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“LIVE AS WORTHY CITIZENS”: THE ΠΟΛΙΤΕΥΟΜΑΙ
METAPHOR IN PHILIPPIANS

A Thesis
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by
Mitchell Lee Holley
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“LIVE AS WORTHY CITIZENS”: THE ΠΟΛΙΤΕΥΟΜΑΙ
METAPHOR IN PHILIPPIANS

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Date_______________________________

For Spencer and Tyler,

my Scylla and Charybdis

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS vi

PREFACE vii

Chapter

1. ΠΟΛΙΤΕΥΟΜΑΙ, METAPHOR THEORY, AND GRECO-ROMAN CITIZENSHIP 1

Introduction 1

Previous Work on the Πολιτεύομαι Metaphor 2

Scope and Thesis 4

Metaphor Theory and πολιτεύομαι 5

Metaphors and Models 9

Greco-Roman Citizenship and πολιτεύομαι 12

The Source Domain of Citizenship 13

The Usage of πολιτεύομαι 17

2. ΠΟΛΙΤΕΥΟΜΑΙ AND PHILIPPIANS 20

The Frame of πολιτεύομαι in Philippians 1:27-30 21

The Object of the πολιτεύομαι Metaphor 26

"Citizenship" and The Christ Hymn 32

"Citizenship" and The πολίτευμα in Heaven 38

Summary 40

BIBLIOGRAPHY 42

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ANRW	Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt
AYBC	Anchor Yale Bible Commentaries
BECNT	Baker Exegetical Commentary on the New Testament
BibInt	Biblical Interpretation Series
BNTCS	Blacks New Testament Commentary Series
JBL	*Journal of Biblical Literature*
JSNT	*Journal for the Study of the New Testament*
JSNTSup	Journal for the Study of the New Testament Supplement Series
LCL	Loeb Classical Library
NICNT	New International Commentary on the New Testament
NIGTC	The New International Greek Testament Commentary
NovTSup	Supplements to Novum Testamentum
NTL	New Testament Library
NTS	New Testament Studies
PNTC	Pillar New Testament Commentaries
SNTSMS	Society for New Testament Studies Monograph Series
WBC	Word Bible Commentary
WUNT	Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen Zum Neuen Testament

PREFACE

As this project nears a terminus, and a thought sprouts into a thesis, I am reminded of the influences that brought me here. One should not embark on a journey like this alone; guides are needed, and friends. I have been blessed with both, so I find myself in the debt of those who helped me arrive at the end of this project.

First, I would like to thank the teachers who made this project possible. Professor Jonathan Pennington deserves unique recognition for in his capacity as my advisor he read every chapter along the way, providing suggestions for improvement and encouragement, which is vital as one moves through the stages of writing. His life and academic work are a model that I hope to emulate. Also, during my time as her assistant, Mrs. Marsha Omanson was the ideal mentor, and I learned many lessons during those two years. I will not soon forget our mirth filled conversations about teaching, writing, and the importance of style.

Second, I would like to thank Shane Saxon and Aaron Downs. These two friends have reviewed my writing for about a decade now, a tedious and burdensome task at times, but they were invaluable helps along the way.

Third, I would like to thank my twin brother, Tyler. He contributed to this project in many ways, and I have dedicated it to him for this reason. He frequently saw the value of my project when it was lost on me. His theological work challenges me to see Christian Scripture as a gift, always arriving in new and vibrant ways.

Fourth, I would like to thank my wife, Spencer. Her patient love and sacrifice made this project possible, so I have dedicated it to her. Truly, through sickness and in health, she supported my work, and I could not begin to recount the myriad of ways in

which she contributed to its success.

Mitchell L. Holley

Louisville, Kentucky

December 2019

CHAPTER 1

ΠΟΛΙΤΕΥΟΜΑΙ, METAPHOR THEORY, AND GRECO-ROMAN CITIZENSHIP

Introduction

In 1637, René Descartes wrote his *Discourse on Method*, which embodied his epistemology of suspicion and made doubt the starting point of rational thinking. Radical doubt increasingly characterized the sciences, and the appropriate method of discerning truth became important—indeed, only the right method, properly applied, could reveal truth. One characteristic of this epistemic method included the elimination of metaphors and equivocal language. During the Enlightenment, metaphors, like all figurative language, were considered deceptive, and philosophers tried to distinguish superfluous, emotive language from cognitive, literal language. As the empiricists John Locke commented,

> If we would speak of things as they are, we must allow that . . . all the artificial figurative application of words eloquence hath invented are for nothing else but to insinuate wrong ideas, move the passions, and thereby mislead the judgement; and so indeed are perfect cheats.[1]

According to Locke, the "true ideas upon which the inference depends" will avoid "metaphorical representations."[2] He illustrates the hegemonic influence of the Enlightenment on the methods and philosophy of the West, and he typifies the academic suspicion of metaphor.

In 1955, and in contradistinction to the anti-metaphor tradition, Max Black

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[1] John Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, ed. Roger Woolhouse (London: Penguin Classics, 1998), 452.

[2] Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, 597.

wrote that philosophers cannot reduce metaphors to a literal correspondence and that metaphors produce new meanings.[3] After Black's contribution, linguistic theorists, cognitive scientists, and philosophers began to use the productive new framework of metaphor for study. In the field of cognitive science, the drive was led by George Lakoff and Mark Johnson in their seminal work, *Metaphors We Live By*. They suggested that metaphor was a matter of thinking, not just language, and that metaphors are embedded into common everyday speech.[4] Metaphors actually organize the most basic understandings of human experience. These pioneers and those that followed them have opened new fields of inquiry into the importance of metaphors.

The primary aim of this study is to examine the biblical metaphor of πολιτεύομαι ("live as a citizen") in Paul's letter to the Philippians. This study will benefit from recent trends in metaphor theory that have demonstrated the ability of metaphor to create powerful conceptual frames, guide perception, and influence group identity. Also, because some scholars have tried to locate the meaning of the πολιτεύομαι metaphor in either its Jewish or Greco-Roman background, metaphor theory will clarify the meaning-making relationship between a metaphor and the various background models that animate it. In light of these recent advances in metaphor theory, my goal is to examine *what* the "citizenship" metaphor in Philippians means and evaluate *how* it functions in the letter.

Previous Work on the Πολιτεύομαι Metaphor

Two article-length studies have introduced novel explanations of πολιτεύομαι and its use in Philippians, but each proposal suggests a different meaning based on a distinct historical setting. In the first study, Raymond Brewer situates πολιτεύομαι in a

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[3] Max Black, "Metaphor," in *Philosophical Perspectives on Metaphor*, ed. Mark Johnson (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1981), 63–84.

[4] George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, *Metaphors We Live By* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003), 23.

Roman context, and portrays a thoroughly Romanized, political Christianity. Πολιτεύομαι is used "when conduct relative to some law of life—political, moral, social, or religious—is signified."[5] Brewer surveys the use of πολιτεύομαι in the LXX and early Christian literature but relies heavily on the discernible Roman personality of Philippi and Paul's letter. Unfortunately, because he only deals with πολιτεύομαι in the LXX, Brewer does not explain how this verb relates to the broader cultural encyclopedia of the Greco-Roman world, which could animate other significant features of this metaphor. Brewer's study does helpfully point out that πολιτεύομαι probably retains its political flavor by showing that it means something very different than περιπατέω.[6]

The second study builds upon the idea that πολιτεύομαι describes a life lived according to a societal ideal, but Ernest Miller suggests that the Jewish background of the LXX always made covenant faithfulness and Torah obedience the standard.[7] He focuses on the Jewish adoption of πολιτεύομαι and Paul's appropriation of the term in Philippians. In this view, Paul modifies the "Jewish" nature of πολιτεύομαι and recast the church as a new Israel, a group loyal to Christ instead of Torah. Miller's proposal creates a highly theological rendering of πολιτεύομαι, which does not consider the lexical history of the word in its Greco-Roman context.[8] The strength of Miller's proposal comes from his recognition of Jewish influence, which does play a part in determining the meaning of πολιτεύομαι. Both Brewer and Miller try to reconstruct a background to the text that will

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[5] Raymond Rush Brewer, "The Meaning of Politeuesthe in Philippians 1:27," *JBL* 73, no. 2 (June 1954): 76–83.

[6] Bible translations have often conflated the verbal meaning of πολιτεύομαι in Philippians 1:27 with words like περιπατέω and ζάω, implying that the three terms are almost identical. Cf. BDAG 649. Several Bible translations illustrate this tendency: "conduct yourselves" (NIV, NET, NASB), "let your manner of life" (ESV), "let your conversation be" (KJV, Douay–Rheims[Latin]), "as citizens of heaven, live" (CSB), "live" (HCSB, Message), "live your life" (NRSV).

[7] Ernest C Miller, "Politeuesthe in Philippians 1:27: Some Philological and Thematic Observations," *JSNT* 15 (July 1982): 86–96.

[8] Two who agree are Gordon D. Fee, *Paul's Letter to the Philippians*, NICNT (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1995), and Moisés Silva, *Philippians*, 2nd ed., BECNT (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2005).

inform the meaning, but each author reconstructs a different background and deduces a distinct meaning. In the end, each reconstruction appears manufactured and arbitrary; their translations follow suite.

As I show below, both articles provide insight into the cultural background of the verb πολιτεύομαι and aid my discussion, but each piece unnecessarily creates a false dichotomy between two cultural settings. While these studies have tried to determine the conventional meaning and cultural background of πολιτεύομαι, metaphor theory explains that these features alone will not specify the meaning of the metaphor.[9] In fact, Paul's pragmatic use of the word is the most important factor for determining the meaning of this metaphor. And finally, unlike the two studies above, this study carefully reads and scrutinizes the πολιτεύομαι metaphor as a metaphor, a task no other study has attempted. As a result, a study like this will require a sophisticated method for explaining how metaphors work to create meaning and shape perception.

Scope and Thesis

This study aims to demonstrate that the πολιτεύομαι metaphor creates a cognitive structure for understanding the Christian life by imposing a new "perspective," which comes from the source domain of Greco-Roman citizenship. In other words, the πολιτεύομαι makes sense of the Christian community's pursuit of a worthy life by evoking several themes from the source domain of ancient citizenship. Paul's metaphor operates "below the surface" of the letter and carries these themes through the letter.

To achieve this goal, (1) I will clarify a theoretical and hermeneutical model for examining the πολιτεύομαι metaphor in Philippians. Like previous studies, this model benefits primarily from cognitive and literary approaches to metaphor theory. These approaches describe what metaphors are and how they function within a text. Then, (2) I

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[9] Dawes warns that conventional meanings of a word do not automatically equate to the metaphorical meaning of a word. Dawes, *The Body in Question*, 126.

will briefly highlight a few pertinent details from the source domain of Greco-Roman citizenship. Finally, (3) I will examine the πολιτεύομαι metaphor in 1:27-30 and show how the metaphor functions throughout the letter.

Metaphor Theory and πολιτεύομαι

In their seminal work, *Metaphors We Live By*, George Lakoff and Mark Johnson suggested, *inter alia*, that metaphor was a matter of thinking, not just language, and that metaphors actually organize the most basic understandings of human experience.[10] Many disciplines have benefited from the conceptual metaphor theory (CMT) of Lackoff and Johnson, and while other scholars have developed insightful theories of metaphor, their theory remains central in the fields of philosophy, literary studies, cognitive science, and cognitive linguistics. In the field of biblical studies, several scholars have used their theory to shed light on Paul's letters, and this study will continue that trend.[11]

According to CMT, metaphors do at least three things that will be important for this study. First, metaphors are a function of human thinking, not merely human

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[10] George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, *Metaphors We Live By* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003), 23.

