[63] The second purpose of the clause is to simply claim that story of Sarah and Hagar points beyond itself. Sarah is not merely the mother of Isaac, nor is Hagar merely the mother of Ishmael. Paul thinks that these women point beyond themselves to the two groups involved in the Galatians conflict, and the phrase ἅτινά ἐστιν ἀλληγορούμενα calls attention to this fact.[64]

Hagar's connection to Sinai and Jerusalem. The second question of verses 24–25 concerns what Sarah and Hagar actually symbolize. What does Paul mean when he says things like "these [women] are two covenants?" Interestingly, Paul mentions Sarah hardly at all after he says that the women are two covenants.[65] Hagar dominates verses 24 and 25, and the way Paul connects her to Sinai and Jerusalem is often what scholars point

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[63] Although I do not agree that allegory as a hermeneutic is reducible to this function, Fowl makes a similar point to mine, arguing that Paul was trying to correct a conventional reading. Fowl, "Who Can Read Abraham's Story?," 80. See also David Dawson, *Allegorical Readers and Cultural Revision in Ancient Alexandria* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), 8.

[64] Martyn, *Galatians*, 436; Caneday, "Covenant Lineage Allegorically Prefigured," 55.

[65] Although multiple commentators spend time on explaining Sarah's absence and what covenant she corresponds to (e.g., Moo, *Galatians*, 301), a fixation on Hagar actually makes sense given Paul's rhetorical aims. The first part of the pericope, as I argued above, is intended primarily to undermine circumcision as the covenantal sign. Hagar achieves this aim by being the mother of Ishmael, the circumcised son who was not an heir and the analog of Paul's opponent. Thus, Sarah's absence matches what Paul is trying to do, which is why he brings her up in the second part of the pericope when he wants to emphasize the Galatians inclusion in the people of God.

to as evidence of allegory. Paul makes three primary claims about Hagar, and they can be paraphrased as follows:

1. Hagar is the Mosaic covenant (v. 24).[66]
2. Hagar is Mount Sinai (v. 25a).
3. Hagar corresponds to the present Jerusalem (v. 25b).

I will deal with claim 2 at length below. Claims 1 and 3 parallel each other and essentially mean the same thing—Hagar corresponds to Judaism, the religious system tied to Mosaic law. Claim 3 most clearly makes this point and thus serves as evidence that claim 1 is saying something similar. In verse 25b, Paul says "[she] corresponds to the present Jerusalem." Although he leaves the subject unspecified, Paul most likely has Hagar in mind since she serves as the focus of this part of pericope. The verb συστοιχέω is more semantically narrow than the verb εἰμί used in the previous two clauses, and although rare, it seems to mean that two things conceptually correspond; that is, they share certain key characteristics.[67] Thus, verse 25 most likely should be understood as "she *conceptually* corresponds to the present Jerusalem." The verb εἰσιν in verse 24 should likewise be taken to mean "corresponds to" since the more semantically specific term συστοιχεώ should inform how one reads the more ambiguous term εἰμί.[68] The idea in both of these verbs is that Hagar shares some conceptual similarities with the Mosaic covenants and the present Jerusalem.

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[66] Paul's logic is very tight in this verse, so the paraphrase above is inferred from v. 24. See Betz, *Galatians*, 244; Dunn, *The Epistle to the Galatians*, 250; de Boer, *Galatians*, 287.

[67] As Moo points out, the lack of evidence makes it difficult to provide compelling examples from primary sources. However, such a meaning could easily be inferred from its original military use, and it fits the context in which Paul's uses it. See Moo, *Galatians*, 303. Cf. Martyn, "Apocalyptic Antinomies in Paul's Letter to the Galatians," 419–20; Betz, *Galatians*, 245; Dunn, *The Epistle to the Galatians*, 252; BDAG, 979. Das cautions against such a translation since "corresponds to" may lead one to think that an item in one column (e.g., Hagar) aligns with an item in another (e.g., Sarah). Das, *Galatians*, 497. However, this miscommunication is highly unlikely. A reader most naturally connects the two objects that are explicitly discussed in the sentence. Thus, in v. 25, it would be unlikely for a reader to align Hagar and Sarah when Paul mentions only Hagar and the present Jerusalem.

[68] Schreiner, *Galatians*, 300; Moo, *Galatians*, 300.

What then do the Mosaic covenant and the present Jerusalem represent? J. L. Martyn has challenged the common view that takes "the present Jerusalem" as a metonym for Judaism, arguing that the label refers to the Jerusalem church and their rival mission to the Galatians.[69] Martyn rests his claim on two primary arguments: First, when Paul uses the term "Jerusalem" elsewhere in his corpus, he always refers to the Jerusalem church (e.g., Rom 15:19, 25, 26, 31; 1 Cor 16:3, Gal 1:17, 18; 2:1). Thus, in Martyn's view, the Galatians would hear the term as Paul normally used it—as a reference to the church in Jerusalem.[70] Second, Martyn thinks that Paul's silence in the early portions of Galatians 2 concerning how the leaders of the Jerusalem church related to the false brothers serves as a subtle critique, lumping James and company in with those who wish to rob Paul of his freedom.[71] This tension between Paul and Jerusalem, therefore, should inform how one reads "the present Jerusalem." Paul is not warning the Jews against taking up Jewish customs as a means to justifying themselves or marking themselves off as the people of God. He is warning them about the alternative mission of the Jerusalem church led by James.

Martyn's desire to avoid anti-Semitism is understandable, but his view is highly unlikely.[72] For starters, Martyn's pool of evidence for Paul's use of "Jerusalem" is too small to establish any sort of pattern that the Galatians would naturally hear. Paul only uses the Greek words for "Jerusalem" eight times in his corpus, and half of those uses are clustered at the very end of Romans. Only three of them are found in correspondence with the Galatians outside of Galatians 4. How would the Galatians

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[69] J. L. Martyn, *Theological Issues in the Letters of Paul* (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1997), 26. See also de Boer, *Galatians*, 287; de Boer, "Paul's Quotation of Isaiah 54:1 in Galatians 4:27," *New Testament Studies* 50, no. 3 (2007): 381.

[70] Martyn, *Theological Issues in the Letters of Paul*, 27–28.

[71] Martyn, *Theological Issues in the Letters of Paul*, 29. See also Betz, *Galatians*, 108.

[72] Boyarin makes a compelling case that even the classic view, or those close to it, cannot be accused of being anti-Semitic. See Boyarin, "Was Paul an 'Anti-Semite'?," 61.

naturally hear "Jerusalem church" when they had only heard Paul use the term "Jerusalem" on very few occasions if at all? The evidence in Paul's corpus hardly establishes the pattern needed to make Martyn's argument work.[73] Furthermore, the tension Martyn places between Paul and James is exaggerated at best. To be sure, Paul clearly does not care to esteem James and his companions (Gal 2:6), but neither is he their enemy. He describes his gospel to them to make sure it fits with theirs (Gal 2:2), and they ultimately offer him the right hand of fellowship (Gal 2:9). Again, hardly the dispute Martyn makes it out to be.[74]

Most importantly, Martyn's view cannot make sense of the logic of the text. Why would Paul insist that the Galatians were not a part of the Jerusalem church as Martyn's view would require? They lived hundreds of miles away from the Jew's holy city, making Paul's point painfully obvious. It could be that he was warning them away from the ideology of that church, the view that Martyn seems to espouse. Jerusalem, in this scenario, somehow makes herself present to the Galatians through her teaching.[75] One cannot help but wonder, however, how this view ends up any different than the standard view. If Paul's problem is not with the Jerusalem church per se but with the ideology of that church, does that not mean Paul is taking issue with Judaism? In the end, Martyn's attempt to explain Paul's point lands him right where he does not wish to be. Although in Martyn's view "the present Jerusalem" first runs through the church at

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[73] As Longenecker points out, it is also interesting that Paul switches to the Hebraic form Ἱερουσαλήμ in his allegory from the more profane designation used by Gentiles Ἱεροσόλυμα that he uses in the autobiographical section of his letter (i.e., Gal 1:17–18; 2:1). It may be that the religious connotations of the Hebraic form better suited his theological point in Gal 4. Either way, the switch makes Martyn's view that much less likely because Paul does not use the same word in both places. See Longenecker, *Galatians*, 33–34.

[74] Longenecker, *Galatians*, xc.

[75] Martyn, *Theological Issues in the Letters of Paul*, 34.

Jerusalem, it ultimately points to Judaism just like the standard view.[76] Therefore, despite Martyn's objections, saying that "Hagar corresponds to the present Jerusalem" is equivalent to saying, "Hagar corresponds to Judaism" and the people that adhere to it, as many have recognized.[77] Such a view fits with the rhetorical aim of the text (i.e., Paul is warning the Galatians away from circumcision in particular and the Mosaic covenant in general), and it explains how the present Jerusalem stands in contrast with the Jerusalem above, a designation that undoubtedly functions as a metonym for a spiritual reality, not a real city.

The parallelism between verses 25b and 24 serves as a strong argument for taking Paul's claim about Hagar being the Mosaic covenant in a similar manner. Both statements share the same structure: "Hagar is [x]" where [x] is something that naturally refers to Judaism. They also both share similar warrants, being grounded by Paul in the concept of slavery. In verse 25 after saying that Hagar corresponds to the present Jerusalem, Paul says, "*for* she serves as a slave [δουλεύει] with her children" (Gal 4:25c). Somehow Hagar's slavery is the ground for pairing her with the present Jerusalem. Verse 24b says something similar: "One is from Mount Sinai because she gives birth [γεννῶσα] to slavery [εἰς δουλείαν]." If the participle γεννῶσα functions causally, the logic is the same as verse 25.[78] Hagar's slavery serves as the reason for connecting her to the covenant from Mount Sinai. Thus, when Paul says that Hagar is the Mosaic covenant (Gal 4:25), he probably means the same thing as when he says that she corresponds to the present Jerusalem—Hagar represents Judaism.

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[76] For a more extensive critique of Martyn's view, see Brendan Byrne, "Jerusalem's above and Below: A Critique of J. L. Martyn's Interpretation of the Hagar-Sarah Allegory in Gal 4:21–5:1," *New Testament Studies* 60, no. 2 (2014): 215–31; Das, *Galatians*, 488–89; Barclay, *Paul and the Gift*, 417n64.

[77] Betz, *Galatians*, 246; Dunn, *The Epistle to the Galatians*, 252; Moo, *Galatians*, 304; deSilva, *The Letter to the Galatians*, 399.

[78] Even if the participle is more logically generic, the flow between the individual clauses of vv. 24 and 25b–c remains very similar.

It is clear, though, that each verse has its own distinct nuance. The two statements "the suits are greedy" and "the businessmen are greedy" mean almost the same thing, but the former is slightly more pejorative because of the use of "suits" as a metonym for the businessmen. So also it is with these two statements. Although materially meaning the same thing, each claim carries a slightly different rhetorical nuance. Verse 24 seems to focus on the religious system of the Jews. Verse 25b on the Jews themselves. Paul's claim that Hagar corresponds to the Mosaic covenant reaches backwards to his previous discourse, reminding his readers that his ultimate concern is that they do not return to the outdated covenant. That covenant, like the birth of Ishmael through Hagar, was a covenant marked by human effort, containing slaves and sons. Thus, it was never the mechanism by which the Jews were made heirs of Abraham's promise (cf. Gal 3:19–29).[79] Paul's claim that Hagar corresponds to the present Jerusalem applies his critique to the present, reaching forward to the images in Isaiah 54:1 quoted in verse 27.[80] As the heavenly Jerusalem/Sarah is the mother of the true people of God, Hagar/the present Jerusalem is the mother of Paul's opponents and those who wish to follow them. In short, "Hagar is the present Jerusalem" means that Hagar represents *the people* that adhere to Judaism, and "Hagar is the Mosaic covenant" means Hagar represents *the Judaism* to which the Galatians wish to adhere.

Paul's supposed historical foible. At this juncture, many scholars think Paul committed an obvious historical foible. "She [Hagar] corresponds to the present Jerusalem" is taken to mean "Israel comes from Hagar" (Gal 4:25b). Since the story of Genesis says the opposite (i.e., Israel comes from Isaac, not Ishmael), Paul seems to be

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[79] DeSilva, *The Letter to the Galatians*, 293; Dunn, *The Epistle to the Galatians*, 396.

[80] Moo is most likely correct when he says that Paul's choice of metonym was influenced by the figure of speech already present in Isa 54:1. See Moo, *Galatians*, 304.

foisting his own reading upon the text.[81] Such a view, however, both misses the claim Paul is making and overlooks the underlying premises that make Paul's argument work.

Paul is not claiming that Israel historically came from Ishmael as if he thought the twelve patriarchs were actually the great grandsons of Hagar. Paul would have known full well that Israel came from Isaac, and it is hard to see how Paul himself would have thought it was convincing to say otherwise. More importantly, though, for Paul's argument to work, he actually has to agree that Israel came from Isaac. This fact becomes evident if both his and his opponents' arguments are framed as syllogisms. His opponents' argument can be framed as follows:

1. Israel came from Isaac.
2. Isaac was a circumcised son of Abraham.
3. Therefore, the circumcised sons of Abraham must be Israel.

Paul's argument can be similarly framed as follows:

1. *Israel came from Isaac*.
2. *Ishmael was not a part of Israel*.
3. Isaac was a circumcised son of Abraham *and* a child of promise (Gal 4:23b).
4. Ishmael was also a circumcised son of Abraham (Gal 4:23a).
5. Therefore,
    a. the children of promise must be Israel (Gal 4:28, 31),
    b. and the circumcised sons of Abraham that are not a part of Israel correspond to Ishmael (Gal 4:25b).