[11] Several important studies have tried to incorporate metaphor theory into their analysis of Pauline metaphors. For example, in his work, Nijay Gupta uses both philosophical (e.g., I. A. Richards, Max Black, and Paul Ricoeur) and cognitive (e.g., George Lakoff, Mark Turner, and Mark Johnson) approaches to metaphor, but he primarily relies on the Janet Soskice's heuristic definition of metaphor. Nijay K. Gupta, *Worship That Makes Sense to Paul: A New Approach to the Theology and Ethics of Paul's Cultic Metaphors*, Beihefte zur Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft 175 (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2010), 27–35. See also Janet Martin Soskice, *Metaphor and Religious Language* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), 15. Gregory Dawes's monograph limits his study to the philosophical approaches of I. A. Richards, Max Black, and Monroe Beardsley. Gregory Dawes, *The Body in Question: Metaphor and Meaning in the Interpretation of Ephesians 5:21-33*, Biblical Interpretation Series 30 (Leiden: Brill, 1998), 25–78. By contrast, Reidar Aasgaard primarily makes use of the cognitive approaches outlined in Lakoff and Johnson's seminal work. Reidar Aasgaard, *"My Beloved Brothers and Sisters": Christian Siblingship in Paul*, Journal for the Study of the New Testament Supplement Series 265 (London: T&T Clark, 2004), 23–31. Erin Heim, however, provides the most multifaceted and integrated analysis of metaphor theory in her monograph. Erin M. Heim, *Adoption in Galatians and Romans: Contemporary Metaphor Theories and the Pauline* Huiothesia *Metaphors*, Biblical Interpretation Series 153 (Leiden: Brill, 2017), 24–111. She employs philosophical, cognitive, linguistic, and literary approach to metaphor as well as insights from anthropology and communication studies to explain "what metaphor is" and "what metaphors do."

language.[12] For example, metaphors structure human thinking according to specific patterns or templates.[13] Lakoff and Johnson give the example ARGUMENT IS WAR to illustrate the structuring power of metaphor. In this example, a conceptual structure of a source domain (warfare) is mapped onto the structure of a target domain (argument). This metaphorical structure provides the means by which one talks and thinks about argumentation: "Your claims are *indefensible*," "He *attacked every weak point* in my argument," "His critiques were *right on target*," and "I *demolished* his argument."[14] More than merely a linguistic convention, this warfare metaphor structures how arguments are conceived and reasoned in the mind; warfare, then, creates a template for understanding and discussing argumentation.

Second, metaphor influences perception by *hiding* and *highlighting*.[15] Consider the example above, ARGUMENT IS WAR. By providing a structure for understanding argumentation, this metaphor prevents reflection upon other aspects of argumentation. Lakoff and Johnson point out that the metaphor ARGUMENT IS WAR might prevent a

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[12] The fields of cognitive linguistics, literary studies, and philosophy have all recognized the instrumental role that metaphors play in the world, and each field has contributed to a comprehensive theory of metaphor. Each of these fields have examined the power of metaphor to influence the perceptions and attitudes of their audiences; in fact, metaphors have documented effect on forming group identities. See Chen-Bo Zhong and Geoffrey J. Leonardelli, "Cold and Lonely: Does Social Exclusion Literally Feel Cold?," *Psychological Science* 19, no. 9 (September 2008): 838–842; Lawrence E. Williams and John A. Bargh, "Experiencing Physical Warmth Promotes Interpersonal Warmth," *Science* 322, no. 5901 (October 24, 2008): 606–607. Also, Benjamin K. Bergen, *Louder Than Words: The New Science of How the Mind Makes Meaning* (New York: Basic Books, 2012). In other words, metaphors have the ability to constrain thinking because they shape the very perception of what they describe. These fields have paved the way for a helpful analysis of biblical text using MT.

[13] According to Lakoff and Johnson, the structuring capacity of metaphors allows a person to reason and think about something, not just talk about something. In fact, metaphors are necessary to talk about abstract concepts like time, causation, and states. See Lakoff and Johnson, *Metaphors We Live By*, 23, and George Lakoff, "The Contemporary Theory of Metaphor," in *Metaphor and Thought*, ed. Andrew Ortony, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 212.

[14] See Lakoff and Johnson, *Metaphors We Live By*, 4.

[15] See George Lakoff and Mark Turner, *More than Cool Reason: A Field Guide to Poetic Metaphor* (Chicago: The University Of Chicago Press, 1989), 39. Cf. "Metaphor never simply reflects resemblances. Rather, it almost always actively asserts a non-necessary connection and smuggles in some disconnections as part of the deal." Peter Zhang, "Corporate Identity Metaphor as Constitutive Discourse in Miniature: The Case of New China Life," *ETC: A Review of General Semantics* 68, no. 4 (2011): 381.

person from seeing the cooperative aspects of argumentation.[16] As an example, while the Christian community includes familial love and compassion (2 Cor 6:18; Gal 6:10; Eph 2:19), Paul's πολιτεύομαι metaphor hides these implications and highlights others. Paul elsewhere will speak about the Christian community in terms of a human body (Rom 12:4-5; 1 Cor 10:17; 1 Cor 12:12, 27; Eph 4:12; 5:23, 30; Col 1:24), a bride (2 Cor 11:12; Eph 5:31-32), a household (1 Tim 3:14-15), and a temple (1 Cor 3:11, 16-17, 19; Eph 2:19-22); each metaphor hides and highlights various aspects of the Christian life. The implications of one do not transfer seamlessly to all the others, while there is some conceptual overlap between, for example, a family and a household. Metaphors are a powerful tool for shaping, framing, and influencing one's perception of a subject.

While Lackoff and Johnson identify this feature of metaphor as a "highlighting and hiding" function, other scholars describe this function a bit differently. Davidson, for example, described this feature as "seeing-as."[17] Black explains that metaphors impose a "perspective," that is, they have the ability to present an object from a certain point of view.[18]

Third, because a metaphor shapes perception, a metaphor also influences individual and corporate identity. [19] When a person conceives of argumentation as warfare, she begins to operate according to this metaphor and act as if arguments must involve winners and losers, counter maneuvers and ambushes, and aggression and

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[16] Lakoff and Johnson, *Metaphors We Live By*, 10. Also, "the metaphor of time as thief hides the idea that it is a matter of natural law that everything gets old and dies, and that therefore no one has a right not to" (39).

[17] Donald Davidson, "What Metaphors Mean," in *Philosophical Perspectives on Metaphor*, ed. Mark Johnson (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1981), 200–19.

[18] Max Black, "More About Metaphor," in *Metaphor and Thought*, ed. Andrew Ortony, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 431–457.

[19] See Lakoff and Turner, *More than Cool Reason*, 39. Cf. "Metaphor never simply reflects resemblances. Rather, it almost always actively asserts a non-necessary connection and smuggles in some disconnections as part of the deal." Zhang, "Corporate Identity Metaphor as Constitutive Discourse in Miniature: The Case of New China Life," 381.

destruction:

> Metaphors have the power to create new reality. This can begin to happen when we start to comprehend our experience in terms of a metaphor, and it becomes a deeper reality when we begin to act in terms of it.[20]

While metaphors influence individual perception of reality and identity, metaphors also function powerfully in a communal context to shape group perceptions of identity. This happens when a community adopts a metaphor and acts in light of it.

For example, when Paul uses the family metaphor as a way of talking about and "making sense of"[21] the Galatians experience of the Spirit (Gal 4:1-7, 20-30; 6:1, 10), he created a new group perception of the world.[22] Paul's υἱοθεσία metaphor creates the perception of interdependence and obligation between members of the Galatians community because they begin to understand their experience of the Spirit in familial terminology—God as father, other Christians as brothers.[23] This metaphor is strengthened when he encourages the Galatian Christians to act in accordance with their status as ἀδελφοί (6:1-10).[24] In short, the metaphorical social designations (e.g., ἀδελφοί[25]) both

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[20] Lakoff and Johnson, *Metaphors We Live By*, 145.

[21] Richard Lanham, *Analyzing Prose*, 2nd ed. (London: Bloomsbury, 2003), 3.

[22] Theories of metaphor clarify how metaphors shape group perception, but sociolinguists have also explored the ability of language, and group designations specifically, to shape and reflect a particular view of the world. Linguistically, this is called a "social dialect" or "sociolect." M. A. K. Halliday, *Language As Social Semiotic: The Social Interpretation of Language and Meaning* (London: Edward Arnold, 1978), 164–82. Philosophically, Burger and Luckman provided the foundation for this view: "the most important vehicle of reality maintenance is conversation."; Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckman, *The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge* (New York: Doubleday, 1967), 152 Halliday, Berger and Luckman stress that language not only reflects or embodies a worldview, but it also shapes it. The "linguistic turn" in philosophy has greatly affected sociolinguistics. Cf. Charles Taylor, *The Language Animal: The Full Shape of the Human Linguistic Capacity* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2016).

[23] See Heim's erudite discussion of the υἱοθεσία metaphor in Galatians. Heim, *Adoption in Galatians and Romans*, 148–199. My brief discussion mirrors her study.

[24] The family metaphor frames Paul's ethical instruction, where Paul addresses the Galatians Christians as ἀδελφοί (6:1; cf. 1:2, 11; 3:15; 4:12, 28, 31; 5:11, 13; 6:18) and describes them as τοὺς οἰκείους τῆς πίστεως (6:10). Again in 6:1, connects the Galatians experience of the Spirit (ὑμεῖς οἱ πνευματικοὶ) with their status as ἀδελφοί as he did in 4:1-7 and 4:21-31 (cf. 3:14).

[25] Eleanor Dickey has surveyed the Greco-Roman literature and shown that the familial titles were a relatively common form of address, but Paul's uses the ἀδελφοί address is far more frequent than his contemporaries. See Eleanor Dickey, *Greek Forms of Address: From Herodotus to Lucian* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996); Eleanor Dickey, *Latin Forms of Address: From Plautus to Apuleius* (Oxford:

arise from and shape group identity and practice; and in this way, Paul's metaphor of family not only provides a way of understanding the Galatian experience, but the presence of the metaphor in the ethical section of 6:1-10 also strengthens their group identity and clarifies their praxis (i.e., their role as family).[26] Paul's use of this familial address here reinforces the sense that the Galatians belong to a group of brothers and sisters,[27] a family that functions differently than those outside the group because they have a shared and special experience of the Spirit.[28] Similarly, when Paul uses the πολιτεύομαι metaphor as a way of "composing" or "making sense of" their personal and communal identity, he created a new group perception of the world. This perception invites them to identify with the metaphor and live in light of it.

Metaphors and Models

In CMT, and in cognitive linguistics more broadly, words evoke a frame (Fillmore) or domain (Lackoff) in which those words appear and from which those words

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Oxford University Press, 2002).

[26] "The relation of language to the social system is not simply one of expression, but a more complex natural dialectic in which language actively symbolises the social system, thus creating as well as being created by it." Halliday, *Language as Social Semiotic*, 183 Identity is constructed in language, and language in turn shapes identity.

[27] "In Galatians, in his discussion arising from the fact that the Gentile Galatians are considering coming under the law (e.g., Gal 4:21), and in the context of a letter where he expresses his distress about this (e.g., Gal 3:1–5; 5:2–7, 11–12), he regularly addresses his Gentile readers as ἀδελφοί (see Gal 1:11; 3:15; 4:12, 28, 31; 5:11, 13; 6:1, 18). The implicit point is that they are already Paul's brothers and sisters, without coming under the law; the point is made explicitly in Gal 3:23–29. It can also be seen in Gal 4:28: 'Now you, brothers and sisters (ἀδελφοί), are children of the promise, like Isaac.' You are already 'children of the promise' and so can already be called ἀδελφοί. Nothing else is needed." Paul Trebilco, *Self-Designations and Group Identity in the New Testament* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 30.