Framed in this way, it becomes clear that Paul's argument contains two unstated premises: (1) Israel came from Isaac, and (2) Ishmael was not a part of Israel. Premise 1 affirms what many scholars think Paul denies. Paul's point is not that Hagar is

[81] For such a reading, see Barrett, "The Allegory of Abraham, Sarah, and Hagar," 16; Betz, *Galatians*, 244; Lincoln, *Paradise Now and Not Yet*, 13; Bruce, *The Epistle to the Galatians*, 219; Andrew C. Perriman, "The Rhetorical Strategy of Galatians 4:21–5:1," *Evangelical Quarterly* 65 (1993): 42; Martyn, *Galatians*, 436; Das, *Galatians*, 485–87; Hunn, "The Hagar-Sarah Allegory," 127.

the flesh and blood mother of the Jewish people. His logic requires that she and her son are excluded from Israel and that Israel does indeed come from Isaac, two points with which both he and his opponents agree.[82] His point is that Israel was never what the Judaizers thought she was. Neither circumcision nor Abrahamic sonship can be the means by which one is included in the people of God because it is something that both Isaac and Ishmael share. Thus, if circumcision were the marker of Israel, then Ishmael must be included among her ranks. Paul, therefore, was not making a historical foible. He knew his history well and was letting it reach its logical conclusion.

Slavery and status. The third major question of verses 24–25 concerns how slavery functions in this pericope.[83] As discussed above, Paul mentions slavery twice. In verse 24, he says, "One is from Mount Sinai, *giving birth to slavery*," and in verse 25, he says, "Hagar is the present Jerusalem, *for she serves as a slave with her children*." What do these two statements mean? In my view, Paul is not primarily appealing to the idea of spiritual slavery contained within the metaphor, although this connotation is clearly present. He is appealing to the lower status of being a slave over against a son. Thus, both of these statements connect Hagar to Judaism because she, like it, does not produce true sons. Both entities produce slaves, that is, sons of Abraham that remain outside his covenant promises.

Like "flesh" and "promise" slavery is a very thick metaphor in Galatians. Perhaps most frequently, it refers to living under the Mosaic law (Gal 2:4; 3:10, 13, 23–25). Less frequently, it refers to the Galatians enslavement to the pagan way of life (Gal

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[82] DeSilva seems to make a similar claim, but it is hard to tell if he thinks that Paul flips the historical sense. DeSilva, *The Letter to the Galatians*, 394. Cf. de Boer, "Paul's Quotation of Isaiah 54:1 in Galatians 4:27," 305.

[83] Hays thinks Paul's connection here is weak, claiming that it is founded on a mere phenomenological link. Hays, *Echoes of Scripture in the Letters of Paul*, 115. Although not as skeptical as Hays, other commentators' discussions seem to similarly struggle with how "slavery" might serve as a legitimate connection between Hagar and Sinai. E.g., Dunn, *The Epistle to the Galatians*, 252–53.

4:3). Both of these uses highlight enslavement in opposition to freedom. Paul also, however, uses slavery to highlight one's status in contradistinction from being a son.[84] Enslavement is present in these uses, but it is more muted.[85] One is either a slave or a son. Both statuses are similar except for the fact that a son alone receives an inheritance.

This point comes out most clearly in the opening verses of chapter 4: "I am saying that as long as he is a child, *an heir is no different than a slave*, even though he is lord of all. He is under guardians and managers until the time set by his father" (Gal 4:1–2). Here, Paul argues that a slave and a son are basically the same.[86] Even though the illustration is somewhat far removed from the modern western mind, Paul's point is still intuitive.[87] Like a slave, a son would operate as a subordinate within a family, doing the bidding of his father and of those his father has placed over him. The only thing that would distinguish him from a slave is his inheritance.[88] The issue, therefore, is not so much slavery versus freedom. It his status within the family. Is he an heir or not? If he is a son, he is. If he is a slave, he is not. Otherwise, both slave and son are the same. Paul applies this metaphor to the Galatians five verses later: "Therefore, you are no longer a slave but a son, and if a son, then also heirs through God" (Gal 4:7). Because of God's redemptive work in Christ, the Galatians were no longer slaves. They were sons because they were now heirs of the promise of Abraham.[89]

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[84] Fowl, "Who Can Read Abraham's Story?," 87; Harmon, *She Must and Shall Go Free*, 199.

[85] For an explanation of how metaphors tend to highlight and hide, see George Lakoff and Mark Turner, *More than Cool Reason: A Field Guide to Poetic Metaphor* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), 39.

[86] Boyarin, "Was Paul an 'Anti-Semite'?," 59.

[87] Das provides an extensive look into the legal practice that may stands behind Paul's analogy. Das, *Galatians*, 427–38. However, the following scholars are probably right when they say that the analogy merely depends on the general situation: Longenecker, "Graphic Illustrations of a Believer's New Life in Christ," 185; Tolmie, *Persuading the Galatians*, 146; deSilva, *The Letter to the Galatians*, 345.

[88] Schreiner, *Galatians*, 265–66; deSilva, *The Letter to the Galatians*, 345.

[89] Longenecker, "Graphic Illustrations of a Believer's New Life in Christ," 190; Das, *Galatians*, 405; deSilva, *The Letter to the Galatians*, 359.

Although there are whispers of enslavement in Paul's use of the metaphor in Galatians 4:21–31, the sense of status serves as the means by which Paul links Hagar and Judaism.[90] Paul's statements about Hagar being the Mosaic covenant and the present Jerusalem *because she is a slave* would then mean that she corresponds to Paul's opponents because her circumcised sons, although genetic sons of Abraham, were not his true sons. They are mere slaves.[91] There are number of reasons to understand the text this way: First, Paul features this sense of the metaphor in the immediate context (4:1–9), which means that it would most naturally be carried forward into his allegory. Second, Paul concludes the pericope in Galatians 4:21–31 in the same way as he does at the end of his illustration early on in Galatians 4. As quoted above, Galatians 4:7 emphasizes that the Galatians are no longer slaves. They are sons. Galatians 4:28 and 31 make the same basic point. This similarity strongly suggest that Paul is using the metaphor in Galatians 4:21–31 in the same way as he did in 4:1–7.

Third and most importantly, this view provides an immense amount of explanatory power to what is an otherwise very enigmatic statement. Forging a link between Hagar's sons and Paul's opponents through this sense of slavery makes sense. It fits the point he has been making throughout the pericope, the metaphor itself, and how the metaphor works in Genesis. Therefore, although clothed in nuanced images, Paul's overarching point in verses 24 and 25 makes explicit what was only implicit in verses 22–23—circumcision is of no value because Ishmael was a circumcised son of Abraham, and yet, he was not an heir.

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[90] Longenecker, "Graphic Illustrations of a Believer's New Life in Christ," 193; Fowl, "Who Can Read Abraham's Story?," 88; Harmon, *She Must and Shall Go Free*, 199; Tolmie, *Persuading the Galatians*, 168–69; Wolter, "Das Israel problem nach Gal 4,21-31 und Röm 9-11," 9.

[91] Hunn appropriately recognizes that slavery serves as the ground of these claims, but she does not flesh out how this might work, leaving her open to claims like that of Hays, who thinks that Paul's connection rests on a mere phenomenological correspondence between "law" and "slavery." See Hunn, "The Hagar-Sarah Allegory," 123; Hays, *Echoes of Scripture in the Letters of Paul*, 115.

It is in this sense that Hagar represents the covenant from Mount Sinai and the present Jerusalem. Both contain circumcised sons of Abraham, but many of these sons, like the wilderness generation, were not true heirs. They were slaves. The connection Paul makes between Hagar and these entities, therefore, is not as arbitrary as it may seem. Readings like Hays who argue that Paul if forging the link through the motifs of enslavement or freedom miss the richness of the metaphor.[92] Hagar and her children's identity as slaves does correspond to the lower status occupied by Paul's opponents who are sons of Abraham but not heirs.

Hagar's name. The fourth and final major question of verses 24–25 concerns Paul's statement at the beginning of verse 25: τὸ δὲ Ἁγὰρ Σινᾶ ὄρος ἐστὶν ἐν τῇ Ἀραβίᾳ (as it is commonly translated "Now, Hagar is Mount Sinai in Arabia"). Other than Paul's use of the verb ἀλληγορέω in verse 24 and his connections between Hagar, the Mosaic covenant, and Jerusalem, his statement here is what scholars most often point to as evidence that he was allegorizing because it looks like he is appealing to the etymology of Hagar's name.[93] These scholars read verse 25 as meaning, "The name 'Hagar' means Mount Sinai in Arabia." To assess this claim, the text must be considered on two levels—the textual level and the exegetical level. The textual history of δὲ Ἁγὰρ Σινᾶ is very difficult. There are five variants listed in the NA28:

1. δὲ Ἁγὰρ Σινᾶ
2. γὰρ Σινᾶ
3. δὲ Σινᾶ
4. γὰρ Ἁγὰρ Σινᾶ

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[92] Hays, *Echoes of Scripture in the Letters of Paul*, 115.

[93] E.g., Betz, *Galatians*, 244n65; Jost Eckert, "Gottes Bundesstiftsungen und der Neue Bund bei Paulus," in *Der ungekündigte Bund? Antworten des Neuen Testaments*, ed. Hubert Frankemölle (Freiburg: Herder, 1998), 149; Steven Di Mattei, "Paul's Allegory of the Two Covenants (Gal 4:21–31) in Light of First-Century Hellenistic Rhetoric and Jewish Hermeneutics," *New Testament Studies* 52, no. 1 (2006): 111–12; Frank J. Matera, *Galatians*, Sacra Pagina (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 2007), 170.

5. γὰρ Ἁγάρ

As can be seen, the variants differ over the conjunctions δέ and γάρ and whether to include Ἁγάρ or Σινᾶ.[94] Each of the variants maintains a deep history in the manuscript tradition. The conjunction δέ is probably to be preferred because it is older, and it would make sense for a scribe to make the logical connection between verses 24 and 25 more explicit. Internal evidence supports the variants that include Ἁγάρ since a scribe would have been inclined to remove the name to make the sentence fit with the neuter article τό at the beginning of the verse. However, P^{46}, a manuscript from the second century, excludes Ἁγάρ, meaning the name would have had to be omitted very early on. For the purposes of my argument, I will opt for the reading in the NA28 that includes Ἁγάρ. Although the textual evidence is inconclusive, the claims about etymology could never work if Hagar's name were not included.[95] Therefore, if Paul was not etymologizing with Hagar's name present in the text (a claim I intend to defend below), he certainly was not doing so with it absent as it is in variants 2 and 3.

The reason multiple scholars think Paul was appealing to Hagar's name is because of the neuter article τό at the beginning of the verse. Because one would expect the feminine article ἡ before Ἁγάρ, Paul must be referring to the name, not the person.[96] Di Mattei's statements are indicative:

> [The typology view] fails to take into account the article τό. Rather, it is the *name* 'Hagar' that must be understood as the subject of the phrase. It should additionally be emphasized that if this is Paul's justification for the allegory he has just proposed—Hagar is allegorically the covenant from Sinai because the name 'Hagar' designates Sinai—then the allegorical this-for-that is constructed on a wordplay and not on a historical personage as typology would demand.[97]

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[94] Hunn, "The Hagar-Sarah Allegory," 123.

[95] Betz admits this point, observing that Hagar's name may have been added to make sense of Paul's argument. Betz, *Galatians*, 245.

[96] E.g., Betz, 244n65; Eckert, "Gottes Bundesstiftungen und der Neue Bund bei Paulus," 149; Matera, *Galatians*, 170.

[97] Di Mattei, "Paul's Allegory of the Two Covenants," 111–12.

In other words, the neuter article τό means that Paul was appealing to the etymology of Hagar's name as the warrant for connecting her to Sinai, and this wordplay suggests that Paul was allegorizing like Philo, who also loved to use these etymologies.

Scholars provide two explanations of how this etymology would work. Some claim that Paul may be playing off the Arabic word *hadjar* which means "rock." The name "Hagar" would then evoke this rocky image, which would in turn evoke the image of a mountain.[98] Others claim that the Hebrew name Hagar sounds like the Aramaic word *hagra* (spelled חגרא) used in Targums Pseudo-Jonathan and Onquelos Genesis 16:7 to designate the "mountainous region wherein Hagar found herself in servitude with her children."[99] Although both of these arguments rightly probe the odd use of the neuter article, these etymological solutions raise far too many problems to be plausible.

First, the two dominant etymological links proposed above are highly unlikely. Concerning *hadjar*, for example, how likely is it that Paul, a Jew, would use an Arabic wordplay to reach a Gentile audience?[100] Also, even if the Galatians were able to catch the rock image, one cannot help but wonder whether they would be able to make the leap from "rock" to "Mount Sinai" without a significant amount of imagination. The *hadjar* link, therefore, seems quite unlikely. Connecting Hagar to Sinai through *hagra* does not fare much better. Despite some similarities, *Hagar* and *Hagra* simply do not sound the same. Even the "h" sound at the beginning, which arguably serves as the strongest phonetic link, is not the same. "Hagra" starts with a guttural ח, and "Hagar" starts with

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[98] E.g., Burton, *Commentary on Galatians*, 259; Oepke, *Der Brief des Paulus an die Galater*, 149–50; Betz, *Galatians*, 245.

[99] E.g., G. I. Davies, "Hagar, El-Heğra and the Location of Mount Sinai: With an Additional Note on Reqem," *VT* 22, no. 2 (1972): 152–63; Martin McNamara, "τὸ δὲ (Ἀγὰρ) Σινᾶ ορος εστιν εν τῇ Ἀραβίᾳ (Gal 4, 25a): Paul and Petra," *Milltown Studies* (1978): 36; Cosgrove, "The Law Has Given Sarah No Children," 228; Michael G. Steinhauser, "Gal 4:25a: Evidence of Targumic Tradition in Gal 4:21–31?," *Biblica* 70, no. 2 (1989): 234–40; Longenecker, *Galatians*, 211–12; Malan, "The Strategy of Two Opposing Covenants," 433; Di Mattei, "Paul's Allegory of the Two Covenants," 112; Matera, *Galatians*, 170; deSilva, *The Letter to the Galatians*, 397.

[100] Lincoln, *Paradise Now and Not Yet*, 15; Schreiner, *Galatians*, 302.

the smoother ה. Connecting the two, therefore, would be like connecting "fired" and "fried." Not very likely.[101] Furthermore, it is not at all clear what region *hagra* designates. Even if the Gentile Galatians were able to catch the very odd Semitic wordplay, it still would not readily evoke Sinai because *hagra* does not obviously refer to the Sinaitic region. Without a plausible link, the etymological understanding of verse 25 becomes less and less likely.

The second major problem surfaces when one looks at instances of obvious etymological exegesis. When Philo etymologizes, he explicitly points out that he is doing so. He mentions that a "name" (ὄνομα) means something, or he uses words that mean "to translate" like μεταλαμβάνω or ἑρμηνεύω to spell out what he is doing. Consider his own handling of Hagar's name: "Now, the prominent characteristics of elementary education are presented through two symbols—race and name [ὀνόματος]. Her race is Egyptian, and she is called [καλεῖται] 'Hagar.' This name, when it is interpreted [ἑρμηνευθέν], means 'sojourning' [παροίκησις]" (*Congr.* 20). That Philo is appealing to Hagar's name is obvious here. He mentions that her name symbolizes what she is. He says that she is called "Hagar," and he then finally points out that the name means "sojourning," an etymology that actually works since הגר readily connects to גור ("to sojourn").[102] Even with its use of the neuter article τό, Paul's exegesis looks nothing like Philo's here.[103]

The third problem concerns how the neuter article typically functions when used in constructions like the one found in Galatians 4:25. When authors combine τό and the conjunction δέ, they are typically pointing to something in the previous context—a

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[101] Longenecker, *Galatians*, 212.

[102] See the following for other examples of etymological exegesis in Philo's corpus: *Sobr*. 28–29; *Gig*. 64; *Mut.* 76; *Ebr.* 128, 143–44; *Post.* 32, 34, 35, 112, 125; *Cher.* 4–7; *QG* 2.77, 3.53; *QE* 28; *Her*. 128; *Migr.* 148; *Plant.* 134; *Det.* 28; *Leg.* 1.67; 3.218, 228; *Ios.* 28; *Conf.* 65; *Somn.* 2.33–35; *Abr.* 82, 201.

[103] For this reason, Betz's claim that the different "h" sounds would not "bother a man who is absorbed with 'allegory' and who would be guided by the most superficial similarities" does not work. Betz, *Galatians*, 245.

phrase or a word, not necessarily a name.[104] Paul uses this same device in Ephesians 4:9 right after he quotes Psalm 68:18: "Therefore, it says, 'when he ascended [ἀναβὰς], he led captives on high, and he gave gifts to men.' Now, in saying 'he ascended' [τὸ δὲ ἀνέβη], what does he mean except that he also descended into the lower regions of the earth?" (Eph 4:8–9) As can be seen, verse 8 begins with the same construction—τό and δέ. However, Paul uses it to mark the verb ἀναβάς from Psalm 68, and thus, he is quite obviously not making any sort of etymological claim. Even Philo uses this device in this way without etymologizing. In *De congressu eruditionis gratia* 155, Philo discusses the phrase "in your hands" from Genesis 16:6, introducing his discussion with τὸ δέ as follows: τὸ δὲ "ἐν ταῖς χερσί σου" δηλοῖ; that is, "the phrase 'in your hands' communicates." Just like in Ephesians, the use of τό does not frame up an etymological argument. It is merely a way of pointing to a particular clause in Genesis 16:6. Therefore, given the weakness of the proposed etymological links, the lack of similarity with other instances of etymological exegesis, and the broader use of τὸ δέ, Paul most likely is not appealing to Hagar's name to establish a link between her and Mount Sinai.

There are two primary alternatives to the etymological view. One takes both Ἁγάρ and Σινᾶ as the subjects of the clause. The other takes Ἁγάρ alone. These two options read as follows:

1. Now, Hagar-Sinai is a mountain in Arabia.
2. Now, Hagar is Mount Sinai in Arabia.

Option 2 would basically recapitulate what Paul has already said in verse 24. Hagar is Mount Sinai. The preposition "in Arabia" merely specifies further which mountain Paul

[104] James Hope Moulton and Nigel Turner, *A Grammar of New Testament Greek* (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1906), 182; Borgen, "Some Hebrew and Pagan Features," 157; Martyn, *Galatians*, 437n132; Matera, *Galatians*, 170; Das, *Galatians*, 497.

is talking about. Option 1 focuses more on the preposition, spotlighting where this Hagar-Sinai mountain is located.[105]

Although both are possible, option 1 seems more plausible for the following reasons: First, rendering the clause as "Hagar is Mount Sinai" basically repeats what the end of verse 24 already claims, making it difficult to tell why Paul would add the phrase at all.[106] Second, option 1 helps account for Paul's use of the neuter article. Paul may not be appealing to etymology, but his use of τό would still fit awkwardly into the clause if it merely went with Ἁγάρ. In option 1, however, τό would be Paul's way of referring to the bond he already made in verse 24 between Sinai and Hagar so that he can make a claim about this combined entity, a use of τό that is consistent with the other uses surveyed above.[107] Third, it helps to explain Paul's logic. If the conjunction δέ is taken in its adversative sense, then verse 25a would function almost like an aside on the way to verse 25b.[108] The logic would run as follows: (1) Hagar is Mount Sinai (vv. 24c and 24d). (2) Now, this Hagar-Sinai combination is a mountain is Arabia, but it corresponds to the present Jerusalem.[109] The second statement would be like Paul saying that even though Hagar-Sinai is a mountain outside the Promised Land, it actually corresponds to Jerusalem, the holy hill of Israel.[110] This clause would also operate as a slight to Paul's

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[105] Lincoln, *Paradise Now and Not Yet*, 15; Dunn, *The Epistle to the Galatians*, 251. Moo's point is similar. He just includes all three nouns (i.e., Hagar, Sinai, and mountain) together with the article. See Moo, *Galatians*, 302.

[106] Stephen Carlson actually excludes Ἁγάρ for this very reason. See Stephen C. Carlson, *The Text of Galatians and Its History*, Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen zum Neuen Testament 2. Reihe 385 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2015), 166. Cf. Dunn, *The Epistle to the Galatians*, 251; Moo, *Galatians*, 302.

[107] This view adjudicates between those who think the article merely goes with Ἁγάρ (e.g., Borgen, "Some Hebrew and Pagan Features," 157) and those who think it goes with ὄρος (e.g., Moo, *Galatians*, 302). It maintains the typical rhetorical function of τό and it allows for the Hagar-Sinai composite.

[108] Contra Betz, *Galatians*, 245.

[109] For explanation of what "Arabia" would have communicated to a Jew in the first century, see de Boer, *Galatians*, 95–96.

[110] John Bligh, *Galatians in Greek: A Structural Analysis of St. Paul's Epistle to the Galatians, with Notes on the Greek* (Detroit: University of Detroit Press, 1966), 182–83; Franz Mußner, *Der*

opponents, degrading their holy place and by extension the covenant it represents. The Mosaic covenant Hagar represents was not even given in the promised land.[111] Given these reasons, Σινᾶ should be paired with Ἁγάρ, and the clause itself should be understood as a geographical claim about where Hagar-Sinai is on the way to connecting her to Jerusalem.[112]

Summary of Galatians 4:24–25. Consider again the four questions posed above raised by Paul's statements in verses 24 and 25: (1) What is Paul claiming when he says ἅτινά ἐστιν ἀλληγορούμενα? He is claiming that, read rightly, Genesis 16–21 point beyond themselves to refute those who think circumcision marks off the people of God. (2) What exactly does he mean when he connects Hagar to things like the Mosaic covenant, Mount Sinai, or the present Jerusalem? He means that Hagar represents Judaism as a religious system and the people that adhere to it. (3) How does Hagar's slavery factor into his claims? Her slavery emphasizes her and Ishmael's lower status relative to Sarah and Isaac. She, like Judaism, gives birth to circumcised sons of Abraham that are not heirs of promise. She gives birth to slaves as do they. (4) Is Paul appealing to the etymology of Hagar's name in verse 25? No. He is making a geographical claim on his way to claiming that Hagar corresponds to the present Jerusalem. These details will help explain how Paul's exegesis aligns with the Genesis text itself.

Galaterbrief, 5th ed. (Freiburg: Herder, 1988), 322–24; Dunn, *The Epistle to the Galatians*, 251; Martyn, *Galatians*, 438n133; Moo, *Galatians*, 302; Das, *Galatians*, 497.

[111] Pierre Bonnard, "L'épitre de Saint Paul aux Galates," in *L'épitre de Saint Paul aux Galates. L'épitre de Saint Paul aux Éphésiens*, by In *L'épitre de Saint Paul aux Galates. L'épitre de Saint Paul aux Éphésiens*, by Pierre Bonnard and Charles Masson, Commentaire du Nouveau Testament 9 (Neuchatel, Switzerland: Delachaux & Niestlé, 1953), 97; Schlier, *Der Brief an die Galater*, 218–19; Longenecker, *Galatians*, 211; Ben Witherington III, *Grace in Galatia: A Commentary on St. Paul's Letter to the Galatians* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1998), 333.

[112] These rhetorical nuances help explain why Paul would include the statement and, thus, solve the obscurity Dunn observes. See Dunn, *The Epistle to the Galatians*, 251–52. See also Betz, *Galatians*, 245; Punt, "Revealing Rereading Part 1," 95.

Galatians 4:26–31: Jerusalem, the Mother of Jew and Gentile

Having finished with the Genesis narratives, Paul moves on to Isaiah 54:1 in verses 26–28. These verses read as follows: "But the Jerusalem above is free, who is the mother of us all. For it is written, 'Rejoice, O barren one who does not bear; break forth and cry aloud, you who are not in labor, because the children of the desolate one will be many more than the one who has a husband.' And you, brothers, are children of promise like Isaac" (Gal 4:26–28). The flow of Paul's thought makes clear that he understands Isaiah 54:1 as a vision of Gentile inclusion, a vision that complements what Genesis 16–21 has to say about circumcision. Presumably, Paul's opponents thought that the Gentile Galatians had to become Jews to become members of God's covenant people (cf. Gal 2:14).[113] Accepting circumcision was part and parcel of fulfilling that requirement. In Paul's view, however, Isaiah completes the implications of the Sarah-Hagar narratives by envisioning Gentiles entering Abraham's family.[114] The Galatians, therefore, need not accept circumcision because Sarah/the heavenly Jerusalem has already become their mother as Isaiah prophesied long ago.[115]

The identity of the heavenly Jerusalem. Understanding verse 26 is key to understanding how Isaiah functions within Paul's argument since the Isaiah quote serves as the ground for Paul's claim there. In my view, "she is our mother" means believing

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[113] In addition to being hinted at in Gal 2, this mirror reading helps to explain how Paul's use of Isa 54:1 might answer his opponents' objections without depending too much on texts, like Isa 53:3–12, which he does not quote.

[114] It could be that Paul thought the work of the servant in Isa 53 serves as the cause of the increase in children as some have claimed. However, Paul does not seem to draw much attention to the cause in the flow of his argument. His main concern is simply that the Gentiles are included within this multitude of children. Although it is difficult to prove, his handling of Isa 54:1 may also involve his experience. The Gentile Galatians already received gifts promised to God's people without being circumcised, gifts promised to Israel in Isa (cf. Gal 3:5 and Isa 44:3). The main point at issue with his hermeneutic, however, is whether he properly identifies the heavenly Jerusalem and the multitude to which she gives birth. For arguments connecting Paul's argument to the work of the servant, see Jobes, "Jerusalem, Our Mother," 313–16; Mark Gignilliat, "Isaiah's Offspring: Paul's Isaiah 54:1 Quotation in Galatians 4:27," *BBR* 25, no. 2 (2015): 211.

[115] Betz, *Galatians*, 249; Longenecker, *Galatians*, 215; Malan, "The Strategy of Two Opposing Covenants," 435; Dunn, *The Epistle to the Galatians*, 255; de Boer, *Galatians*, 300.

Jews and Gentiles are a part of the people of God. The identity of the mother in verse 26 is relatively easy to discern. Given the parallelism between verse 26 and 28 and the way Isaiah uses the same metaphor, the Jerusalem above is simply a way to refer to the true people of God. Thus, to say "she is the mother of us all" is to say that the "us," whoever they may be, are a part of the people of God.[116]

The Jew-Gentile "we." Who the "we" are proves slightly more difficult to determine because the we-you dynamic is a hotly contested issue throughout Galatians.[117] Does the "we" refer to ethnically Jewish believers, or does it refer to refer to all believers, Gentiles included? If ἡμῶν merely refers to Jews, then it would be less obvious that Paul understood Isaiah as envisioning the Gentile inclusion. Rather, he would merely be saying that the heavenly Jerusalem is the mother of Jews because Isaiah says so, a point his opponents would have happily agreed with. In support of an ethnically Jewish view, some scholars point to other portions of the letter where Paul does clearly use "we" merely to refer to Jews.[118] In Galatians 2:15, for example, "we" undoubtedly refers to Jewish believers. Paul says, "we are *Jews* and *not Gentile* sinners," making it almost impossible to take the pronoun any other way.