[28] Two ideas here: One, this designation separtes insiders and outsiders: "Groups, whether formal or informal, are aware of and cannot ignore the boundary-marking function of language, if only by the name of the group." A. Tabouret-Keller, "Language and Identity," in *The Handbook of Sociolinguistics*, ed. Florian Coulmas (Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishers, 1998), 321. And two, part of the feature that defines this group the unique and shared experience of those within the group: "The repertoire of a community of practice includes routines, words, tools, ways of doing things, stories, gestures, symbols, genres, actions, or concepts that the community has produced or adopted in the course of its existence, and which have become part of its practice. It includes the discourse by which members create meaningful statements about the world." Etienne Wenger, *Communities of Practice: Learning, Meaning, and Identity* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 82–83.

derive meaning.[29] Fillmore describes a frame as "any system of concepts related in such a way that to understand any one of them you have to understand the whole structure in which it fits." For example, the meaning of the word *discount* implies a knowledge of all the concepts within a commercial transaction (i.e., buyers, goods, sellers, and money) and how they relate.[30] A frame or domain represent a whole structure of concepts and requires an encyclopedic knowledge in order to properly understand a concept.[31] In a metaphor, the concepts from one domain (source domain) is used to describe the concepts from another domain (target domain). In the phrase "I *demolished* his argument," the target concept of ARGUMENT is described by using a word from the source domain WAR. To understand what this metaphor symbolizes, one must begin by comprehending the interconnected systems of concepts that constitute the source domain.

Black described the source domain of a metaphor as a an underlying "system of associated commonplaces."[32] he called this system of signification a *model*, which exists in the thoughts of the reader.[33] This system forms an "implicative complex" and includes thought structures created by conventional meanings, common associations,

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[29] Charles J. Fillmore, "Frame Semantic and the Nature of Language," *Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences* 280, no. 1 (October 1, 1976): 20–32 Similar to metaphors, frames impose a perspective on a situation because events can be framed differently, and this framing can hide and highlight implications. For example, Lackoff examines the framing of taxation, specifically the phrase "tax relief." With this phrase, politicians frame taxation as a burden, which hides the benefits to taxation like universities and roads. So semantic frames function in similar ways as does conceptual metaphors and both form a branch of cognitive linguistics. See, George Lakoff, *Moral Politics: How Liberals and Conservatives Think*, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University Of Chicago Press, 2002), 415–18. Also, cf. George Lakoff, *Women, Fire and Dangerous Things: What Categories Reveal About the Mind* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), 462ff, where he first addresses frames from a cognitive perspective.

[30] Fillmore, "Frame Semantic and the Nature of Language," 20–32.

[31] William Croft and D. Alan Cruse, *Cognitive Linguistics*, Cambridge Textbooks in Linguistics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 30.

[32] Max Black, *Models and Metaphors: Studies in Language and Philosophy* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1962), 27–28, 39–40. See Black, "More About Metaphor", where he clarifies his terms, but continues to agree with his initial findings.

[33] "Every metaphor is the tip of a submerged model." Black, "More About Metaphor," 90. See also Dawes, *The Body in Question*, 38, "A model is a consistent imaginative construct or (if one prefers) a consistent pattern of thought by means of which apparently isolated phenomena may be seen to be related to one another."

mental simulations, emotions, and whatever sensate experience a community of readers might have with the metaphor. In Black's example, "man is a wolf," the lupine vehicle evokes an underlying model. A reader then sees a "man" through a wolf-colored lens, and the association complex of a "wolf" shapes how a person perceives a man. The metaphorical meaning derives from a "projection" of the associated implications which are predicable to a *wolf* onto the primary subject, the word *man*.[34]

Therefore, an examination of the wider system of associations will elucidate the features which animate the πολιτεύομαι metaphor in Philippians. Part of the role of this study is to reveal a piece of this implicative complex that is evoked by this πολιτεύομαι metaphor. This "system of associated commonplaces" will include cultural associations, societal structures, linguistic and semiotic factors, and the sensate experience of first century Roman citizens. While not every detail of a model will transfer to the metaphor, a detailed look at the underlying model will prove helpful for determining the possible meanings of the πολιτεύομαι metaphor in Paul's discourse.[35]

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[34] At this point, Black's theory sounds suspiciously close to the Aristotelian theory of substitution and ἐπιφορά: in a metaphor, one system of associations (the subsidiary subject) are substituted for another system of associations (the primary subject); associations connected to the wolf are substituted for associations connected to man in "man is a wolf." His newest article compounds this issue by stating explicitly that only the association of the subsidiary subject (wolf) "project upon" the primary subject (man)—metaphors work one way. Black, "More About Metaphor," 28ff. Therefore, the "interaction" between the two subjects appears more like comparison or substation than interaction. Also, Black notes that metaphors function analogically by "drawing implications grounded in perceived analogies of structure between two subjects belonging to different domains" (31). Metaphors, then, create "isomorphic" networks, which allow speakers to see subjects in new ways; so, metaphors are creative but not ontologically creative in the sense that allow new perspectives old subjects. This solution leaves the paradoxical creation of new metaphorical meaning an enigma. Also, see the similar comments of Soskice, *Metaphor and Religious Language*, 46, and Paul Ricoeur, *The Rule of Metaphor: Multi-Disciplinary Studies of the Creation of Meaning in Language*, trans. Robert Czerny (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981), 102–103.

[35] By highlighting the appropriate "background" and meaning of πολιτεύομαι, the biblical exegete has not automatically discovered Paul's meaning of the metaphor. The two studies above by Miller and Brewer tried to illumine novel description of πολιτεύομαι by situating the verb within a specific background model, one Jewish and one Roman. In contrast, Ricouer has argued that the meaning of a metaphor occurs at the levels of sentences and discourse; the meaning of πολιτεύομαι is not the sum total of a Jewish or Roman background model. Ricoeur, *The Rule of Metaphor*, 74–104 The attenuating effect of context does not imply that a metaphor can be summed up in a few easy propositions; rather, it reminds the biblical exegete that the meaning of πολιτεύομαι metaphor is essentially bound to and interanimated by the literary context in which it occurs. Paul's use of the metaphor in his discourse will determine what the metaphor means.

Greco-Roman Citizenship and πολιτεύομαι

To understand the "perspective" that the πολιτεύομαι metaphor maps on to the Christian life in Paul's letter, we require an understanding of the source domain of Greco-Roman citizenship. This model includes the semantic frame of πολιτεύομαι, which includes related words like the concrete noun πολίτευμα, the abstract noun πολιτεία (cf. πόλις), and the agent noun πολίτης. The semantic frame also includes social, ethical, and political sentiments about the best type or "polity" (πολιτεία) and what characterizes the ideal "citizen" (πολίτης). All of these concepts, and others, belong to the domain of Greco-Roman citizenship, and I have surveyed some of these concepts in greater details elsewhere.[36] For the present study, because an encyclopedic survey of the citizenship domain would be outside the bounds of this study, several other important studies on ancient citizenship will have to supplement this one.[37] To limit the scope, this section will outline only those pieces of the source domain that promise to shed light on Paul's usages of the πολιτεύομαι metaphor in Philippians.

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[36] See Mitchell L. Holley, "Communitarian Ethics and Greco-Roman Citizenship," *Journal of Ethics in Christianity and Antiquity.*

[37] The literature is vast, but the formative studies on ancient citizenship are as follows: for the archaic Greek period, see Alain Duplouy and Roger W. Brock, eds., *Defining Citizenship in Archaic Greece* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018). For the classical period, see Philip Brook Manville, *The Origins of Citizenship in Ancient Athens*, Princeton Legacy Library (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990). Also, note a helpful re-evauation of by Josine Blok, *Citizenship in Classical Athens* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), Josine H. Blok, "Becoming Citizens. Some Notes on the Semantics of "Citizen" in Archaic Greece and Classical Athens," *Klio* 87, no. 1 (n.d.): 7–40, Josine H. Blok, "Perikles' Citizenship Law: A New Perspective," *Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte* 58, no. 2 (2009): 141–70. See Mirko Canevaro and Benjamin Gray, eds., *The Hellenistic Reception of Classical Athenian Democracy and Political Thought* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018) for helpful studies on citizenship in the Hellenistic reception. For a specific study on the intersection of individual and communal obligations, from the persepctive of political philosophy, see Peter Liddel, *Civic Obligation and Individual Liberty in Ancient Athens* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). The most comprehensive, and yet unrivaled, treatment of Roman citizenship was completed by A. N. Sherwin-White, *The Roman Citizenship*, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980). Note the diachronic studies by Kurt A. Raaflaub, "From City-State to Empire: Rome in Comparative Perspective," in *The Roman Empire in Context* (John Wiley & Sons, 2011), 39–66; cf. P. Garnsey, "Roman Citizenship and Roman Law in the Late Empire," in *Approaching Late Antiquity: The Transformation from Early to Late Empire*, ed. Simon Swain and Mark Edwards (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 133–55. Finally, a current overview of the topics related to citizenship can be found in Lucia Cecchet and Anna Busetto, eds., *Citizens in the Graeco-Roman World: Aspects of Citizenship from the Archaic Period to AD 212* (Leiden: Brill, 2017).

The Source Domain of Citizenship

The next two sections argue that the verb πολιτεύομαι only makes sense with reference to a specific πολιτεία and that this πολιτεία defined the behavior of each citizen. In other words, to "live as a citizen" entails a commitment to be a member of and to live according to a "constitution." Also, this constitution need not be written down; in fact, the best constitution was embodied by a virtuous ruler, whose life served as an example of the model citizen. The verb πολιτεύομαι profiles this ethical and political domain and relies on this frame for significance.

The domain of citizenship surveyed below includes three important points. First, the state was not easily separated from the lives of its citizens. While the term πολιτεία can refer to the "conditions of citizenship" or the "daily life of the citizen" (i.e., their right and obligations), and often both at the same time, it also refers to the "state" or "constitution of the state." The daily life of the citizen and the state itself were tightly bound because "the state *is* a certain number of citizens" (ἡ γὰρ πόλις πολιτῶν τι πλῆθός ἐστιν; *Politics* 1275a).[38] Manville explains how the term πολιτεία articulates the relationship between the private life of citizens and the state:

> Citizenship was membership in the Athenian polis, with all that this implied—a legal status, but also the more intangible aspects of the life of the citizen that related to his status. It was simultaneously a complement of formal obligations and privileges, and the behavior, feelings, and communal attitudes attendant upon them.[39]

In the Greek πόλις, the πολιτεία defined how the state should operate and how the citizen should live.

Second, citizens obeyed the laws, which constituted part of their obligation to

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[38] Aristotle, *Politics* 1275a. For Aristotle, "one ought not to think that a citizen belongs to himself, but that all belong to the state (τῆς πόλεως): for the individual is a part of the state (γὰρ ἕκαστος τῆς πόλεως)" (*Politics* 1337a27; 1253a1-3; cf. *Ethics* 1180a24-29; *Metaphysics* 1075a19). Also, according to Plato, a Greek πόλις emerged as mutually beneficial enterprise because "each of us lack many things," but together every member works for himself and his neighbor (*Republic* 369a). For this reason, the state should not get too big (cf. *Politics* 1326b1-10): "But experience demonstrates that it is difficult, equal even to impossible, for an exceedingly large population to be well governed" (*Politics* 1326a26-28).

[39] Manville, *The Origins of Citizenship in Ancient Athens*, 7.

the πολιτεία. For Aristotle, the laws of the state habituated virtue and cultivated εὐδαιμονία among the citizens.[40] This theme of obedience to the law also appears in Greek drama and in the orations.[41] As a "gift from the gods (δῶρον θεῶν)," the laws regulate the lives of men by deterring men from "wrong" (μὴ δίκαιόν) and making the rest "better men" (βελτίους).[42] Demosthenes insisted that the laws were the true rulers of both individuals and "statesmen" (πολιτεύομαι).[43] The laws of the state stemmed from and also reinforced the social values of the citizens.[44]

The laws had social value because they trained virtuous citizens, but laws could be "written down or not written down" (γεγραμμένων ἢ ἀγράφων; *Ethics* 1180b1-2). Thucydides states that the best citizens obey the "unwritten laws," which bring shame on those who break them.[45] While Leocrates avoided breaking any specific Athenian

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[40] *Politics* 1279a18-19; *Ethics* 1179b30-36ff; 1081b16-24; 1181a24-25. Aristotle uses an agricultural metaphor to communicate the need for proper laws to cultivate good virtues: "But the mind of the student must have been prepared beforehand to love and hate rightly, just as the soil must have been previously prepared for the seed" (*Ethics* 1079b24-27).