The problem with reading ἡμῶν in the same way in Galatians 4:26 is that the contextual reasons for understanding the pronoun as including Jews and Gentiles are very

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[116] Longenecker, *Galatians*, 214; Witherington, *Grace in Galatia*, 334–35; Schreiner, *Galatians*, 303; Barclay, *Paul and the Gift*, 417n64. Contra Martyn, *Galatians*, 459–66.

[117] According to Barclay, the modern debate on this issue has been stirred up by Donald Robinson and Terence Donaldson; see Donald Robinson, "The Distinction between Jewish and Gentile Believers in Galatians," *Australian Biblical Review* 13 (1965): 29–48; Terence L. Donaldson, "The 'Curse of the Law' and the Inclusion of the Gentiles: Galatians 3:13–14," *New Testament Studies* 32, no. 1 (1986): 94–112. For more sources that discuss this issue, see Barclay, *Paul and the Gift*, 419n70, 71; Das, *Galatians*, 241n42.

[118] E.g., Barclay, *Paul and the Gift*, 419.

strong.[119] The blending of the we and you in Galatians 4:26b, 28, 31, and 5:1 strongly suggests that ἡμῶν includes Gentiles. Consider these texts side-by-side:

Gal 4:26b: "She is the mother *of us all* [?]."

Gal 4:28: "*You* [Gentiles], brothers, are children of promise like Isaac."

Gal 4:31: "Therefore, brothers, *we* [Jews and Gentiles] are not children of the slave woman but of the free woman"

Gal 5:1: "For freedom Christ has redeemed *us* [Jews and Gentiles]. Stand firm [Gentiles], therefore, and do not submit [Gentiles] again to a yoke of slavery."

This blending is most apparent in Galatians 5:1. Since Paul infers that the Gentile Galatians are to stand firm from the fact that Christ redeemed "us" means that the "us" includes both Jews and Gentiles. Being in close proximity with the "us" from Galatians 5:1 and sharing the motif of freedom, the "we" from 4:31 most likely maintains the same referent—Jews *and* Gentiles. Since 4:31 almost perfectly parallels 4:26b, the "we" in the latter (i.e., the ἡμῶν in question) mostly likely refers to Jews and Gentiles as well. To put it simply, all the pronouns around Galatians 4:26 include Gentiles, even those that are first person. Thus, Paul was most likely not using ἡμῶν to mark himself off from his Gentile brothers as he does elsewhere in the letter. Verse 26 claims that the heavenly Jerusalem is the mother of all believers—Jew and Gentile. Isaiah 54:1 serves as the ground of this claim as Paul explicit says.[120] The heavenly Jerusalem is the mother of both Jews and Gentile because Isaiah said that one day she would be. A corollary of this reading is that the many children of the desolate woman from Isaiah 54:1 are not merely Jews. They are also Gentiles, a point not obvious from Isaiah itself and thus requiring

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[119] Betz, *Galatians*, 248; Longenecker, *Galatians*, 215; Malan, "The Strategy of Two Opposing Covenants," 435; Dunn, *The Epistle to the Galatians*, 254; Schreiner, *Galatians*, 303; de Boer, *Galatians*, 308; Das, *Galatians*, 500; deSilva, *The Letter to the Galatians*, 399.

[120] Burton, *Commentary on Galatians*, 264; Jobes, "Jerusalem, Our Mother," 302; François Vouga, *An die Galater*, Handbuch zum Neuen Testament 10 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1998), 118; Di Mattei, "Paul's Allegory of the Two Covenants," 116; de Boer, "Paul's Quotation of Isaiah 54:1 in Galatians 4:27," 379; deSilva, *The Letter to the Galatians*, 400.

investigation below.[121] To sum up, Paul thought Isaiah 54:1 refuted his opponents because it looked forward to a time when God's people would include Gentiles.

The Logic of Paul's "Allegory" Summarized

In the flow of Galatians 4:21–31, Isaiah 54:1 works alongside Genesis 16–21 in Paul's argument to refute circumcision by envisioning the Gentile inclusion into the people of God.[122] His logic could be paraphrased as follows: You, who value circumcision, are not reading the law rightly (Gal 4:21). Abraham had two sons, not just one. Both sons were circumcised, but only the true son was chosen according to God's promise (Gal 4:22–23). These Jews who wish to be under the law correspond to Ishmael because he, like they, are slaves. They are circumcised sons of Abraham, but they are not true heirs (Gal 4:24–25). The true sons of Sarah include both Jew and Gentile as Isaiah prophesied. Thus, although demanded by the old covenant, circumcision was never what made one an heir like Isaac.[123] Promise was, and you, Gentiles, are sons of promise like Isaac already (Gal 4:26–28, 31).[124] Do not, therefore, accept circumcision (Gal 5:1).[125]

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[121] De Boer suggests that Paul may be drawing on the fact that children were promised to both Isaac and Ishmael: "According to Genesis, God promised many descendants to Abraham though *both* Isaac *and* Ishmael (Gen 15:1–6; 17:2–6, 20; 22:17–18), and Paul may have had this in mind in his christologically shaped apocalyptic interpretation of Isa 54:1." De Boer, "Paul's Quotation of Isaiah 54:1 in Galatians 4:27," 384 (italics original). The problem with this argument is that even if one thinks Paul refers to Sarah and Hagar with the two women from Isa 54:1, only Sarah is the mother of the Jew-Gentile people of God Paul envisions. For de Boer's argument to work, Paul would have to include Ishmael's children in the heavenly Jerusalem, a point he has adamantly denied throughout his allegory.

[122] It is becoming increasingly popular to say that Isa 54:1 serves as the sole foundation for Paul's reading of Gen 16–21. See, e.g., Jobes, "Jerusalem, Our Mother," 302; Joel Willitts, "Isa 54:1 in Gal 4:24b: Reading Genesis in Light of Isaiah," *Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft* 96, nos. 3–4 (2005): 202–8; Di Mattei, "Paul's Allegory of the Two Covenants," 117–18; Gignilliat, "Isaiah's Offspring," 207. The Sarah-Hagar narratives themselves, according to this view, have very little if anything to offer on their own. If my readings of Gen and Paul are correct, however, then this view falls short. Details of the Sarah-Hagar narratives commend Isaiah's reading as it does Paul's.

[123] Tedder, *Children of Laughter and the Re-Creation of Humanity*, 180.

[124] Moo, *Galatians*, 308.

[125] I have chosen not to give sustained treatment to Gal 4:30 in which Paul quotes Gen 21:10. The main modern debate over the verse concerns whether Paul quotes Sarah's words as a command to be obeyed or as an indicative statement to be believed. Susan Eastman has famously argued against taking the quote as a command. As she observes, Paul does not tend to use second person imperatives even when he is

The Warrant to Which Galatians 4:21–31 Appeals

If this construal of Paul's exegesis is correct, then his readings fit the Abrahamic narratives of Genesis 16–21 and the prophesy of Isaiah 54:1 quite closely. Genesis spotlights God's agency in choosing his own people by juxtaposing Ishmael and Isaac. Ishmael is Abraham's son. He is circumcised. He has the affection of his father. He even receives promises that resemble the ones that ultimately culminate in Isaac, but he is still not Isaac. He is still not *the* heir. Thus, as Paul correctly points out, Genesis communicates clearly that it is God's promise that divides his people from the rest, not circumcision and not being related to Abraham. Likewise, Isaiah 54:1 does envision the Gentiles' inclusion within Israel's ranks. Non-native Jews were to be the recipients of Israel's eschatological blessing.[126] They were to be sons of Sarah, just like Isaac was. Thus, one need not accept circumcision to be a son of Abraham. The following exposition of both Genesis 16–21 and Isaiah 54:1 will defend these points.

Genesis 16–21: Sarah, Hagar, and Their Sons

The narratives Paul appeals to from Genesis are thought generally to run from chapters 16 to 21, but seeds of that narrative are planted far sooner.[127] The end of chapter 11 sets up a long-running motif that frames up the climax of the story. After it describes the Tower of Babel, Genesis uses a genealogy to introduce Abraham, who is to dominate

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quoting the OT, and it would be odd for him to infer an indicative statement from an imperative as he seems to in v. 31. Susan Grove Eastman, "'Cast out the Slave Woman and Her Son': The Dynamics of Exclusion and Inclusion in Galatians 4.30," *JSNT* 28, no. 3 (2006): 319–23. Eastman may be correct, but her evidence is not very persuasive. Paul uses the second person singular in Gal 4:7 to refer to the Galatians as a whole, and the inference in Gal 4:31 probably sums up the entire pericope, not just v. 30. Thus, although these observations are curious, they struggle to overturn the natural reading of the imperative. If Paul merely wanted to make an indicative statement, why would he include the command at all? Either way, v. 30 does not give much insight into his hermeneutic. Whether one takes the quote as a command or not, Paul seems to be reading the command straightforwardly. Sarah did want to cast out Ishmael, and Paul seems to be reading the text accordingly.

[126] Caneday, "Covenant Lineage Allegorically Prefigured," 64.

[127] Since I am investigating Paul's understanding of Genesis in what follows, I will not be dealing with the different compositional strands of Gen. Paul would have undoubtedly read the book as a unified whole.

the story until at least Genesis 22. It is also quick to point out that he marries Sarai, a woman who has long been barren (Gen 11:29–30). From the beginning, therefore, the reader knows that the narrative wants to emphasize two things about Sarai. She is Abraham's wife, and she is barren. The text places special emphasis on the latter by stating it twice. As both the MT and the LXX read, "Sarai was barren, and she had no child" (Gen 11:30).[128] This characterization of Sarai (Sarah hereafter) lingers when God first issues his grand promises to Abraham in chapter 12.[129] If God is to make Abraham into a great nation (Gen 12:2), will he do so through his barren wife?[130]

The function of Sarah's barrenness. The story returns to this tension multiple times until Isaac is born in chapter 21. Although it does not mention Sarah, Genesis 15 draws attention to her barrenness through Abraham's doubt. God comes to Abraham in a dream, comforting him in his fear and reminding him that his reward will be very great (Gen 15:1).[131] Abraham cannot understand how this might be, for "he remains childless" (Gen 15:2–3). God calls him to look at the sky and ensures him that

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[128] Throughout this discussion, I am reading from the Göttingen editions of the LXX where available.

[129] Watson is probably correct to point out that Yahweh already hints at Gentile inclusion in Gen 12:3 even though both the LXX and MT use the word for tribe (i.e., φυλή and מִשְׁפָּחָה). Watson, *Paul and the Hermeneutics of Faith*, 168. Cf. Keith N. Grüneberg, *Abraham, Blessing, and the Nations: A Philological and Exegetical Study of Genesis 12:3 in Its Narrative Context* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2003), 186.

[130] Gerhard von Rad, *Genesis: A Commentary*, rev. ed., OTL (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1973), 158–59; Walter Brueggemann, *Genesis*, Interpretation (Atlanta, GA: John Knox Press, 1982), 116; Nahum M. Sarna, *Genesis*, JPS Torah Commentary (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1989), 85; Bruce K. Waltke and Cathi J. Fredricks, *Genesis: A Commentary* (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2001), 200–201; Jon Douglas Levenson, *Inheriting Abraham: The Legacy of the Patriarch in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012), 21; Tedder, *Children of Laughter and the Re-Creation of Humanity*, 61.

[131] Following John Van Seters, Waltke and Fredricks argue that God comforts Abraham because he was afraid of the repercussions of the war fought in Gen 14. Although this view is plausible, Gen 15:2 seems more pertinent in determining the nature of his fear. Although Abraham might have been afraid of repercussions, his fear primarily concerned his lack of heir. Waltke and Fredricks, *Genesis*, 240; John Van Seters, *Abraham in History and Tradition* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1975), 449–50. Cf. Sarna, *Genesis*, 113. Rightly, Brueggemann, *Genesis*, 141; von Rad, *Genesis*, 183; John H. Sailhamer, *The Pentateuch as Narrative: A Biblical-Theological Commentary* (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1992), 149–50; Watson, *Paul and the Hermeneutics of Faith*, 185.

his offspring will be as numerous as the stars (15:5). This juxtaposition between Abraham's doubt and God's promise functions the same way it did in the opening verses of chapter 12. God was to bless Abraham with a child, but it is not obvious how he will do so given Abraham's age and Sarah's barrenness. It is important to note that this child would be his heir (Gen 15:4). This designation lays the groundwork for understanding how Ishmael fits into the story later on. This child was not to be merely Abraham's progeny. He was to inherit the promises of Genesis 12 and 15.

The narrative returns to Sarah's barrenness again and again. It does so in chapter 16 as the impetus for Abraham's relationship with Hagar (Gen 16:1), in chapter 17 when Abraham mentions Sarah's age (Gen 17:17), in chapter 18 when Sarah laughs at Yahweh's promise (Gen 18:11–12), and finally in chapter 21 when Sarah expresses her amazement at Isaac's birth (Gen 21:6–7). Up until Isaac is actually born in chapter 21, God continues to insist that Sarah will bear Abraham a son. His promises to Sarah specifically in chapter 17 serve as his response to Sarah and Abraham's actions with Hagar in chapter 16. They tried to make the promises happen themselves, but it is through Sarah that they will be fulfilled (Gen 17:16).[132] In chapter 18, Yahweh responds to Sarah's laughter by asking her if anything is too hard for him (Gen 18:15).[133] In chapter 21, his unlikely promises finally come to fruition in the birth of Isaac (Gen 21:6–7).[134] Sarah's barrenness, therefore, operates as the backbone of the narrative, creating a tension with God's promises that make clear the means by which these promises were to be fulfilled. How is God going to make Abraham into a great nation despite his age and

[132] Brueggemann, *Genesis*, 153; Sailhamer, *The Pentateuch as Narrative*, 154.

[133] Waltke and Fredricks, *Genesis*, 268; Schreiner, *Galatians*, 299.

[134] Waltke and Fredricks, *Genesis*, 293.

his wife's barrenness?[135] By his own miraculous act. This barren woman will give birth to Abraham's heir.

The function of Hagar's slavery. Genesis uses a similar literary device to frame Hagar and the role she is to play throughout the narrative. From the moment she is introduced, Hagar is labeled "the slave woman" (Gen 16:1). As Sarah is the barren woman, Hagar is her slave. From the start, therefore, Hagar takes on a lesser status than her master.[136] Although too much can be made of this detail, its inclusion adds to the interplay between Isaac and Ishmael, insinuating that the latter would never be the chosen son. This take on Hagar's slave status is further confirmed toward the end of the narrative. In chapter 21, Sarah does not even mention Hagar's name, only referring to her by the epithet "slave woman" as she excludes Ishmael from the promises of God (Gen 21:10). The point of this label, therefore, it not so much to emphasize her enslavement to Sarah but to focus on the fact that, being enslaved, Hagar occupies a lesser status than her master. To be sure, this label needs the other narrative details to make its purpose clear, but with these details, it does seem to make this point. Isaac was the son of Abraham's true and free wife. Ishmael merely the son of her property.

Ishmael: a pseudo Isaac. Ishmael heightens the tension created by Sarah's barrenness and the repeated promise by serving as a foil for Isaac. He perfectly mirrors the son of laughter, and yet, the narrative makes clear that he is not Abraham's promised heir. This juxtaposition leaves the readers with no choice but to recognize that God's choice is what divides Isaac from Ishmael. Ishmael comes on the scene in Genesis 16. Seeing that she has no children, Sarah offers Hagar as a means to fulfilling God's promise. If Sarah could not bring the promise to fruition herself, she would do so through

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[135] Sailhamer, *The Pentateuch as Narrative*, 138–39; Grüneberg, *Abraham, Blessing, and the Nations*, 9; Schreiner, *Galatians*, 304.

[136] Von Rad, *Genesis*, 192; Sarna, *Genesis*, 119.

her slave (Gen 16:1–4). It could be argued that Sarah just wanted to provide Abraham children, and her intent was not to fulfill God's promises for progeny on her own.[137] The flow of the narrative, however, makes this reading unlikely. Genesis 16, the chapter in which Hagar gives birth to Ishmael, is buttressed on both sides by promises for an heir (Gen 15:4; 17:2–6, 17). Thus, although it does not say so explicitly, Ishmael almost undoubtedly is Sarah's attempt to fulfill those promises by her own effort.[138] Abraham's response to the promises in Genesis 17 further corroborates this reading. After God reiterates his promise to provide him with an heir and make him the father of many nations (Gen 17:4–6), Abraham offers up Ishmael as a means to fulfilling this promise. In Abraham's words, "'will a son be born to a man who is a hundred years old? Will Sarah give birth even though she is ninety years old?' And Abraham said to God, 'O, that Ishmael would live before you!'" (Gen 17:17–18). Despite God's covenant-ratified promise, Abraham still doubts, offering up Ishmael as the heir.[139] This repeated attempt to fit Ishmael into the promises of Genesis 12, 15, and 17 binds Ishmael to Isaac. He is the human wrought version of the divinely born heir.

The story parallels the sons in a number of other important ways. Ishmael is a son of Abraham. He is circumcised like Isaac, and he receives promises that mimic Isaac's. In Genesis 17, God commands Abraham to circumcise all the men in his house (Gen 17:10–14). Abraham promptly circumcises Ishmael (17:23), and when Isaac is born,

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[137] Dunn seems to suggest as much when he argues that Sarah was acting in line with the custom at the time. See Dunn, *The Epistle to the Galatians*, 246.

[138] Von Rad, *Genesis*, 191; Brueggemann, *Genesis*, 151; Sailhamer, *The Pentateuch as Narrative*, 154; Waltke and Fredricks, *Genesis*, 251; Grüneberg, *Abraham, Blessing, and the Nations*, 9; Di Mattei, "Paul's Allegory of the Two Covenants," 119; Watson, *Paul and the Hermeneutics of Faith*, 186–87.

[139] Sarna argues that Abraham's request on behalf of Ishmael stems from being afraid that Ishmael would be left out of the covenant, not from doubt concerning the covenant promises themselves. Such a view, however, cannot make sense of the rhetorical question in v. 17. The fact that Abraham questions whether he, as an old man, might have a son, strongly suggests that he is offering up Ishmael as the son of promise as he did so in Gen 16. See Sarna, *Genesis*, 126. Rightly, Brueggemann, *Genesis*, 156; Waltke and Fredricks, *Genesis*, 262; Schreiner, *Galatians*, 299; von Rad, *Genesis*, 203.

he circumcises him on the eighth day as God commanded. Both sons shared this mark of the covenant (Gen 21:4).[140] Matthew Thiessen has challenged Paul's affirmation of this parallel. In his view, Paul was not appealing to the shared sign of the two sons. Rather, he was drawing on a Jewish tradition that took eighth-day circumcision as the only legitimate form of the covenant sign. Paul's problem was not, therefore, with circumcision simpliciter. It was with an aberrant type, a type represented by Ishmael.[141]

Thiessen's reading maintains the same rhetorical point as mine (i.e., Paul's allegory attempts to keep the Gentiles from circumcising themselves), but it does so via a radically different path. Paul's problem is not with circumcision per se. It is with this non-eighth-day type, the type the Gentile Galatians were presumably considering. Although it has some precedent in second temple literature, Thiessen's reading seems unlikely.[142] Neither the narratives in Genesis nor Paul's pericope in Galatians commend the view. The initial covenantal stipulation merely requires circumcision without qualification (see Gen 17:10–11), and the narrative gives every reason to think that this right was carried out faithfully on Ishmael and on Abraham himself (Gen 17:23).[143] As far as Genesis is concerned, Ishmael's circumcision was legitimate. Furthermore, Galatians knows nothing of this eight-day circumcision. His issue is with circumcision in

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[140] Tedder suggests that the tension between circumcision as a marker for a *singular* nation and the promise that relates to *all* nations suggests that Gen 17 should be understood as introducing two interrelated covenants. Although such a view would help explain how Paul separates circumcision from the Abrahamic covenant, the repetition of the covenant promises in Gen 17 and Paul's own reading on this text, which associates circumcision with the Mosaic covenant specifically, makes this reading unlikely. Tedder, *Children of Laughter and the Re-Creation of Humanity*, 77. Cf. Sailhamer, *The Pentateuch as Narrative*, 156.

[141] Thiessen, *Paul and the Gentile Problem*, 77–82.

[142] *Jub.* 15:25–26, for example, says the following: "This is a law for all the eternal generations and there is no circumcising of days and *there is no passing a single day beyond eight days* because it is an eternal ordinance ordained and written in the heavenly tablets. *And anyone who is born whose own flesh is not circumcised on the eight day is not from the sons of the covenant which the LORD made for Abraham since (he is) from the children of destruction*." James H. Charlesworth, ed., "Jubilees," in *The Old Testament Pseudepigrapha*, trans. O. S. Wintermute (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 1983), 87 (emphasis added).

[143] Von Rad, *Genesis*, 203; Waltke and Fredricks, *Genesis*, 263; Tedder, *Children of Laughter and the Re-Creation of Humanity*, 82–83.

general. Thus, Thiessen's view does not stand up to scrutiny, and Paul most likely does see circumcision as something that both Isaac and Ishmael shared.[144]

The promises issued to Ishmael are perhaps the most interesting of the links between him and Isaac. They complete the bond between Ishmael and Isaac by echoing the promises made concerning the latter. After Sarah banishes Hagar from her presence, God has mercy on her and promises that he would increase her offspring into an innumerable multitude (Gen 16:10).[145] In response to Abraham's pleas, God promises that Ishmael would father twelve princes (Gen 17:20), a promise that undoubtedly echoes the promises made to Abraham and perhaps harks forwards to the twelve patriarchs of Israel.[146] Finally, once Isaac is born, God continues to have compassion on Ishmael by promising to make him into a great nation (Gen 21:13). All of these promises closely mimic those made to Abraham concerning Isaac.[147] In fact, these parallels have led some scholars to argue that Genesis does not differentiate between the two sons. In Roger Syrén's view, for example, through the promises, "Ishmael is, in effect, integrated into Abraham's family and is seen to share in the promise made to the patriarch."[148]

Isaac: the true son of Abraham. In the end, however, the narrative still singles out Isaac as the chosen son.[149] It does so subtly very early on through making

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[144] Thiessen's work does succeed in showing that the Jews of the Second Temple period recognized the problem Paul poses. If circumcision encompassed all heirs of Abraham, what does one do with Ishmael? Paul simply allows this problem to reach its logical conclusion—circumcision was not, in fact, what marked off the heirs of Abraham.

[145] Von Rad claims that there is not a word about the great promise made to Abraham. Von Rad, *Genesis*, 194. However, the parallels between Gen 16:10 and 15:5 are simply too close.

[146] Sailhamer, *The Pentateuch as Narrative*, 159–60; Waltke and Fredricks, *Genesis*, 262; Tedder, *Children of Laughter and the Re-Creation of Humanity*, 65.

[147] Brueggemann, *Genesis*, 183; Emerson, "Arbitrary Allegory, Typical Typology, or Intertextual Interpretation?," 18.

[148] Roger Syrén, *The Forsaken First-Born: A Study of a Recurrent Motif in the Patriarchal Narratives* (Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1993), 18. Cf. Punt, "Revealing Rereading Part 2," 107.

[149] Schreiner, *Galatians*, 300.

clear that Ishmael was born out of doubt. Neither Abraham nor Sarah could understand how they would conceive, and so, tried with their slave, Hagar. This doubt casts a shadow over Ishmael's birth, leaving the reader with a nagging suspicion that he would not be the promised son from Genesis 15:4.[150] This suspicion is confirmed twice in chapter 17. It is confirmed first when God makes promises to Sarah that closely parallel Abraham's. It is as if the narrative is saying, "nice try with Ishmael, but Sarah will be the one through whom these promises are brought to fruition." From her is to come this promised son (Gen 17:16).[151] It is confirmed second in God's response to Abraham's request concerning Ishmael. After Abraham offers up Ishmael as the promised son (Gen 17:18), God says that it is with Isaac that he will establish his covenant (Gen 17:19).[152] He will have mercy on Ishmael, multiplying him greatly (Gen 17:20), but Isaac is to be the chosen son (Gen 17:21).[153]

The narrative finishes in the same manner. Echoing Sarah's earlier dispute with Hagar from chapter 16, Genesis 21 recounts Sarah's frustration with Ishmael's supposed mockery of her newborn son (Gen 21:9–10). Sarah casts him out as she did Hagar before him, "for the son of this slave woman will not be an heir with [her] son Isaac" (Gen 21:10). Abraham is not pleased (Gen 21:11), but God supports Sarah.[154] "Do not be displeased because of the boy and the slave woman. All of which Sarah said to you

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[150] Tedder, *Children of Laughter and the Re-Creation of Humanity*, 61.

[151] Brueggemann, *Genesis*, 157; Grüneberg, *Abraham, Blessing, and the Nations*, 9; Tedder, *Children of Laughter and the Re-Creation of Humanity*, 65.

[152] Sarna, *Genesis*, 127; Sailhamer, *The Pentateuch as Narrative*, 159; Punt, "Revealing Rereading Part 2," 109; Emerson, "Arbitrary Allegory, Typical Typology, or Intertextual Interpretation?," 18; Watson, *Paul and the Hermeneutics of Faith*, 187.

[153] The LXX's rendering of Gen 17:19 might bring this denial into doubt. Instead of using a Greek word for "no" to render the Hebrew particle אֲבָל, it uses *ναί*, the Greek word for "yes." Thus, on the surface, it may seem like God is actually granting Abraham's request. It is probably the case, however, that the translators of the LXX merely struggled rendering אֲבָל, which can often have an affirmative force (e.g., Gen 42:21). Also, that God immediately turns to Sarah's child right after the word *ναί* maintains the contrast despite the odd "yes" answer. The LXX, therefore, matches the narrative flow of the MT. God ultimately denies Abraham's request.

[154] deSilva, *The Letter to the Galatians*, 404.

listen to, *for in Isaac, shall your seed be named*" (Gen 21:12). God goes on to promise to make Ishmael into a great nation as he has done so throughout the narrative, but the contrast is clear. When God says, "in Isaac, shall your seed be named," he affirms Sarah's words from a few verses earlier. Ishmael is not to be the promised heir.[155] Thus, the crack in the parallel started in Genesis 16 finally widens into a chasm. Ishmael is everything that Isaac is, but he is not the chosen son.[156] The true seed of Abraham is not the son of slave woman, born of the flesh. He is the son of promise, born from a barren woman by the power of God.

Isaiah 54:1: Zion, the Mother of All Nations

As stated above, Paul understands Isaiah 54:1 as a vision of Gentile inclusion.[157] This reading of Paul raises two questions that bear weight on Paul's hermeneutic: First, who are the two women—the barren woman and the married woman—mentioned in the quote? Second, does this multitude of children include Gentiles as Paul seems to think it does?