[41] Two typical examples come from Lysias and Demosthenes. In Lysias' speech *On the Murder of Eratosthenes*, "And I said, 'I will not kill you, but the law (νόμος) of our city, which you have transgressed'" (Lysias 1.27). Also, Demosthenes explains, "When making the laws, scrutinize what sort of laws they are, but when you have placed them, guard and enforce them" (Dem. 21.34). Liddel provides numerous other examples, and he concludes, "Obedience to the laws of Athens could be said to be backed by necessity, fear, or placed alongside other forces such as shame or respect for kin. Laws were justified by attributing them to the archaic lawgivers Solon or Draco. Such modes of argumentation, however, far from suggesting the low esteem of the laws in ancient Athens, suggest the breadth of authorities, historical, legislative, and moral, to which the orators referred to insist upon the pertinence of the laws or particular laws." Liddel, *Civic Obligation and Individual Liberty in Ancient Athens*, 115, cf. 118–23.

[42] Demosthenes 25.16-17.

[43] Demosthenes 26.5-6. He also comments, "No man living will attribute the prosperity of Athens, her liberty (ἐλευθέραν), her democracy (δημοκρατουμένην), to anything rather than the laws." Demosthenes 24.5.

[44] See Mark Golden, "Epilogue: Some Trends in Recent Work on Athenian Law and Society," in *Law and Social Status in Classical Athens*, ed. Virginia J. Hunter and J. Edmonson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 175–85. He surveys the research and shows how Athenian laws both influence social factors and are shaped by social factors. Also note Cohen, who establishes a connection between the laws and statutes of the Athenian community and preexisting social values: David Cohen, "The Social Context of Adultery at Athens," in *Nomos: Essays in Athenian Law, Politics and Society*, ed. Paul Cartledge, Paul Millett, and Stephen Todd (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 147–66; David Cohen, *Law, Violence, and Community in Classical Athens*, Key Themes in Ancient History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).

[45] "While in our private lives we carry ourselves without offense, in our public lives our reverent respect refrains us from lawlessness because we obey both authorities and the law, especially those laws established to protect the oppressed, and those unwritten laws, which bring a shame that everyone

laws when he abandoned the city, Lycurgus still prosecutes him "on behalf of the laws" (*Against Leocrates* 138, 150). Like Aristotle (cf. *Politics* 1284a12-15; cf. Gal 5:23), Lycurgus explains that "because laws are too concise, they are but able to teach; rather, they merely command what it is necessary to do."[46] On the other hand, poets teach men how to live by depicting virtuous lives, and these depictions provide the standard with which Leocrates is condemned. Lycurgus appeals to Homer's Hector (*Against Leocrates* 103) and the Spartan poet Tyrtaeus, who inspired the soldiers at Thermopylae (107-109), and Leocrates does not live up to these embodied laws (110). Ultimately, Lycurgus can suggest that Leocrates abandoned the "laws" themselves (143) when he abandoned the πόλις (26, 43, 134, 145, 147) and its citizens (5). This case demonstrates the veracity of "unwritten laws," which were embodied by the paragons of virtue.

Furthermore, many agreed that the best "constitution" (πολιτεία) was a singular exemplar, whose life would function as a living law. For example, Aristotle stated "if any one person exists that is superior to the rest in virtue," then "no law can legislate against such a one, for he is himself a law" (*Politics*, 1284a5-14ff).[47] When one man "happens to be superior (διαφέροντα γενέσθαι) in virtue" and "surpasses (ὑπερέχει) the rest," it is just and right for this one to be the king (*Politics*, 1288a15-19). Even for the Romans, the ideal ruler "puts his own life before his fellow-citizens as their law" (Cicero, *Republic* 1.34). Also, Plutarch comments, "if he [the citizen] is given the choice among governments he would follow Plato's advice and choose no other than monarchy, the only one which is able to sustain that top note of virtue" (*Concerning Politeia*, 827bc).

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recognizes on those men who break them." Thucydides, *P.W.,* 2.37.3.

[46] *Against Leocrates,* 102f.

[47] Paul uses this same exact phrase in Galatians 5:23 with a similar point. He explains that the community that embodies the fruit of the Spirit could never be legislated (κατὰ τῶν τοιούτων οὐκ ἔστιν νόμος). The implication is that their life itself would become a law. Paul's use of the same phrase would suggest some familiarly with these themes.

Writing some time later, Philo praises Moses as the ideal ruler: "The duty of the king is to determine what is right and to forbid what is wrong . . . so that at once the king is a living law and the law is an equitable king."[48] Citizens benefit from "the lives of those who seek after virtue" because their lives are "unwritten laws" (νόμοι ἄγραφοι).[49] Virtuous leaders like Abraham and Moses encourage others to emulate their lives because they are "living and rational laws." [50] In fact, the "written laws" serve as a "memorial" to these "ancient lives." Philo claims that Moses "taught" the Israelites to "live as citizens according to his constitution" (τοὺς κατ' αὐτὸν πολιτευομένους), and then he gave to them the laws to guide them in virtue.[51] Moses, specifically, served as the "rational and living law."[52]

Third, citizenship required loyalty to the πολιτεία. This theme of loyalty was made clear in a few ways. Certain laws specified the allegiance that citizens owed to the state and its citizens. For example, transporting a cargo of corn to any city besides Athens,[53] evading military service,[54] and committing traitorous or cowardly acts during war was punishable by death.[55] Also the state is frequently referred to as a πατρίς: "the term *patris* may be said to function almost as an emotional synonym of polis. So, to a Greek the *patris* was his *polis*, and for his *polis* he was expected to lay down his life."[56]

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[48] Philo, *Moses*, 2.2–4

[49] Philo, *Virtues,* 194.

[50] Philo, *On Abraham,* 5; 276.

[51] Philo, *On Rewards and Punishments,* 3–5.

[52] Philo, *Moses,* 1.162; cf. *Decalogo,* 1.

[53] *Against Leocrates* 27; cf Demosthenes 35.51.

[54] Demosthenes 24.103.

[55] *Against Leocrates* 130. For other examples of these type of laws, see Manville, *The Origins of Citizenship in Ancient Athens*, 120–122.

[56] Thomas Heine Nielsen, "The Concept of Patris in Archaic and Classical Sources," in *Once Again: Studies in the Ancient Greek Polis*, Papers from the Copenhagen Polis Centre 7 (Franz Steiner Verlag, 2004), 74 Nielson surveys the literary and documentary sources from the classical and Hellenistic period, and he demonstrates how the πόλις was frequently referred to as a πατρίς. According to him, the

Plato's *Crito* uses this metaphor to explain that citizens owe to the πόλις the cost of his nurture, which they might repay through obedience and giving their lives for the defense of the state (*Crito* 50d). Finally, this theme of loyalty naturally materialized in the form of military service; in fact, Athenians were liable for military service from the age of eighteen to sixty.[57] In fact, "military metaphors were a common way of expressing civic duties or ideals."[58] For this reason, Lycurgus portrays Leocrates as "abandoning" his post as a citizen (39). Conversely, Lysias defends his reputation as a statesman by appealing to his military service (Lysias 16.17).

The Usage of πολιτεύομαι

While the section above suggested that citizenship entailed membership in a state, obedience to laws of the state, and loyalty to the state, this section examines how these ideas specifically relate to the verb πολιτεύομαι. The verb πολιτεύομαι, or πολιτεύω, appears most often in the middle voice and first in Thucydides (c. 460–396 BCE), which coincides with the rise of the Greek πόλις.[59] By examining the use of specific uses of πολιτεύομαι, I hope to show that it often indicated a specific mode of life, which was defined by the πολιτεία.

For example, Xenophon expresses the desire for Greeks to "live as citizens in peace" with each other.[60] Also in one of his oratories, Andocide asks to resume a life

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two were synonymous in some literature. Also, see Liddel, *Civic Obligation and Individual Liberty in Ancient Athens*, 139ff.

[57] Ronald Thomas Ridley, "The Hoplite as Citizen: Athenian Military Institutions in Their Social Context," *L'Antiquité Classique* 48, no. 2 (1979): 510.

[58] See Jakub Filonik, "Metaphorical Appeals to Civic Ethos in Lycurgus' Against Leocrates," in *Citizens in the Graeco-Roman World: Aspects of Citizenship from the Archaic Period to AD 212*, ed. Lucia Cecchet and Anna Busetto (Leiden: Brill, 2017), 231–2, who examines the conceptual metaphor WARFARE IS CITIZENSHIP.

[59] The classical distinction might shed some light on the active and middle forms. Words in -εύω describe a condition or state, "I am a citizen," but the middle voice describes the action itself, "I live and act as a citizen." Herbert Weir Smyth, *Greek Grammar* (Oxford: Benediction Classics, 2013), 245.

[60] Xenophon, *Hellenica*, II, 4, 22. Cleocritus pleads with his fellow citizens (πολῖται) not to cast him out of the city. by appealing to their common πολιτεία: their "shared" (μετεσχήκαμεν) religious

"living as a fellow citizen" (πολιτεύσασθαι μεθ' ὑμῶν), with all of the concomitant commitments and obligations.[61] Again Xenophon explains that some men prefer not "to live as citizens" under a democracy.[62] Others prefer "to live as equal citizens through liberty and custom" instead of "ruling others by force."[63] Even Philo has the same meaning when he describes a people who "function as citizens" (πολιτεύονται) of a heavenly homeland (πατρίς),[64] and others who 'live as citizens" (πολιτευομένην) according to customs (ἔθος).[65] He describes "those citizens who live under the best constitution" (τοῖς ἄριστα πολιτευομένοις) and "live as citizens" (πολιτευόμενός) by becoming comfortable with "civil affairs" (πολιτικός).[66] Also, "those who live as citizens of a city" have only one master (δεσπότης).[67] The written laws of Athens and other city-states can ensure liberty as long as "citizens dutifully obey them" (πειθαρχούντων αὐτοῖς τῶν πολιτευομένων) and understand "right reason."[68] Finally, Philo explains that the law was given on Sinai to establish laws (νόμους) and a constitution (πολιτείας) "by which citizens live" (οἷς πολιτεύσονται).[69]

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life, their "common preservation and freedom" (ὑπὲρ τῆς κοινῆς ἀμφοτέρων ἡμῶν σωτηρίας τε καὶ ἐλευθερίας) as "comrades in arms" (συστρατιῶται), and their common ties of "kinship, marriage, and brotherhood." Also, the expulsion of Cleocritus by the Thirty Tyrants in Athens amounted to "sin against the state" (ἁμαρτάνοντες εἰς τὴν πατρίδα). Cleocritus not only invokes the social cohesion of the citizens, but also the state itself, which the oligarchical πολιτεία of the Thirty subverted. Under a different πολιτεία, they might "live as citizens in peace" (ἐν εἰρήνῃ πολιτεύεσθαι).

[61] Antiphon and Andocides, *Minor Attic Orators: Antiphon and Andocides*, trans. K. J. Maidment, vol. 1, LCL 308 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1941), II, 10.

[62] *Cyropaedia*, I.1.1.

[63] Demosthenes, *Philipic* 4.4

[64] Philo, *Confusion,* 78.

[65] Philo, *Drunkenness,* 68.

[66] Philo, *Drunkenness,* 141.

[67] Philo, *Joseph,* 36.

[68] Philo, *Good Person,* 47, 158; cf. 76, 128; *Flaccus,* 81.

[69] Philo, *Decalogo,* 14. See also the similar reference to Torah and πολιτεύομαι in *The Special Laws,* IV.226. In these examples, the Torah is recast as a type of πολιτεία. Philo not only maintains the social and political force of πολιτεύομαι, but he also echoes the close Greco-Roman association between citizenship and πολιτεία. In every example above, Philo references the ethical and political dynamics of

The above survey reveals at least two important conclusions about the verb πολιτεύομαι: one ethical, the other political. (1) The verb intimates a behavioral standard. One can fail to "live as a citizen" by abandoning the πόλις (e.g., Leocrates) or by not contributing to the good of society (e.g., Andocide). (2) The actions and obligations of a citizen were measured against a social and constitutional ethos, a πολιτεία, which supplied the expected standard of behavior. In addition to these two points, Philo illustrates the how these political themes associated with the domain of Greek citizenship continued into the influence the use of the verb πολιτεύομαι.[70]

πολιτεύομαι, and in several examples, he explicitly references a πολιτεία. The Torah itself is a constitution, which cultivates virtue in those citizens who live in accordance with this constitution (i.e., πολιτεύομαι).