Who is the married woman? At a glance, one might think that the barren woman and the married woman correspond to Sarah and Hagar, respectively. Paul has been discussing two women up until this point in the pericope, and the quote contains two women. Naturally, one would link them together. This connection has led some scholars to label Paul's reading as awkward. Sarah fits the barren woman, but Hagar does not fit the married woman because Genesis casts Sarah alone as Abraham's true wife, not

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[155] Sarna, *Genesis*, 147.

[156] Brueggemann, *Genesis*, 183; Emerson, "Arbitrary Allegory, Typical Typology, or Intertextual Interpretation?," 18; Watson, *Paul and the Hermeneutics of Faith*, 188; Tedder, *Children of Laughter and the Re-Creation of Humanity*, 84.

[157] As with Genesis, Isaiah's compositional structure will not factor into my argument. Paul most likely read the book as a whole. For a survey of modern compositional views of the book and an argument for reading the book a unified whole, see Antti Laato, *"About Zion I Will Not Be Silent": The Book of Isaiah as an Ideological Unity* (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell International, 1998), 1–2.

Hagar.[158] Thus, Paul only gets his reading half right, forcing the figure of Hagar onto the married woman of Isaiah. The problem is compounded when one considers the quote in the context of Isaiah. As Joel Willitts has correctly pointed out, what appears to be two women in Isaiah 54:1 is actually the same woman in two different states.[159] The married woman is Israel before Yahweh "divorces" her and sends her into exile. The barren woman is Israel devastated by the exile.[160] She has no children because God has stripped her of them. Both are Israel.[161]

The immediate context provides strong support for Willitts's reading. In Isaiah 54:1 itself, the desolate woman of 1c parallels the barren woman of lines 1a and b, suggesting that "barrenness" is a symbol for the desolating effects of the exile. The barren woman most naturally refers to exiled Israel and her desolate state.[162] Likewise, Isaiah 54:4–6 envisions a time where the shame of this desolated woman's previous marriage will no longer plague her memory. "For your maker is your husband . . . For Yahweh has called you like a deserted wife and a grieved spirit, like a wife of one's youth when she is cast off" (Isa 54:5–6). These images depict a time when Yahweh would return to his former bride or, as the text says, the bride of his youth. This desolated

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[158] Hays, *Echoes of Scripture in the Letters of Paul*, 118; Jobes, "Jerusalem, Our Mother," 302; Martyn, *Galatians*, 442; Das, *Galatians*, 502; de Boer, "Paul's Quotation of Isaiah 54:1 in Galatians 4:27," 380.

[159] Willitts, "Isa 54:1 in Gal 4:24b," 196. Cf. John N. Oswalt, *The Book of Isaiah. Chapters 40–66*, NICOT (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1998), 418.

[160] De Boer argues that the married woman refers to Babylon, whom Isaiah refers to as a woman in Isa 47:1–4. De Boer, "Paul's Quotation of Isaiah 54:1 in Galatians 4:27," 371; de Boer, *Galatians*, 302. The problem with this argument is that the woman metaphor is the only thing that connects Babylon to the married woman. Babylon is not married, nor are her children married. Pre-exile Jerusalem, however, was both married and had children. Thus, she fits this married woman in Isa 54 much more closely than Babylon.

[161] Willitts, "Isa 54:1 in Gal 4:24b," 195–96; David Starling, *Not My People: Gentiles as Exiles in Pauline Hermeneutics*, Beihefte zur Zeitschrift fur die Neutestamentliche Wissenschaft und die Kunde der Alteren Kirche 184 (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2011), 44–66; Tedder, *Children of Laughter and the Re-Creation of Humanity*, 97.

[162] Jobes, "Jerusalem, Our Mother," 308; Jan L. Koole, *Isaiah III*, vol. 2, *Isaiah 49–55*, Historical Commentary on the Old Testament (Kampen: Kok Pharos, 1997), 350; Das, *Galatians*, 502; Gignilliat, "Isaiah's Offspring," 213.

woman, therefore, was not always barren. She was made so by her divorce, and these promises of return are intended to comfort this woman in her divorced state (cf. Isa 49:14; 50:1).[163] She will have more children than she did before Yahweh left her. Following on the heels of Isaiah 54:1, these verses imply that the mysterious married woman in the text to which Paul appeals is pre-exile Israel as Willitts's claims.[164] She is not Hagar, and Paul's reading would not quite fit the quoted material if he was reading the married woman as a reference to Hagar. There is good reason, however, to think that Paul used the quote in a more nuanced manner.

The logical extent of Isaiah 54:1. The problem with reading Paul as connecting the two women of Isaiah 54:1 to Sarah and Hagar is that it overextends what the quote seems to ground. Rather than supporting the whole of Paul's allegory including the two women, Isaiah 54:1 most likely grounds only verse 26, where Paul describes the heavenly Jerusalem.[165] Sarah/the heavenly Jerusalem is the mother of us all (Gal 4:26) because Isaiah says she would be (Gal 4:27). Not, Sarah/the heavenly Jerusalem is the mother of us all because Isaiah said she would have more children than Hagar. To be sure, Isaiah's complex metaphors that combine Jerusalem as a holy hill and as a mother of a new people clearly stand behind why he characterizes the two women as two different Jerusalems. Such is the imagery that runs throughout Isaiah (e.g., Isa 1:8, 3:16, 4:4, 37:22, 40:9, 51:16, 52:1).[166] However, it does so through supporting Sarah first.

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[163] Koole, *Isaiah III*, 2:345.

[164] Willitts, "Isa 54:1 in Gal 4:24b," 196. Contra Brevard S. Childs, *Isaiah*, OTL (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 2001), 429.

[165] See Schreiner, *Galatians*, 295. Contra de Boer, "Paul's Quotation of Isaiah 54:1 in Galatians 4:27," 379; de Boer, *Galatians*, 304; Das, *Galatians*, 501–2.

[166] Throughout his work, Laato makes the point that the city Zion/Jerusalem serves as a definitive feature that runs throughout all of Isaiah. Laato, *"About Zion I Will Not Be Silent"*.

Isaiah informs Paul's take on Sarah which in turn informs his take on Hagar. Paul does not use Isaiah to support his reading of Hagar directly.[167]

There are three reasons that support this more nuanced reading of verse 27: First, this view helps make sense of an otherwise odd reading. Why construe Paul's reading as awkward if he can be understood in a way that makes sense of the quote and the flow of his thought? Limiting Isaiah 54:1 to verse 26 does both. Second, the content of the quote most naturally fits the content of verse 26. As already observed, Isaiah claims that the barren woman, a label intended to evoke Sarah, will have more children than the married woman; that is, she will include both Jews and Gentiles, the precise point Paul makes in verse 26. Thus, one need not overextend the quote if it matches the content of verse 26. Third, and perhaps most compellingly, Paul has already grounded his claims concerning Hagar by the time he gets to Isaiah. Hagar is the present Jerusalem because "she serves as a slave with her children" (Gal 4:25). His logic is, therefore, completed before he moves onto Sarah, forming a rhetorical wall between verses 25 and 26 that stops the quote from connecting to Hagar. Therefore, although readings that match the two women of Galatians 4 with the two women of Isaiah 54 provide insight into the women of Isaiah, they fail to read how the quote functions in the flow of Paul's own thought. The two women of Isaiah are actually one, before exile and after, but Paul rightly recognizes them as one despite claims to the contrary.

The identity of the multitude. The second major question concerns the identity of these children. Are the "many children of the desolate one" Jews and Gentiles as Paul thinks, or are they merely Jews? Taken in isolation, Isaiah 54:1 seems to lean toward the latter. If the barren woman is Jerusalem personified as Sarah, then it might seem natural for these children to be Jews, the genetic progeny of Sarah and Abraham.

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[167] Contra Moo, *Galatians*, 307.

Read in this way, the promise would be for a redeemed Israel comprising only Jews, not a multi-ethnic spiritual people that would eventually include the Galatians. The relationship between the nations and Israel is very complicated throughout Isaiah, but there are good reasons to think that the children of which Isaiah 54:1 speaks includes both Jew and Gentile.[168]

Isaiah 54:1 is immediately followed by statements that seem to envision an Israel that includes the nations within her ranks. Consider verses 2 and 3: "Enlarge the place of your tent, and stretch out the curtains of your dwelling. Do not refrain. Lengthen your cords, and strengthen your stakes. For you will spread abroad to the right and to the left. *Your seed will inherit the nations*, and they will inhabit the desolate cities" (emphasis added; Isa 54:2–3). The tent image in verse 2 recalls a metaphor from early on in Isaiah. Envisioning the heavenly Jerusalem, Isaiah 33:20 says the following: "Behold Zion, the city of our appointed feasts. Your eyes will see Jerusalem, an untroubled dwelling place, *a tent that will never move*." In chapter 54, Isaiah draws on this image and looks forward to a time when Israel will enlarge her boundaries, extending them to the right and the left. With all the discussion throughout Isaiah concerning the surrounding nations, one cannot help but understand "to the right and to the left" to mean that the children of Jerusalem will extend outside the boundaries of the promised land; that is, they will include the nations (cf. Isa 43:5–9).[169] The second half of verse 3 further corroborates this intuition when it claims that the barren woman's seed will inherit the nations (MT גּוֹיִם, LXX ἔθνη). These parallel lines inform one another. Verse 3 helps explain the "who" by mentioning the nations or Gentiles, elucidating what enlarging the tent means. Verse 2 helps explain the *nature* of this inclusion, elucidating what it means that the seed "will inherit" the nations. These nations will not merely be ruled by Abraham's natural

[168] Dunn, *The Epistle to the Galatians*, 255; Oswalt, *The Book of Isaiah. Chapters 40–66*, 415; Das, *Galatians*, 507; Tedder, *Children of Laughter and the Re-Creation of Humanity*, 113.

[169] Gignilliat, "Isaiah's Offspring," 215.

progeny. They will be included within her tent.[170] Thus, although they do so subtly, verses 2 and 3 provide clues that suggest that the "many children" of verse 1 are indeed Jews *and* Gentiles.[171]

The wider context of Isaiah also supports this reading.[172] Both before and after Isaiah 54:1, the prophet blurs the boundaries between Jew and Gentile, making it seem as if the latter will eventually stand on equal footing with the former. Toward the middle of chapter 11, for example, Isaiah envisions the root of Jesse as a sign to the nations. "On that day, the nations will seek the root of Jesse, who will stand as a sign to the peoples. Of him the nations will inquire" (Isa 11:10). The root of Jesse, the Jewish Messiah, is the one to whom the nations would flock. The prophet goes onto say that God will gather what remains of his people from multiple surrounding nations—Egypt, Assyria, Pathros, Cush, and others (Isa 11:11). What is interesting about this list is that it includes nations into which God does not send Israel.[173] Of course, in historical hindsight, Israel was spread to many nations other than Assyria and Babylon, but in the flow of Isaiah, this text indicates that he will gather his people from places where he did not send them. Verse 12 heightens this effect when it parallels the gathering of the banished of Israel with raising a sign for the nations. "He will raise a signal for the nations. He will assemble the

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[170] The verb יָרַשׁ can mean to "dispossess" (i.e., destroy) as it does in Deut 2:12. However, echoes of the patriarchal promises and the parallel with verse 3 make this reading unlikely, hence the translation "will inherit." Koole, *Isaiah III*, 2:356–57. Cf. Oswalt, *The Book of Isaiah. Chapters 40–66*, 418.

[171] Interestingly, although absent from the MT, v. 15 in the LXX provides further contextual support. It reads, "proselytes will come to you through me, and they will flee to you" (Isa 54:15 LXX). These proselytes are not natural born Jews; that is, they are Gentiles. However, that they are called "proselytes" (προσήλυτοι) and that they flock to Israel suggest that they would be included in the people of God. They would be become a part of Israel. Since it is in close proximity to Isa 54:1, it also colors how one should understand the multitude of children, suggesting that the multitude would be a composite of natural-born Jew and Gentile.

[172] Das, *Galatians*, 505; deSilva, *The Letter to the Galatians*, 401; Tedder, *Children of Laughter and the Re-Creation of Humanity*, 129–31.

[173] J. A. Motyer makes a similar observation when he says the image is of a worldwide Exodus. J. A. Motyer, *Isaiah: An Introduction and Commentary*, TOTC (Nottingham: InterVarsity Press, 1999), 106. Cf. John N. Oswalt, *The Book of Isaiah. Chapters 1–39*, NICOT (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1986), 288.

banished of Israel" (Isa 11:12). This text suggests that he is calling both Israel and the nations to himself in a similar manner. Both will flock to Zion.

Isaiah 19:18–25 envisions a day when both Egypt and Assyria will turn to Yahweh and worship him. "And Yahweh will strike Egypt, striking and healing. *And they will return to Yahweh*. He will listen to them and heal them" (Isa 19:22; emphasis added). Verse 24 mentions that both Egypt and Assyria will be blessings in the midst of the earth along with Israel, a statement that alludes to the original promises made to Abraham in Genesis 12:2–3. Isaiah follows this allusion up by placing Egypt and Assyria side-by-side with Israel as God's very own people.[174] "Blessed be my people, Egypt, the work of my hands, Assyria, and my inheritance Israel" (Isa 19:25). This last statement clearly envisions Egyptians and Assyrians as true sons and daughters Yahweh. They, like Israel, are his blessed people.[175]

Isaiah 25 continues this trend. In verse 6, Yahweh invites the nations to his banquet table to enjoy a meal of fine food and well-aged wine. In verse 7, he also promises to remove their veil, a metaphor for death (cf. Isa 25:8), suggesting that he would ultimately save them from the grave and hinting at the New Heavens and Earth described later in Isaiah. Like the tent metaphor of Isaiah 54, the nations' eating of the family meal suggests that they, like Israel, have become a part of the people of God, citizens of Zion.[176]

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[174] Oswalt, *The Book of Isaiah. Chapters 1–39*, 381; Motyer, *Isaiah*, 137; Joseph Blenkinsopp, *Isaiah 1–39: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary*, AB 19 (New York: Doubleday, 2000), 320.

[175] Isaac Seeligmann argues that the LXX changes the referents of these blessings from Egyptians and Assyrians to the diaspora groups in Egypt and Assyria. The LXX adds the preposition ἐν so that the text reads "those *in* Egypt" and "those *in* Assyria," perhaps suggesting that Isaiah is talking about exiled Jews in those areas. Isaac Leo Seeligmann, *The Septuagint Version of Isaiah and Cognate Studies*, Forschungen zum Alten Testament 40 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2004), 117. However, as Tedder has helpfully pointed out, the contextual clues in vv. 22 and 24 still suggest that the LXX refers to Egyptians and Assyrians. Tedder, *Children of Laughter and the Re-Creation of Humanity*, 124n154.

[176] Oswalt, *The Book of Isaiah. Chapters 1–39*, 463–64; Motyer, *Isaiah*, 171.

As one moves closer to Isaiah 54, the blurring continues. Isaiah 49:20–23 begins with the children of the desolate one asking their mother to make room for them (Isa 49:20). She is perplexed. She was left barren, "exiled and put away" (Isa 49:21). Where will all these children come from? God answers, saying "Behold, I will lift up my hand to the nations, and I will raise up my signal to the peoples. And they will bring your sons in their arms and will carry your daughters on their shoulders. Kings will be your foster fathers and queens will be your nursing mothers" (Isa 49:22–23a). This passage is important because it uses the same motherly image as Isaiah 54, closely connecting the two texts. The fact that the barren mother has no children suggests that these children being brought from other nations are not her natural children. Her natural children are long gone.[177] Verse 23 helps this image along by using familial language to describe the kings and the queens of these nations as foster fathers and nursing mothers, further integrating these nations into the barren woman's family unit.[178]

A couple of chapters after Isaiah 54, Yahweh discusses foreigners and eunuchs who have joined the people of God (Isa 56:3–6).[179] Yahweh promises that these foreigners and eunuchs will receive a place within his walls better than that of sons and daughters (Isa 56:5). They, like his natural children, are a part of his family.[180] Throughout Isaiah, therefore, the prophet blurs the lines between the Jew and Gentile, including the latter in the former. When one comes to Isaiah 54:1, therefore, one cannot help but read the multitude as a Jew-Gentile multitude. The barren woman is to widen her tent to include the nations into her own family.

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[177] Oswalt, *The Book of Isaiah. Chapters 40–66*, 309.

[178] Koole, *Isaiah III*, 2:357.

[179] The verb לוה can mean to join in a political sense (Ps. 83:9 MT). Such a connotation would weaken the connection, but the familial connotations are heavy in immediate context, suggesting that the verb means something like what it means in Zech 2:15 MT: "And on that day, many nations will join the LORD, and they will be my people." Cf. Jan L. Koole, *Isaiah III*, vol. 3, *Isaiah 55–66*, Historical Commentary on the Old Testament (Kampen: Kok Pharos, 1997), 12.

[180] Oswalt, *The Book of Isaiah. Chapters 40–66*, 460; Motyer, *Isaiah*, 351; Childs, *Isaiah*, 458.

Genesis, Isaiah, and Paul

Paul's reading, therefore, of both the Genesis narratives and the Isaianic prophecy fits the texts quite closely. Genesis does spotlight God's agency in choosing his own people by juxtaposing Ishmael and Isaac. Ishmael was a circumcised son of Abraham, but he ultimately remains the son of the slave woman, occupying a lower status than Isaac, the child of promise. Likewise, Isaiah 54:1 does envision the Gentiles inclusion within Israel's ranks. Non-native Jews were to be the recipients of Israel's eschatological blessing. They were to be sons of Sarah, just like Isaac was. Thus, together, these texts do in fact warrant the conclusion that circumcision was not the means by which one is made an heir of the promises first made to Abraham in Genesis 12:1–3.

The Hermeneutical Function of the Spirit

The last question that must be addressed in this chapter concerns the hermeneutical function of Paul's experience with the Spirit. It must be admitted that many of the insights observed above are somewhat *ad hoc*. They become clear because Paul has made them so. It has been often argued that something similar must be true of Paul. Hays and Fowl, for example, argue that Paul's experience with the Spirit is *the* warrant for his retrospective reading. He read what he observed amongst the Galatians and others back into the text. In Paul's thought, Genesis and Isaiah mean what they mean only because of the Spirit. The texts themselves have very little if anything to commend his reading.[181] Barclay, Tedder, Watson, and Starling are more measured, arguing for a dialogical relationship between Paul's experience with the Spirit and his reading of

[181] Hays, *Echoes of Scripture in the Letters of Paul*, 105–11; Fowl, "Who Can Read Abraham's Story?," 79.

Scripture. Paul would not have understood Genesis and Isaiah lest the Spirit came, but the texts do shape how Paul understands his experience.[182]

Although it may be true that the reception of the Spirit by the Gentiles served as the impetus for Paul's reading of Genesis and Isaiah, it is not obvious that it served as *the* warrant for Paul's reading as Hays and Fowl claim. Paul points to details in Genesis and Isaiah to support his exegetical conclusions, not his experience of the Spirit, and his observations do seem to warrant the exegetical conclusions he makes. His mention of the Spirit in Galatians 4:29 merely serves as a description of the means by which the Galatians were made a part of the people of God. It does not operate as his warrant for his reading of Sarah, Hagar, and their sons.

Tedder and Caneday provide a better means for threading Paul's experience with the Spirit together with his hermeneutic.[183] Caneday in particular compares the plot structure of the Bible to a novel.[184] Novels contain foreshadows that are often understood once only one reaches the climax, but the climax merely serves as the hermeneutical key to unlock these obscure passages. It does not change what the foreshadows meant. They were always what they were. The climax merely shines light on them. So also it is with the Bible. The "Christ event" certainly is the climax of the Bible, but contrary to the thinking of Hays and Fowl, the climax does not dominate the early texts. There were always hints and clues within those texts that pointed in a certain direction, even if they could only be understood in light Christ. Therefore, it simply is overstated to say that the Spirit serves as *the* reason for Paul's hermeneutic. The details of texts themselves clearly

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[182] Barclay, *Paul and the Gift*, 415–18; Starling, "Justifying Allegory," 231; Watson, *Paul and the Hermeneutics of Faith*, 16–22; Tedder, *Children of Laughter and the Re-Creation of Humanity*, 151–52.

[183] Caneday, "Covenant Lineage Allegorically Prefigured," 52–53; Tedder, *Children of Laughter and the Re-Creation of Humanity*, 151–52.

[184] Caneday, "Covenant Lineage Allegorically Prefigured," 52–53.

played a defining role, which is why Paul appeals to the textual details and not the Spirit to support his reading.

Conclusion

At the close of this chapter, there are a few key things to note before making the final comparison between Paul and Philo in the conclusion. First, Paul clearly thought that the text warranted his reading. He opens Galatians 4:21–31 with a call to hear the text, and as I argued above, the phrase ἅτινά ἐστιν ἀλληγορούμενα is Paul's way of stating that the Galatians were misunderstanding Scripture. These two statements are claiming that the text has objective meaning. They are not Paul's way of saying that he is playing with text. They suggest that he thought he was reading the text as it should be read. Second, Paul's argument starts in his rehearsal of the Genesis narratives (Gal 4:22–23). The logic of those narratives, according to Paul, undermines circumcision as the marker of the people of God because, as I have pointed out, Ishmael is a circumcised son of Abraham but is outside the covenant.

Third, when Paul connects Hagar to the Mosaic covenant and the present Jerusalem, he is not claiming that Hagar is the mother of Israel, reversing the historical lines contained in Genesis. He is claiming that Hagar conceptually corresponds to Judaism because she gives birth to sons of Abraham that are outside the covenant just like it does. Not all Israel were Israel. This logic of Paul's argument requires that he assumes that Israel does in fact come from Isaac, making clear that he actually was paying attention to the historical lines described in Genesis. Fourth, Paul was not appealing to Hagar's name to make this conceptual connection. He was appealing to her lesser status entailed by her slavery. Her sons were not true sons. They were slaves. Likewise, Paul's opponents, although sons of Abraham, were not true sons. They also were slaves. Fifth and most importantly, given all these points, Paul's reading is warranted by the texts he appeals to. Read as a narrative, Genesis does communicate that

circumcision was never what made one Abraham's true heir. God's sovereign, miraculous action was. Likewise, Isaiah does envision the Gentiles joining the people of God, and thus, Paul's appeal to Isaiah 54:1 to substantiate this very point is justified. This warrant serves as the key point of comparison between Paul and Philo, and it is this comparison that my last chapter will make explicit.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

This chapter will briefly bring together what has been argued thus far, showing how each of the pieces works together to answer the question "was Paul allegorizing?" As I acknowledged in my introduction, one cannot deny that Paul's exegesis in Galatians 4:21–31 looks like allegorical exegesis on the surface. He uses the verb ἀλληγορέω. He makes odd connections between Hagar, Sarah, and their respective Jerusalems. He even says things that make it seem as if he is appealing to Hagar's name. It is these details that have led many to see categorizing Paul's exegesis as anything other than allegory as an exercise in futility. Despite these similarities, however, Paul was not allegorizing the narratives of Sarah and Hagar because he was not doing what Philo, the allegorical exemplar of the first century, was doing, and he was not doing what Philo was doing because his writings lack the attributes that made Philo's hermeneutic what it was. To establish this thesis, consider first the following summaries of each chapter.

Defining the Question

Part of the difficulty in defending this thesis is the ambiguity of the question itself. What is being asked in the question "was Paul allegorizing?" To return to Richard Longenecker's comment on this issue, "determination of the extent of allegorical interpretation depends largely on how one defines 'allegorical exegesis,' and how one relates it to 'allegory.'"[1] In chapter 2, I attempt to address this issue by doing two things. First, I carefully read through many of the works written on Paul's allegory in the modern

[1] Richard N. Longenecker, *Biblical Exegesis in the Apostolic Period*, 2nd ed. (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1999), 33n110.

era, showing at what points this ambiguity surfaced. Many scholars have made conflicting statements within their own definitions. Others thought they agreed on the answer to the question, but they were operating with different definitions of allegory. To sort this issue out, the second thing I attempt to do in chapter 2 is show that there is a common denominator in nearly every scholar's work on the issue—Philo. Whatever allegory was in the first century, Philo was doing it. The question, therefore, "was Paul allegorizing?" properly means "was Paul doing what Philo was doing?"

For this reason, it does not make much sense to say that Paul was allegorizing even though he was not doing what Philo was doing as multiple of the scholars surveyed above claim.[2] If Philo does embody allegory and Paul was not doing what Philo was doing hermeneutically, then these observations must be allowed to reach their logical end—Paul was not allegorizing.[3] Otherwise, one must either deny that Philo does indeed embody allegory or deny that there is any significant hermeneutical difference between Paul and Philo. The problem with denying that Philo embodies allegory is that it is almost impossible to do. For better or for worse, Philo's name has become synonymous with allegory.[4] My argument in chapter 2 demonstrates this fact by showing that scholar after scholar recognizes allegory in Philo's exegesis. There is something unique about the exegesis of the ancient Alexandrian that scholars cannot help but think of when they think of allegory. He is the exemplar of allegory in the first century CE.

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[2] R. P. C. Hanson, *Allegory and Event: A Study of the Sources and Significance of Origen's Interpretation of Scripture* (London: SCM Press, 1959), 82; James D. G. Dunn, *The Epistle to the Galatians*, BNTC (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 1993), 248; David Starling, "Justifying Allegory: Scripture, Rhetoric, and Reason in Galatians 4:21–5:1," *Journal of Theological Interpretation* 9, no. 2 (2015): 236; Samuel J. Tedder, *Children of Laughter and the Re-Creation of Humanity: The Theological Vision and Logic of Paul's Letter to the Galatians* (Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 2020), 152.

[3] Iain W. Provan, *The Reformation and the Right Reading of Scripture* (Waco, TX: Baylor University Press, 2017), 150.

[4] Adam Kamesar, "Biblical Interpretation in Philo," in *The Cambridge Companion to Philo*, ed. Adam Kamesar (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 72.

One could, of course, argue that Philo and Paul were in fact employing the same hermeneutic. As described above, Stephen Di Mattei defends this view, arguing that "allegory" should merely be understood as a this-for-that trope. Since both Paul and Philo fit this model, they were both allegorizing.[5] This argument understands the question as I have argued it should be understood, but it misunderstands either Philo, Paul, or both. If it is true that "was Paul allegorizing?" means "was Paul doing what Philo was doing?" two questions follow: First, what was Philo doing, and second, what was Paul doing? Only in answering these questions can the more general question be answered, and in the remaining chapters, I attempt to address both of these questions.