[70] In the *Letter of Diognetus*, while Christians "spend time" on earth, they "live as citizens of heaven" (ἐν οὐρανῷ πολιτεύονται). *Diognetus*, 5.9. Significant for my argument, no examples of πολιτεύομαι demonstrate a conflation of the term with περιπατέω or ζάω, which is precisely what many modern translations have done with πολιτεύομαι in Philippians 1:27.

CHAPTER 2

ΠΟΛΙΤΕΥΟΜΑΙ AND PHILIPPIANS

This study has pursued a different approach to the meaning of the πολιτεύομαι metaphor in Philippians 1:27, an approach that appreciates the cognitive and social influence of metaphor. Although I have not divorced this metaphor from its historical situation in Philippians, nor have I disregarded the historical-critical questions related to the verb itself (see the previous section), I have outlined a new method of studying the πολιτεύομαι metaphor that allows the metaphor to communicate in unique and multivalent ways. This methodological shift in the study of Pauline metaphors mirrors a number of other Pauline studies that understands the significance of metaphorical meaning.[1] While metaphors draw significance from an underlying "system of associated commonplaces," or *model*, they also influence perception, shape thinking, and cultivate identities. At no time can the meaning of a metaphor be reduced to "literal" paraphrases, neither is this type of reduction a desirable goal.

Part of this new approach includes the detailed examination of the metaphor itself. In this section, I explain the frame, or immediate context, of 1:27-30, and I show how the πολιτεύομαι evokes the source domain of Greco-Roman citizenship, specifically, the concept of πολιτεία. Also, I argue that the object of the metaphor is the polity of Philippian Christians, and the metaphor casts a "perspective" upon this object. Finally, I see how this perspective on the Christian community continues through the letter.

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[1] The most important work in Paul that uses metaphor theory is Heim, *Adoption in Galatians and Romans*. See also the following studies: Gupta, *Worship That Makes Sense to Paul*, Dawes, *The Body in Question*, and Beverly Roberts Gaventa, *Our Mother Saint Paul* (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 2007).

The Frame of πολιτεύομαι in Philippians 1:27-30

Structurally, 1:27-30 constitute one sentence in the Greek. On one side, the first word (μόνος) and the sudden shift to second person imperatives marks the start of a new section, and on the other side, the inferential particle (οὖν) in 2:1 indicates a new development in the argument.[2] Within this frame, or the immediate context of the metaphorical utterance, Paul describes his metaphorical command (πολιτεύεσθε) as an athletic "contest" (ἀγών) in 1:28. Because the text conflates these two metaphors, it would be helpful for my project to examine how these metaphors function together within this frame. In what follows, I show how the citizenship and athletic metaphors "composes" or "makes sense of"[3] the themes of loyalty, obedience, suffering, and salvation.

First, Christians "live as citizens," but that mode of life is defined by the πολιτεία of the gospel. The above survey showed how the themes of obedience to laws and loyalty to the state were a part of the domain citizenship. In Philippians 1:27, Paul commands the Christians to "live as citizen," but citizens that are "worthy of the gospel of Christ." Inscriptions in Philippi testify to phrases like "worthy of both the king and the citizens," "worthy of God and state," or "worthy of our *colonia.*"[4] In Paul's letter, the phrase "worthy of the εὐαγγέλιον" is unusual, but not gibberish. While the Roman emperor claims to bring about "fortune" (τύχη) and "salvation" (σωτηρία), Paul claims loyalty to the εὐαγγέλιον of Christ is a "sign of salvation" (1:28; 3:20).

Paul's use of the verb πολιτεύομαι, therefore, is subversive because Christian citizens show loyalty to the gospel of Christ. This is made explicit when in the rest of the metaphorical frame, specifically with the introduction of πίστις. In 1:28-30 Christians are

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[2] Of course, all of 1:27-2:18 belong together as five Greek sentences, each one connected grammatically to the previous sentence.

[3] Lanham, *Analyzing Prose*, 3.

[4] Peter Pilhofer, *Philippi*, vol. 2, Katalog der Inschriften von Philippi 119 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2009), 137, 532–37, 689.

gifted (ἐχαρίσθη) the opportunity to πιστεύειν in Christ, but in the previous clause, πίστις is also something they wrestle for (συναθλοῦντες τῇ πίστει τοῦ εὐαγγελίου). The phrase τῇ πίστει τοῦ εὐαγγελίου could refer to the content of faith (genitive of apposition) or to the act of believing (genitive of source).[5] In 1:25, for example, Paul seems to refer to the content of their πίστις, but even there he is concerned about their "progress" in πίστις. Because Paul begins with the obvious political command to "live worthily as citizens of the gospel," συναθλοῦντες τῇ πίστει τοῦ εὐαγγελίου probably retains a similar emphasis. In this political context, πίστις carries a sense of loyalty (or allegiance); that is, πίστις makes sense in the Greco-Roman world of imperial propaganda, where loyalty to the emperor was described as πίστις. That πίστις can have this nuance is well-known to biblical scholars, so this reading is no surprise here.[6] Finally, note that the ἀγών metaphor further makes sense of this task to show "loyalty" to Christ; Paul figures this pursuit of loyalty as a type of athletic competition where Christians struggle and contend for faithfulness to the gospel.

Second, the ἀγών metaphor depicts the Christian task of "suffering" (πάσχειν) for Christ. This oppression occurs in the form of "opponents" (ἀντικειμένων), but general opposition suffering is also included. And in light of this suffering the need to stand and strive "in one spirit" as a unified civic body becomes all the more obvious. In fact, the community has the same struggle or "contest" (ἀγών) as Paul currently has in prison.

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[5] On the former, see Morna Hooker, "Philippians 2:6-11," in *Jesus und Paulus: Festschrift für Werner Georg Kümmel zum 70. Geburtstag*, ed. Edward Earle Ellis and Erich Grässer (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1978), 496, and on the later, see Peter T. O'Brien, *The Epistle to the Philippians*, NIGTC (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2013), 152.

[6] Barclay hints at this connection in his John M. G. Barclay, *Paul and the Gift* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2015), 397, 398. He says, "Paul's allegiance is now exlusively to Christ, the source of his new life in faith" (398). Gorman describes faith as "believing allegiance" in Michael J. Gorman, *Becoming the Gospel: Paul, Participation, and Mission* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2015), 93. Write explains that, "For Paul, *pistis* is the personal allegiance to the God who was now to be known as "the God who raised Jesus from the dead". N. T. Wright, *The Paul Debate: Critical Questions for Understanding the Apostle* (Waco, TX: Baylor University Press, 2015), 14. Of course, Bates argues for this understand of "faith" extensively in his Matthew W. Bates, *Salvation by Allegiance Alone: Rethinking Faith, Works, and the Gospel of Jesus the King* (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2017), 71ff.

Significantly, they have the privilege to show loyalty "to Christ" and to suffer "for him." The Christian life includes allegiance to Christ and suffering for this loyalty, and Paul composes both with the metaphor of athletics.

Suffering and ἀγών was a common theme in moral philosophy. In his formative study, Pfitzner shows that the ἀγών metaphor was common, particularly among Hellenistic moral philosophers.[7] Different Cynic or Stoic thinkers might use the ἀγών metaphor to promote their ideas about pursuing virtue, and other authors, like Philo, might use the same metaphor to promote their own ideas about the virtues.[8] For example, Seneca states that the wise (*sapiens*) "stands upright under any weight" (*Epistulae*, 71.26; cf. 41.4-5), and Epictetus says the ideal Stoic is happy despite sickness, danger, death, or disrepute (*Discourses* 2.19.24). Of course, the connection between suffering and a moral life also appears in apocalyptic Jewish literature (e.g., 1 Enoch 103:9-15; 2 Enoch 66:6) and elsewhere in Paul (2 Cor 4:8-9); therefore, in Paul's use, these common tropes take on a Christian shaping. In fact, while the Stoic sage is self-sufficient, strong, and impervious to suffering, Paul's ethic is more communal, rooted in a common "fellowship" with Christ and thus each other.[9] At this point, Paul's depiction of the virtuous life is discontinuous with radical Stoic individualism, and the distinguishing factor is the verb πολιτεύομαι. Christians "struggle" (ἀγών) for virtue, but they do so together as "citizens."

Third, the result of contending for loyalty and enduring opposition is "salvation" (σωτηρία). Later I will explain Paul's meaning by this term in more detail,

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[7] Victor Pfitzner, *Paul and the Agon Motif: Traditional Athletic Imagery in the Pauline Literature*, Novum Testamentum Supplements 16 (Leiden: Brill, 1967), 35.

[8] Ibid., 38ff.

[9] "It is often plain that this [Stoic] *humanitas* is ultimately in the service of the ego that wishes at all events to preserve its inner imperturbability and harmony of life. . . . Hence, every contact with other human beings, every attachment, every sympathy and love is bounded by the hollowed egoism of the wise man." Jan Nicolaas Sevenster, *Paul and Seneca*, Supplements to Novum Testamentum 4 (Leiden: Brill, 1961), 174.

but for now, it is clear that Paul makes a connection between living as a worthy citizen and salvation. These themes make sense considering the widespread imperial propaganda that claimed the emperor was a savior. The exact antecedent of the relative clause (ἥτις) is debated, with commentators connecting it to πίστει[10] or the whole preceding clause in 1:28.[11] However, the dative ἥτις could form by attraction to ἔνδειξις, which resolves the problem but leaves the grammar ambiguous.[12] Regardless of the ambiguity, the overall meaning is clear: When Christian citizens live worthy of the gospel, stand firm together, fight for the faith, do not shrink back in fear, contend for loyalty, and endure suffering, then their lives become a "sign" of their salvation. The short phrase in 1:28, "and this from God," refers to more than just σωτηρία, but it recalls the entire pattern of conflict, destruction, perseverance, and salvation.[13] Living as a loyal citizen and enduring suffering is the pattern of salvation, and this pattern comes "from God."

The themes of loyalty, suffering, and salvation connect to the larger metaphor of citizenship in 1:27-30. Loyalty and endurance should characterize worthy Christian citizens, and God established this process as the pattern of salvation. The phrases, "strive together for loyalty to the gospel" and "do not shrink back at all from your opponents" describes what it means to "live as citizens worth of the gospel." And while the infinitive πάσχειν refers to the immediate opposition of the "opponents," it also functions rhetorically in ethical discourse. Any kind of opposition to living as a worthy citizen could be considered "suffering," and in this light, suffering is something with which the worthy citizens must "contend." While the Philippian community must resist their

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[10] Gerald F. Hawthorne, *Philippians*, WBC 43 (Nashville: Thomas Nelson, 2004), 80–81.

[11] Most commentators take this position, but Silva it typical. Moisés Silva, *Philippians*, 2nd ed., BECNT (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2005), 89.

[12] F. Blass and A. Debrunner, *Greek Grammar of the New Testament and Other Early Christian Literature*, trans. Robert W. Funk, Revised edition. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961), section 294.

[13] On this connecction, see the argument of Silva, *Philippians*, 83.

opponents, they ultimately struggle to live as loyal citizens, and they live out this pattern of salvation despite suffering.

Paul uses the athletic metaphor to further describe the community's struggle to "live as citizens worth of the gospel." Arnold, in his study of the ἀγών, goes to great length to show how moral philosophers use athletic metaphors to leverages their ideas about virtue, but he moves too quickly past the πολιτεύομαι metaphor.[14] In the context of 1:27-30, Paul's athletic metaphor functions as thrall in the service of Paul's larger political agenda. After all, the athletic metaphor highlights the individual's contest for virtue, but it hides the corporate emphasis of Paul's later commands.[15] Therefore, Paul's very use of the ἀγών metaphor is extraordinary because its focus on the individual contradicts the significant theme of unity in the letter (1:27; 2:1-5; 3:17, 20; 4:1, 3). While Paul might have mirrored the Stoic philosophers in their use of the athletic metaphor, as Arnold and others posit, surely Paul's πολιτεύομαι metaphor serves as a departure from the Stoic emphasis on the individual.

Athletics and citizenship were often connected. Aristotle stresses the role that training in a *gymnasion* played in cultivating a virtuous (ἀρετή) citizen, a type of citizen whose mind and body were prepared for service to the πόλις (*Politics*, 1337a-1339a). In Roman occupied Greece, the *gymnasion* was understood as a necessary tool to teach men how to participate in their community.[16] It makes perfect sense, then, to see both athletics

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[14] Bradley Arnold, *Christ as the Telos of Life: Moral Philosophy, Athletic Imagery, and the Aim of Philippians*, WUNT 371 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2014), 161–170.

[15] See Philip Esler, "Paul and *Agon*: Understanding a Pauline Motif in Its Cultural and Visual Context," in *Picturing the New Testament: Studies in Ancient Visual Images*, ed. Annette Weissenrieder, Friederike Wendt, and Petra von Gemnden, WUNT 193 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2005), 380. Although Esler tries to say that Paul uses this athletic metaphor in 3:12-16 to address the community as a group, he also admits that athletics were ruthlessly individual. Esler believes Paul achieves this goal by elevating himself as the prototypical follower of Christ. However, if athletics were the only metaphor in Paul's letter, this type of individual display of virtue would only heighten an emphasis on the individual's pursuit of the good life. Therefore, I would suggest that only the political metaphor (1:27; 3:20) can push these athletic metaphors in the corporate dimension.

[16] Jason König, *Athletics and Literature in the Roman Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 47.

and citizenship metaphors in Paul because they were both instruments of virtue formation.[17] Moreover, within this political context, athletic competition was necessary for the habituation of virtuous Greco-Roman citizens.

In sum, I have suggested that the ἀγών metaphor functions together with the πολιτεύομαι metaphor to connect three themes within this contextual frame. First, these metaphors encourage Christians to contend for loyalty to the gospel, and this loyalty is characterized by "standing firm in one spirit," "striving together for the faith of the gospel," "not fearing opponents," and most importantly, "living worthily as citizens of the gospel of Christ." Second, theses metaphors embolden Christian citizens to pursue this type of gospel loyalty despite suffering. Third, this pattern of loyalty and suffering will result in σωτηρία. Below, I will specify the exact tenor of the πολιτεύομαι metaphor, but for now, the πολιτεύομαι metaphor unites these three components of the Christian and caries them through the letter.

The Object of the πολιτεύομαι Metaphor

Metaphors create a perspective on an object, and the goal of this section is to specify the object of the πολιτεύομαι metaphor. The above section showed how the three themes of loyalty, suffering, and salvation fall into place within the domain of Greco-Roman citizenship, and these three themes are part of the "perspective" that the metaphor casts upon an object.

Below, I argue that the object of the metaphor is the polity of Philippian

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[17] Esler uses a more sensitive socio-scientific approach to the study of ἀγών in 3:12-16, and he examines the Greco-Roman literary and visual evidence. He concludes that Paul leverages the athletic metaphor in 3:12-16 to constructs a group identity of committed athletes. Paul does this by making himself a prototypical example of the Christ-follower (3:17). Although, Esler does not clarify exactly how this aggressively individualized metaphor would shape *group* identity, his analysis of the athletic metaphor in chapter 3 sheds light on the background of 1:27. Esler, "Paul and *Agon*," 379–381. Also, Arnold's broader study explores the function of "running" in 3:13-14 in Paul's letter by examining the interconnected themes of athletics, virtue, and moral philosophy. These themes are found in Philippians as well, and Arnold explains how the athletic metaphors in Philippians functions to encourage the Christian community to compete for virtue. Arnold, *Christ as the Telos of Life*, 5–54. Different scholars may wish to color the athletic metaphor in Paul with additional nuances, but scholars agree that the metaphor encourages the community to strive after a moral ideal.

Christians. In other words, Paul speaks about the polity of Philippian Christians in terms which seem to be to be suggestive of Greco-Roman citizenship. This option is more destabilizing of the wider associations of the city. Christian "citizens" do not operate within the polity of the Roman πόλις in Philippi; rather, Christians live within the polity of Christian citizens and the social ethos of the Christian πόλις is determined by the gospel of Christ (1:27).

This thesis contradicts the view of Brewer and others, who says that Paul encourages the Philippian community to live as good Roman citizens, provided that they do so in a manner worth of the gospel. In the words of Brewer, "continue to discharge your obligations as citizens and residents of Philippi faithfully and as a Christian should."[18] Ruemann also understands πολιτεύομαι as a call for Christians to function as good citizens in the Roman *colonia*.[19] He leans upon the analysis of Winter, who places 1:27 within "the well-known problem of discord and concord among citizens in the public domain."[20] For Winter, Paul's command in 1:27 belongs in the same category as Plutarch's "Precepts of Statecraft" (πολιτικά παραγγέλματα)[21] or one of Dio Chrysostom's thirteen discourses on "concord" (ὁμόνοια) within a state. These classical authors illustrate the problem of disunity within an "association" (πολιτεία), and my own study above made a similar point. Because the family unit was the foundation of the state, the familial ideals of ὁμόνοια or *concordia* were seen as important for the state as well. Plutarch, for example, says, "often disagreement, arising out of personal affairs and

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[18] Raymond Rush Brewer, "The Meaning of Politeuesthe in Philippians 1:27," *JBL* 73, no. 2 (June 1954): 83.

[19] John Reumann, *Philippians*, AYBC (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2008), 285.

[20] Bruce W. Winter, *Seek the Welfare of the City: Christians as Benefactors and Citizens*, First-Century Christians in the Graeco-Roman World 1 (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1994), 84. Winter addresses Philippians 1:27 under the heading "Civic Responsibilities."

[21] This essay is part of Plutarch's many moral essays (*Moralia*), and it provides instructions for a young Menemachus, who aspires to be a politician.

differences, comes into the public life and throws the whole state into confusion."[22] The command in 1:27, then, relates to the command against grumbling in 2:14-16, and Paul's concern is that the Philippians "shine as lights in the world."[23] For Winter, the imperative in 1:27 emphasizes "unity in a community as it strives to give credibility in the public place to the implications of the faith created by the gospel."[24]

Winter remains one of the only commentators who recognizes that the verb πολιτεύομαι is located within the context of a πολιτεία, and he highlights the tendency of Plutarch and Chrysostom to contend for concord in the πολιτεία. My own analysis above suggested this connection between πολιτεύομαι and πολιτεία, and I provided a number of illustrations from a variety of ancient authors. According to Winter, New Testament semantic studies suffers from a type of "tunnel vision," where lexicographical investigations demonstrate a lack of knowledge regarding the wider social and political contexts of words.[25] Winters provides a helpful corrective to this trend, and he correctly suggests that life in Christian community had implication for the city of Philippi as a whole.

However, the position of Winter and Ruemann has several significant weaknesses. First, when Paul's uses the cognate πολίτευμα in 3:20, a term which appears nowhere else in Paul or the NT, he locates this πολίτευμα in the "heavens" (ἐν οὐρανοῖς). Below I will address the ambiguities attached to the term πολίτευμα; its infrequent occurrence and ambiguity in usage make the noun hard to define. My point here is that the πολίτευμα "exists" (ὑπάρχει) in the heavens, and on the surface, 3:20 seems to imply

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[22] πολλάκις ἐκ πραγμάτων καὶ προσκρουμάτων ἰδίων εἰς δημόσιον αἱ διαφοραὶ προελθοῦσαι συνετάραξαν ἅπασαν τὴν πόλιν. *Precepts of Statecraft*, 825a.

[23] For Winter, 1:27-2:18 forms one thematic block, a view which has its own issues. Winter has not adequately shown how the Christ hymn in 2:6-11 would fit into this schema.

[24] Winter, *Seek the Welfare of the City*, 103.

[25] Ibid., 84.

that 1:27 refers to a same "heavenly" citizenship. Furthermore, because many, if not most, of the Christians in Philippi would not have had Roman citizenship, the Winter-Ruemann thesis seems tenuous.[26]

Recognizing the problematic connection between chapters 1 and 3, Ruemann argues that 1:27 and 3:20 refer to different citizenships, the one to Rome and the other "in the heavens."[27] His arguments rest on the firmly held belief that 1:27 and 3:20 are not part of the same letter, a position that has come under significant attack over the years.[28] Winter simply comments in a footnote, "Paul's use of a cognate in Phil. 3:20 does not influence the translation of the verb in 1:27," and he briefly defends this statement by pointing to the contrast between "earthly things" (οἱ τὰ ἐπίγεια) and a πολίτευμα "in heaven" in 3:20.[29] He does not clarify why this contrast in 3:17-4:1 would preclude one reading 1:27 and 3:20 together; in fact, the parallel nature of these passages intimates that they are mutually informing.

Upon closer examination, the context of each passage (1:27-2:18 and 3:17-4:3) has several parallels. Both passages have opponents (ἀντίκειμαι in 1:28 and τοὺς ἐχθροὺς τοῦ σταυροῦ in 3:18), whose end is destruction (ἀπώλεια in 1:28 and 3:19). The earthly mindset (οἱ τὰ ἐπίγεια φρονοῦντες) of the opponents in 3:19 contrasts with unified mindset (τὸ αὐτὸ φρονῆτε. . . τὸ ἓν φρονοῦντες) of the Philippians community in 2:2. God exalted Christ in 2:9, and Christ will exalt the Philippian believers in 3:21. In 1:27, Paul says the Philippians should "live as citizens" (πολιτεύομαι), "stand firm" (στήκω),

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[26] Peter Oakes, *Philippians: From People to Letter*, SNTSMS (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 1–70.

[27] Reumann, *Philippians*, 597.

[28] See my comment under note 14.

[29] Winter, *Seek the Welfare of the City*, 103 n. 45. Lincoln examines this contrast between "earthly" and "heavenly" in detail, but he does not make the same distinction as does Winter. Andrew T. Lincoln, *Paradise Now and Not Yet: Studies in the Role of the Heavenly Dimension in Paul's Thought with Special Reference to His Eschatology*, SNTSMS 43 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 97ff.

and “strive together” (συναθλέω) for the gospel. Then in 3:20-4:3, Paul explains that because (ὥστε) of their “heavenly” πολίτευμα, the Philippian Christians should continue to “stand firm” (στήκω) with Euodia and Syntyche, who have already “labored together” (συναθλέω) with Paul for the gospel. The passage in chapter 3 repeats several words and themes that occur in 1:27-2:18, and these two sections were obviously written to mirror one another as two ends of the discourse. In light of these similarities, and without a compelling reason to separate 1:27 and 3:20, it makes the most sense to read them in conjunction as referring to the same metaphorical citizenship.

Also, the Winter-Ruemann thesis misses the relationship between the obvious ἀγών metaphor and the verb πολιτεύομαι. Like the citizenship metaphor (1:27; 3:30), Paul uses athletic imagery at the beginning and end of his discourse (1:30; 3:12-16). Both metaphors frame the letter, and both images relate to civic life and virtue. I explored the relationship between the ἀγών metaphor and πολιτεύομαι above, but my point here is that the πολιτεύομαι metaphor functions in the same contexts as the ἀγών metaphor and achieves a similar affect. If one takes the Winter-Ruemann hypothesis, then the ἀγών metaphor would depict the Christian life, but the πολιτεύομαι metaphor would depict life in the broader Roman city. The discussion of the metaphorical frame of 1:27-30 would dispute this claim and call into questions any attempt to bifurcate these two metaphors.