Philo's Hermeneutic

In chapter 4, I answer the first question ("what was Philo doing?") by looking at Philo's corpus generally and his treatise on Sarah and Hagar specifically. I argue that Philo's hermeneutic consisted of four attributes: (1) the solving of problems, (2) the use of etymologies, (3) the use of numbers, and (4) seemingly arbitrary conclusions. Each of these attributes happens very frequently in Philo's exegesis, and they serve as his warrant. Thus, they were what made Philo's exegesis what it was. Attribute (1) concerns Philo's tendency to see the text as a collection of enigmas that must be solved. These problems vary widely, but they usually have something to do with text's antagonistic relationship with one of Philo's Platonic commitments. Philo's favorite solutions to these problems involve names and numbers, i.e., attributes (3) and (4). If there is a name in the text, Philo will inevitably appeal to its etymology—sometimes because the text calls for it (Abraham), sometimes for no apparent reason (Aaron). He uses numbers similarly. Attribute (4) describes the relationship between Philo's exegetical conclusions and the text more so than it does the means he uses to connect the two. Philo's conclusions,

[5] Steven Di Mattei, "Paul's Allegory of the Two Covenants (Gal 4:21–31) in Light of First-Century Hellenistic Rhetoric and Jewish Hermeneutics," *New Testament Studies* 52, no. 1 (2006): 164.

despite often being buttressed by multiple arguments, feel arbitrary. They do not follow from the text or the argument that Philo puts forward. In *De congressu eruditionis gratia*, for example, Philo takes Sarah to be virtue because her name means "ruler of me." Here, Philo provides an argument for his conclusion, but the argument he provides does not seem to yield the conclusion it presumably defends. This arbitrariness runs throughout Philo's exegesis and thus serves as one of its defining markers.

At the end of this chapter, I discuss Philo's defense of the literal sense. Readings of Philo like mine, so it is argued, misunderstand him because there are clear examples of Philo's defense of the literal sense. I answered this objection not by denying the premise on which it is built, for Philo does indeed at times affirm the literal sense of the text. I answered it by claiming that it misunderstands the question. When discussing allegory, the question is not "what does Philo do hermeneutically?" It is "what does Philo do *when he allegorizes*?" It may be the case that Philo, the first-century interpreter, does appeal to and defend the literal sense, but do his allegories? In my view, the answer to this question is "no" because even if Philo defends the literal sense in some texts, when he allegorizes, he does not. Philo's allegories see problems in the text they wish to solve, or they have very little if any connection with the text itself. For example, in Philo's exposition of Genesis 16, Sarah becomes virtue. She is barren and fertile. She courts Abraham, a sojourning mind, away from the enduring allure of Hagar, a symbol for elementary education. Philo's allegory of Sarah and Hagar is worlds away from the story Genesis tells.

What Did ἀλληγορέω Mean?

In chapters 3 and 5, I address the question "what was Paul doing?" Chapter 3 specifically focused on Paul's use of the verb ἀλληγορέω. As the etymological ancestor of the modern English word "allegory," ἀλληγορέω has led many to conclude that Paul was indeed allegorizing. In these scholars' view, the phrase ἅτινά ἐστιν ἀλληγορούμενα means

"these things are being interpreted allegorically" and is Paul's way of answering the general question in the affirmative. Against this view, I argued that the phrase should be read as meaning "these things are metaphorical." Although ἀλληγορέω did eventually refer to an act of the reader, most of the uses of the verb refer to actions of the text that resemble modern day metaphors. As it is used today, the word "metaphor" serves as a catchall term to refer to any non-literal speech. A simile, synecdoche, metonymy, and even allegory are properly called "metaphors" in this sense. At the time Paul wrote Galatians, ἀλληγορέω predominantly functioned in the same way. So, when Paul says ἅτινά ἐστιν ἀλληγορούμενα, he merely means to say that Sarah, Hagar, and their sons point beyond themselves. "These things [i.e., the narratives concerning Sarah, Hagar, and their sons] are metaphorical." He is not flagging what he is doing hermeneutically. This rendering fits the dominant sense of the term at the time and the contextual clues that suggest that Paul was referring to an action of text not the reader, such as his call to hear the Law in Galatians 4:21 and the fact that the antecedent of the pronoun ἅτινα is the text itself.

What Was Paul Doing?

In chapter 5, I assess the other enigmatic portions Paul's pericope. Recognizing that Paul's use of ἀλληγορέω was not his way of flagging his reading as allegorical is necessary to my argument, but it is not sufficient on its own. It still could be that Paul exhibits others essential attributes of allegorical exegesis found in Philo's writings. Thus, chapter 5 looked at both Paul's reading and his warrant, that is, how Paul's reading related to the texts he interprets in Galatians 4:21–31. To accurately describe his reading, I first argued that, throughout Galatians, Paul is concerned with the question, "who are the people of God?" As much as he is concerned with how humanity is made right with God, he is also concerned with the identity of the sons of Abraham. Are they his circumcised genetic progeny, or are they marked by something else? Paul answers this

question by appealing to the juxtaposition of Isaac and Ishmael in Genesis 16–21 and the Gentile inclusion envisioned in Isaiah 54:1. If circumcision was what made one a part of the covenant community, then why was Ishmael not included. Isaiah already envisioned a day when Gentiles would become a part of the family of God. The Galatians, therefore, were already members of Abraham's household and should not accept circumcision.

In making this case, Paul makes several interpretive moves that resemble allegory on the surface.

1. He connects Hagar to the Mosaic covenant and the present Jerusalem.
2. He seems to say that Israel came from Hagar, a claim that seems to be completely at odds with the Genesis accounts. Israel came from Sarah through Isaac, not Hagar.
3. He appeals to Hagar's slavery to make these connections.
4. He seems to appeal to the etymology of Hagar's name.

I argue that none of claims turn out to be accurate depictions of what Paul actually does. Both the Mosaic covenant and the present Jerusalem in their own ways operate as metonyms for Judaism and its people. Similarly, point two misses the unstated premises that make Paul's logic work. To refute his opponents, Paul's argument actually assumes that Israel comes from Isaac. If Israel came from Isaac and Ishmael is excluded from Israel, how can circumcision be made one a true heir of Abraham? Isaac was not Abraham's only circumcised son. Paul, therefore, was not reversing the Genesis accounts, claiming that Hagar was the ancestor of Israel. His argument assumes that Israel came from Isaac just like his opponents' do.

Because of its subtly, Paul's handling of slavery in Galatians 4:21–31 is perhaps the most difficult issue. I argued that "slavery" is a thick metaphor in Galatians that includes the connotations of lower status relative to being a son. One is either a "slave" or "son." One is either outside or inside the covenant. Thus, Paul connects Hagar to his opponents because they, like her son Ishmael, are the genetic circumcised sons of Abraham, but they are not inside the covenant. They are mere slaves, not sons. Lastly,

despite appearances, Paul was not etymologizing Hagar's name. There are no good etymological links that would connect the name "Hagar" to Mount Sinai, and Paul's statement in Galatians 4:25a looks very little like clear instances of etymological exegesis. The neuter article τό, which serves as the only hint that he might be etymologizing, has a much broader range of meaning and probably is Paul's way of summarizing the connection he has made between Hagar and Mount Sinai in Galatians 4:24.

Galatians 4:25 actually serves as a geographical claim on the way to connecting Hagar to the present Jerusalem. Even though this Hagar-Sinai is a mountain outside the Promised Land, it actually corresponds to Jerusalem, the holy hill of Israel. Understood in this way, Paul's reading is warranted by the texts to which he appeals. Genesis does juxtapose Isaac and Ishmael in such a way as to make clear that circumcision is not sufficient to become Abraham's heir, and Isaiah does envision a day when the Gentiles would become a part of Israel.

Paul vs. Philo

At this point, the difference between Paul and Philo, and therefore Paul and allegory becomes quite obvious. Paul lacks every attribute that makes Philo's hermeneutic what it was, and some of the attributes that make up his hermeneutic stand at odds with some of Philo's. These points are evident when we compare Philo and Paul on the use of numbers. Although Paul mentions two sons, he does not assign that number any exegetical significance. He sees significance in the fact of Abraham having two sons. He does not see significance in the number two itself. Numerology is completely lacking from Paul's exegesis. The same is true of etymology. Philo appeals everywhere to the etymologies of names. He even appeals to the etymology of Hagar's name (*Congr.* 20). Paul does not.

More importantly, Paul does not see a problem in the text. Philo, on the other hand, attempts to solve a number of alleged problems within Genesis 16. He thinks the text presents Sarah as barren and fertile. He takes issue with the excessive labeling of Sarah as Abraham's wife. He does not think that Abraham could truly have had sexual relations with Hagar. He also does not think that Sarah, as virtue, could justifiably fight with Hagar. These problems are embedded in the literal sense, according to Philo, and they must be solved. Paul's exegesis looks nothing like this. To be sure, he does take issue with an *interpretation* of the text, but this sort of argument is drastically different than taking issue with the details of the text itself. Paul does not start Galatians 4:21–31 by observing paradoxes within the story of Genesis. He starts by allowing the literal sense to stand. Sarah remains Sarah. Hagar remains Hagar. Isaac and Ishmael remain Isaac and Ishmael. This sort of exegesis is at odds with Philo's problem-solving tendency.

Lastly, Paul's exegesis is warranted by both Genesis and Isaiah; that is, it is not arbitrary. Genesis does yield the conclusion that Israel is not marked by circumcision by juxtaposing Isaac and Ishmael. It does not, however, yield the conclusion that Sarah serves a symbol for virtue or Hagar for elementary education as Philo understands it. Similarly, Isaiah envisions eschatological Israel as a Jew-Gentile people. Despite bearing some surface similarities, therefore, Paul's exegesis looks nothing like Philo's, and if Paul's exegesis looks nothing like Philo's, then it stands to reason that he was not allegorizing.

Is Allegory for Today?

At the close of this dissertation, it might be helpful to repeat the point of this comparison. In the Spirit of Jonathan Z. Smith's classic statement, "comparison

requires . . . some stated cognitive end," my cognitive end aims at a common argument that runs as follows:[6]

1. If the apostles allegorized, then the church should follow in their footsteps.
2. The apostles did allegorize as exemplified by Paul's allegory in Galatians 4:21–31.
3. Therefore, the church should follow in the apostles' footsteps and pursue allegory as a legitimate means of reading.

My thesis directly challenges premise (2) and thus undermines conclusion (3). Whether the church can follow the hermeneutic of the apostles, advocates of allegory have not properly understood what it is that the apostles were doing, at least in Galatians 4:21–31. Other texts, of course, must be understood. Paul may not be allegorizing in Galatians 4, but he may be doing so elsewhere. If my thesis is correct, however, Galatians 4:21–31, one of the main texts discussed in this conversation, cannot be used as evidence for apostolic allegory and thus cannot support the practice today.

[6] Jonathan Z. Smith, *Drudgery Divine: On the Comparison of Early Christianities and the Religions of Late Antiquity* (London: University of London, 1990), 47.

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ABSTRACT

PAUL AND ALLEGORY: GALATIANS 4:21–31 REVISITED

John Jarrett Ford, PhD
The Southern Baptist Theological Seminary, 2022
Chair: Dr. Thomas R. Schreiner

Those engaged in modern hermeneutical debates have begun to look afresh at the apostles for guidance concerning how one should read the Bible. How did the apostles read, and do their methods match those used in modern biblical scholarship? Amongst the texts discussed in this conversation, Galatians 4:21–31 stands out. Paul's methods seem foreign to modern minds, and he even seems to flag his reading as an allegory, leading many to see in this text a justification for allegorical hermeneutics. This dissertation attempts to address the question "was Paul allegorizing?" by arguing that Paul was not allegorizing because Paul was not doing what Philo, *the* allegorical exemplar of the first century, was doing.

This argument is built on the following four pieces: First, this dissertation provides a selective survey of modern scholarship on the issue, showing that Philo serves as the allegorical exemplar of the first century and, consequently, as a baseline for figuring what "allegory" was. Second, it analyzes what is implied by the phrase ἅτινά ἐστιν ἀλληγορούμενα in Galatians 4:24 by a broad study of how the verb ἀλληγορέω functioned in the first century, concluding that Paul meant little more than "these things are metaphorical." Third, it provides a careful reading of Philo's treatise *De congressu eruditionis gratia*, suggesting that Philo's hermeneutic comprised four attributes: (1) problem solving, (2) etymology, (3) numerology, and (4) arbitrariness.

Fourth, it attempts to explain how Paul moved from Sarah and Hagar to the present and heavenly Jerusalems through a detailed analysis of the so-called allegorical pericope found in Galatians 4:21–31 and the Old Testament texts on which this pericope depends (i.e., Gen 16–21 and Isa 54:1). Fourth and finally, it compares this interpretive scheme to that of Philo.

VITA

John Jarrett Ford

EDUCATION

BS, Oklahoma State University, 2012
MDiv, Southern Baptist Theological Seminary, 2017

PUBLICATIONS

Ford, Jarrett. Review of *Doing Theology with the Reformers*, by Gerald Bray. *Presbyterion* 45, no. 2 (2020): 146–48.

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Ford, Jarrett. Review of *Children of Laughter and the Re-Creation of Humanity: The Theological Vision and Logic of Paul's Letter to the Galatians*, by Samuel J. Tedder. *JETS* 64, no. 3 (2021): 630–32.

ORGANIZATIONS

The Evangelical Theological Society
Society of Biblical Literature
The Institute for Biblical Research

ACADEMIC EMPLOYMENT

Adjunct Professor, The Southern Baptist Theological Seminary, Louisville, Kentucky, 2021–

Garrett Fellow, The Southern Baptist Theological Seminary, Louisville, Kentucky, 2016–

Online Teaching Assistant, The Southern Baptist Theological Seminary, Louisville, Kentucky, 2016–

MINISTERIAL EMPLOYMENT

Youth Intern, Oakwood Baptist Church, New Braunfels, Texas, 2012