Finally, the nature of the exhortations in Philippians suggest that Paul’s concern was with the internal “association” (πολιτεία) of the Christian community. In fact, many if not most of the Christian community would not have had Roman citizenship. Also, Paul’s letter cultivates a very different type of citizenry, and this “Christian” citizenry does not exactly fit the mold of a good Roman citizenry. A citizen of a “heavenly” πολίτευμα has Christ as her model (2:5-11). In fact, one way that Paul nurtures the corporate identify and unity of the Philippian Christians is by placing them in conflict with the broader civic “association” of the Roman city. The community sets itself against the “dogs” (3:2), “enemies of the cross of Christ,” an enemy that worships their

"stomach," "glories in their shame," and "thinks on earthly things" (3:19). On the other hand, the Philippian community is "like-minded, having the same love, spirit, and purpose" (2:2). Furthermore, a number of studies related to Paul's relationship to Rome and the imperial cult have clarified how Paul's gospel message, particularly the Christ hymn, could have generated conflict with Roman ideologies.[30] While I am not suggesting that Paul advocates for a separatist movement (e.g., the Essenes), I am suggesting that the very nature of Paul's exhortations fosters unity among the "insiders."[31]

Therefore, in light of the deficiency of the Winter-Ruemann hypothesis and the frame of the metaphor above, it is best to see the object of the metaphor as *the duty of the Christian community to live worthy of the gospel*. With this understanding, the metaphor invites the Philippian Christians to see themselves as "citizens," who share a common "polity" (πολιτεία), and Paul indicates the nature of this polity by identifying τὸν εὐαγγέλιον τοῦ Χριστοῦ as the *norma normans* (cf. Gal 5:26). We know that the gospel is the norm that animates the community because Paul encourages this unified group not only to live in accord with τὸν εὐαγγέλιον τοῦ Χριστοῦ, but also to strive together for the πίστις τοῦ εὐαγγελίου. This type of loyalty to the "faith" and the "gospel" distinguishes a "citizen" from a non-citizen.

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[30] While I will try to critique this current trend in scholarship, at the very least it proves that the connection between religion and politics in the ancient world was not as bifurcated as it is in our modern contexts. For a quick sample, see Richard A. Horsley, ed., *Paul and Empire: Religion and Power in Roman Imperial Society* (Harrisburg, PA: Trinity Press International, 1997); esp. Neil Elliott, "The Anti-Imperial Message of the Cross," in *Paul and Empire: Religion and Power in Roman Imperial Society*, ed. Richard A. Horsley (Harrisburg, PA: Trinity Press International, 1997); N. T. Wright, "Paul's Gospel and Caesar's Empire," in *Paul and Politics: Ekklesia, Israel, Imperium, Interpretation*, ed. Richard A. Horsley (Harrisburg, PA: Trinity Press International, 2000), 160–83; N. T. Wright, *Paul and the Faithfulness of God* (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2013); Seyoon Kim, *Christ and Caesar: The Gospel and the Roman Empire in the Writings of Paul and Luke* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2008). Cf. H. Wagenvoort, *Pietas: Selected Studies in Roman Religion*, vol. 1, Studies in Greek and Roman Religion (Leiden: Brill, 1980).

[31] The shared experience and language of the community are part of the features that define a group: "The repertoire of a community of practice includes routines, words, tools, ways of doing things, stories, gestures, symbols, genres, actions, or concepts that the community has produced or adopted in the course of its existence, and which have become part of its practice. It includes the discourse by which members create meaningful statements about the world." Wenger, *Communities of Practice*, 82–83. Also, "Groups, whether formal or informal, are aware of and cannot ignore the boundary-marking function of language, if only by the name of the group." Tabouret-Keller, "Language and Identity," 321.

An important implication of this view is that the "gospel of Christ" defines the polity of the Christian citizens (i.e., they are one "in Christ"). Also, the "gospel" functions as a type of "constitution," which legislates the type of "worthy" citizen they should become (i.e., in conformity to the gospel). When citizens "contend together" for this type of loyal and virtuous life, it is an indicator of their corporate σωτηρία. However, this type of communal pursuit of virtue is not at all easy. The gift of faith also includes the gift of suffering (1:28), so the Christian community must contend and struggle to live as worthy citizens of the gospel of Christ. The πολιτεύομαι metaphor, then, recalls the three implications that I summarized earlier in my discussion of the metaphorical frame: (1) The metaphor encourages Christians to contend for loyalty to the gospel, where loyalty is standing firm in one spirit, striving together for the faith of the gospel, not fearing opponents, and most importantly living worthily as citizens of the gospel of Christ. Also, (2) πολιτεύομαι emboldens Christian citizens to "contend" for this type of gospel loyalty despite suffering, and (3) πολιτεύομαι encourages athletic endurance in this type of life, which will result in σωτηρία.

The citizenship metaphor creates a perspective on the Christian life, but this "perspective" also continues through the letter. In what follows, I identify two places where the citizenship metaphor explains the connection between these three themes as they appear in the rest of the letter of Philippians.

"Citizenship" and The Christ Hymn

The Christ hymn ties together these three themes under the heading of citizenship, and so the hymn further defines what it means to live worthily as citizens "of the gospel of Christ."[32] Paul's hymn is full of difficult issues and many scholars have

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[32] I will only briefly touch the mountain of scholarship on the Christ hymn, but Martin has already provided a valuable resource for those looking to survey the scholarship on Philippians 2:5-11. Ralph P. Martin, *Carmen Christi: Philippians 2:5-11 in Recent Interpretations and in the Setting of Early Christian Worship*, SNTSMS 4 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

tried to unpack its significance. That the hymn connects logically to the metaphor 1:27 is clear not only from the inferential conjunction (οὖν) in 2:1, but also from the theme of solidarity (ἐν ἑνὶ πνεύματι, μιᾷ ψυχῇ) that continues into 2:1-5. Below, I (a) highlight how the hymn relates to citizenship, and (b) show how it connects to the three themes above.

Before looking at the hymn, I should reference the long debate about whether the hymn function theologically or ethically. Although numerous studies contribute to our understanding of the Christ hymn 2:5-11, Käsemaan's essay in 1950 still stands as a watershed for this conversation.[33] He argued against the "ethical example" interpretation of the hymn: Christ "*ist Urbild, nicht Vorbild*" (archetype, not example).[34] Käsemaan wrote to emphasize the soteriological implications of the Christ hymn, but one need not bifurcate the themes of ethics (obedience and humiliation; 2:6-8) from divine theology (vindication and exaltation; 2:9-11). The exaltation and vindication of Christ as the κύριος actually applauds his obedience.[35] For Paul, the "obedience" of Christ in 2:8 grounds (ὥστε) "obedience" of the Philippian community 2:12. In fact, this paradigm of Christ as example occurs elsewhere in Paul (Rom 15:1-7; 1 Cor 11:1; 2 Cor 8:9; cf. 1 Peter 2:21–25).[36] Even upon a closer look at the hymn, the soteriological significance

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[33] Ernst Käsemann, "Kritische Analyse von Phil. 2, 5–11," *Zeitschrift for Theologie und Kirche* 47, no. 3 (1950): 313–60.

[34] Käsemann's concerns were theological, so he highlighted the soteriological value of the Christ event instead of reducing it to mere ethical ideals, which was characteristic of the Old Liberalism. Ibid., 344. Hurtado explores the theological contribution of Käsemann in his essay Larry W. Hurtado, "Jesus as Lordly Example in Phil 2:5–11," in *From Jesus to Paul: Studies in Honour of Francis Wright Beare*, ed. Peter Richardson (Waterloo, ON: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1984), 113–26. His method, however, is the most troubling: by removing the hymn from the letter he speculates as to its Gnostic origins, then this mythic origin is read back into Paul's use of the hymn. This type of logic is obviously circular. On this point, see Gordon D Fee, "Philippians 2:5-11: Hymn or Exalted Pauline Prose?," *Bulletin for Biblical Research* 2 (1992): 36. Hooker represents a host of other scholars when she comments, "For even if the material is non-Pauline, we may expect Paul himself to have interpreted it and used it in a Pauline manner." Hooker, "Philippians 2:6-11," 152 Furthermore, any interpretation of the Christ hymn must deal seriously with Paul's use of it, and for Paul, the hymn clearly provides the grounding (ὥστε) for some ethical instructions in 2:12-18.

[35] Hurtado, "Jesus as Lordly Example in Phil 2:5–11," 125.

[36] Hurtado explains, "It is not strict imitatio but rather conformitas that the passage promotes, by which the believers are called to see in Jesus's action not only the basis of their obedience also its

need not force out any ethical implications; rather, we see here a typical Pauline pattern.[37]

My contribution to this conversation is only to highlight how the πολιτεύομαι metaphor and the Christ hymn function together. Above, I already showed how Greco-Roman polity need not be defined by laws; in fact, laws were flawed and they could never truly reflect the ideal social ethos of the virtuous community. Instead, the best "constitution" (πολιτεία) would be a singular exemplar, whose life would function as a living law. When one man "happens to be superior (διαφέροντα γενέσθαι) in virtue" and "surpasses (ὑπερέχει) the rest," it is just and right for this one to be the king (*Politics*, 1288a15-19). This unwritten law paradigm continued into the Roman empire, where presentation of the emperor as the paragon of virtue was common, even formulaic. Knust explains this development from Augustus onward:

Even the Alexandrian Jew Philo asserted that Augustus' "every virtue outshone human nature" since "he alone was able to quiet the storms of civil war, set every city at liberty, bring order to disorder and civilization to barbarians" (*Legatio* 143-51). Later emperors were also evaluated according to their (relative) virtues or vices, with "good" emperors praised for magnanimity, clemency, piety, and self-control. For example, the younger Pliny asserted that Trajan's deeds and person exemplified *pudor*, *moderatioy temperantia*, *concordia*, and *pietas* (*Panegyricus* 22-25). . . .The emperor had come to embody "the divine blessings of justice, peace, concord, abundance, and prosperity," guaranteeing the well-being of the entire Empire. By the second century, the association of the emperor with the virtues had become a cliché.[38]

In this context, the Christ hymn functions as a type of royal *encomium* to the

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pattern and direction." Ibid.

[37] "The behavior which is required of those who are in Christ is required of them — and possible for them—precisely because they are in Christ, and this being in Christ depends on the saving acts proclaimed in the gospel" Hooker, "Philippians 2:6-11," 156.

[38] Jennifer Wright Knust, "Paul and the Politics of Virtue and Vice," in *Paul and the Roman Imperial Order*, ed. Richard A. Horsley (Harrisburg, PO: Trinity Press International, 2004), 161.

supreme κύριος. His life functions as an unwritten law, which defines the polity of Christian citizens and depicts the ideal virtuous ruler. Also, king Jesus guarantees the wellbeing of his citizens by embodying the type of virtues that lead to salvation.

The Christ hymn functions as an unwritten law by illustrating what it means to "live worthily as citizens of the gospel of Christ." Christ is the model, the unwritten law, who both thinks and acts virtuously, where virtue is defined by the very life of Christ. The verb φρονέω occurs three times in 2:1-5, and most prominently in 2:5, where Paul makes correct "thinking" the pressing issue. Christ "humbled" (ταπεινόω) himself in 2:8, and the community must show "humility" (ταπεινοφροσύνη) in 2:3. Like Christ "regarded" himself rightly in 2:6, and the community should "regard" themselves rightly in 2:3. Although the virtuous thinking of Christ is the paradigm, Paul explains that this type of thinking is only possible for those "in Christ." The expression φρονεῖν ἐν is unusual, especially with reference to ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ, but 4:2 has the same construction with similar meaning (cf. Rom 15:5). In the later reference, Paul says, "I urge Euodia and I urge Syntyche to think the same thing in the Lord (τὸ αὐτὸ φρονεῖν ἐν κυρίῳ)." Both 2:5 and 4:2 include an appeal to unity, but 4:2 specifies that this unity is made possible by their common bond in Christ.[39] If ones allows this nuance in 2:5, the verse is rendered as follows: "Have this mindset among yourselves as those who are in Christ." The example of Christ not only provides the model, but it also makes the model possible.

In parallel to 2:3-4, verses 14-16 further specify the type of virtuous citizens who think rightly and demonstrate humility. "Grumbling and bickering" are antithetical to the model of Christ, and they represent a real threat to the community's desire to "strive together for the loyalty to the gospel." By avoiding these community destroying vices, Christian citizens become "blameless and pure." A community of citizens that

[39] Silva makes a similar argument in Moisés Silva, *Philippians*, 2nd ed., BECNT (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2005), 95–97.

embodies the model of Christ "shines like stares" in the midst of immoral people. In this regard, Paul and moral philosophers like Seneca both present the virtuous community as a radiating light to the world.[40] For example, Seneca says that the virtuous person "gives a clear conception of himself to many men. He has shone forth like a light in the darkness" (*Epistulae*, 120.13). Again, Paul contrasts with the moral philosophers by focusing on the community instead of the individual. For Paul, the moral community shines by imitating their model citizen.

The Christ hymn also emboldens Christian citizens to "contend" for this type of citizenship despite suffering, and he does this by connecting the imitation of Christ with joy and final deliverance. Despite the presence of suffering and opposition (1:28-30), joy is still possibility for the virtuous community of citizens. Paul connects "joy" to virtuous behavior in 1:4, 1:18, and 1:25, and he continues this connection in 2:1-5.[41] These citizens experience "comfort," "encouragement," "fellowship," "affection," and "compassion" (2:1), but these emotions are connected to thinking and acting virtuously in 2:2-4. Both the Epicureans (cf. Plutarch, *Moralia* 1089d) and the Stoics (cf. Diogenes Laertius VII.116) regarded joy as the natural byproduct of thinking and acting virtuously; joy was a central concern in moral philosophy, and Paul makes a similar connection here.[42]

Furthermore, the life of Christ models the pathway to final deliverance. Christ was obedient (2:8), so Paul expects obedience of the Philippian community in 2:12. In a command parallel to "obey," citizens are obliged to "bring about their own

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[40] See Arnold on this connection. Arnold, *Christ as the Telos of Life*, 183.

[41] On the connection between joy and virtue in Paul, see ibid., 158f., and Oakes, *Philippians*, 108.

[42] On this connection in Hellenistic moral philosophy see Christopher Gill, *The Structured Self in Hellenistic and Roman Thought* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 225. Note also Seneca (*Ep.* 59), who says that joy is the main emotion of the virtuous sage.

deliverance."[43] Paul's use of σωτηρία here compares with his own deliverance in 1:19 and his reference to the σωτηρία of the Christian citizens in 1:28. In general, the use of σωτηρία as "well-being" or "health" is well attested during this period, and it was expected that a good rulers (σωτήρ) would affect health for his people.[44] Paul's use of σωτηρία in 1:19 comes verbatim from Job 13:16 (LXX), which colors the meaning of σωτηρία as a type of vindication for a righteous sufferer.[45] This nuance makes some sense because σωτηρία appears in the context of Paul's suffering in prison (1:19) and the Philippians suffering as Christian citizens (1:28). In 1:28, the Christian citizens are given the gift (ἐχαρίσθη) of believing and suffering because of their steadfast gospel commitment, and both are included as part of their σωτηρία. Significantly, Christ himself illustrated this link between suffering and σωτηρία in 2:6-11. The κύριος "obeyed" to the point of suffering death (2:8), and then he was vindicated and delivered. Paul's reference to σωτηρία in 2:12 should be read in light of the suffering-deliverance motif that he developed in 1:19 and 1:28, and the overall pattern of suffering and vindication present in the Christ hymn. With this in mind, the Christ hymn again provides the model for every citizen to follow: Every citizen must continue to "obey" and "bring about" their σωτηρία by following the model of Christ.

The idea of Christ as king and unwritten law allows for the redemptive-historical and ethical nuances of those scholars above, but it takes seriously the power of metaphor to shape human thinking and perception. Already in 1:27 the πολιτεύομαι

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[43] My translation of κατεργάζεσθε differs from the traditional "doctrinal" rendering, "work out." However, Silva and O'Brien take similar approaches. O'Brien, *The Epistle to the Philippians*, 278, and Silva, *Philippians*, 134–40.

[44] "In the Roman imperial world, the 'gospel' was the good news of Caesar's having established peace and security for the world. . . . Caesar was the 'Savior' who had brought 'salvation' to the whole world." Richard A. Horsley, *Jesus and Empire: The Kingdom of God and the New World Disorder* (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2002). See also the two volumes of essays in which Paul's letters are placed in dialouge with the politics of Rome: Horsley, *Paul and Empire*, and Richard A. Horsley, ed., *Paul and Politics: Ekklesia, Israel, Imperium, Interpretation* (Harrisburg, PA: Trinity Press International, 2000).

[45] See Hays' discussion of the echoe in Richard B. Hays, *Echoes of Scripture in the Letters of Paul* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1993), 21–24.

metaphor invites this connection between the law of Christ and the social ethos of the community when he said, "live worthily as citizens of the gospel of Christ," and strive for "loyalty to the gospel." This connection becomes explicit in the Christ hymn and 2:12, where Christ is celebrated as κύριος. Jipp surveys the king-as-living-law motif in Greek-Hellenistic kingship discourse and shows how these themes surface elsewhere in Paul's letters (Gal 5:14; 6:2; Romans 13:8-15:13).[46] He identifies 2:6-11 as a panegyric to Christ as king. In these types of royal panegyrics, emperors were said to be "equal with the gods," which Paul parallels in the hymn (2:6; τὸ εἶναι ἴσα θεῷ). While Jipp illustrates this kingship motif in Paul, he does not address the implications of Paul's citizenship metaphor. However, my survey above has shown how these two themes belong together.

To summarize, Paul interprets the life of Christ as an unwritten law, a type of "constitution" that further defines what it means to "live worthily as a citizen of the gospel of Christ." As a law, the model of Christ animates the Christian community by modeling virtuous thinking and acting, but it also makes this type of community possible. The model of Christ emboldens Christian citizens to contend for this worthy Christian life in the midst of suffering. Christ's humiliation and exaltation establishes the pattern of deliverance, and those who follow this path achieve salvation. Citizenship makes sense of the determination of the Christian community to live worthy of the gospel.

"Citizenship" and The πολίτευμα in Heaven

The citizenship metaphor reappears in 3:20 and describes Christ as the "governing institution" of the Philippian community. Three issues are important for understanding the connection between 1:27, the Christ hymn, and 3:20-21: (1) the meaning of πολίτευμα, (2) the reference of ἐξ οὗ, and (3) the reoccurrence of the three themes above.

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[46] Joshua W. Jipp, *Christ Is King: Paul's Royal Ideology* (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2015), 43–76.

To the first issue, the noun πολίτευμα has been translated either as "citizenship" or as "commonwealth," but neither translation makes sense in this context. The translations have preferred to render the noun as "citizenship," and some commentators use this translation rhetorically to emphasize the comparison with Roman citizenship. However, as I mentioned before, the Philippian community would not have had Roman citizenship, which would eliminate the rhetorical significance of this translation, and the gloss of πολίτευμα as "citizenship" is only weakly attested in the NT period.[47] The other possible translation is "colony" or "commonwealth." O'Brien adopts this understanding from Lincoln who traces the usage from Aristotle to Philo and argues that it refers to "the state as a constitutive force regulating its citizens."[48] The translation then becomes "commonwealth."

However, evidence from the first century papyri, particularly the Herakleopolis papyri, which were published after Lincoln wrote, reveal that Lincoln was only partially right. While the noun does refer to a regulating authority in the papyri, this regulation authority is not a "state," but is used more broadly to refer to any "governing body." This institution could send out delegates, who had the authority to settle disputes, uphold laws, and to regulate behavior among its members.[49] The translation of πολίτευμα as "governing institution" benefits from past studies like Lincoln's, but it makes more sense of the second issue below.

The singular relative construction ἐξ οὗ in 3:20 refers grammatically to

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[47] Lincoln, *Paradise Now and Not Yet*, 99; Peter Oakes, "The Christians and Their Politeuma in Heaven," in *In the Crucible of Empire: The Impact of Roman Citizenship upon Greeks, Jews and Christians*, ed. Katell Berthelot and Jonathan J. Price, Interdisciplinary Studies in Ancient Culture and Religion 21 (Leuven: Peeters, 2019), 146–148.

[48] O'Brien, *The Epistle to the Philippians*, 461; Lincoln, *Paradise Now and Not Yet*, 98ff. Aristotle says, "The government (πολίτευμα) is everywhere sovereign in the state and the constitution (πολιτεία) is in fact the government (πολίτευμα)." *Politics*, 1278b.

[49] See a discussion of the papyri in Oakes, "The Christians and Their Politeuma in Heaven," 151–160.

πολίτευμα, but this was seen as logically impossible if πολίτευμα meant “citizenship” or “commonwealth.” Commentators offer a number of solutions, but Lincoln is typical. He says this construction represents a *construction ad sensum* because the relative must refer to οὐρανοῖς, but this is a needless complication.[50] If one understands πολίτευμα as a “governing institution,” then Christ is easily understood as the authoritative agent of this “governing institution in heaven” who is sent to make things right among the citizen who look to this πολίτευμα for governance.

Lastly, Paul speaks about the authority and influence of Christ in terms which are seen to be suggestive of a πολίτευμα in heaven. He does this in several ways: (a) the πολίτευμα is in heaven, but Christ is figured as the authoritative representative of the “governing institution” who comes to earth. (b) Christ is identified as σωτήρ, a savior totally unlike a Roman emperor; and he establishes himself as the “governing authority” by “subjecting all things to himself” (3:21). (c) As the supreme σωτήρ, Christ is the ultimate source of σωτηρία because he can “transform our humble bodies into conformity with his glorious body” (3:21). (c) Christian citizens recognize that this “governing institution” provides the standard of behavior. The behavior of those who have this πολίτευμα “in heaven” contrasts with those whose “god is their stomach” and who “think (φρονοῦντες) on earthly things.” Like in 2:1-4, the issue is properly ordered “thinking” and acting. Again, the life and “body” of Christ is the model to follow, and Christ himself conforms Christian citizens to this model.

Summary

Paul’s πολιτεύομαι metaphor composes or makes sense of the duty of the Christian community to live worthy of the gospel. Our examination of the metaphorical frame introduced another metaphor from the field of athletics. In the immediate context

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[50] Lincoln, *Paradise Now and Not Yet*, 102.

of 1:27-30, these metaphors invite the Philippian community to see themselves as a group of citizens, contending together to live worthy of the gospel of Christ. We identified three points of significance about this metaphorical utterance: (1) it encourages Christians fight for loyalty to the gospel, (2) it emboldens the Christian citizens to contend for this type of life, (3) and it explains that endurance in this type of life will result in σωτηρία.

Then, I showed how the "citizenship" metaphor moves these three themes throughout the letter. For example, the Christ hymn functions as a model of the virtuous citizen, and the life of Christ embodies a type of "constitution." As a type of law, the life of Christ animates the Christian community by modeling virtuous thinking and acting, but it also makes this type of community possible. Furthermore, Christ's humiliation and exaltation in the Christ hymn establishes a pattern of deliverance, and those who follow his example achieve salvation. Of course, this pattern comes with the promise that God does both the "willing" and the "working" that achieves salvation (2:13)—indeed it was God himself who delivered Christ (2:9-11).

Finally, I demonstrated that the πολίτευμα metaphor in 3:20 interprets Christ himself as a "governing authority." This governing institution influences the way a Christian citizen should "think" and act, but it also affects final salvation, where Christian citizen are made to be like their model king.

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ABSTRACT

“LIVE AS WORTHY CITIZENS”: THE ΠΟΛΙΤΕΥΟΜΑΙ METAPHOR IN PHILIPPIANS

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This thesis argues that *πολιτεύομαι* functions as a dominant conceptual metaphor in Paul’s letter to the Philippians, and therefore, this metaphor frames and structures Paul’s ethical discourse. When Paul employs this powerful metaphor to describe the Christian life, he brings to the foreground a conceptual template, which Paul ties to an ideal Christian community and a model citizen—Christ. The verb *πολιτεύομαι* provides an avenue for understanding Christian responsibility by evoking an encyclopedic conceptual frame animated by both the Greco-Roman and Jewish backgrounds. In other words, the *πολιτεύομαι* metaphor in Philippians supplies a familiar cultural lens through which Paul exhorts the Philippians.

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